It’s a bit early so far because what is flying around is not something formal in a list where the EU or Ukraine has published it, but different statements reproduced from the meeting in Geneva, so below is a certain degree of speculation until it is no longer.
First of all, we already know that an agreement is meaningless because Russia has violated 15 of them since they violated the Budapest Agreement, which the UK and USA did not bother to hold them accountable for.
But don’t be discouraged by that – now agreements will be written again that no one will be held accountable for.
Europe seems to have insisted that the US should provide Ukraine with security guarantees similar to Article 5 – why we didn’t instead write that we in Europe would provide Ukraine with strong security guarantees is very intriguing and can be perceived as weak by both Russia and China.
Trump may have picked up that ball and now it stands like this – the USA/Trump has the right to intervene in Ukraine if Russia violates the agreement. So, the USA/Trump has that possibility but not the obligation.
Furthermore, it states that Europe should follow the USA, so if the USA/Trump chooses not to intervene, we should not do it either.
- to Trump because Europe set the table for him.
It also seems like Europe is discussing the size of Ukraine’s defense forces instead of telling Trump to go to hell – they have thus accepted that Ukraine cannot have the defense forces they believe they need to defend their country.
Normally, it is the loser’s defense forces that are negotiated – is Ukraine the losing party?
So far, Europe’s leaders seem to be torn between disaster or abysmal.
Something that seems implicit is a ceasefire, Europe does not want Russia to acquire possession of conquered areas and gets entangled in a difficult wording, but the USA wants Russian interests to be accommodated.
However, a ceasefire seems to be a given, and that would mean that we have reached 1938.
Right now, I don’t see how Ukraine will be able to resist when Europe bends like a reed in a autumn storm.
They retreat at the fronts but with their strategic offensive reserve, they manage to stabilize the situation somewhat.
There have been whispers of an offensive, but as the USA/Trump/Russia now indicate, a UA offensive will draw significant criticism.
And if Europe does not unequivocally stand on Ukraine’s side, it will be a defeat in negotiations of some sort.
The USA has –
-stopped the money so that the citizens will get angry.
-opposed Zelensky for a long time to weaken his political platform.
-supported Russia.
-attacked the EU for the problems Russia has caused us.
-allowed Russia to drive some corruption scandal.
-taken a Russian capitulation plan and made it sound like a US document.
Europe is being too kind here, but the problem is not that, but that we are now heading towards a global conflict because we have exploited Ukraine’s four-year sacrifice.
One point was good on the European list – that Europe would send a lot of troops to Ukraine.
Anyone daring to guess if Trump will even mention that with a single word?
Russia doesn’t want that, so you already have the answer, it will be hushed up just like with Kursk.
Allowing the USA to negotiate when it’s not even a negotiation but everything is rigged is very strange, but that’s where we are anyway.
If there is a ceasefire, we are at the point where Russia thought they would arrive after a week.
Then their phase 2 can begin four years too late, but they seem almost euphoric right now.
The Baltic states and Poland are already today exposed to active war-preparing measures, not yet twilight, so it’s easy to see who’s next in line.
Finland has started training reservists
Now, I don’t know how much weight you can put on Telegraph, but according to them, Europe has suffered from acute battle fatigue and rolled over on its back and died
There is a whole bunch claiming that Europe has a brilliant plan and that we are the adults in the room – it’s about time to see the result of this plan now.
The question is whether the same bunch will say that a ceasefire is for the better as well, but it’s not.
A ceasefire takes us back to 1938 unfortunately, and Europe will have to face the consequences of our brilliant plan for the next 5-6 years.
One is not entirely satisfied with this, and one sympathizes with Ukraine, who trusted their friends but learned the hard way that we are the pals who betray when it really matters.
I will try to keep up and follow what is happening now during the most crucial months of the war because it will determine our situation in Europe for at least the next 5-6 years.
Don't forget to donate, Ukraine's cause is ours! Support Ukraine!
Russian losses 2025-11-25
1120 KWIA
2 Tanks
4 AFVs
18 Artillery systems
2 Anti-aircraft systems
448 UAVs
112 Vehicles & Fuel tanks
3 Special equipment
SLAVA UKRAINI
๐
Earlier during the war, before Trump took office and began to do Putin’s bidding, Russian troll accounts spread the message that Ukraine was completely under the control of the USA and was forced/deceived into going against Russia. It actually started even earlier, back in 2014 during Maidan, it was the CIA and who knows what was behind that revolution.
The Ukrainians were actually Russians but with a Nazi-like, USA loyal leadership.
In addition, there was also a lot of talk about how Europe was also completely controlled by the USA.
The stuff about Ukraine was of course just nonsense propaganda, but now one almost starts to wonder when it comes to Europe. Why can’t we just ignore the USA and come up with our own plan?
Sure, we have been disarming for many years but it’s not so bad that we couldn’t do much more for Ukraine than we have. Throughout the war, we have read about countries buying military equipment, take Poland for example, which has bought everything from tanks to HIMARS. Turkey probably has one of the world’s largest holdings of tanks, etc.
The fact that we can’t take the lead from the USA makes you wonder why we don’t dare to do something on our own and instead let the USA call the shots.
Another thought, which may be more likely than us being controlled by the USA, is that the situation in Ukraine may be much worse than we know. The Russians’ nightly attacks have escalated and continue to increase.
It may be that Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has taken a huge hit.
Europe’s recent plan seems to have shifted from delivering weapons to providing money so that Ukraine can build what they need.
A good plan in essence but without electricity, Ukraine’s factories will not be able to deliver.
If the Russians have also managed to knock out weapon factories, etc., it’s even worse (Ukraine never tells when it happens, but we are naive if we don’t think it happens now and then).
