Monthly financial statements are important and March has been exciting \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Barbarians are the fourth highest in warfare, soft vehicles the highest, LV 9 the best month, MLRS high, IFV\/strv and artillery are high numbers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One of the major events of the war has passed somewhat unnoticed but has been clearly visible in the artillery and MLRS loss statistics over the past two months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ukraine now has FPV drones in quantity at the fronts with a range of 40km.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So RU artillery is essentially neutralized, including MLRS.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In fact, Ukraine has introduced a completely new category of indirect fire they did not have before as they have gradually increased the drone umbrella range from 4km-10km-20km and now 40km.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is a 40km wide corridor where the Russians are hunted prey.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Those of you who have read the posts over time know two things \u2013 that UA began offensive operations on February 6, 2025, and then we have vividly described how UA would achieve their breakthroughs before the spring offensive of 2023, which is difficult to spin positively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When will the UA offensive start is the big question \u2013 positioning struggles and reconnaissance struggles seem to continue, and pre-emptive strikes in the rear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Europe has also been very clear recently about what applies, and that is the borders of 1991.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
RU has unexpectedly resumed attacks and UA warns that RU is about to start offensives on the northern and southern fronts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the southern front, RU seems to have already started some time ago in my opinion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is very clear to Ukraine that negotiations will never return their territory, so they must take it by force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The easiest way would be if RU collapses and the army throws in the towel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But… if RU, in the midst of a blazing offensive, has managed to build up strategic reserves for the Southern front including the Dnieper, the northern front, and the Baltic states, then perhaps Europe should be a bit quicker in their decisions than they are now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, self-defense has proven to work excellently, but it probably required Ukraine for that, Lex 1940.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So what are we really witnessing playing out right now?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Well, 80-85% of Russian losses are caused by drones \u2013 there you have it \ud83d\ude36<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Why is Ukraine advancing in Pokrovsk?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Why are they not focusing on breakthroughs and trying to drive spearheads deep?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Well \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ukraine first lays down the drone blanket like a wet blanket over an area essentially anywhere. They pair it with effective EW that now also stops the Russian FAB bombs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(this advantage may be a window of 6 months).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Instead of large mechanized falls, they attack maximally with a composite battalion force, and the goal is to defeat the enemy within an area \u2013 for example, a village. By defeat, I mean annihilate a bunch of Russians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They have effectively blocked the hunted force, which is a platoon, company, or battalion \u2013 if they try to retreat, it’s death for the Russians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Then they chase FPV drones into every opening, and finally they launch cluster weapons from artillery, GRK, or drones when the defense goes into position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Russians now flee back into their dens, and it is a cleanup that unfolds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Larger hardened areas get hit by FAB, which is as terrifying for RU as for UA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The defense lacks support from armor and has no artillery. Air and army aviation are now denied to the fronts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The mechanized battalion’s task is to clean up, and with very small losses, they wipe out a Russian battalion. We will go back to attacking in numerical inferiority and a 1:9 loss ratio.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
You see it all the time, and you saw this already in 2023 when Azov cleared trenches in Bakhmut.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But now in 2025, the quantity has increased, and they have trained the units and the coordination between different types of weapons, and have activated the drone weapon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Probably they still need to pool capabilities to gain a local advantage in priority areas, but this is a bit like Polish cavalry against German tanks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So what we should expect to see is more and more of this type of warfare in more and more places where they eliminate those present in the target area and work their way forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Every Russian defense system becomes an isolated island that is then fought against, rinse and repeat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It will be like the Russian advance and be slow, where we see a small blue dot here and there, but the difference is that UA retreated and RU will be wiped out one battalion at a time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And this is how UA will keep grinding until it collapses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Now I have read the NYT article and have some comments \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n
https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20250330021832\/https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/interactive\/2025\/03\/29\/world\/europe\/us-ukraine-military-war-wiesbaden.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n I think it is written from an American perspective but is fairly well substantiated \u2013 I am willing to take the information at face value, but some details have probably been withheld because they are sensitive or reflect poorly on the USA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOver more than a year of reporting, Adam Entous conducted more than 300 interviews with current and former policymakers, Pentagon officials, intelligence officials and military officers in Ukraine, the United States, Britain and a number of other European countries. While some agreed to speak on the record, most requested that their names not be used in order to discuss sensitive military and intelligence operations.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 1-<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAn early proof of concept was a campaign against one of Russia\u2019s most-feared battle groups, the 58th Combined Arms Army. In mid-2022, using American intelligence and targeting information, the Ukrainians unleashed a rocket barrage at the headquarters of the 58th in the Kherson region, killing generals and staff officers inside. Again and again, the group set up at another location; each time, the Americans found it and the Ukrainians destroyed it.