If we look at the losses, it signals a decrease in intensity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And if we look at the movements on the battlefield – high intensity in the battles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So what’s happening?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We have described this before in some world-leading posts, RU has simply taken a page from Ukraine’s playbook.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Instead of mechanized breakdowns and major offensives, they have made changes – they send forward a group or troop to try to advance as far as possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They have done this before, but now they have made improvements to the overall concept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Observation drones log UA positions when they reveal themselves – they have also done this before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But RU’s kill-chain has improved, we saw that already in 2024 during Kursk, and now they have probably shortened it even more so RU puts UAVs in the identified firing positions promptly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And on top of that, a drone cover that prevents UA movements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
UAVs have an absolutely devastating effect – ask Hamas and Hezbollah how they rate them on a scale from 1-10, they just start crying. Our hope that new UA fighter jets would completely eliminate UAVs has been in vain \ud83d\ude10<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At times, UA has had effective EW, but clearly, UAVs are now being shot down accurately again – all such advantages always have lead times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The page they took from the UA playbook is when they attack with a group and engage a platoon in defense with a 1:5 ratio in their own losses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Russians do it a little differently – they sacrifice the group, place a UAV on the two defenders, and then advance over the bodies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But it works…<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Everything is always relative, and all advantages are always worked away over time if possible – if you remember that whack-a-mole game I usually describe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I thought it looked very good during the autumn, a period when UAVs no longer hit, so RU had to deploy 6 per target, RU drones were difficult to jam with EW, and Ukraine’s own drones did well. Then Ukraine received a lot of equipment, and according to their own information, they have solved the issue of personnel supply.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This predicament was solved by Putin with the help of Trump – Ukraine was forced to remain passive during that period until RU caught up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In total numbers, UA often reports that they are at a disadvantage of 3:1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When they are in defense, they usually lose at a ratio of 1:5 \u2013 1:10, and when they conduct offensive operations, it’s at a ratio of 1:3 \u2013 1:5<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So the question is, are UA losses increasing or not?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Are they abandoning terrain to keep losses down?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
RU handles this exceptionally well – planning and executing offensive operations that involve advancing with a lot of indirect fire – it’s hard to fail at that as long as they keep losses below the number of new recruits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They are simply in their comfort zone now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I make the following guesses \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n
-overall, RU has more aircraft, units, artillery, and drones so they can create more focal points where they can gather an advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
-China provides drone support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
-North Korea provides units to man defensive positions and free up RU units.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
According to all sources, Ukraine should at least have received or will receive equipment, but it is still only what we can produce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Throughout 2024, they managed to gather an advantage at focal points by significantly deprioritizing other areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The area east of Kupiansk is probably in a bit of trouble – RU should have 24-hour drone coverage on all roads to and from there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is a low probability that they will survive the summer if RU intends to launch an offensive in the area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The area south of there doesn’t look good either, and the two attack vectors towards the remaining crossings have 20km left and are slowly moving forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This area is also not a priority for UA now that RU is advancing in other places – it’s not ideal if the foothold east of Oskil is lost.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then the only way to regain the area is to defeat Russia, there is no other option.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The access roads to Pokrovsk are probably also at risk, there is a road northward that should still be open.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Presumably, UA has both set up depots on site and has alternative routes like in Bakhmut?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The only way to break this slow retreat is for UA to regain the initiative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the opportunity to defeat Belarus has passed, or if the West intervenes, we don’t know, but otherwise, that would be a suitable new attack vector to surprise with.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The northern front is becoming increasingly well-manned, so it is also becoming more difficult to come up with something there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If RU takes the area east of Oskil, it will also be closed off to UA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It doesn’t get easier the shorter the front Ukraine can attack on, it becomes more predictable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The strategic bombing war would be interesting if it resumes after a unilateral pause, and if UA can deploy real long-range missiles in large numbers, it will make a difference, but the question is whether it’s too late to stop Putin with asymmetric warfare if they have flown to the war bunkers in Samara?<\/p>\n\n\n\n On May 9, he was the king of kings, unlike previous years when only those who would be arrested if they didn’t show up did.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Trump and the troika seem to believe that the way forward is peace – what they do is take the truth that “every war ends at the negotiating table” and then say that it is inevitable and might as well happen now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Three years of doing nothing and then letting Putin run circles around us during peace talks that we forced Ukraine into, so they lost their advantage, was not fun to watch.