In addition, we also see how Russia, albeit slower than a snail, keeps advancing and Ukraine keeps retreating. It has been the same for over two years now. Sure, Ukraine was in Kursk but for some reason was forced to retreat from there too.
Zelenskyy seems satisfied after the talks in Switzerland, although personally I don’t think it seems to have led to any decisive differences from the original Russian plan.
The fact that he seems satisfied despite poor conditions may unfortunately be an indication that the situation in Ukraine may be really bad. Maybe Europe’s leaders are also aware of this, but instead of taking action to change the situation, they are instead ready to give in.
Zelenskyy, on his part, has probably realized that Europe has no intention of increasing its support and is not willing to deploy troops. Then maybe he reasons that a bad peace is still better than risking that a large part of the male population dies in battles and that the whole country risks falling.
Or maybe I am completely wrong in my speculations. Perhaps Zelenskyy is satisfied with the changes to the agreements because he knows that Putin will never accept them, so the whole peace agreement will just fizzle out.
Even though Russia looks clearly strongest at the frontlines, cracks are starting to show in the country’s economy, but also among the population, more and more. I actually believe that even Putin is starting to get really nervous now.
The near future could absolutely be decisive if these peace negotiations actually lead somewhere.
However, I am not worried about a global escalation if it ends in peace. I think Putin will breathe a sigh of relief, his failed three-day war has cost immensely and he will probably be glad if he can get away with it.
I see no major risk for Europe, however, it may not be too many years before there is a new attempt against Ukraine. The propaganda will of course continue about how badly they treat Russians, etc. then we will have some false-flag operations and then they will roll in again.
Good summaries from both of you๐๐๐
Europe does not deny itself. Yesterday there was a European speakers’ meeting in Stockholm which, among other things, would shed light on the consequences of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Ukraine’s speaker Ruslan Stefantjuk was present, but also Argentina’s speaker. (For some reason).
Either it is as Johan and MXT suggest that Europe knows more about the state of affairs in Russia and delays everything with endless meetings of various kinds, or like the ostrich, they bury their heads in the sand and hope that the USA will slam their fist on the table.
NYT 25(11(2025))
Hur fredsplanen ser ut fรถr Ukraina och Ryssland
Kriget i Ukraina har pรฅgรฅtt i nรคstan fyra รฅr, eller elva รฅr om man rรคknar frรฅn Krims annektering 2014. Mรฅnga fรถrutsรคgelser har visat sig vara felaktiga: Ryssland kommer att vinna inom en vecka. Ukraina vinner, mot alla odds. Vรคsterlรคndska sanktioner kommer att tรถmma Ryssland pรฅ resurser och tvinga landet till fรถrhandlingsbordet.
I stรคllet har detta fรถrvandlats till ett utnรถtningskrig, dรคr Ryssland lรฅngsamt avancerar.
Kraven frรฅn bรฅda sidor รคr ofรถrenliga. Ryssland kommer aldrig att dra sig tillbaka till en position fรถre 2014, sรคger analytiker. Ukraina kommer aldrig att gรฅ med pรฅ ett avtal som inte innehรฅller garantier mot en framtida invasion frรฅn Ryssland. Men mellan dessa positioner, vilka kort har varje sida pรฅ handen? Var finns utrymme fรถr fรถrhandlingar?
Andrew Kramer, vรฅr Ukraina-chef, och Anatoly Kurmanaev, en lรฅngvarig korrespondent i Ryssland, har bevakat kriget frรฅn bรถrjan. Jag ringde upp dem bรฅda.
Andrew, vilka รคr Ukrainas rรถda linjer?
Territoriet รคr absolut avgรถrande. De behรถver ocksรฅ trovรคrdiga sรคkerhetsgarantier. Avtalet erbjuder Ukraina sรคkerhetsgarantier, men den version vi har sett specificerar dem inte. Det utarbetas tydligen i en separat bilaga till avtalet. Sรฅ det รคr verkligen dรคr det gรคller.
Anatoly, vilka รคr Rysslands rรถda linjer?
Att fรถr alltid utesluta Ukrainas medlemskap i Nato โ inte bara ett lรถfte, utan att fรถrankra det i ukrainsk lag och Natos stadgar. Ryssland vill ocksรฅ gรถra ansprรฅk pรฅ ytterligare territorium, som Donbas, som Putin kan sรคlja som en seger. Nรคrvaron av Nato-trupper i Ukraina รคr ocksรฅ ett absolut nej.
Andrew, vilket territorium tror du att Ukraina maximalt skulle kunna avstรฅ frรฅn?
Ukraina gick redan i mars med pรฅ ett eldupphรถr lรคngs den nuvarande frontlinjen. Det skulle alltsรฅ innebรคra ett de facto erkรคnnande av rysk kontroll รถver allt รถster och sรถder om frontlinjen. Men tillรคgget i planen รคr den del av Donetskregionen som fรถrblir under ukrainsk kontroll. Det skulle troligen ta Ryssland minst tvรฅ รฅr att erรถvra den. Att ge bort den รคr en grรคns.
En kompromiss skulle kunna vara att kalla detta omrรฅde en demilitariserad zon under rysk kontroll.
Och skulle Ukraina kunna leva med det i utbyte mot eftergifter pรฅ andra omrรฅden?
