First – you should continue your daily discussion in the thread below regarding the Ukraine war.
Feel free to comment if you like this type of post in between, I posted it on a Sunday so it wouldn’t interfere with your Japanese Gi during the week.
With this post, I want to highlight the amount of disinformation that Russia and its paid agents in the West engage in.
Everyone is familiar with U137, which ran aground at night outside the Karlskrona base, leading to some dramatic days culminating in Torbjörn Fälldin unexpectedly finding his inner cavalryman and commanding the somewhat historic “Hold the Line” for Sweden.
Before that, the coastal artillery, which had almost no crew at all, had set up an experimental radar, and the Russians interpreted it as every coastal artillery battery in Sweden being aimed at their relief forces and that they were in a disadvantaged firing position – which was not the case because the only coastal artillery they had managed to man was an experimental radar and some towed artillery they had brought forward (I’m painting a bit…).
U137 eventually made its way back to Russia, and the alternative narrative started immediately.
You have all followed the mink stories and the herring shoal, as well as the constant mocking of our poor navy that loses itself during the daytime.
To be clear – Gåsefjärden was very suitable, a listening station from the FRA in the vicinity a few islands away, protected on-site with too few summer cottages, important sea cables, and proximity to the Karlskrona naval base, of course.
The Russians were also not known for avoiding risks – during WW2, they navigated in the Baltic Sea by maneuvering among the large rock formations along the seabed after attaching logs to the hull, allowing them to pass directly UNDER the Finnish sea mines. High risk was a bit their thing, simply 😲
There has been an extreme amount of energy put into various explanatory models, and when Anders Jallai discovered that it was beneficial for book sales to claim that it was US submarines that violated our archipelago, it was game over for the truth this time. I am quite disappointed in him, but his books sell, and I work entirely voluntarily without a penny for writing, so who is the real winner.
Then a certain “magazine” has devoted editorial energy to promoting alternative explanatory models, and one almost ends up in the hospital trying to argue with them – I have long emails that are like psychological torture.
The Russians themselves chose the less flattering “drunken sailor” track as an explanatory model, and books have been written on the subject.
Moreover, this was not a regular tour with U137 but a highly ranked officer from the home base was on board along with a group from GUGI. And Gugi were not just anyone – a bit like a British submarine having a group from the SAS on board. Gugi is the Russian unit that deals with underwater operations even in the Atlantic at great depths.
But apparently, the crew felt that a group from SOF and some high-ranking officer on board would not be able to prevent them from a huge drinking spree, so they didn’t know which way was up.
Or maybe the group from Gugi was on board to be landed inside Gåsefjärden perhaps, we will never know?
What I initiated on the Skalman forum was to try to prove that U137 COULD NOT have navigated wrongly, that the probability of that was close to zero.
Here comes the actual thesis, link at the bottom – you need to keep a clear head for this is the summary of an EXTREMELY broad discussion, but the conclusion is indisputable.
So what I am challenging is the possibility/probability of U137 having navigated wrongly.
And if the probability was close to zero, it meant that they did not navigate wrongly regardless of whether Jallai and Russia officially claimed it along with all sorts of others in a mosaic of wild explanatory models.
JHANS U-137 THESIS.
As I see it, the discussion about U137 boils down to two assumptions below, everything else is a side issue,
1 – a large number of consecutive errors, mistakes, misfortunes, and so on were made, which together led to the grounding, and this was therefore navigation error. (if at any one time, over a number of days, with a single instrument, they could have determined their course, the accident would never have happened, they would have sailed where they planned).
– The above sequence is not considered unreasonable, since U137 ran aground, there must have been a navigation error, and no one can be so foolish as to voluntarily sail in there. – The information presented to strengthen the above reasoning is theoretical assumptions or questioning of the information that does not indicate navigation error, and it is believed that a motive picture does not exist and that it is not unreasonable, or impossible, to navigate wrongly.
2 – a single error was made in connection with the grounding, likely after the change to 020 degrees, they had 2 minutes and ended up 8m off course, otherwise it was not navigation error.
– the technical information available is as good as it could ever be because it is the Navigation Journal, and we know it is correct. It has been reviewed by SOU 1995, considered the best investigation of the accident, and they are clearly skeptical of navigation error. Can the above be considered correct?
