Deep dive into russian losses, year on year comparison and also 2025 in detail

Below I will review the Russian losses per year up to 2025 and also provide a detailed overview of 2025. I will also try to analyze and identify any trends that can be observed. The statistics, as usual, come from Ragnar @ragnarbjartur.bsky.social. A big thank you to Ragnar!

Let’s start with yesterday’s Russian losses in Ukraine:

• 910 KWIA
• 6 Tanks
• 2 AFVs
• 42 Artillery systems
• 2 MLRS
• 1 Air defense system
• 590 UAVs
• 1 Cruise missile 169 Vehicles & fuel tanks

Russian losses per year

Here I have included the most important categories and excluded some where there is, for example, no data for the entire war or where the losses are so low that a year-to-year comparison does not provide much insight.

KWIA
Regarding the losses of killed and injured personnel, 2025 with 416,550 KWIA was the second highest year, just below 2024 with 430,320.

Here is an overview with the losses for each year month by month:

Tanks
Just as expected during the year, tank losses have decreased, and 2025 is so far the year with the lowest losses with a total of 1,811 tanks. 2024 is the record year so far with 3,691.

Other armor
The same applies to other armor with a total of 3,780 for 2025. Even for this category, 2024 was the year with the highest losses at 8,951.
Exactly what is behind the decrease, considering the huge overall losses for armor (including tanks), one can speculate that they are not as easily able to deploy large numbers. It could also be a combination of changed tactics where smaller groups of soldiers now seem to attack without the support of armor. Whether this is a tactical change due to a lack of armor or a conclusion that the losses from larger armor attacks are not worth it given how many are taken out, can only be guessed.

Artillery
When it comes to artillery, I am somewhat surprised, as I had perceived that the Russians were using less artillery and that the losses were also lower. Nevertheless, 2025 is so far the year with the highest number of losses at 13,947, closely followed by 2024 with a total of 13,021. North Korea has supplied Russia with artillery, which may be a reason they still have access to many artillery pieces. I have also seen information that they have reduced the caliber, with 152mm increasingly being replaced by 122mm and even smaller. This is both cheaper and apparently 122mm is more common in North Korea. In any case, we can conclude that artillery has not yet been phased out in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

MLRS
In this case, 2025 is the second lowest year with 319 units. 2024 was the second lowest with 314 (the graph gives the impression that 2025 is lower than 2024). 2023 is the record year with 518. One can consider whether Russia is running out of pieces, or if they are using them more sparingly since they have shorter range and are easier to take out with drones. MLRS also have poor precision, and another reason for the decrease could be that FPV drones have simply replaced their use.

UAVs
Russia has significantly increased the use of, among others, Shahed drones, which is also evident in the losses. 2025 sets a record by far with 76,374 units, which is over five times as many as in 2024 when there were 14,456.

Air defense
It turns out that 2025 is the year with the second lowest losses, with only 233 pieces. 2023 is the record year with 410, while 2024 closely follows with 397.

Other vehicles / logistics
When it comes to so-called “soft” vehicles, 2025 is by far a new record year with 39,498 units. This is almost double the number in 2024, which is the second highest year with 21,270.
I guess this is because they are increasingly using simpler means of transport such as civilian trucks, buses, motorcycles, and more recently even horses. This requires significantly more transports to deliver all the necessary equipment compared to using larger military trucks. Here, I speculate that they may have difficulty obtaining a sufficient number of vehicles, but perhaps mainly that, just like with armor, they may have concluded that the losses are not worth it and therefore opt for cheaper and simpler solutions, focusing on capacity rather than quality.

Here are the losses per year and for each respective month:

Special equipment
2025 also marks the second lowest year here with only 371 units, while the record year 2024 reached 2,406.

Summary of the annual comparison

It is, of course, difficult to make exact analyses based solely on losses, but I still think that a couple of conclusions can be drawn.

The first is that Russia seems to be increasingly struggling to maintain quality, and the war of attrition has forced them to increasingly try to cost-effectively optimize.
For 2025, we see, apart from artillery, only high or increased losses when it comes to “cheap” resources like manpower, drones, and simpler transport solutions. Even artillery could perhaps be classified as cheap if they are mostly sourced from North Korea.

The second conclusion I draw concerns the increased use of FPV drones. In the statistics above, we see nothing about FPV drones specifically, but the decreased losses over time for some of the categories are surely influenced by drones becoming more common and replacing some of the more traditional tactics. Instead of launching broad front attacks with armor, drones can be used for reconnaissance and facilitate attacks where it is optimal, especially where Ukraine has weaker defenses, while suicide drones can also act as deterrents and even replace armored vehicles. At the same time, FPV drones are cheap, and the increased usage surely also relates to cost-effectiveness.

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Russian losses in the war in Ukraine during 2025

KWIA
The losses were highest at the beginning of the year with a low point in early September, followed by a weak rising trend again.

Tanks
The Russians’ tank losses follow a similar trend. Higher losses (though relatively low compared to the entire war) at the beginning of the year, and from the end of April, they dropped to under 5 per day. We may also possibly see a small increase towards the end of the year, but it could just as well be a normal fluctuation.

