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<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\nSo what does Europe have to counter a drone-saturated battlefield in 2026, and what exactly is a drone-saturated battlefield \u2013 has Johan No.1 made up that word?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine has confirmed that instead of RU losses caused by 12% snipers and 75% artillery, losses are now caused by over 80% from drone weapons alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia loses somewhere around 30,000 verifiable soldiers per month, 0.8X30k = 24,000 Russians who partly have their own drone weapons and anti-drone defense for close protection but also experience trying to hide from drones (personal skill through practical experience).<\/p>\n\n\n\n When they try to attack mechanized and expose themselves it becomes a veritable drone massacre every time. So much so that RU has completely changed its doctrine and tries to swarm with dispersed shooting instead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Lithuania recently had a simulated exercise to defend against a full Russian invasion \u2013 at first it did not go well but when they added a drone weapon in the form of drone swarms in the exercise they won.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This also applies the other way around, right, and right now it is Russia that has the drone swarms and Europe does not have the drone swarms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, Russia has increased the use of FAB to 250-300 per day (and wants to increase significantly) which proved absolutely devastating for UA units in defense. The USA assisted by delaying precision aircraft to Ukraine so they cannot practically prevent these today. They can also release these at significantly longer distances than 60 km today, up to 100 km has been suggested but take that with a grain of salt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The drone weapon as it has developed today and can be used is comparable to the Germans’ blitzkrieg doctrine during WW2 \u2013 if you haven’t kept up with the development it is a major negative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now the blitzkrieg doctrine was paired with a decentralized decision chain and great room for initiative from lower commands so it is wrong to say it was only a technical advantage \u2013 I will return to that next week because Ukraine has stolen some pages from that handbook now with its transition to corps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia learned the hard way that their air defense developed throughout the Cold War against hostile missiles and aircraft cannot handle drone swarms \u2013 they are still trying to find countermeasures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine today has the world’s best air defense and on a good day can shoot down 90% (100% in exceptional cases) of incoming strategic drone threats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n FPV drones I do not know, have not seen any figures but RU uses 10,000 per day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n UA has acute problems with missiles where RU (previously) managed to launch 100 because Trump delayed deliveries of Patriot missiles to Ukraine even though they now seem to have their own systems that work \u2013 Zircon should also be able to be jammed with advanced EW systems (28 in total have been forced to crash) and they have a brand new battlefield laser.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine has also developed interceptor drones which have proven effective but in MENA they quickly saw that giving them a complete system after some training caused chaos \u2013 it is an integrated system where the operators must understand the whole, which a quick introduction was not enough for. We covered that yesterday.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Countermeasures are thus definitely increasing but you must have enough, be able to handle the package and then understand the whole chain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When the Houthis had their firing spree in the Red Sea they attacked over 300 ships in total including several surface combatants \u2013 some countries in Europe were forced to leave because the close protection systems on their surface combatants were inadequate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the Iran war they have certainly hit several US ships as the US has moved around its naval resources, and Trump is also trying to get Europe to take over the monitoring of Hormuz which he caused to be closed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Besides that Israel has had problems with its Iron Dome against drone swarms mixed with missiles where quite a few got through.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The drone weapon is thus fully tested in two wars and is a threat to all traditional capabilities including surface combatants for the simple reason that close protection has not yet kept up with the development \u2013 it is underway but we do not have it yet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Not to mention the sea drones that have decimated the Russian Black Sea Fleet \u2013 if I were the commander of the Russian Baltic Fleet I would also try to acquire these capabilities after China surely built the production lines for them in Russia sometime since 2023. Anything else would be malpractice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n EU\/Europe<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The naval capabilities we have in the Baltic Sea largely lack advanced air defense \u2013 our corvettes do not have it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But we have the multi-purpose cannon and it works well against drones, but it is a cannon that can be saturated \u2013 a bit of a mixed bag.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I was looking through the new German frigates and they were a bit the same \u2013 I had a post in the works about why but it never materialized. You know how it would have gone \u2013 we build advanced surface combatants without adequate air defense at a time when close protection air defense is critical otherwise they are just big floating bathtubs \u2013 who pushed that in politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I seem to recall Finland had a bit the same but they are trying to solve it with land-based protection, Poland and Denmark I do not know.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No other countries will have surface combatants in the Baltic Sea when they are needed if we are reactive \u2013 which we have so far shown a very strong willingness to be. A few sunk ships in the channel outside Denmark if you read yesterday’s post.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Our ground forces cannot fight in a drone-saturated combat environment at all. Since sometime in 2025 Ukraine always sends a couple of drone groups and they paralyze the blue team \u2013 it became a whole post about that the other day, Aurora26<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now defense Twitter is absolutely damn angry at Ukraine who gave us IG during Aurora but it is true, 28 of 32 vehicles were knocked out and they got through the perimeter defense of an airbase in 20 minutes where they engaged targets without own losses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The exercise leadership had to pause three times and eventually remove OPFOR for there to be any exercise at all \u2013 they showed they were world-leading in warfare, but they had to remove the enemy to be able to fight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If there is a conflict zone in the Baltics where our brigades face Russian counterparts it will look like this \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n RU now has the drone troops branch set up after the Ukrainian model with years of practical experience \u2013 about 100,000 strong today and rapidly increasing with the ambition to reach +160,000. It is called Rubicon and gets everything they point at.