Det รคr verkligen den stora frรฅgan: Skulle regeringen i Kiev kunna presentera detta fรถr ukrainarna som nรถdvรคndigt fรถr en lรฅngsiktig fred? Privat sรคger ukrainska tjรคnstemรคn att sรคkerhetsgarantier รคr viktigare รคn den exakta placeringen av den nya demilitariserade zonen. Fรถr det รคr det som garanterar landets lรฅngsiktiga suverรคnitet och sรคkerhet. Det รคr det som skulle gรถra det mรถjligt att รฅteruppta den ekonomiska utvecklingen.
Sรฅ hur ser trovรคrdiga sรคkerhetsgarantier ut?
De modeller som ligger pรฅ bordet รคr att ha nรฅgra europeiska trupper vรคster om floden Dnipro, vilket i stort sett skulle vara symboliskt, som en tryggande styrka; en tripwire-modell, som skulle krรคva en stรถrre styrka i Europa som skulle aktiveras fรถr att delta i striden vid en ny attack; eller ett lรถfte om vรคstligt stรถd om Ryssland skulle invadera igen โ nรฅgot som bygger pรฅ Natos artikel 5 om รถmsesidigt fรถrsvar, men utan Nato.
Anatoly, pรฅminn oss om Rysslands invรคndningar mot ett samarbete mellan Nato och Ukraina.
Putin kallade invasionen fรถr en kampanj fรถr att โavnazifieraโ och โdemilitariseraโ Ukraina. Denna berรคttelse bygger pรฅ falska uppgifter om Ukrainas historia och dess regering. Men den angivna motiveringen รคr att Ryssland invaderade fรถr att eliminera ett upplevt hot, och hotet var att Ukraina drog sig mot Nato. Kreml har framstรคllt kriget som en fรถrebyggande attack.
Natos gradvisa expansion รถsterut vรคckte en mycket verklig kรคnsla av upprรถrdhet bland ryssarna, inklusive Putins kritiker. Folk oroar sig fรถr att Ukraina ska bli en bas fรถr vรคsterlรคndska trupper och missiler.
Andrew, finns det nรฅgot sรคtt att komma runt Natos invรคndningar genom att istรคllet ha fredsbevarande styrkor som bรคr en EU-mรถssa?
Det hรคnde i Georgien pรฅ kontaktlinjen mellan Ryssland och Georgien i regionerna Sydossetien och Abchazien. Sรฅ det finns ett prejudikat fรถr det.
Sett frรฅn Ukrainas perspektiv, tror du att det finns en rimlig chans att denna plan faktiskt kan leda till ett fredsavtal?
Ja, det tror jag. Sรฅ smรฅningom. Ju fler iterationer detta gรฅr igenom, desto mer sannolikt รคr det att nรฅgot kommer att fastna.
Och det finns vissa punkter dรคr det finns utrymme fรถr fรถrhandlingar. Till exempel storleken pรฅ taket fรถr den ukrainska militรคren. Analytiker sรคger att Ukrainas efterkrigsmilitรคr oundvikligen kommer att behรถva minskas i storlek. De kan inte behรฅlla en miljon man stark stรฅende armรฉ.
Och nรคr det gรคller Nato: det finns en fรถrstรฅelse fรถr att Ukraina inte kommer att gรฅ med i Nato eftersom inte alla Nato-medlemmar skulle acceptera det. Sรฅ detta รคr inte lรคngre den oenighet som det en gรฅng var.
Anatoly, hur รคr det med Ryssland?
Trots alla brister i denna plan verkar den รฅtminstone fรถrsรถka infรถrliva nรฅgra centrala krav frรฅn bรฅda sidor. Vad behรถver bรฅda sidor som ett absolut minimum fรถr att sluta strida? Bรฅde Putin och Zelensky stรฅr infรถr enorma inhemska utmaningar, och de mรฅste bรฅda sรคlja detta som en seger till sina vรคljare.
Andrew, ger folket i Ukraina Trump kredit fรถr att han fรถrsรถker fรถrhandla fram nรฅgot?
Ja, det finns kanske รถverraskande stรถd. Det fanns en extraordinรคr frustration รถver Biden-administrationens politik att dra ut pรฅ bistรฅndet utan att gรถra nรฅgra diplomatiska anstrรคngningar. Tanken att det finns nรฅgon form av uppgรถrelse pรฅ gรฅng รคr mycket hoppfull, รคven om detta kanske inte รคr den slutgiltiga versionen.
N Slobozhansky-Kursk 3โ๏ธ
S Slobozhansky 5
Kupyansk 4
Lyman 15๐ฅโ๏ธ
Slovyansk 15๐ฅโ๏ธ
Kramatorsk 0
Kostjantynivka 24๐ฅ๐ฅโ๏ธ
Pokrovsk 61๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฅ
Oleksandrivskij 13๐ฅโ๏ธ
Huliaypillia 17๐ฅ
Orikhivsk 1โ๏ธ
Prydniprovskij/Dnipro 2
Sum sectors 160โ๏ธ
Total 183โ๏ธ
Unloc 23โ๏ธ
In an attempt to grasp at straws.
Regarding the link about the Finns’ exercise, it’s nice to see that Sweden is contributing (if the picture is indeed from the exercise…)
Can we invade Murmansk ๐ง
MXT – in previous posts we have well described how it looks in action and it looks quite dark.
Now the strategic reserve is fighting and can probably continue.
But if the USA increases soft pressure too much, anything can happen – and that’s probably what they’re trying to do?
Europe is backing off so Ukraine stands alone.
Regarding increased conflict – history does not agree at all and all Chiefs of Defense in Europe are starting to get worried.
The path to peace is to collapse Russia so that China doesn’t have time to get started.
Right now that’s not happening and the alternative is increased global conflict instead.
If it wasn’t a threat, why is Poland buying all the weapons they can find?
Or why is Finland training reserves?
Such things are expensive.