Other armor
Here too, there were higher losses at the beginning of the year, but then they decreased significantly since the beginning of May.

Artillery
We see a similar trend here as well. Higher losses at the beginning of the year and lower towards the end.

MLRS
The losses here are so low that it is difficult to draw any direct conclusions. Low in January, then a slight increase until the end of April, and then it is about one per day.

UAV
2025 was overall the year with the most UAV losses, and looking at the year, there is a fairly stable and clear upward trend, but of course with some variations. Unfortunately, we have not yet reached the peak.
Russia seems to love its terror attacks on civilians, where they target everything from residences, schools, hospitals, infrastructure in the hope that the people will suddenly become more favorable to a Russian takeover of the country.
At the same time, we should not be naive and think that the Russians only target civilians. They not only attack the energy infrastructure but also, of course, try to hit military targets and industrial sites for military production.

I now see these nightly UAV attacks as the biggest threat to a Ukrainian victory over Russia. Not because I believe they will succeed in breaking the Ukrainians’ will to resist, but because it may eventually become very difficult for Ukraine to continue defending itself.
Without electricity and heat, all functions of society are affected, including the defense industry and the military itself.
Just as we hope that Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries, depots, etc., will lead to an economic collapse in Russia, Russia’s attacks may make it difficult for Ukraine to conduct an effective defense. As we probably have not yet seen the peak and if the increase continues at the same rate even during 2026, it will be really tough.

Vehicles and logistics
2025 was a record year for this category of losses, with almost twice as much as in 2024. However, looking at how it developed during the year, the losses have remained relatively stable without a clear trend. Highest losses at the end of April, lower during the autumn with a tendency to increase again in December.

Special equipment
Low throughout the year but with a peak at the end of April.

Number of combat engagements
Here it is of course difficult to draw any conclusions as it is not clear how significant the battles have been, but we may see a slightly increasing trend towards the end. When it comes to losses, the reasons are not always clear, although one can imagine that higher activity at the fronts also results in higher losses. At the same time, higher or lower losses may also reflect changes in Ukraine’s capabilities or changes in tactics by the Russians, such as using more or less armor.
Therefore, it is interesting to also try to compare with the number of engagements, but still difficult as we only know the quantity and not the extent.
Even though we have some extra intense days at the beginning of the year, we do not see a clear decline in September, and we rather see an increase towards the end, but it seems to have peaked at the end of November. It does not quite follow the losses in several of the categories.

Artillery attacks
These figures are also interesting to look at and compare with the losses. Partly following the number of engagements above and also the losses, with the most intense period at the end of April. We see a decrease in September, but then the trend continues downward. 2025 was a record year for artillery, but looking in detail at 2025, the trend is clearly decreasing steadily now. We had an average that was around 6200 at its highest, now we are down to around 3,500.
The trend is so clear that I believe it will continue to decline, and I suspect that it is actually because Russia and North Korea have now depleted their stocks and therefore cannot maintain deliveries. Even though FPV drones have taken over some of the artillery’s role, I do not think the Russians would voluntarily reduce their usage.
NOTE, Ragnar’s chart cannot display a full year, so it is divided into the first and second half of the year.

Suicide drones / FPV
Regarding FPV drones, we had a long upward trend going from an average of 2,000/day at the beginning of the year to around 6,400 in September, but after that, we have not seen an increase but rather a slight decline, now varying around approximately 5,000/day. Hopefully, we have seen the peak of their capabilities when it comes to FPV. If so, that is very positive. Perhaps they can no longer afford to pay China enough.
NOTE, Ragnar’s chart cannot display a full year, so it is divided into the first and second half of the year.

Summary for 2025

2025 was overall a record year in terms of soft vehicles and artillery, but looking in detail at soft vehicles, we do not see an increase, and regarding artillery, the losses decreased over the year along with the number of artillery attacks.
Armor has also continued to decline, and it is also positive to see that FPV drones have actually decreased. 2025 was the second-highest year in terms of personnel losses, but here too we see a decrease.
I interpret this positively and believe that Russia has reached its peak and is now actually on the decline. The costs are likely starting to be felt seriously, perhaps in combination with a certain general war fatigue.

The cloud on the horizon is the Russian attacks with UAVs, Shaheds, and cruise missiles. It risks paralyzing Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine has strong support and also strikes back deep, destroying refineries, depots, pipelines, substations, and industry. Russia is almost entirely dependent on its oil and gas for income, and if Ukraine can continue with its attacks and perhaps even intensify them, I still believe they have the upper hand.
Ukraine also does not have the same problem of being dependent on a single export income. The economy as a whole is of course severely strained, and they are instead dependent on external economic support. Recently, the EU has approved support for two years, and even though it will not be enough, many countries also provide direct support. Therefore, I think 2026 still looks very promising. We may not see a Russian collapse this year, but if it does not happen, it will probably be in 2027.

SLAVA UKRAINI