Since those who believe in Alternative 1, the chain of accidents and mistakes, only need to argue that it is not impossible or unreasonable as the discussion has evolved, the burden of proof lies on Alternative 2. Then it remains for those who believe in Alternative 2 to show as far as possible that one of these consecutive errors, mistakes, misfortunes, and so on is false, then the entire reasoning collapses like dominoes. U137 would have, assuming the right error/mistake is chosen, known where they were and sailed correctly instead. It then doesn’t matter how reasonable or unreasonable an incursion into Gåsfjärden is or that the motive picture is unclear.
– the thesis has failed, U137 did not navigate wrongly, period. Here we stand now, the final battle if you will. Here is my proposal for a false error or mistake that breaks Alternative 1 entirely and collapses the entire thesis,
The Utklippans lighthouse could not be mistaken for a fishing boat, – Those who know their navigation in the thread have unanimously and persistently claimed that Utklippans lighthouse cannot be mistaken for a fishing boat, they are starting to get a bit annoyed now. – SOU 1995 holds the same view as those who know navigation in the thread, one cannot mistake Utklippan lighthouse for a fishing boat. – Utklippans lighthouse was a radio beacon – Utklippans lighthouse was 30m above the water surface – Utklippans lighthouse should not be mistaken for anything other than Utklippans lighthouse http://www.fyr.org/wiki/index.php/Ang%C3%B6ringsfyr – A single hydrophone bearing would have told U137 that it was not a fishing boat.
– U137 passed 4M from Utklippans lighthouse, which is built to be visible from a great distance. – the course change after Utklippans lighthouse occurred in the red-green sector, and those who know their navigation in the thread have unanimously claimed that then you know where you are.
– U137 had this part of the Baltic Sea as a patrol area and should have been familiar with the lighthouses in the area. I believe that the theory of misnavigation is established, those of you who do not think so are welcome to provide information that strengthens why Utklippans lighthouse can reasonably be considered to have been mistaken for a fishing boat. Time, I don’t know, when it dies out I summarize all the arguments that have come in and then we’ll see if we need to reassess. A purely theoretical reasoning that it couldn’t be impossible probably should be considered a bit too vague given where we are now
https://forum.skalman.nu/viewtopic.php?f=22&t=44019&start=15#p742634
—
The discussion was then concluded in a way that the evil team did not provide any further explanations on the subject at all, they lost interest (guess why 😁).
Unfortunately, the media was not the least bit interested at the time, but they have continued to push NATO submarines and misnavigation as likely causes – we submitted this to all daily newspapers and offered to be interviewed but apparently the truth was not of interest to the entire established media in Sweden.
I later managed to uncover a Western psyops where a certain prominent Swedish politician with close ties to the USA was highly involved, and I posted it in the same thread – I’ll see if I can find it again 😀
And then we have Hårsfjärden where a West German submarine followed the Russian invasion fleet (some exaggeration…) and hence the chaos.
We were in the Skalman thread piecing together the information we received from open sources and what was declassified, and we succeeded surprisingly well.
The problem is that even today, those who were involved largely choose not to talk about it – the paper they signed stating that everything was confidential still seems to be taken seriously.
Considering the world situation and that our government has very clearly identified Russia as The Great Satan today, perhaps it’s time for a white paper?
Yes, some individuals in Sweden will not be painted in particularly beautiful colors BUT they are in most cases deceased or in nursing homes at best.
Anyway – at some point I will post an article about the submarine intrusions.
I also want to pitch that if anyone has a story to tell, they are welcome to do so under Johan No.1 with full source protection, contact me via DM on my Bluesky, DM on Substack, or on the website.
Every little puzzle piece is valuable no matter how small, as it always confirms another puzzle piece and we can build further.
Yes, this has faded a bit due to the ongoing war of invasion, but it is our history that has been falsified with the help of Russian subversive activities, and it is always important to clarify such matters.
If you liked the post, feel free to share it on your channels,
If you want a fun comment section that is really starting to pick up and is no longer just me talking it up on Bluesky – johanno1.se.
I recommend everyone who still comments on Substack or Bluesky to switch over to that thread instead – then your grandchildren will read your historical archive and start to like you.
On Substack, you are more than welcome to become paying subscribers, even those of you who already follow, and it’s great to see that some find it worth reading, appreciate all the work put into this, and took the step to subscribe 👍
https://bsky.app/profile/johanno1.bsky.social
Then there are the Swedish rescuers, those I have been in contact with operate quietly and deliver supplies to Ukraine. You don’t see them constantly on social media because they are instead working to support Ukraine.
