On johanno1.se, a daily summary of RU and UA attacks as well as the daily lottery line of Russian losses is posted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Our guess was that offensive operations would start when the ground was bearable sometime in mid-April, and that was quite accurate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the statistics, you can now see how UA attacks are increasing and sometimes exceed 50% of the total, and that RU losses are rising again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We previously guessed that UA had a strategic offensive reserve they held back, maybe +60,000 strong, consisting of their elite units \u2013 Rangers, GUR, SOF, Airmobile, Assault formations, Azov, and the 3rd which were previously brigades but are now corps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In autumn 2025, they were forced to start fighting when RU managed to break through north of Pokrovsk, and it went so-so, but since then they have shown an extremely high capability to fight offensively in a drone-saturated battlefield.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At some point, I stopped watching RU advances because when needed, this reserve conducted an operation over a few days where they advanced, fought mobile (probably almost constantly) for a few days, then slipped back behind the RU drone screen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The RU units in the area were quite worn out after the protective hunt, and the units responsible for the area could then enter and occupy their old positions again, so everything started over.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This has been the pattern during 2026 in several places, and UA has now adjusted how they fight in defense \u2013 spaced out between pits and using many drones to keep their own losses down, and when some Russian brigade commander wins the lottery and manages to break through, a company (maybe a battalion) from the strategic offensive reserve is sent forward to wipe out the breakthrough together with gathered indirect capabilities, as the operation is prioritized by the advancing brigade and its commander.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Until autumn 2025, when UA deployed their elite units, it looked like a slow retreat and the unit maps showed a different picture than UA conveyed; I also keep a small eye on Deepstatemap because they start painting a more negative picture than it is, but project owl is good \u2013 I was quite worried.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Trump tried to depose Zelensky, the army fighting then was under heavy pressure, and Europe did not dare to cross the USA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The second the strategic offensive reserve made its entrance, everything changed, and if there are setbacks, they are now just temporary hiccups in the upward curve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Probably UA was forced to fight with that reserve earlier than planned due to the situation in Pokrovsk, but now that is behind us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A qualified guess is that behind the strategic offensive reserve there is a larger number of maneuver brigades that have had time to be resourced and rested.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
How many and which ones I do not know, but the amount of heavy vehicles and mine-clearing equipment delivered to UA during 2025 is enormous and far exceeds what the strategic offensive reserve would absorb, and they were already resourced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
UA has already shown us that they master fighting in urban areas and clearing fortifications at a level that is almost incomprehensible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I did about 2.5 years total and know Swedish mechanized infantry well. Our armored infantry gets orders to take attack objective A, and then a platoon or company moves in and attacks with fire and movement, but the focus is to attack according to training in group-platoon-company-battalion; how it goes at the attack objective is unknown. If it doesn\u2019t work, you die on the way, and the lifespan of an armored infantry company in combat was calculated to be low \u2013 a consumable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When we reached the level where we functioned as a platoon, it meant we could operate together and that would be enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When the Ukrainian infantry attacks, it looks messy, unorganized, and not particularly good, but what they have done is elevate themselves beyond the level of fighting as a platoon, which happens automatically, and each soldier reads the threat in front of them and acts completely individually \u2013 more like warriors than soldiers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When we fight according to training and hopefully overrun the defense, they read the target area and adapt in real time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yes, we see the videos when it goes well, but there are very many of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This level is now so high that UA has stopped training their soldiers with us in Europe; our elite forces\u2019 training no longer adds anything.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Stubb also admitted that the Ukrainian infantry is exceptional, but in terms of now having work-life experience; I thought it was unfair, but he has been the most vocal in praising them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We were supposed to attack with a 3:1 numerical advantage, no less, and RU has a 10:1 numerical advantage for their attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
UA attacks with a 1:3 or worse numerical disadvantage, knocks out defending group\/platoon, and gets a few wounded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They master defense, urban combat, mechanized attacks, fortification clearing \u2013 the hardest tasks there are.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On top of that, they manage to fight in a drone-saturated combat environment and have the world\u2019s best drone weapons today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These are their maneuver brigades, and in addition, they have SOF\/Reconnaissance numbering in the tens of thousands, where even their home guard has its own platoons with operators \u2013 a swarm of hornets buzzing in the Russians\u2019 rear areas, even inside Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
