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<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\nA bit further south, the next area is starting to be cut off where RU is +1 mile away from reaching Oskil, and there is a bridge over the waterway, and the waterway is much wider in that area – the likelihood of pontoon bridges is lower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And finally, the third area that is forming is Lyman – there they have a very small waterway, Siversky Donets, to deal with and can probably move in and out of the area relatively easily, but it is geographically limited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We just received word that 30,000 more North Koreans are on their way – the rest of the 11th AC, therefore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then there were reports of Laotians and a million Indian guest workers whose tasks will quickly be to die in war for Putin and honor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russian forces at the northern front are +50,000, or the offensive reserve should be that, and then more forces are added along that border, so in total more.<\/p>\n\n\n\n RU has chosen offensive operations in that area in two areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What I have been waiting for quite a while is for the “colonial forces” to take up border protection along that border but inside Russia and thus avoid the whole discussion of their involvement in the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For this, Putin obviously needs Trump’s help to persuade Ukraine not to fight inside Russia up there, which Trump has assisted with beyond expectations \ud83d\udc4d<\/p>\n\n\n\n A tangible offensive reserve would then be 50,000, for example, to be pushed into northern Luhansk to end that offensive?<\/p>\n\n\n\n If RU takes the area north of Siversky Donets, the distance for the artillery to Slovyansk becomes +13 km.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Northern Luhansk is not a prioritized area for Ukraine and so far not for RU either, which is good, but RU intends to take this terrain to anchor themselves at the northern end of their front behind dominant terrain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By the way, Kramatorsk is now also within comfortable artillery range, and UA has probably started evacuating the towns already?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The problem with artillery vs. drones is that you can’t combat the artillery shells.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The positive thing is that instead, you can combat the artillery platforms \ud83d\ude00<\/p>\n\n\n\n But having a city within comfortable range for artillery is never good…<\/p>\n\n\n\n The numerical and capability in the area are notoriously difficult to assess – UA has previously had brigades with 300 personnel holding areas for a brigade, for example, and what it looks like for RU in the area is difficult to determine even though we can see the number of brigades on the map.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The problem for UA seems to be that as the areas they hold become smaller, RU can concentrate their indirect fire more effectively, for example, in the northern area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And having an access road under indirect fire certainly doesn’t make things better.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Johan No.1 was completely wrong in always thinking about you, but those were the reasons given for Kursk becoming unsustainable and they had to leave the whole area two days before Trump’s envoy landed in Moscow, and Putin went out and said that if Ukraine remained in Kursk, the envoy would be sent back, which would have been a prestige loss for Trump. But that was not at all the reason Ukraine left Kursk \ud83d\udc4d<\/p>\n\n\n\n That RU intends to reach Kostiantynivka is quite obvious and there are 20km between Chasiv Yar and the western attack vector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One can assume that Ukraine has prepared for defense in Kostyantinynivka. The downside is that if RU gains a foothold in the town, there is a stretch of signs\/buildings all the way up to Kramatorsk from the city.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since RU has reached Rodynske north of Pokrovsk, the last north-south supply line is now cut off, and the east-west supply line is under indirect fire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During the summer, supply can of course be maintained over the fields, so it’s not urgent, but the fortress of Pokrovsk is starting to be surrounded both to the west and east of the city, making the fortifications and the expected delaying battle in the cities of Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk redundant, which is unfortunate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As we have already written, we should expect a UA counteroffensive here reasonably soon, shouldn’t we?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then down to the southern front where RU has crossed the presumed watercourse and entered Kamyanske for about a month, probably coming from the east, but there is no dominant terrain there at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On paper, Ukraine should have a significant capability in the area, and RU should not have a particularly acute advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It looks significantly worse in other areas along the southern front, and RU has not conducted offensive operations in the area for quite some time, so RU forces should be equipped\/rested.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is also not an area with many RU “elite forces,” even though they have pooled their capabilities for Kamyanske.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Presumed defense lines Kamyanske – RU have passed a two-lane road and dominant heights, as well as water\/riverbed from the south.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unfortunately, it is worse than what Deepstatemap shows; UA has withdrawn to Plavni\/Stepnohirsk north of Kamyanske.<\/p>\n\n\n\n You constantly wonder why I am sulking about the West’s inactivity, empty promises, and lack of action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is why \u2013 these are the maps that every week show how UA is losing dominant terrain they should hold, and where on the unit maps it looks like they have good capability in the area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A bit of a warning sign in Vuhledar in some places with brigades that are critically short on personnel, and yet Zelensky has promised us since the spring of 2024 that the personnel issue is resolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In my profession, which for the moment apparently involves building infrastructure for cartels for their drug import to the USA, we constantly work with risk lists and risk. In some projects where consultants wanted to completely fleece the client, we have had risk matrices and spent a lot of time on it in many workshops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In other projects, I personally review the contractor’s HSE risk assessments and assess the risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n HSE has far-reaching consequences for us consultants too if we turn a blind eye and something happens \u2013 our bosses’ first reaction is to ask us to demonstrate that we have done everything correctly when someone has the bad judgment to go and die on the project, and if we haven’t done our job, dismissal is never far away, depending on whom the client will try to blame to save their own skin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since today we have quite good insight into the war, and after +3 years have started to learn something, I am quite sure that our leaders in Europe do not have a completely different view of the situation than we do, and can thus calmly lean back and tinker with their phones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is what frustrates me \u2013 that our elected officials are willing to turn a blind eye to this risk when the consequences are absolutely enormous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Because what is the consequence if Ukraine collapses? Well, the war will come to us, and the same elected officials who did not lift a finger to eliminate the risk will then decide who will go to war, and it is rarely they themselves who will stand there in a mobilization depot fingering an over-greased AK4 in the drizzle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a risk assessment, it would be bright red with a direct requirement that the contractor must minimize the risk before the work task begins, and we sign off on it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When there is a risk of interstate war, politicians seem to fall back asleep.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Either Ukraine is preparing for offensive operations or they intend to withdraw to the main line outside the area Putin intends to conquer – those should be the alternatives we are facing, right?<\/p>\n\n\n\n In both cases, they must combine it with full asymmetric warfare to succeed, but unfortunately, we don’t see that either.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Refineries and export infrastructure…<\/p>\n\n\n\n We had weeks where 3-4 refineries were on fire per week, and Russian oil exports are only marginally lower than at the start of the war today (yes, refinery vs. oil…).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since Ukraine is sending drones over Russia every week, we know they have the capability; in fact, the capability today is much higher than during the periods when they knocked out most refineries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Similar to Putin and May 9th, they probably won’t.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Or the node in Tatarstan, which if destroyed would disrupt Russian oil completely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The last refinery on my list is February 2025, I have probably missed something, but it’s almost half a year ago…<\/p>\n\n\n\n We know that Trump also pressured Ukraine regarding the refineries, but Europe was supposed to take over from Trump when it became clear that he was playing on all sides and fully support Ukraine so they could continue to win the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that Ukraine is not conducting high-level asymmetric warfare can only mean that Europe is not providing the support that Ukraine feels they would need, right?<\/p>\n\n\n\n I find it hard to see any military-technical reasons why Ukraine stopped dismantling Putin’s best source of income to finance the war?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now we are still buying Russian crude oil directly from Russia and then refined Russian products from India, so we are also providing cash to continue the war, yes, I am tired of this \ud83d\ude10<\/p>\n\n\n\n The glimmer of hope is the technological advantage and that things have started to move in many places, but the less movement in Ukraine, the less courage the -stans and republics will have to fight for their freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Everyone knows exactly how much Europe and the USA will support if Russia starts opening torture centers in the country, for no one has forgotten the heart-wrenching screams of the dying in Belarus, and how Europe turned away and pretended nothing was happening.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is important to see the whole picture and what is happening in action, not what is said \u2013 Ukraine is retreating at the fronts, and full asymmetric warfare is conspicuously absent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I am of the opinion that Ukraine has offensive capability, and we know that they always have a plan to reclaim their land, but it’s difficult to determine if “everything is always relative” has come true now…<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine themselves say they are at a 1:3 numerical disadvantage, but they have fought in defense at 1:5-1:9 in losses for RU, and often at 1:3-1:5 in losses for RU during Ukraine’s own offensives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now they are also starting to hammer down the Russian technology-whack-a-mole and get up their own stacks, but favorable season for offense is until the beginning of October sometime?<\/p>\n\n\n\n And they have received a hell of a lot of material.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A numerical disadvantage has never been decisive in this war, and they have infinitely better material today than in 2022, and the Russian team rides an electric scooter or uses crutch-shooting – it should be an advantage for Ukraine, reasonably?<\/p>\n\n\n\n I find it difficult to see any sensible reasons why the effective asymmetric warfare would have ceased now when the drone weapon has been scaled up so significantly as it has – it can only be political, reasonably?<\/p>\n\n\n\n So I am starting to ponder what is simmering in the undergrowth here?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The only thing that can be said with certainty is that it is likely not good for Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It would probably be best if Ukraine just waited for Trump for another month before deciding they are crazy, but I think we should be well past that by now and we are in the middle of the offensive period – but preemption and asymmetric warfare are conspicuously absent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you liked the post – please share it in your channels and above all, please share the English version with people you think might appreciate posts and comments they have not been able to read before. https:\/\/johanno1.se\/en\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Continued appreciation for the site is always gratefully received and there is a QR code for that purpose as well as a donation page with links to Swedish Rescuers, drones 2 Ukraine, and other organizations we have learned over time are legitimate and dare to donate to.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On Substack – there is still a chance to become subscribers and valuable to me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n johanno1.se<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n