Don't forget to donate, Ukraine's cause is ours! Support Ukraine!
NOTE: Those of you who do NOT want to allow automatic translation of your comments, please go to your profile page and set it.
Hover over your name at the top right, select edit profile, and you will then find the setting under the language settings heading.
Good morning!
1180 KWIA
6 Tanks
14 APVs
58 Artillery systems
3 MLRS
2 Anti-aircraft systems
190 UAVs
142 Vehicles & Fuel tanks
1 Special equipment
Glory to Ukraine!
https://bsky.app/profile/matsextrude.bsky.social/post/3ljweig2euk2k
Hmm, posted before I read. Maybe it should have been a separate post instead of a comment, since the post is not about Ukraine? 🤔
Are you allowed to read again 😉
“First – you should continue your daily discussion in the thread below about the Ukraine war”
(The first attempt to publish this comment ended up as a separate/main comment, long live the 5-minute editing function!)
Yes, of course, but when no comments came at all, I thought it might be due to the absence of Ukraine in the post.
There are reports from multiple sources that Ukraine is planning an orderly retreat from Russian Kursk. I am wondering what will happen next besides the propaganda victory for Russia, which will be painful to read. Obviously, the defense line should be significantly shortened and troops should retreat to prepared defensive positions. Will the 100,000 Russian soldiers, at least a large portion of them, then shift their focus back to Pokrovsk?
It may depend on how strong Ukraine and Russia are there at Kursk. If they withdraw in time and there are good defensive lines, there is probably no danger, but there is also a risk that the Russians instead continue into Ukraine. If they feel they have the upper hand, it is not impossible that they will at least try. They should be just as interested in tying up Ukrainian troops there as they are in preventing them from reinforcing elsewhere.
Hopefully, Ukraine has managed to give the Russians such a beating at Kursk that they do not have the opportunity to continue, so they settle for a retreat. Or we may see Ukraine push again after having retreated. It is difficult to know exactly what is happening there; perhaps it is not as bad as it seems, and rumors of withdrawal may be a smokescreen.
No, I brought it up a few days ago and now UA themselves have confirmed it after reading my decision 👍
The risk is that they will keep rolling, on the other hand, a well-equipped and competent Ukrainian brigade is freed when they no longer need to guard the rat hole Sudzja. The propaganda gain for the Russians is the worst, on the other hand, it has cost literally thousands of Russians and North Koreans.
Much appreciated submarine post.
More please!
Contemporary history (=last 50-100 years) is often treated stepmotherly, it is both too close and too distant at the same time.
At the same time, it provides the keys to what is happening today.
I doubt that we will ever see a white paper, though (just look at the broad political consensus not to dig into the Stasi archive…).
I think Theutenberg’s books (recommend “Palme reevaluated” for those who can’t handle all the brickstones) provide a good picture of Fälldin and the political generation he belonged to. Regardless of whether you agreed on specific issues or not, many of them still stood for something, dared to shoulder responsibility, and could admit mistakes and shortcomings (unlike the slippery eels of the 2000s).
Was K-O Feldt the last in that generation?
And before anyone else can intervene, speaking of submarines, ships, and lighthouses:
“I say *you* divert *your* course, or counter measures will be undertaken!”
“This is a *lighthouse*, mate. Your call.”
I *know* it’s an urban legend (and ‘the arrogant captain’ a worn-out trope) but… it’s still hilarious.
Den är rolig och tål att upprepas!
Theutenberg is credible
Thank you 😀
The submarine history is interesting, and I must agree that it sounds very strange if one were to have gotten drunk and navigated so wrongly.
Now, the Russians are who they are, but that would mean that they also have no self-preservation instinct whatsoever if they think it’s a good idea to operate a submarine without a sober person navigating.
Jo, several previous accidents involving drunkenness at sea were brought up, and that a US submarine had driven STRAIGHT into an entire underwater mountain.
At Bokus, you can find the book “Inside U 137: My Own Story” by Vasilij Besedin, deputy ship commander on the submarine:
https://www.bokus.com/bok/9789186560874/inifran-u-137-min-egen-berattelse
The book has a reader review:
“A bit thin and feels like the story is embellished. Doesn’t get better when I realized that the author’s title “deputy ship commander” meant political officer. But the book is fun.
Johan, November 6, 2013″
Could it possibly be you, Johan?