ATESH not to be forgotten, which now moves across the entire area inside Russia together with local liberation fronts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Today, during attacks, UA has real-time information from observation drones that direct fire and provide situational awareness in seconds so they can constantly meet the threat in the best way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When the USA or UK tried this, it turned out that the attacking force had such an advantage that they considered starting to write memorandums and seek permission to implement it in units within the next 30 years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 2023, the capability existed in prioritized units like Azov; today, the entire armed forces have it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The drone units are highly mobile and carry ammunition with them so they can quickly pool what is needed and then move on when the targets are destroyed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
All traditional indirect platforms are also available; their kill-chain is excellent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Soon precision aircraft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The drone cover is now so far back that Russian MLRS, which had the longest range and were protected, are regularly being knocked out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I will try to describe an RU attack as I perceive it and a UA one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Russian troop commander gets orders to take attack objective A and probably solves it at the CAA level by assigning divisions responsibility areas, and then brigades attack forward toward attack objective A until they are exhausted and a new brigade takes over.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
RU has learned the extremely hard way that large mechanized failures mean runaway death.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They have adapted their tactics to attack in small groups that swarm forward to many sub-objectives on the way, which for a Russian troop commander preferably should be small communities where they can plant a flag.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
CAA has been tasked with taking dominant terrain or cities for prestige, and brigade commanders mark small communities on the map that lie in a line toward the Big Prize.<\/p>\n\n\n
The swarming has two goals \u2013 partly to identify UA defenses so they can be fought with indirect fire and then to gain a “foothold” in a locality so they can build up the capability to continue swarming forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The brigade commander always hopes for a breakthrough and the CAA commander has an offensive reserve he intends to use at the breakthrough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Ukrainian line is infinitely stretchable, so it is probably associated with some frustration among the Russian troop commanders to constantly be banging their heads against a rock wall.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If things get tight as in Pokrovsk, they throw in their offensive reserve there as well \u2013 this time it was the 76th GAAD which was probably heavily decimated in that battle recently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When Ukraine fought the Russian artillery, Putin agreed with Trump to give them air protection status so they could replace artillery with FAB bombs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
GPS-guided bombs delivered by air with an unpleasantly good hit pattern.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
During 2024-2025 was their heyday before UA adapted tactics and too many Ukrainians were buried under the FAB bombs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
By autumn 2025, UA had adapted tactics so a hit on the target resulted in at most one lost flight pair, but as I understand it, they have also started jamming them so it takes up to 6 to hit the target.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Then there is the stealth aircraft coming, and UA completely denies access to the weapon carriers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
RU has solved this with longer range but the FAB threat is definitely declining.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Russia has no plan B here \u2013 they will continue to fight this way and when they start to get worried, Putin will demand intensified attacks leading to larger mechanized failures with catastrophic results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Orders have already been issued to the CAA commanders and everything is underway, and with the inertia RU has, they will carry out offensive operations for too long.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yes, RU also tries to have a drone cover over UA lines but it is more sensitive to EW and apparently UA now has a drone superiority of 3:1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
RU is less flexible and UA can pool capabilities where needed in a much more efficient way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
RU in defense \u2013 it will go just as badly and I describe it below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Russian spearhead is already quite weak today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
FSB and Rosgvardia will not choose death in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Russian rear units such as artillery, logistics, and depots will not choose death in Ukraine either.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yes, RU has about +\/-700,000 in the army in Ukraine but not all are prepared to die and the spearhead is quite worried today about the chance of survival \u2013 but it is always easier when you have the initiative yourself and can calmly control the situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So what does a UA attack look like?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Until now, we have seen local counteroffensives and tactical offensives on various front sections \u2013 probably UA will wait out some low point in the RU offensive or when something breaks on a front section and then it will be a classic MXT “all-in” which he always burns himself on with Bitcoin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What they are doing now works but the drone superiority has an expiration date, RU has started to get interceptor drone rifles out to units but still far too few.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