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We have learned a thing or two over three years, and one truth is that if it doesn’t work, Russia will increase the level of violence until it either works or they crash. The entire peace negotiation track is an attempt by the West to bypass that, but good luck changing a Russian’s DNA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Merz is doing good things now, but Taurus is no longer needed – if Germany sends them, it might be around 150 or so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Manufacturing is in the future, and volumes are even further away.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And it IS historically charged with German missiles hitting the Kremlin whether you want it or not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Today, Ukraine will be able to produce the volumes of their own missiles needed if the resources are allocated – which Merz understood, smart.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Trump is playing a delaying game (again…) \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now there should be peace agreements and a meeting on June 2, a Russian initiative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is probably a risk that Trump will succeed here – our strategy in Europe is based on the assumption that Ukraine can hold out, but if they collapse, I’m pretty sure there is no sensible contingency plan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition to Ukraine being the big loser thanks to us constantly torpedoing them when things were going well, Europe will have to bear the brunt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The USA has never wanted what’s best for Europe – they are running their own race.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One million unemployed soldiers will seek their fortune in the EU underworld. Refugee flows and Russian influence on a scale far beyond what we see today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For me, throughout an entire war, it has been incredibly simple – help Ukraine help themselves to a win, and a bonus if Russia and Belarus collapse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The USA probably pushed hardest against letting Ukraine win, and Trump is running the same race, but there one might suspect that there is also a hidden agenda for Russia to win.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We in Europe were supposed to take over when Trump showed his true colors, but we haven’t done so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was quite generous of Ukraine to be able to fight any targets they wanted today – very nice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They are damn tired of the war in Ukraine and they feel betrayed by us, a perfect breeding ground for Russian subversive activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n RU has thus been conducting a continuous offensive since the fall of 2023, and the only thing UA has done is their course offensive, which went so well that Putin was forced to ask Trump to negotiate it away, but nothing more has happened. RU keeps pushing forward, and towns like Vuhledar are more than 40km behind the front lines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, the EU continues to buy Russian crude oil and LNG, bringing in hard currency, and India and China are also buying.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China has significantly increased its support to Russia in 2025, and I bet five hundred that they provide LV against drones to important installations in Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We probably all know Putin by now – while he’s spinning us around with peace negotiations, he’s preparing a blow. Why do we know this? Because that’s how Russia has always operated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So there will be more of everything, and it is my clear opinion that it is in the year 2025, and perhaps well into 2026, that Russia has a window to achieve something.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After that, it’s closed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The worst thing that could happen is if Europe is left standing there with a blank face and no plan if Ukraine starts to falter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine actually has the cash now to start buying from the open market in the West, but some countries still have bans on that, and now all of Europe has started to strengthen their own national defense, so Ukraine simply cannot quickly buy \u20ac50 billion worth of offensive material.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you work in the private sector, you have learned that the goal is what’s important. When I guest-starred in the public sector, the goal was barely discernible, but how one worked and what one did took up an enormous amount of time without leading to anything, it was the meetings themselves that were important.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We were absolutely drowning in meetings, while the maintenance of the critical infrastructure you commute to work on every day is in such poor condition that it’s almost condemned, if only you knew. In fact, Sergels Torg is like ten floors standing on concrete pillars, and at the bottom, they are so porous that you can almost poke through them with a finger. When they built the tramway, they reinforced the pillars, but to not spend too much money, they only reinforced the top floors – they didn’t care about the ones at the bottom. You can ponder the logic in that, and there were also some major consulting firms involved in this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n School, military service, and university are not like that – the goals are very clear there, so everyone has grown up with a clear target.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the case of the Ukraine war, Europe is still operating a bit like a municipal company and does not have a clear goal to work towards, but it seems that the wording and the meetings themselves are what’s important – to make it look like something is being done.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Putin has a goal, even though this will probably go down in history as one of their poorly managed wars, but after endless new chances and restarts, they are starting to get organized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I’m not looking forward to this summer at all because there probably won’t be any UA offensive during June, as that prisoner exchange is dragging on, and they are still holding back, and then Trump will have another round of negotiations, and Ukraine won’t be able to lift a finger\ud83d\ude10<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you liked the post – please share it in your channels, and most importantly, feel free to share the English version with people you think might appreciate posts and comments they haven’t been able to read before. https:\/\/johanno1.se\/en\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Continued appreciation for the site is always gratefully received, and there is a QR code for that purpose, as well as a donation page with links to Swedish Rescuers, drones 2 Ukraine, and other organizations we have learned over time are legitimate and worth donating to.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On Substack – there is still a chance to become subscribers, which is valuable to me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n johanno1.se<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/substackcdn.com\/image\/fetch\/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep\/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb075adb9-ef3f-4d6d-b35d-680647c6a131_955x857.png\")
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