Sure, there is a threat and you can never know what Putin will come up with and it also depends on China.
My assessment is that China is not interested in actively supporting Russia and attempting to take over, for example, the Baltics, however, China may very well try with Taiwan and probably wants to take advantage while Trump is still in office.
Without China, I don’t think Putin dares to do anything serious against Europe. Sure, he realizes that we are cowardly and not willing to sacrifice enough to give Ukraine victory, but a direct confrontation against Europe, I don’t think he dares.
He now seems to have barely been able to wriggle out of a war that he thought would be a simple military operation but turned into a nightmare that if it continues for too long could cost him both power and life.
Russia pretends to be strong when they are weak and provokes as much as they dare, but I think it stops there. If Putin can just achieve something he can sell as a victory, I think he will be satisfied.
Sure, it’s impossible to know what risks he is actually willing to take, but I think the chance of something happening against Europe in several years is extremely low.
But it is certainly not zero, and therefore we must prepare ourselves. We have been too complacent for too long so there is much that needs to be built up.
Also, we do not know if Putin could be replaced by someone else.
A large part of Russia’s population has been heavily brainwashed, so within 5-10 years, it is not impossible that things will escalate.
Europe underestimated Russia’s aggressiveness for many years and believed in eternal peace.
Now I instead think that they overestimate Russia’s capabilities, just as they begin to have internal problems and probably would not be able to last more than 1-2 years.
If there were to be peace, I instead see that the risk is much greater that they firstly gain influence over Ukraine (election interference, etc.) and then when they have some time, they will probably make new attempts to take over.
Even if the goal is to take over the Baltics as well, I think he wants full control over Ukraine as a buffer zone and to be able to mobilize soldiers from the population before moving on. That was probably his plan from the beginning but right now I think they are too weak for that.
Unfortunately, Europe is also too weak and wants peace, otherwise I think it would have been the perfect time to escalate significantly because I don’t believe that Russia would hold up much longer.
I actually think it’s Putin who has pressured Trump for peace negotiations this time and Trump needs success now so both are probably equally eager to achieve something.
Found a thread about defense lines in Poland and the Baltics against Belarus and Russia – a total of 15km…
China and Taiwan – they have come a long way there.
Regarding Russia, the first bid is probably that they will try to stay under Article 5?
And then trigger a financial crash for us through their black swan?
—
The question is how resilient we are against drone weapons in 2025 and if it might make RU a little more risk-prone?
—
But it seems we agree that we should prepare ourselves and we have not done that.
has UA cleared out Pokrovsk again or not?
hearing different things about it.
should they have done?
See Greg’s post yesterday about Pokrovsk. That it is indeed being cleaned up, but that it has ended up in the media shadow.
Perfect – what I think we are seeing is tactical adaptation from UA + that they are now using their strategic reserves.
Can probably continue like this for a while.
We are risking this –
“we in Europe are ready to support Ukraine to victory but now they chose to go along with the US peace plan and then we must respect that”
Best regards
Europe that hasn’t said a word in two weeks and crossed their fingers hoping they wouldn’t have to make a decision
Europe can’t keep up with Trump’s pace at all. And Trump doesn’t want Europe involved in the discussions either, it’s too complicated.
If Europe is kept out, it also makes it easier for Trump to grab a larger “peace deal.”
Europe has lost its edge when it comes to negotiating peace. Previously, for example, it was Martti Ahtisaari who sat down with representatives from both sides, and they went through both sides’ arguments and talked and discussed under the mediator’s control until they were somewhat in agreement.
Now Trump is stomping around talking to the aggressor and scolding the victim every other minute, demanding that Ukraine behave. How is it possible to achieve a sustainable peace in that way?
Yesterday I wrote a post about the EU’s import of Russian oil and oil products during July this year. Based on data from Eurostat, I concluded that the EU’s import of such could be estimated at a maximum of 2 percent of Russia’s exports.
CREA has a compilation that can be compared with. Data is presented in the form of a figure, which for understandable reasons is difficult to read accurately. However, the figure is complemented with text that provides certain numbers. As a statistician, I become a bit skeptical when I see a figure where the explanatory text doesn’t even include information about the unit used. (Millions of EUR?) Furthermore, regarding the time period, it is stated that the numbers refer to the period: since the EU’s oil ban until the end of September 2025. Surely, these extremely important details can probably be found out/figured out. However, one shouldn’t have to do that. It doesn’t give a direct professional impression.
With that said, it is claimed that the EU accounted for 6 percent of purchases of Russian crude oil and the EU is not included in the figure of buyers of Russian oil products.
I won’t go into details here, but summarizing it, according to this data, the EU appears to be a relatively small buyer of Russian oil/products. However, it probably corresponds to significantly more than the figure I mentioned yesterday, see above.
The EU does not buy Russian coal at all.
When it comes to natural gas, the EU is a very large buyer both via pipelines (35%) and in the form of LNG (about half). However, the revenues from such are significantly less than from oil/products.
In terms of revenues (another figure plus text) from fossil fuels total during September, the largest contributions came from China (42%) and India. The EU accounted for 8 percent of Russia’s revenues from fossil fuels. In September 2025, the EU contributed EUR 1bn to Russia for such fuels. I leave it to those interested to put this figure into context.
A halt to the import of pipeline gas to the EU would presumably be very effective. Such would likely be difficult to sell through another channel. I believe we know fairly well who the specific importers are here. (May possibly return with details.)
All of the above according to CREA
[Link to the source article](https://energyandcleanair.org/september-2025-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/)
Yes, the EU has continued to buy, and it has been up more than once.
Now the EU promises that everything will go to zero in December 2027.
