Since the Russian army has conducted its version of offensive operations since autumn 2023, it has now for three years been permeated by that type of warfare. The corps commander gives orders on paper which the brigades then solve in the same way they have done throughout the war but now slower forward so even more comfortable. No one needs to make split-second decisions and there is no decision cycle to get inside. All higher commanders sit in their air-conditioned bunkers with gourmet food and a lot of running around by non-soldiers at night. Apparently female doctors and nurses have been forced into other types of full-time jobs so no one wants to work in the war zone anymore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Since mechanized combat led to acute losses, they reshuffled doctrine to swarm forward with dispersed infantry instead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ukraine has gradually increased its drone zone so changes had to be made there as well, artillery went down from 60,000 shells\/day to today 4,000-5,000. FAB bombs delivered by air had to replace artillery together with the drone weapon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We have discussed the FAB plague many times but it is so acute that Zelensky in his thank you speech to Sweden for our Gripen planes mentioned that now they can finally reduce FAB usage. Easy to understand since a FAB bomb buries everyone in the bunker, no survivors.<\/p>\n\n\n
The new Russian doctrine was to use infantry as ammunition to spot positions where drones can operate and place FABs, and once they were eliminated, to work their way forward to the next defensive position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It worked so well that UA now only has a sparse line of infantry in trenches on the front lines under strong drone protection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Russian armed forces have comfortably parked themselves in some kind of World War I environment, completely without historical awareness but very Russian.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The brigades at the fronts lack heavy vehicles, indirect fire comes from drone groups and strike aircraft, they have gotten used to grinding forward about a kilometer a week, and have absolutely not prepared for defensive warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We already know that they have not expanded the fieldworks to the new areas they have conquered \u2013 Clement Molin confirmed this recently but we have suspected it for a long time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The logistics are all stocked beyond the 50km line where the brigades have what they have in their fortifications, deliveries by drones are quite common for them as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Larger depots are surely beyond the old HIMARS range of +100km. At a safe distance, they run it very Russian \u2013 huge gigantic depots.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yes, Ukraine has used drones quite a bit but not with the intensity that triggers a full behavioral change yet inside occupied Donetsk or beyond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the Russian side of the border, they certainly still have those large bases Ukraine was never allowed to touch before they had their own long-range weapons \u2013 10 to 15 army bases where everything is neatly lined up, about a dozen air bases, and then their 45 to 50 Iskander platforms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As the US and Europe kept doing and destroying \u2013 geographical restrictions on various weapons, the US had to approve every target and if it was too high-value, they leaked it to the Russians and delayed approval.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ukraine followed the rules all the time, which were constantly changed if, against expectations, things went too well anyway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Russia is a creature of habit that has adapted to moving forward slowly with infantry and does not expect any direct counteroffensives because none have come since summer 2023 on all fronts in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Russian staff has also prepared their own spring and summer offensive which we see playing out in parallel with Ukraine increasing the temperature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Our guess has been the following \u2013 orders have been given for attack objectives to the CAA commanders who probably cooperate intermittently but largely have a siloed organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They have then distributed the task to the divisions which use the brigades as expendable goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The chain of command is slow and absolutely no one likes to convey bad news up the chain. Throughout the war, they have only said \u201cmore, more, more\u201d as medicine against every setback.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This year’s focus points are \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– a buffer zone along the northern front.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– Slovyansk\/Kramatorsk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– an offensive on the southern front towards Dnipro and at Huliapole where after Pokrovsk they have dominating terrain. All roads lead to Dnipro so it is easy to see that Putin intends to take the Dnipro area and up to Pavlohrad and then stand behind dominating terrain in the form of rivers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– a sideshow was to reach Oskil up in northern Luhansk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Pokrovsk was for a long time the focus and they have had a high ambition level this year as the VDV has been fully expended, at Pokrovsk it was the 76th GAAD and Stepnohirsk 104th AAD + 7th MAAD.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The idea is probably to try to reach Oskil in the north and then the Dnipro \u2013 Pavlohrad area. In the middle they stand in Kramatorsk \u2013 Slovyansk and now have a sufficiently attractive position to propose a ceasefire and negotiations. Then in a few years, they will run round two to try to conquer the entire area east of Kiev.