Not exactly a credible witness 😳
Maybe I was in an emotional state at some point, don’t know 😀
Thank you johhano1 for the submarine story, it’s always interesting to ponder. An acquaintance was on standby when it happened, but they sent in a conscripted year group instead to monitor the waters around the vessel.
The coastal artillery’s fixed installations had a visually very clear red lever. One position was “Peace” and the other position “War”.
When the lever was switched to “War”, the radar’s functionality changed and the frequencies jumped to avoid being easily jammed. This is what was done, and the Russian forces thus became aware that the coastal artillery had switched to a war footing and locked onto their targets.
There were also several Swedish air companies on their way there, and all the Viggens were armed and ready. Even though the coastal artillery bluffed a bit (only a few battalions were combat-ready), there was a lot of firepower under the Viggens’ wings. The Russians were wise and did not cross the line.
I didn’t have any knowledge about flying, but were there some 77 howitzers out there?
Thank you! Very welcome with contemporary history. And the peculiar disinformation fog that lies over things we should have been able to straighten out. I fully agree that it was not misnavigated. Sometimes you can almost discern a pattern in when events are intensely flooded with more or less reasonable explanations (disinformation campaign) and almost always in a derogatory/you are paranoid tone – then you get an indication that something is being hidden 😂🤪
For a while, I thought that if Russia collapses, maybe we could get some answers on some things (either released through archives or by people daring to talk/could talk without being shot down via disinformation campaigns). Keeping my fingers crossed that the time will soon be right.
Sure, that would be perfect 👍
A bit surprised by what a TV series can achieve.
In my world and social circles (perhaps limited and with a general confirmation bias), no one has ever believed that U137 was in Gåsefjärden due to navigation errors. We were teenagers at the time, but a quick look at the map and a minimum knowledge of the Swedish archipelago make the claim of navigation error so unlikely that it can be disregarded. – That’s also how I perceive it, since it has been proven time and time again, by experts and the interested public.
It was probably a navigation error within Gåsefjärden itself, as it seems a bit far-fetched that Swedish preparedness (the aggressiveness in their behavior) would be tested by running a submarine aground…
So, I thought “Whiskey on the Rocks” was a fun and absurd comedy when I watched it. Without much reflection, based on the understanding that it’s a pure made-up story. – Then all hell broke loose for many. That’s when – only then – I started wondering if that was actually the purpose behind it, from someone. A diversion tactic?
I feel like U137 is getting attention now that it doesn’t really deserve. I get the impression that this attention instead gives dubious forces an opportunity to explain things away to younger generations. We older folks know what happened and have never conveyed anything else (or so I thought).
Is probably if nothing else the only time we have indisputable evidence of a submarine violation that is not in a top-secret archive 😀
Johan!
As boldly as you argue your case here, one can hardly object. However, this discussion has an emotional significance for me due to a personal experience. I’ll take the chance.
Some declarations first.
1. I have no problem at all believing that the Russians would consider me doing something like that if their risk calculation ended up in the positive.
2. I have not followed details about the route and definitely do not pretend to be able to assess the credibility (or rather incredibility) of claims about how they ended up where they did.
However, there are some details that could indicate a navigation error. As may be apparent above, I refrain from weighing them against what speaks against navigation errors.
1. Several very credible witnesses claim to have heard the submarine running on diesel engines long before running aground. These witnesses, including fishermen, with great experience at sea, could of course have been mistaken. If the assessment they make of what they heard is correct, it must strongly indicate a navigation error. A submarine commander must be a complete idiot if he does not choose propulsion via electric motors during a spy mission.
2. We have all seen the pictures. My memory is that about half of the submarine is on the reef. Maybe I’m exaggerating a bit here. In any case, it is obvious that the boat hit the reef with considerable speed. Commander Captain Andersson estimated at least eight knots if I remember correctly. (Whatever experiences he bases that on. Similar incidents do not happen often.)
Once again, the commander must be a complete idiot if he does not proceed at the slowest possible speed in case he is unsure of his exact location, i.e., in a very difficult-to-navigate area. If I remember correctly, it was foggy, i.e., almost windless. There may of course be currents affecting the speed. But eight knots or more in a large vessel seems more than a bit idiotic unless you have extremely good knowledge of the waters you are in.