But worse is probably that we are selling what Russia needs for its arms industry as well, through detours, and we have not addressed that yet.
It’s actually a bit exhausting.
It can still be good to quantify.
There is so much conflicting information right now – Zelensky is supposed to meet Trump or that Trump does not want to meet Zelensky.
Merz has said a lot of good things in the last two days.
Starmer and Macron are more diplomatic.
BUT everything is about the peace plan as it is written when there should be a strong counteroffer that Europe is ready to back up with firepower.
Unfortunately, the discussion seems to be HOW to achieve a ceasefire – we are already there already, I interpret it as.
It will be interesting to see what they have actually come up with during the discussions in Geneva. I expect that Russia will not approve it, they will continue with the 28-point list.
But the USA should at least get a plus for pretending to listen to Ukraine.
I don’t think Russia will agree to a ceasefire unless they are the ones dictating the terms. They are still advancing slowly with great losses, it works for them.
Don’t forget the fronts – if we continue like this, Ukraine will eventually accept a ceasefire because it is the least bad option, and Europe will say that Ukraine has made its choice.
A thought.
Could it be that Zelensky is satisfied, because he knows that Russia will break its part of the agreement as soon as possible? Is this the harsh way to show Russia’s true face – so that Europe finally understands?
Because, does anyone really believe that Russia will actually keep its ceasefire?
As soon as ONE Russian drone moves a centimeter in the wrong direction, they have already violated the agreement…
The first week you can blame on poor communication, “rogue units”, but then it’s not possible.
The Ukrainian intelligence service probably knows what is planned behind the scenes, so I don’t think Ukraine is blind.
Perhaps the best thing after all is to let the shit hit hard in Europe’s lap.
A cynical game, but we deserve it.
Yes, a Ukrainian acceptance of a bad deal could be a ruse of war. What are the chances that Russia will even accept, let alone respect it? With European troops in place after a ceasefire, as mentioned above, it will also be difficult to deny violations of the ceasefire.
Russia is unlikely, at this stage, to sign an agreement that they have not dictated themselves, for example, like the 28-point agreement that the USA has translated. Russia still has people they can sacrifice, and with a leader who keeps himself far from the more or less brainwashed people, he also does not feel their suffering, they are expendable to him.
The proposal that the USA has now discussed with Ukraine is unlikely to be approved by Russia, and the same goes for Europe’s proposal.
They do not approve of European troops in Ukraine. Presumably, they could approve of Belarusian or Chinese troops, I suppose.
Foreign troops will be deployed in Kyiv and Odessa: British, French, and Turkish soldiers will arrive in Ukraine after the agreement is signed,
โ French President Emmanuel Macron.
https://x.com/heroiam_slava/status/1993259507892601194?s=46
A small point is that they are very far from the frontlines in Kiev and Odessa.
That was positive, a little more than just talk finally. They may not have such an active role, but they can free up some troops from Ukraine.
“Explosions reported in Lgov, Kursk region. Initial information points to a strike on an industrial zone. The extent of the damage is still being clarified.”
https://bsky.app/profile/noelreports.com/post/3m6hc2l2ooc2e
“โ๏ธ๐บ๐ฆUkrainian troops from the 81st Separate Airmobile Brigade burned a ๐ท๐บRussian tank, also damaged an artillery gun, a tank, an armored combat vehicle, and are attacking infantry on the Siversk direction.”
https://bsky.app/profile/militarynewsua.bsky.social/post/3m6hbtm3lgk2a
“A Russian drone has crashed into a residential house in Moldovaโs Nizhnie Kugureshty, Floreศti district, according to local police. Residents were evacuated, and the site is now secured by law enforcement. Sappers are on the ground checking for explosives.”
https://bsky.app/profile/noelreports.com/post/3m6hbo6ceh22e
“Unmanned Systems Forces commander Magyar confirms: SSO, SBU, GUR, and others, hit deep inside Russia. Targets: the Beriev plant in Taganrog (A-50s, A-60 and Tu-95MS present), drone maker Atlant Aero, Sheskharis oil terminal in Novorossiysk (damaged oil loaders + S-400), and Tuapse oil refinery.”
“Confirmed by Ukraineโs General Staff: the rare Russian A-60 airborne laser aircraft was likely destroyed in a strike on the Beriev plant in Taganrog. Also hit: drone factory โMolniya,โ oil terminals in Novorossiysk, Tuapse refinery, and an S-400 launcher.”
“Macron says that after a peace deal is signed, “assurance forces” will be deployed beyond the front line, including in Kyiv and Odesa. Nearly 20 countries, among them the UK, France, and Turkey are ready. These wonโt be NATO forces but a multilateral coalition acting like NATOโs eastern flank.”
I wonder how “deployed beyond the front line,” should be interpreted.
According to the NE dictionary, it can mean
1 beyond, on the other side [of]
But there are also other meanings.
“Ukraine’s Air Force reported on the overnight drone and missile attack. Shot down: 438/464 Shahed and other type drones 1/4 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles 5/7 Iskander-K cruise missiles 5/8 Kalibr cruise missiles 3/3 Iskander-M ballistic missiles”
https://bsky.app/profile/noelreports.com/post/3m6gv2na5zk2l
“Zelensky confirmed Russia launched 22 missiles and over 460 drones in the latest wave of attacks, targeting Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Cherkasy regions, focusing on energy and civilian infrastructure. Four drones even crossed into Moldova and Romania.”
https://bsky.app/profile/noelreports.com/post/3m6gto3d45c2l“
“FIRMS data confirms two separate fires in Taganrog after yesterday’s Ukrainian drone/missile attacks, one at the Beriev Aircraft Company and one, likely, at industrial enterprise Natek Yuzhmost.”
https://bsky.app/profile/noelreports.com/post/3m6gtgurfa22l
“๐ฅ Results of the FP-2 UAV hit on the central pumping station of the Gvardiyskiy oil depot in the village of Kar’erne, Crimea, – Dnipro Osint”
https://bsky.app/profile/maks23.bsky.social/post/3m6hc4zeryc2t
“Lavrov says Russia has received Trumpโs peace plan through unofficial channels and is ready to discuss specific wording. Moscow appears eager to shape the narrative before any formal negotiations begin.”