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Things are shifting in Europe, Ukraine is fighting back, Russia is being mocked \u2013 no one higher up in the chain likes it so \u201cmore, more, more\u201d probably echoes between the walls at staff meetings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The CAA commanders sit in their bunkers and use the brigades as expendable ammunition where they rather sacrifice them than be forced into humiliating farewells \u2013 they try until it no longer works, then try a little more just to be on the safe side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is what it looks like on the Russian side, broadly painted but important points to take with you \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– they have gotten used to low-intensity grinding<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– orders for spring\/summer offensive are given<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– the command chain is, if possible, even slower, the big shots are under great pressure to maintain their image<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– maintenance is at a great distance<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– units in the combat area have no vehicles<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– the task forces are already expended to varying degrees at the fronts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is actually fact but no one dares to believe the situation is this bad. Ukraine knows very well how things stand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ukraine has worked a bit differently but suffered greatly from the West’s constant betrayals until we reached 2026 when the stars began to align in the right constellation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They have bridged all material shortages through domestic production except interceptors against Russian missiles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For a long time Sirsky ran around micromanaging down to battalion level which did not help at all. He is probably most harmful as Chief of Defense but with the introduction of corps, competent troop commanders have gained enough freedom of action for it to show.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Personnel shortages were at one point acute and brigades were down to 300 at worst because they received no replacement personnel. The 72nd fighting at Vuhledar broke down in October 2024 and defended themselves on social media \u2013 that was the first time we got it confirmed from a first-hand source.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Frontline service was a death sentence as 80% of the wounded returned to service \u2013 the number of personnel who found reasons not to be at the fronts far exceeded those who sat in the trenches at the spearhead. The armed forces swelled to +1.2 million but brigades in defense had an area dimensioned for 5,000 but down to 300.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At Bakhmut we saw the 3rd assault brigade fight excellently, the marines took the spearhead of the spring offensive 2024 and all special forces seemed to run their own race but there were many units in radio shadow that were low priority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Early 2025 Ukraine began introducing the corps and the foremost troop commanders managed to grab a corps and immediately started clawing for the best brigades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Since then, the army, territorial defense, and national guard have acted in parallel throughout the war where the army has had the former volunteer brigades, army brigades, airborne, and marines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Some units like the Skala regiment are now about the size of a division and have been a prioritized unit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Besides that, Ukraine has had a strategic offensive reserve of elite units that are deployed where needed, we first saw them at Pokrovsk a bit too early before it became critical in autumn 2025 and then everything changed \u2013 critical areas were just that until the reserve rushed in. I sat and counted it to maybe 60,000 strong at some point but they exist partly in reserve and then spread out among various ACs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What I believe the reorganization into corps has done is that they now have a decentralized chain of command where corps commanders have great freedom of action and cooperate with each other + a direct line to the strategic offensive reserve to present their proposals on where it is needed most in various operations.<\/p>\n\n\n
Sirksy has less to say and everything is going much better.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the southern front, the 17th AC has several elite units subordinated, for example, and the Skala regiment is apparently Sirksy’s go-to unit for firefighting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The series of small counteroffensives we now see are corps commanders acting on their mandates within their respective areas,<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 1st Azov corps apparently all wanted to participate because they only have elite units, and the 12th AC is like a larger European defense force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Apparently, the 3rd AC, which was built around the 3rd Assault, asked to have its area expanded and also took responsibility for a problem area \u2013 easy to see that they wanted maximum freedom of action within the framework of the orders given.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is what they themselves say about the restructuring \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cA very accurate article \u00abWe are fighting against Russia and know why they will lose\u00bb by the commander of the 1st Corps in the NSU \u00abAzov\u00bb, Brigadier General Denis Prokopenko. I recommend reading it in full, but want to highlight some key theses. —<\/p>\n\n\n\n We know that RU uses around 10,000 FPV drones per day in the daily summary on johanno1.se that MXT provides us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What doesn’t quite fill social media is that Ukraine uses the same or even more drones than RU; Russian soldiers often describe how 7 to 10 drones per Russian soldier is their everyday reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine has gained FPV drone superiority partly through its EW, own drones, anti-drone measures, but also through a persistent fight against Russian drone groups. I don’t know exactly when this was in time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yes, different at different fronts, but where UA decides on offensive operations, they can both fight mechanized under their own protection and also have drone dominance to deny movement and conduct pre-emptive strikes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Drones are tricky because they get into every opening, big or small.