3. If I had been the captain on such a mission, I would have proceeded at the slowest possible speed. I would also have partially filled the ballast tanks so that I was about half a meter, or maybe more, deeper than the minimum draft. If I had hit something, I could blow the tanks and float free.
4. Regarding probabilities (my professional field). But it’s difficult assessments in this case even for a statistician. (The type of reasoning that applies here is not usually dealt with by a statistician.) Let me just say that in this world, extremely improbable things happen frequently. When the range of possible events is almost infinite, extremely improbable things happen. I don’t want to assert anything specific here, just point out this fact.
Unfortunately, I am a bit busy today. So I can’t be here continuously today, but of course, I will try to respond to any objections. And as I said, I do not want to argue that it was a navigation error. Just point out a few things that could indicate that direction.
We actually went through that with the speed – the boat needed a certain speed for steerage way and the fjord itself would have been enough without any problem to stop the submarine if it hadn’t run aground.
I seem to remember that we also went through the ballast tanks but I don’t remember what we concluded.
We also went through the incorrect navigation they did in the fog and it was 8 seconds that caused them to run aground – 8 seconds too late for a course change.
As I said – this conclusion was preceded by a year of discussion where every single piece was examined, the whole discussion is saved in the Skalman thread.
This is just the thesis itself.
MXT mentions the book from the officer on the submarine – it has also been cited as evidence but he is a party in the case and in no way an independent expert, and besides, he’s Russian 😀
The most important place to hang out is always here 😀
Fälldin is a hero. Speaking of artillery duels, Not my area of expertise. But as a ship captain, one would probably hesitate to engage in an artillery duel against a battery embedded in solid rock.
May I share a different personal experience about a boat trip in somewhat unfamiliar waters in the archipelago.
Many years ago, I was on a boat trip with a friend (now more like a former friend) on the outskirts of the Stockholm archipelago (Svartlögafjärden). My friend had no experience at sea. An open plastic boat barely five meters long. The wind started to pick up. Not much, but enough to create some waves. Even with moderate wind, there can be quite a bit of swell on large fjords. My friend thought he was a tough guy. It was amusing to see him get scared. I hadn’t even considered those thoughts. The difference, of course, has nothing to do with courage or anything like that. It’s about experience. I knew from experience that what we were experiencing then was basically nothing compared to what the boat (and the skipper) could handle.
What my friend didn’t know, luckily for him, was that I didn’t have complete control over where the shallows were. At times, we were inside the three-meter contour on the nautical chart and on the outskirts of my familiar waters. So, it was important to keep a close eye. Well, I had been there before, so it was far from having no clue.
How to establish dominance 😀
Completely unintentional!
Very interesting information above, will try to find time to read and comment even if it moved on to a new post.
A reflection – so it is not NOW that history has changed with SVT – this has been going on for MANY years trying to whitewash history. For a very long time, and when Jallai started writing books with NATO as the perpetrator, it became quite difficult to shift the focus back to Russia.
But now it should be possible, and at some point history must be written as it actually unfolded.
I almost think we can create another category, “miscellaneous” or similar, where we can include this post (and any future ones that are not related to Ukraine). That way it will be easier to find it again, so the thread can continue as long as there is interest. Or I can “pin” the post with a direct link in the main menu “U 137”? So far, we have plenty of space in the menu and if it makes it easier for visitors, we might as well take advantage of it.
Sure, here is the translation:
“Sure, it’s probably a good idea to move the special posts to their own category.”
Ok! Fixed another item in the menu now!
There is some more information available.
The Navy uses single marks for navigation.
I remember that we found an interview with an officer who, in another discussion, confirmed that a single mark was damaged/missing and that it was in the area.
I don’t dare to swear by it, but it’s in the shell thread.
And if they had navigated by single marks, the damaged one would have affected them.
Regarding the speed someone mentioned above – have you ever seen the Navy drive in our inner archipelago 😳
I was about to start arguing about the single marks. But then it would be like I’m taking a stance. Do I want to refrain from that. In that context, I checked the weather anyway. I must correct what I stated as a memory regarding the weather. It was calm, but not foggy. Good visibility according to Wikipedia.
It was an interview with a major, if I remember correctly, in another context, here is some of the discussion
https://forum.skalman.nu/viewtopic.php?f=22&t=41075&p=741680&hilit=ensm%C3%A4rken#p741680
https://forum.skalman.nu/viewtopic.php?f=22&t=41075&p=741682&hilit=ensm%C3%A4rken#p741682
Johan!