Russian oil supplies to India will collapse by more than half due to sanctions, Reuters reported citing sources. Purchases may fall to 600-650 thousand barrels, one of the agency’s sources said. In October, India imported 1.65 million barrels of Russian oil daily.
So far, Moscow has not felt the effects of the sanctions. In November, Russian oil supplies to India will even increase (to an expected 1.87 million barrels per day), because many buyers wanted to replenish stocks before the US and European sanctions came into effect.
The decline will begin in December. According to a Reuters source, US sanctions against Rosneft and Gazprom have led to increased banking oversight in India. As a result, Indian state-owned oil refiners have become extremely cautious.
If the Reuters interlocutor’s forecast for December proves correct, Russia may lose buyers for a quarter of its oil supplied by sea. Total Russian oil exports by sea from October 20 to November 16 amounted to 3.36 million barrels per day.
Hear this – Putin’s worst nightmare is European troops in Ukraine.
That is the ABSOLUTE last thing he wants there.
How do you think he will get out of this?
Will Trump back out of the whole deal now?
The important thing is to include the essential conditions for Ukraine, present them in such positive terms for Russia that Trump lights up with anticipation, whereby Trump’s disappointment leads to consequences when Russia still backs down, such as further sanctions, Tomahawk, etc.
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I think Trump will probably complain a bit about Putin not approving it, but Russia may come up with a counterproposal, that it must be like Belarusian or Chinese troops. Then Trump will have to pass the ball and pressure Ukraine again.
#UkraineRussianWar By Henrik Brändén Swedish politician (Henrik Brändén is a phil.lic. in immunology, science writer)
โ๏ธ๐งตhttps://x.com/anno1540/status/1993254440627736901?s=46
– While the spectacle called negotiations over Ukraine takes up most of the media space, I think it might be time for a small overview of how the war is going.
The fronts
The fronts are hardly moving at all: Over the past year, Russia – despite numerous headlines in the media about Russian progress and new small towns that Russia has allegedly taken or was about to take – has conquered a total of another 0.5% of Ukraine, which is only an insignificant increase from the 19% they controlled a year ago.
This has happened at the cost of about half a million dead, wounded or captured Russian soldiers. If the war continues at this pace and in this way, it will take the Russians 160 years and several times their entire adult male population to occupy all of Ukraine.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2025/jun/22/one-million-and-counting-russian-casualties-hit-milestone-in-ukraine-war
The rough picture of what part of Ukraine Russia controls is thus the same as a year ago: Crimea, the northern coast of the Sea of โโAzov east of the Dnipro estuary in the Black Sea, and in the east most of Luhansk oblast (county) and large parts of Donetsk oblast (county). In addition, Russia controls some small slivers of Kharkiv oblast just inside the northern border with Russia, while Ukraine controls some slivers of Russian Kursk oblast on the other side of the border.
The fighting along large parts of the front is, however, intense, and has changed its character in many places over the past year, possibly as a result of the rapid development of drone warfare:
https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/09/26/we-were-sent-to-the-slaughter
– In many places where there used to be trenches, from which the Russians sent groups of tens or hundreds of men to penetrate a bit into Ukrainian-controlled territory – who were shot down until the Ukrainian guns got so hot that they had to take a break, or the Ukrainians ran out of ammunition – the lines are now considerably more diffuse, and both Russian advances and Ukrainian reconquests are taking place by sending small groups of soldiers into areas that are supposedly controlled by the opposing side, and from time to time managing to hold on, after which new small groups arrive and reinforce.
In many places – not least in and around the city of #Pokrovsk, where such fighting has been the fiercest – there is a diffuse border zone many kilometers wide in the air, where neither Russian nor Ukrainian drones have air supremacy, and where groups of soldiers from both sides therefore risk being discovered and destroyed by the other side’s drones, and where the other side’s drones make it very difficult to deliver supplies to their own people and evacuate the wounded.
The ability to recruit soldiers
Despite the extraordinarily difficult situation at the front, Ukrainian losses are significantly less than Russian losses – according to various estimates, between 1/5 and 1/3 as large, which roughly corresponds to the difference between the population sizes of Russia and Ukraine.
If everything were to continue as it has been so far – which of course it will not – it is therefore not at all certain that Ukraine would run out of potential soldiers before Russia. Quite the opposite, in fact: A large proportion of Ukrainians are still motivated to go to war, while the Russians have largely only been able to recruit poor people from the periphery of the federation and prison inmates who were promised amnesty after spending time at the front.
Recently, the latter method of recruitment has been expanded to include young men arrested by the police on the street on suspicion of petty crimes, who are faced with the choice of being tried on fabricated evidence or signing a contract with the army.
https://militarnyi.com/en/news/russia-criminals-coerce-men-into-signing-military-contracts/
To create the right incentive for the police officers, high bonuses are paid for each soldier a police officer “recruits”.
The Russian bailiffs have also begun to “offer” those with debts to enlist, and use the enlistment bonus and their first salaries to pay off their debt.