<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/russias-expanding-drone-forces-passes-100-000-personnel-copies-ukrainian-example-magyar-says<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n This branch uses around 10,000 FPV drones daily in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n About every other day RU can launch 500 Geran drones and the launch ramps are Toyota pickup-type vehicles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They have a few thousand missiles in stock and if they want, they can launch 100 in one day; they use them sparingly in Ukraine but Ukraine has targeted a couple of missile depots, more on that below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, RU drops between 250-300 FAB bombs (on a good day) over fixed defenses in Ukraine which has been such a big problem that Ukraine has completely changed its defensive warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Can the FAB bombs be taken down by Geran drones?<\/p>\n\n\n\n UA now has groups on the front line and then an FPV drone cover that handles the defensive fight \u2013 the drone capability we do not yet have.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We still need to defend ourselves with personnel since we lack the drone weapon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n UA artillery, IFV, tank, and all other types of vehicles could initially fight according to our doctrine but with constant movements. Today that is no longer possible \u2013 they simply have to be kept beyond 30km-50km (not sure if 50km might be UA range and RU a bit shorter) otherwise they get knocked out. Ukraine has now fully learned this and uses artillery less because of it but their drone weapon has replaced it instead. Just as RU has replaced its artillery with FAB and the drone weapon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yes, RU artillery is still used but to an extremely lesser extent than at the start of the war \u2013 then RU fired 50,000 \u2013 60,000 shells per day, today 5,000-6,000 shells per day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The drone weapon has longer range so our IFV and artillery cannot get far enough forward to operate \u2013 that’s just how it is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Against us, however, the Russians\u2019 artillery and IFV can operate according to previous doctrine since we do not yet have any drone weapon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But we have an air force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Our air force can also drop missiles or JDAMS beyond the RU air defense umbrella \u2013 they will not steal that capability from us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n RU has its own air force so there it will still be traditional warfare \u2013 we come out winning from such a fight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We have about 1700 supersonic planes in Europe’s various air forces and RU has 800 \u2013 1300 so it looks promising.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the big weakness of our air force is something completely different \u2013 only Sweden uses road bases so all aircraft in Europe stand on large airbases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Missiles and JDAMS are stored in large central depots.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yes, in case of war there are more airbases but unless we are proactive, all our capability will be neatly lined up on a couple of large airbases per country when it kicks off.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During 2025 so many drones flew over Europe that it should be accepted that RU has logged all targets already.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2025 Germany logged 1000 drone overflights at its bases and other high-value targets \u2013 one single country in Europe and what they have disclosed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/germany-registers-over-1000-suspicious-drone-flights-in-2025\/a-75261162<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n These targets can be reached with larger efforts with Gerans and missiles which are also present on the shadow fleet’s ships around all of Europe \u2013 they can reach any target they want in all of Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, Russia and Iran pay for gang murders and criminal clan services to expand the pool of their own operators and recruited spies \u2013 if they want, they can carry out direct sabotage, fly FPV drones close to airbases or wait with MANPADS on planes at takeoff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Russian electronic warfare also works and during the war several of our GPS-guided weapons have had problems in Ukraine, SAAB’s GLSDB had problems, right?<\/p>\n\n\n\n GPS jamming from Kaliningrad and St Petersburg is in full swing and increasing by the way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Recently, aircraft and ships have seen on their systems that they are located somewhere else than where they actually are. Feels like something China has provided and since everything we have is GPS-based, it will be interesting to see what our sharp countermeasure is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/russia-can-falsify-gps-signals-deep-into-europe-lithuania-says-2026-05-26<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n When the USA attacked Iran, their specially equipped F-16 for EW performed excellently, whatever they are called now, and then their SEAD \u2013 since the USA no longer seems to want to know about Europe, do we have this capability?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Not enough would probably be the answer but we have it, and RU knows exactly where those airframes are.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A bit off topic but then the USA used that “Cuba embassy sonic weapon” in Venezuela? It paralyzed the soldiers who were supposed to protect Maduro according to rumors \u2013 it was probably a Russian weapon originally that the USA immediately started developing themselves?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine has during the war carried out several spectacular drone operations against RU airbases, the best was probably when they knocked out 30% of the Russians’ strategic bombers in one strike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Besides that, Magyar, who is the world’s best at this, has explained that he could knock out the entire European air force \u2013 if you don’t believe me and are getting angry about defeatism maybe you will be calmer now that you have his confirmation?<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI answered the following, that four of my battle crews standing only 10km away from this base can destroy it fully in 15 minutes, it would look like Pearl Harbor during the second World War,\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/07\/16\/politics\/ukrainian-military-leaders-drones<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n RU today has missiles in stock. Ukraine usually targets Russian GRAU from time to time but these are the latest figures a year old, they shoot less \u2013 China assists \u2013 UA targets GRAU. Could not find a good source for this year but maybe around 2000?<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/newsukraine.rbc.ua\/news\/russia-s-weapons-stockpile-revealed-how-many-1750496990.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n China has built up the Russian armaments industry including missile production.