UA isolates a company or battalion and puts a drone cover over them that softens up the defense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Small FPV drones that buzz into every opening, vertical and horizontal, and JDAM\/artillery.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When the attack gets going, the defense tries to get into firing positions but is then completely exposed and often it is mostly about UA throwing bundle charges into bunker openings when the Russian bastards try to hide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The entire attacking force is in direct contact with observation drones that guide them and give them a complete overview of the battlefield.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If RU tries to bring forward task forces, they have to move on roads and become big fat targets just like when RU tries with their mechanized failures \u2013 50 km from the combat area UA has full control and drone cover.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The defending battalion\/brigade is thus completely isolated and must wait for their death.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When UA attacks, it is at a numerical disadvantage of 1:3 or more and they sweep the floor completely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There is nothing RU can do to counter this and UA will keep chipping away at the defense lines until something breaks somewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They try to take out brigade staffs and CAA staffs where they can to cut off the head of the snake, FSB\/Rosgvardia are high-value targets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This will increase in intensity and what we have not yet seen is when UA decides to exploit a weak point and go for a breakthrough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We can however guess how it will go because RU is as poorly prepared as in 2022 and 2023, only that since autumn 2023 they have had the initiative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Since they have been allowed to grind on with their low-intensity offensive because Zelensky had to try to survive politically from Trump’s ravages and UA got badly burned when we forced them to fight according to NATO doctrine in 2023, they needed the time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But it also makes RU believe that their tactical adaptation works best because they are lazy bastards and the whole organization has adapted to this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yes, there are competent well-equipped task forces behind the fronts, many of them are probably VDV but they MUST MOVE ON ROADS to be useful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Every building block is in place now, all Ukraine needs is for Europe not to betray them again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
USA knows very well what kind of relationship they have with Ukraine and no longer cares but they need Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Putin will demand a ceasefire sometime this summer and THEN Europe MUST stand strong and not chicken out again for the fifteenth time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the fronts we have some exciting developments \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the Dnieper, the only remaining task force is the 98th AD but only two of the regiments, otherwise undermanned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Crimea is poorly defended, a few thousand, behind the Dnieper front down to Crimea there is basically no defense at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The southern front is not strong anymore either and the two task forces 104th AAD and 7th MAAD are already in combat near Stepnohirsk where UA has attacked for a long time \u2013 they are retreating.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There are 5 BARS in depth but they are battalion-sized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Further up near Donetsk \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At Zeleny Haij it is the 90th TK that has fought and they are said to be in poor shape, there is no task force in the vicinity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I have poor knowledge of the Huliapole area which is just south of the 90th TD but they have attacked a lot there so it should be a mixed bag of capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Between just south of Pokrovsk up to Chasiv Yar seems to be a focus point for RU \u2013 high density of Russian bastards but at Pokrovsk the 76th GAAD wore themselves out to take the city and quite a few brigades around Pokrovsk should be in poor shape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Something a bit strange is that RU has deprioritized Chasiv Yar and Bakhmut, UA is advancing in Chasiv Yar, Prigozhin is turning in his grave.<\/p>\n\n\n
Up in northern Luhansk, RU also looks weak, and near Kupiansk it is now battalion-sized units instead of brigades that are fighting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Along the northern front, however, RU seems to have a fairly good defense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Everything is always relative, and UA must be strong where RU is weak for it to make a difference. Northern Luhansk looks like a defense so far, UA has a lot of capability around Kupiansk, but RU is also trying to attack down from the north along the border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Now it probably matters less because UA has so far shown that they can quickly concentrate highly mobile offensive units together with devastating indirect fire; RU is weak in several places.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This year we will see what should have happened in 2022 and 2023 if the USA and Europe had not sabotaged Ukraine and rigged the game for Putin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
He is trying again this year to get a ceasefire on May 9th; last year we forced Ukraine into it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The world’s best infantry \u2013 which I have argued about over the years but now everyone with some knowledge admits that I was right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And the ridicule over UA offensive operations not breaking through and that I was looking for false explanations when it was crystal clear that it was Europe and the USA who destroyed it \u2013 this year you will see.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Those of you who have canceled paid subscriptions on Substack, don’t forget to reactivate them, and those of you still considering it \u2013 go ahead and become a winner.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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