An offer that is difficult to refuse. The fact that Russia has recently developed its methods of recruitment in this way reinforces the picture that comes from many reports from the fronts, that the Russians are finding it increasingly difficult to fill their ranks.
Of course, one wonders why the Russians do not simply mobilize and forcibly call up their large hordes of conscripts.
The answer is simple: despite the enormous propaganda apparatus and the public declarations of the patriotic cause and Russia’s historical mission on everyone’s lips, very few of the ethnic Russians in the country’s relatively affluent, populous central regions are willing to sacrifice their own lives or the lives of their sons in the war.
And the Putin regime’s legitimacy and relative popular support are based on the fact that these groups have accepted Putin’s offer of security and relative prosperity in exchange for the abandonment of freedom and democracy.
A general mobilization would simply jeopardize the popular tolerance – in many circles, support – that the regime has enjoyed so far.
So far, volunteers have been attracted by recruitment bonuses and salaries that are enormous by Russian standards, which have made it more attractive for a family man who cannot provide his family with a reasonable standard of living and therefore experiences life at home as rather grey, dull and depressing, to give his children a reasonable start in life by playing Russian roulette with his own life by enlisting.
But the financial bonuses have been paid from the large fund Putin created in the early 2000s from the then enormous gas and oil revenues.
https://www.intellinews.com/moscow-blog-putin-25-years-in-office-has-he-been-a-boon-or-a-bane-for-russia-359727/
But that fund is now largely exhausted, and there is increasing evidence – albeit regionally varying – that the rewards are falling and are becoming increasingly uncertain to receive.
At the same time, signs continue to accumulate that the Russian economy is in serious trouble.
Large parts of the banking system are teetering on the brink of collapse, and are being kept alive by various government interventions, where it is highly unclear to me whether what is being pumped in is real value, or the digital era’s equivalent of paper money, so that an enormous bubble is just waiting to burst.
Ordinary people can no longer exchange Western currency, they are having increasing problems withdrawing the money they have in the bank, and more and more goods are becoming so tempting to steal in ordinary grocery stores that they are being fitted with alarms.
But so far the Russians have managed to scrape together enough people to fill the gaps left by the large numbers of fallen and wounded.
https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/09/26/we-were-sent-to-the-slaughter
However, it is not certain that they will be able to do this for much longer:
Russia’s economy
The bottom has fallen out of the internal market for real estate, housing, cars and other capital goods, and with rising interest rates, more and more people are having increasing problems making payments for things they bought on credit before the outbreak of the war, and which can no longer be sold for anything close to the price they once paid.
And that’s not to mention the problems many small and medium-sized companies are having in making their loans with rising interest rates and declining demand.
In addition, for a few years now the Ukrainians have not only been allowed to use Western missiles against targets inside Russia, but now also have their own, which can reach targets over a hundred miles into Russia.
Over the past six months, the Ukrainians have used that capacity to systematically bomb EDIT first the Russian air defenses that protected them, and then END EDIT Russian refineries, other facilities needed for the export of oil that is still ongoing, and also Russian arms industries, weapons depots and transports of weapons and other military supplies to the front.
Bombings beyond the front in Ukraine
Of course, the Russians are also trying to bomb Ukrainian military installations, but if you look at the figures of how many Russian missiles are fired at Ukraine, how many are reported to have been shot down and how many hit civilian targets, there are not very many left for hits on military targets.
https://frontliner.ua/en/official-data-how-many-missiles-russia-has-launched-at-ukraine/
And the number of hits on civilian targets in Ukraine – even with missiles and drones that have a documented accuracy of a few, a few tens or a few hundred meters – shows that Russia is continuing the strategy from the Chechen war of trying to terror bomb the resistance into submission on a large scale. Lots of missiles are aimed at civilian hospitals, orphanages, schools, shopping centers and homes.
Then, during the autumn and the approaching winter, Russia has resumed bombing the infrastructure for electricity.
Which has led to electricity shortages in several parts of Ukraine, so that most people, even in the capital Kiev, have their electricity turned off for large parts of the day.
However, most of the time, following a schedule that lets people know when they can be fairly certain of having electricity, so that elevators work, water can be pumped up even to apartments at the top of the tallest buildings, and you can charge batteries and power banks, and run a washing machine.
My impression, however, is that the Russians are completely wrong when they think they can terror-bomb the Ukrainians into submission.
Every time the Russians score a direct hit on a residential building far behind the front, killing dozens of people, most people’s anger and determination not to bow down increase.
– And of course, among the minority who before the war saw Russians as a friendly brotherly people, that feeling does not increase, some switch to considering the Russians as an enemy to fight against, while others instead feel that everything is hopeless and pointless.
On Ukraine’s infrastructure, economy and industrial potential
On the one hand, as a Swede, you have to be impressed by the order in which the shutdowns are taking place, the speed with which bombed installations are repaired, and the speed with which in recent years they have expanded reserve capacity and created a centralized system with resilience.
On the other hand, it is precisely against the background of these major shutdowns of the electricity grid that citizens receive information about the latest corruption scandal, in which a number of high-ranking people – some close to the president – have obtained kickbacks of approximately 15% of the investments in infrastructure for a more sustainable electricity grid, and have put P for the actors who could have contributed but who did not want to pay, or did not align themselves with the actors who were involved in the corruption.
But it is a bit symptomatic that of all that is happening inside Ukraine, it is precisely this corruption scandal that has caught the interest of the Western media.
• Not that the Ukrainian economy is growing so much that it is cracking.
• Not that the Ukrainian arms industry has grown so quickly that the Ukrainian defense is significantly less dependent on supplies from the West than at the beginning of the war:
– Ukraine today manufactures more than half of the ammunition the country uses, is a world leader in manufacturing military drones and manufactures large quantities of missiles and missile-like drones that can reach far into Russia.