You previously mentioned a single mark that was missing. My thought, which I didn’t fully articulate in writing, was that in that case the boat should hit the ground right in front of the “previous” single mark. However, what you linked to doesn’t mention a missing single mark. But of course, it’s possible to fail to follow the single marks even if they are in place.
But lo and behold. The link describes the boat hitting right in front of a single mark. So it could be that they missed turning towards the new single mark and simply hit the “old” single mark.
Regarding wind speed and course speed. Have been browsing a bit at SMHI. The nearest station I found with wind data for the current time was Hanö. I might have missed a closer station. Can’t guarantee that it’s the closest station. Utklippan and Karlskrona don’t have data for the time at least.
Hanö reports on 27/10 1981
At 18: 4.0 m/s
At 21: 6.0 m/s
Not a strong wind, but not calm either.
Correct.
I attended a lecture, organized by Jonas V Marten, a few years ago. At that lecture, a coastal ranger officer, at the time, spoke about the events surrounding the submarine.
Among other things, they had taken down a navigation mark for renovation. It was a type of plank with a white(?) triangle, and a corresponding triangle painted on the rock. If the captain had intended to use this to navigate into the fjord, it aligns quite well with the course he was holding at the time of the collision.
Furthermore, he was deeply impressed by the prompt action taken throughout the incident. Upon request, a road was quickly built down to an established observation point to provide the soldiers with accommodation, hygiene, and provisions. They also suggested an air defense since they suspected an attack and a rescue operation via helicopter as a likely scenario. The proposal was immediately accepted, and within hours, air defense had been established on surrounding islands. As for the cannons and target radar, there was a 12/70(?) battery on Tjurkö with two cannons. They had removed the old radar to replace it with a new one, so the battery was actually not operational. However, they had access to a radar housed in mobile wagons, intended for training, and they brought it to a position between and just below the two cannons. The communication cables had to be pulled through the gates in the rock, so they couldn’t seal off the mountain. When Soviet ships began to approach Swedish territorial waters, they activated the frequency-hopping radar, causing the ships to come to a sudden stop. They also fired two projectiles a kilometer in front of the ships as a warning, which led to some diplomatic activity…
These are my recollections of the lecture. If anyone else was there, please feel free to add or correct if I misunderstood anything.
In the submarine discussion, many miss the most important thing – what was happening while everyone was looking at the “misguided” submarine?
The fact that witnesses heard diesel engines before the grounding, MAY indicate that the submarine WANTED to attract attention.
If, for Russia, a greater profit can be obtained in relation to an exposed submarine (+ repairs), it is entirely conceivable that this could be the motive for the submarine’s location.
In addition, there is a huge influence operation (decoys, distractions, etc.).
So, the real question is, what happened while we were fully occupied swarming around their submarine?
This is a textbook example of how an illusionist works – “look at my hand with the handkerchief”… and then the dove appears elsewhere.
Assuming that Russia gained something from its “misnavigation,” then the question is, what could be so important that it is worth sacrificing a submarine for?
It’s also a bit strange that it was the ONLY submarine that navigated incorrectly… we have never heard anything similar again.
If they were so clumsy, one wonders a bit how they planned to survive a possible nuclear war… which suggests that they were NOT clumsy, but it was a deliberate act.
What do I know, I’m not an expert or anything.
Not without that thought being interesting. – I perceive that misnavigation has been almost non-existent for over 40 years, even though it is not technically impossible, just very unlikely…
I can tell you that 😁
There were two (2) submarines that night, from memory I believe it was those who heard the engine noises that revealed it.
Then there was a new secret torpedo test.
And the Swedish navy saw two very small underwater vessels near the lighthouse and in the area where they tested the torpedoes.
I’m a bit rusty with this since we stopped writing in 2017 or something but everything is in the shell thread, I’ll try to learn how to search.
So you are absolutely right in other words 😁
Thank you Johan for an interesting post!
It was always a tense situation in our waters back then. Navigation errors are unlikely. Yes, there should be someone who has information that would prove it.
Recommend a couple of interesting books about the submarine intrusions.
“The Truth About the Submarine Issue” by Bengt Gustafsson, “The Impossible Submarine” by Nils-Ove Jansson
Thank you too – yes, they have written interesting books
When I checked Skalman, it was 8m off, not 8 seconds…
This was completed in 2017 or so, so a bit rusty 😲