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n I remember this well and how they targeted many high-level staff positions \u2013 why has it stopped?<\/p>\n\n\n\n I recall that at some point long before Trump, the USA announced that they would no longer provide target information to Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2-<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cthe Ukrainians poured vast complements of men and resources into a finally futile campaign to recapture the devastated city of Bakhmut. Within months, the entire counteroffensive ended in stillborn failure.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Did UA really try to recapture Bakhmut \u2013 I always interpreted Bakhmut as the flytrap so they could strike elsewhere in my grand campaign plan. Hasn’t the USA understood that?<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3-<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201d<\/em> Time and again, the Biden administration authorized clandestine operations it had previously prohibited. American military advisers were dispatched to Kyiv and later allowed to travel closer to the fighting. Military and C.I.A. officers in Wiesbaden helped plan and support a campaign of Ukrainian strikes in Russian-annexed Crimea. Finally, the military and then the C.I.A. received the green light to enable pinpoint strikes deep inside Russia itself.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Do you remember how I described the “red cards” from the USA?<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4-<\/p>\n\n\n\n Zalizhny seems to have been almost the angriest at the USA? Sirsky received the information instead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was supposed to be “70 CIA in Lvov making the target selections,” we thought, but apparently it was in Wiesbaden where the main center was located?<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2022, the USA told UA what to do \u2013 that’s what we guessed as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cEvery morning, officers recalled, the Ukrainians and Americans gathered to survey Russian weapons systems and ground forces and determine the ripest, highest-value targets. The priority lists were then handed over to the intelligence fusion center, where officers analyzed streams of data to pinpoint the targets\u2019 locations.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n And this is how we imagined it roughly happened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 5-<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThere would be no points of interest on Russian soil. If Ukrainian commanders wanted to strike within Russia, General Zabrodskyi explained, they would have to use their own intelligence and domestically produced weapons. \u2018Our message to the Russians was, \u2018This war should be fought inside Ukraine,\u2019 a senior U.S. official said.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n USA red cards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWiesbaden would oversee each HIMARS strike. General Donahue and his aides would review the Ukrainians\u2019 target lists and advise them on positioning their launchers and timing their strikes. The Ukrainians were supposed to only use coordinates the Americans provided. To fire a warhead, HIMARS operators needed a special electronic key card, which the Americans could deactivate anytime.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n USA strictly controls the use of weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 6-<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kherson \ud83d\ude01<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cTheir top commander, General Zaluzhny, along with the British, favored the most ambitious option \u2014 from near Zaporizhzhia, in the southeast, down toward occupied Melitopol. This maneuver, they believed, would sever the cross-border land routes sustaining Russian forces in Crimea.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n In theory, General Donahue agreed. But according to colleagues, he thought Melitopol was not feasible, given the state of the Ukrainian military and the coalition\u2019s limited ability to provide M777s without crippling American readiness. To prove his point in the war games, he took over the part of the Russian commander. Whenever the Ukrainians tried to advance, General Donahue destroyed them with overwhelming combat power.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n What they ultimately agreed on was a two-part attack to confuse Russian commanders who, according to American intelligence, believed the Ukrainians had only enough soldiers and equipment for a single offensive.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The main effort would be to recapture Kherson and secure the Dnipro\u2019s west bank, lest the corps advance on the port of Odesa and be positioned for another attack on Kyiv.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n General Donahue had advocated a coequal second front in the east, from the Kharkiv region, to reach the Oskil river valley. But the Ukrainians instead argued for a smaller supporting feint to draw Russian forces east and smooth the way for Kherson.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Here it is slightly adjusted, and I will explain why – Donahue did not support the attack plan from Zaporizhia towards Melitopol as the only UA offensive. In that area, there were no mines at the time, and RU had all their better units on the western side (wrong side) of the Dnipro, right?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead, Donahue suggested dividing the UA forces in two and then at the Dnipro go STRAIGHT AT the entire VDV defense and the huge minefields they had laid on the western side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So – the article is adjusted here assuming that Donahue was not a total idiot, which he was not at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It avoids addressing WHY Donahue did not accept Zalizhny’s offensive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What it does support is that UA did not receive approval from the USA for that attack, as Zalizhny also stated – it’s called conspiracy fact, right?<\/p>\n\n\n\n And this one, but it’s only the offensive from the WESTERN shore that is referred to \ud83e\uddd0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Until that moment, U.S. intelligence agencies had estimated the chance of Russia\u2019s using nuclear weapons in Ukraine at 5 to 10 percent. Now, they said, if the Russian lines in the south collapsed, the probability was 50 percent.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Washington, Mr. Biden\u2019s top advisers nervously wondered the opposite \u2014 if they might need to press the Ukrainians to slow their advance.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The moment might have been the Ukrainians\u2019 best chance to deal a game-changing blow to the Russians. It might also have been the best chance to ignite a wider war.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n In the end, in a sort of grand ambiguity, the moment never came.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n And this one \ud83e\uddd0<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cTo accomplish this, General Zabrodskyi explained as the partners gathered in Wiesbaden in late autumn, General Zaluzhny was once again insisting that the primary effort be an offensive toward Melitopol, to strangle Russian forces in Crimea \u2014 what he believed had been the great, denied opportunity to deal the reeling enemy a knockout blow in 2022.