At the same time, Western arms factories continue to expand, delivering larger and larger quantities to Ukraine.
And after all of Trump’s pirouettes, arms industries outside the United States are adapting to make themselves independent of American components, which could give the United States the right to impose an embargo on the sale of weapons systems.
https://www.iea.org/reports/ukraines-energy-security-and-the-coming-winter/ukraines-energy-system-under-attack
What will happen in the short term?
So when the negotiations that are now being conducted hit a wall – presumably by the US Secretary of State and the Ukrainian delegation and the EU producing a proposal that they get Trump’s blessing for, which is unacceptable to Putin and therefore rejected from there, but perhaps in one of one hundred and fifty-one other possible ways – the war will in the short term continue much as it has so far:
The fronts will be largely stationary, the Russians will advance a few kilometers here and the Ukrainians will pull back a few kilometers there, the Russians will continue to bomb everything near the front, and continue to terror bomb even further into Ukraine.
While Ukraine will continue to bomb the infrastructure Russia needs to wage and finance the war.
And in the long term? In Russia.
And sooner or later Russia will not be able to fight the war any longer.
Whether the weakest point turns out to be getting enough soldiers, selling the oil they need to get the necessary money or being able to manufacture and get the equipment to the front that is needed, I will leave it unsaid.
All three are interconnected, and for none of the issues is it possible to foresee any sustainable solution for Russia.
How long will it take?
– It depends to a large extent on external actors: If China switches from shouting encouraging words from the sidelines to really helping with things that play a big role, it will take longer, if on the contrary they withdraw today’s more indirect support, it will go faster.
And if, against all odds, Trump gets the American political system to open up to Russia even during an ongoing war, it will of course also take longer.
What will happen next in Russia?
The current regime has chained itself to the war, so when it can no longer be carried on, the rug will be pulled out from under Putin, and the various power groups that combine violent capacity with economic muscle will settle the score over who will be allowed to appoint the next boss.
(And there are many such groups – Putin has made sure that none of them has become too dominant, in order to be able to balance them against each other: the FSB, the National Guard, the GRU, the armed forces – all of which have received large financial grants -, the remaining oligarchs with their own security services, Kadyrov’s gang, various private armies, Putin’s motorcycle gangs … )
– It will hardly be possible to do so without bloodshed, but whether the whole thing will be sorted out through a few quick strategic assassinations, or through a protracted civil war, remains to be seen.
In the long term in Ukraine
For Ukraine, the situation after the war is considerably brighter.
https://www.cfr.org/report/rebuilding-ukraine
It is true that large parts of the frontline areas have been leveled, so extensive reconstruction work remains.
But Ukraine will be let closer and deeper into the Western political and economic community – I am personally convinced that the promises of EU membership are serious and will be fulfilled, but even if I am wrong there, the development in that direction will continue (enormous steps have already been taken!).
Western investors are queuing up, both to establish themselves in Ukraine for even deeper economic cooperation, and to be involved in reconstruction.
At least as important is that Ukraine is now using the war as leverage for the first time since I started traveling there 35 years ago for a serious and effective fight against corruption.
The anti-corruption authorities are not only striking, as always, against the president’s political enemies and their allies, but also against the president’s friends.
A large number of high-profile bribe-takers are currently shaking bars – including important financiers of Zelensky’s election campaign.
The latter was previously completely unthinkable. It is unclear to me how much of this is due to this and how much is a direct effect of the war, but many people I speak to testify that social trust is increasing.
Much, much remains to be done before corruption is defeated, but an impressive amount has been done.
– I suspect it has to do with the fact that increasingly large parts of the economic elite realize that the price of being able to get Western help to protect themselves against Russia is that they give up opportunities to enrich themselves that they previously had.
When the alternative to giving up those opportunities is to become Putin’s client (and thus completely at his mercy), the choice has been easy for most.
– Moreover – but no less important – the war has led to a dramatic change in the world’s image of Ukrainians, and will lead to an even more dramatic change in the Ukrainians’ image of themselves: from the eternally mocked, oppressed and trampled losers, to those who managed to defend their independence against what everyone believed was the world’s second-strongest military power.
And if it ends as I think it will – defeat it.
Finally:
Behind every sentence I have written in this post is a deep awareness of the pressure it means for millions of Ukrainians to hear the air raid siren every night (it affects numerous relatives and friends), of the tragedy it has meant for hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian families to have their homes destroyed (which has affected many friends’ friends), of the immense nervous strain it means to have a loved one at the front (which several friends are living under) and of the fact that every wounded, killed or missing Ukrainian and Russian soldier is a tragedy both for him or herself, and for a larger or smaller circle of loving boyfriends, girlfriends, mothers, fathers, siblings and/or friends.
But it is not possible to write a summary of readable length if I have to remind you of this in every sentence, every paragraph.
That is why I am doing this.
The Russians’ problems with air defense must be mentioned.
Ukraine has broken through the air defenses and knocked out several S-400 units around Russian air bases, the naval base in Novorussisk and important industries. They have broken through the air defense circle around Moscow.
– In addition, there seems to be no capable air defense left in Crimea.
They have been able to knock out important installations there with individual drones. Earlier in the war, a lot of diversionary maneuvers were required to get through.
The implication of this is that attacks on Russian infrastructure will become even more effective over time.
When you don’t have to resort to complex operations to get through, you become more effective.
Author:
Henrik Brändén 251124
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Interesting and Positive, thank you ๐
Interesting. Thank you.
I agree!