<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/www.uawire.org\/center-for-strategic-and-international-studies-china-helped-russia-triple-iskander-missile-production-skirting-sanctions<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The laws of war apply so if Russia targets goals in Europe we can target goals at them \u2013 how many missiles do we have?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Not so many unfortunately because we counted on the USA’s Tomahawks, called “the long range gap”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taurus, which is an attractive weapon, I think Germany long delayed \u2013 the company wanted early in the war to produce “large volumes much cheaper” but they never got any orders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since 2025 there have apparently been orders and the production rate is 50-60 per year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Storm Shadow is manufactured and according to Google production started seriously in summer 2025 \u2013 they should be able to reach 600 per year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is how it looks \u2013 we have a full war in Ukraine and now the Iran war so we are not very far from the truth.<\/p>\n\n\n Europe actually has three conflict zones\/threats to handle \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. The Baltic Sea<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. The Baltics<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. indirect long-range capabilities and hybrid threats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I want to argue, and will return to this at the end, that the only thing we could now manage is to defend the Baltics, but then we must be prepared for heavy losses and difficult decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Our navies are vulnerable and will quite quickly disappear into the archipelagos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The strategic drone threat \u2013 we cannot even retaliate proportionally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We are extremely vulnerable to hybrid threats inside Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here I interject my answers to the two questions even though the post went far beyond them, it almost became a completely different post.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. NATO Article 5<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This must be a consensus of all members including the pro-Russian government in Bulgaria, Donald Trump, Turkey, and pro-Russian Fico in Slovakia \u2013 you can forget about Article 5 being activated without delay. It might become a decision but absolutely not within the critical week needed to avoid wading across the Daugava.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The countries whose governments can make decisions on certain capabilities directly are Sweden, France, the UK, and a few others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finland, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Poland all need parliamentary decisions, and many have coalition governments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Countries without governments or with elections this year \u2013 Denmark, probably soon the UK, Sweden, Latvia, Czech Republic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Sweden, if it is a government decision, 24 ministers from three parties vote \u2013 unclear if it is a simple majority and the Prime Minister presumably has the deciding vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since this whole chain is reactive, I find it incredible that we will manage within a reasonable time \u2013 when all decisions are made, the question to consider is, are we prepared to retake terrain in the Baltics from a buried Russian behind the Daugava comfortably under its drone umbrella.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That will not happen, so countries need to start acting preventively now, which is the point I have tried to hammer in since autumn 2025 \u2013 if you talk about a DEFENSE it must be in place before the violence breaks out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. Europe\u2019s violent response<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe don\u2019t need to retake the Baltics, we knock out the Baltic Sea fleet and invade Kaliningrad instead\u201d is a recurring suggestion for a desirable way forward when I worry about the Baltics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kaliningrad will have tactical nuclear weapons \u201cthat can self-ignite from boot stomps\u201d and some very scared Chinese colonels there this summer \u2013 no one will invade Kaliningrad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Or we do, and Russia then has territorial claims on us for an enclave they have already written off \u2013 since it is the world that judges in such matters and surprisingly many stand on Russia\u2019s side, it is not insignificant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Russian Baltic Fleet is a good target, Ukraine will probably get to it after the Russian fleet in the Caspian Sea but we should absolutely knock it out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia has already accounted for this so either it leaves for Murmansk or is sacrificed \u2013 and if it is sacrificed they probably want to strike first. Since we are reactive by definition, they have the opportunity to do so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Baltic Fleet\u2019s task is to block reinforcements by sea to the Baltics and be a step on the escalation ladder \u2013 when that is achieved they probably expect to lose it in exchange for getting the Baltics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Warning<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Warning signs, is a new Zapad 25 underway someone asked on johanno1.se because that could suggest that Russia does as we are used to, a huge exercise to under the cover of it bring forward the units they need for an invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Already in autumn 2025 when I reviewed available information, the Baltic Fleet had for two years (now three years) trained more than the normal curve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now it looked like this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/united24media.com\/latest-news\/russia-simulates-strikes-on-nato-ships-in-baltic-drill-using-oniks-and-kh-35-missiles-17148<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n First \u2013 Belarus will not join the war, they are flank protection and project a threat against Poland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Belarus has had 42 military exercises just in May and Lukashenko talks about war (again). Recently they closed off 19 large forest areas at the borders with Ukraine, the Baltics, and Poland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They have mobilized and trained reserves in shifts and carried out the preparations required for general mobilization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, they have started building defenses against Ukraine and it was recently confirmed that they have nuclear weapons in Belarus after the larger exercise recently conducted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Belarusian armed forces have been trained by old Wagner since 2023 and in Russian drone warfare, both to operate under it and also as their own drone weapon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2022 we laughed heartily at them, today they are probably a factor with just under 100,000, fully mobilized half a million strong.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They have received new Russian equipment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n