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 7-<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now I see that I was right about Bakhmut, forget above that the USA did not understand it \ud83d\ude01<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe secondary offensive, by General Syrsky\u2019s forces in the east, would be focused on Bakhmut \u2014 where combat had been smoldering for months \u2014 with a feint toward the Luhansk region, an area annexed by Mr. Putin in 2022. That maneuver, the thinking went, would tie up Russian forces in the east and smooth the way for the main effort, in the south \u2014 the attack on Melitopol, where\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n May 4, 2023 was probably the date I chose for the offensive when reconnaissance battles and Bakhmut reached a certain intensity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe counteroffensive was to begin on May 1. The intervening months would be spent training for it. General Syrsky would contribute four battle-hardened brigades\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n We were also discussing this – as soon as RU moved everything out of reach, UA gained the next capability with longer range.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe previous year, the Russians had unwisely placed command posts, ammunition depots and logistics centers within 50 miles of the front lines. But new intelligence showed that the Russians had now moved critical installations beyond HIMARS\u2019 reach. So Generals Cavoli and Aguto recommended the next quantum leap, giving the Ukrainians Army Tactical Missile Systems \u2014 missiles, known as ATACMS, that can travel up to 190 miles \u2014 to make it harder for Russian forces in Crimea to help defend Melitopol.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n One becomes slightly suspicious of Sirsky, but it could also have been a power ambition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 8-<\/p>\n\n\n\n It stopped at Kursk, but maybe you remember my discussion about UA launching a violent offensive in 2024?<\/p>\n\n\n\n It didn’t turn out that way, but that was what they had in mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cJust weeks before, the president had instructed General Zaluzhny to push the Russians back to Ukraine\u2019s 1991 borders by fall of 2024. The general had then shocked the Americans by presenting a plan to do so that required five million shells and one million drones. To which General Cavoli had responded, in fluent Russian, \u2018From where?\u2019\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 9-<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cYet with peril came opportunity. The Russians were complacent about security, believing the Americans would never let the Ukrainians fire into Russia. Entire units and their equipment were sitting unsheltered, largely undefended, in open fields.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n We also discussed this – the string of bases just on the Russian side of the border where everything was just set up in the open.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 10-<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOf roughly 100 targets across Crimea, the most coveted was the Kerch Strait Bridge, linking the peninsula to the Russian mainland. Mr. Putin saw the bridge as powerful physical proof of Crimea\u2019s connection to the motherland. Toppling the Russian president\u2019s symbol had, in turn, become the Ukrainian president\u2019s obsession.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n It had also been an American red line. \u201c<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Yep – UA is not allowed to take out the Kerch Bridge just as we guessed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It hurts to see how the USA constantly micromanaged Ukraine and our gut feeling has always been right, and I think we have hit the major points in an entire war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In other words – those of you who have read these posts and comments have actually been informed of the truth to a large extent, even though there have been many questions over the years and quite a bit of headwind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I must admit that I am quite satisfied with having managed to report so closely on the events behind the drawn curtains over three years with the information we have received from open sources – I give myself 10\/10 so you don’t have to.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One has had a bit of help from Budanov and Dengamle, but lesson number two is how much time one must spend on this to be able to make sensible analyses – a full-time job on the side of a full-time job and family, and completely unpaid, so it’s best not to think about what position one would have been on the career ladder if the time had been spent on a paid job instead – but now everyone is about to become paying members on Substack so the hunger of the lower class will soon be forgotten.<\/p>\n\n\n Lately, I have started to get too busy and lost touch a bit, but the UA offensive is in the cards, I am completely sure of that. Those of you who have been following the posts know that the puzzle pieces are starting to fall into place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I have previously also decided that the USA has already decided to take down Iran \u2013 I believe that guess still stands and that it will happen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then comes the blocking of the Hormuz and the escalation that Russia can no longer handle. So, the USA is taking care of the next escalation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then you might also consider whether I might be right about the USA now doing what is best for the USA and that they (maybe) will come out on top, as well as the Russian attack on the Baltic States and\/or Svalbard \ud83d\ude00<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regarding the economy, I am guessing, but I believe the outcome of all this is likely to be a recession in the EU \u2013 we will see, and as I said, I know nothing about economics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Just as we want to try to economically break Russia, Russia is trying to economically break Europe with the help of the USA now that we have gone all-in. It’s no more difficult than that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We MUST have a debate and people MUST have different opinions \u2013 but in Sweden, when it comes to the environment and the Green Party (MP), it seems not to apply even if you have the answers and post verifiable links \u2013 because the intention is good. I see how followers fluctuate on Substack, and there are always some who leave in a huff when something is posted about the Green Party, and the most aggressive comments about ruining one’s own career if you write such things always come in questions about the Green Party, or Trump nowadays.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, of course, we must continue with that in between.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you liked the post, please share it on your channels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you want a fun comment section, visit johanno1.se. The comments are of high quality, I can promise you that \u2013 you learn something new every day, and you can post pictures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On Substack \u2013 now, for heaven’s sake, don’t forget to become paying subscribers, even those of you who already follow. It’s great to see that some find it worth reading, appreciate all the work put into this, and took the step to subscribe, but more are needed \ud83d\udc4d<\/p>\n\n\n\n johanno1.se<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n substack.com\/@johanno1<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/bsky.app\/profile\/johanno1.bsky.social<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n