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For a long time, Ukraine has been using drones to eliminate high-value targets in the strategic drone war best described as a backlash.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At times they have been banned from this, and during 2025 the USA held them back, but since August 2025 the intensity has been high and has also started to include more and more target types.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is indisputable that Ukraine has already won the strategic drone\/missile war as their air defense manages to combat 90% of targets on average, on good days nearly 100%.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They have developed EW against the Zircon missiles, which are supposed to be the hardest to counter, and have already shot down 28 during approach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia manages to counter very few, not even in Moscow where they have gathered hundreds of air defense platforms of all types, they remain vulnerable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For a couple of months now, Ukraine has started with the \u201cmid-range,\u201d which seems to be from 50 km depth, as FPV drones manage up to 250 km.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is HIMARS all over again; Russian logistics have adapted, and suddenly Ukraine rolls out a new no-go zone over which they have full fire control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Social media likes this kind of thing, so you probably haven’t missed it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/substackcdn.com\/image\/fetch\/$s_!H7-t!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep\/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faa25ff29-79e0-4988-8d00-3ef67de31da3_493x805.png\")
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Prokopenko starts with the most important \u2014 the fundamental mistake the West made in 2022:
\u00abOn the threshold of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Western analytical centers and intelligence communities made a fundamental mistake in assessing Russia’s military strength. Their forecasts, which predicted Kyiv’s fall within a few days, were based on quantitative indicators: an army of millions, thousands of aircraft, tanks, and artillery systems. This approach scared ordinary readers but ignored intangible yet crucial factors: command culture, morale, social cohesion, and adaptability.\u00bb
\u00abThis analytical blindness partly remains today. Many in the West continue to view this conflict solely through the prism of a war of attrition, where victory is determined exclusively by resource volume and the ability to mobilize more people. This is a dangerous mistake.\u00bb
This is a fundamentally important point. The West still thinks in 20th-century categories \u2014 tanks, guns, troop size. But the war is already different. And precisely for this reason, Western analysts could not foresee either our resilience in 2022, or our technological breakthroughs in 2024\u20132026, or the failure of the Russian military machine.
\u00abThis war is not just a collision between armies but the ultimate test of two diametrically opposed systems that arose in the post-Soviet space. One system, the Ukrainian, is a network model built on trust, which unleashes human potential. Much of the changes have been initiated and developed here by ordinary citizens, soldiers, sergeants, and junior officers.\u00bb
\u00abUkraine’s defense forces, especially units that emerged from the volunteer movement, such as \u201cAzov\u201d, have cultivated a command philosophy based on the principles of decentralization and extended authority. This model is a modern interpretation of the German concept Auftragstaktik (Mission Command), developed to conduct combat on a dynamic, non-linear battlefield.\u00bb
Auftragstaktik is a doctrine that gave the Wehrmacht an advantage in World War II over all opponents. Its essence is simple: the commander sets the task and explains the purpose, and the executor on site decides how to carry it out. This fundamentally differs from the Soviet-Russian model, where every step is detailed from above and initiative is punished.
The Ukrainian army, which grew out of the volunteer movement, naturally built a system that German general staffs in the 1800s developed over decades. And precisely because of this, we defeat an enemy that numerically surpasses us.
\u00abThe Russian system of troop control is the exact opposite. It is a rigid, vertically integrated hierarchy of the Soviet model, where every step is regulated from above. This system was not created for maximum combat effectiveness but to ensure political control over the army, where loyalty to the regime has always been more important than competence.\u00bb
\u00abA key situation for this system failure is the chronic underdevelopment of the junior command staff and the madness of senior officers, who are ready to sacrifice an enormous amount of personnel (all the way to the last soldier), to please leadership, without deviating an inch from the higher commander’s intent, even if it was doomed to fail from the start.\u00bb
The Russian system is not built for victory but for generals to steal undisturbed. This is a systemic feature of the empire \u2014 loyalty is more important than competence. And this very feature is destroying the Russian army from within today, slowly but inevitably.
While the West looks at the numbers, the real war is won by the minds of younger officers and sergeants who make decisions on site. This is our main advantage, and it must be preserved at all costs.
Moreover, I personally am pleased by the thesis that:
\u00abWestern partners learn from us and gladly adopt combat experience.\u00bb
I hope this is true. Because the Ukrainian army is today the world’s best school in modern warfare. The Azov corps, SSO, SBS, GUR, SBU \u2014 each unit independently surpasses most NATO armies in real combat capability. This is a fact we see every day in the results from the battlefield.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n