Dudayev said that “when the Ukrainian sun rises, the Russian empire falls,” freely translated as I haven’t memorized his statements as well as Churchill’s.
Churchill also said that “a dead Russian bastard is a good Russian bastard, but a shot in the knee with buckshot works too,” but later clarified that he did not mean children under 18 when the children’s ombudsman brought him to court in the early 1940s.
Ukraine is the only country that can reach Russia, and Europe can retaliate against old cheese for a very cheap price. The French are still bitter about Russia invading Paris back in the day.
The Germans got what they deserved, although maybe they don’t count, but we Swedes have an unresolved issue, and so do Finland and all of Eastern Europe.
But winning the war through strategic droning is far from certain, despite what everyone is now enthusiastically claiming – this is the third round with refineries, and we thought the oligarchs and siloviks would hang Putin the first time around, but we have learned the hard way.
I already learned on May 9, 2022, that the war was a fly on Putin’s coat, which was indeed annoying but not a big flying dinosaur. Now today, the fly is much bigger, but the constant hope of an imminent collapse always makes us feel like we don’t need to do anything. Some suspicion about those who are pushing that narrative, General SVR was early, and Putin has died a few times there 🧐
Putin has good control over the country, and China is providing what is needed (for now).
It’s also a routine curve, so now citizens and the clan’s accomplices are used to this – a new normal.
The country probably needs a significant violent push, and Ukraine has already gone all-in with subversive activities in Russia, despite wild protests from the West, a bit of liberation killing here and there. A whole bunch of partial republics are sitting on the fence, waiting for Russia to show weakness.
May 9, 2025, and the subsequent meeting in China did not show Russia as weak at all, so right now, it’s probably only Azerbaijan openly siding with Ukraine.
If they had droned Putin on May 9, as they easily could have done, maybe the revolution would have started by now, but I guess Trump, Xi, and every leader in Europe personally called Zelensky to ensure the opposite. Yours truly wanted it because I wanted to start the revolution as soon as possible, but all the cowards said no.
There are liberation fronts in Russia that Ukraine collaborates with, as well as opposition that is not Navalny’s wife, who mostly wants to restore tsarist Russia.
Many want their freedom, but everyone is a coward and waits until it’s safe, just like Europe does, shamelessly, cowardly, and unmanly (and all other gender identities).
Ukraine probably needs to do something bigger on the battlefield as well to convince all the doubters, we have a strong positive bias when it comes to Ukraine and praise even the smallest shot but turn a blind eye to Russian successes.
Right now, everyone wants to talk about a few hundred, and soon maybe a few thousand, surrounded Russians when Ukraine is still retreating almost everywhere.
If we strip away all the rhetoric and look at what’s happening in action, Northern Luhansk is probably lost, and there will soon be a power struggle in Donbass on a very large scale.
At Kamyanske, RU is now advancing towards Stepnohirsk and can start rolling up the southern front from behind.
Not to mention Siversk – things are going poorly there.
This is constantly warned about in my posts because this is what we see in action.
But do not despair, Bakhmut was the flytrap, so now Pokrovsk – Kostiantynivka – Novopavlivka is the flytrap of the year 2025.
Ukraine always strikes on the flanks, and instead of the northern front, maybe it’s Belarus this time – that probably depends 100% on what Europe’s leaders say.
But yes, Ukraine still maintains a forest of units at Kursk, and there is a long border in Bryansk and Belgorod oblasts as well – they must be used for something.
Reconnaissance is back in action.
And then the Azov offensive – this legendary target of attack that a world-leading blogger has been describing since 2022 so everyone knows the details.
Ukraine now has a HUGE capacity for amphibious warfare after all they have received from the West, along with a high capability for airborne operations.
I believe I’ve counted over 300 capable vessels like our SB-90 and various other countries’ equivalents down to larger dinghies.
Previously, the 70th MRD was supposed to have been moved to Pokrovsk from the Dnieper front, and later also the 104th AAD, although it is still marked there.
Besides the 98th AD, there are no competent strike forces left at the Dnieper front after that relocation – that’s all the Dnieper commander has available if things escalate.
I don’t know what’s down in Crimea – not much, but the FSB and Rosgvardia are probably not marked on the maps, and they have bases everywhere, in addition to the navy and the air force.
The Dnieper front has probably never been more attractive, and raids can be conducted along the entire coast from Kinburn Spit down to Crimea, where all the headquarters and rear functions have been relocated with said watercraft.
Considering that Ukraine now has very little ammunition for HIMARS, what’s below is almost considered pre-emptive.
We know that today in 2025, drones and FAB supporting smaller units are fully feasible as an offensive armored fist – RU is advancing on that, motorcycles and sand buggies under a violent indirect umbrella.
We also know that mechanized warfare has just returned, suggesting a lot of upcoming Russian offensives.
But Zelensky now has 100 tank battalions.
Did a blogger have a point since January claiming that Ukraine has a strategic offensive reserve when everyone else was crying cascades?
If I were to guess – 100 battalions with all sorts of armor protection and some tanks, a mosaic?
Back to the 2025 Azov offensive, which is light-years ahead of the 2023 Azov offensive in every aspect.
If Ukraine consolidates its electronic warfare and drone capabilities at the Dnieper front, they will have an absolute advantage there. They can blanket all Russian units and deny Russian drones access to the fronts.
They also have a high capability for deep strikes with FAB, CAS, and drones.
Already today, Russian LV is almost defeated on Crimea and behind the Dnieper, and the air force can operate in the area, which it does, we recently posted about FAB against some FSB base in Crimea, I believe.
If Ukraine were to fully deploy amphibious warfare between Kinburn Spit – Crimea, increase pressure at the Dnieper, and at the right moment conduct airborne operations to block the land bridge to Crimea, it would be possible to strangle the peninsula.
The Kerch Bridge is probably already a “walking dead”?
Therefore, the units that expose themselves to danger against the barbarian hordes have drones and FAB available for indirect deep strikes. Since they land/airdrop in areas without Russians, the Russians must travel by road and on foot to get there, which equals a lot of dead Russians right away along the roads.
This is what experts call the Davidyi Brid effect, make a raid into an undefended area and go on the defensive under your indirect-fire umbrella and await grilled BTG.
Someone epic blogger coined that term back in 2022.
Considering that RU is withdrawing forces from the Dnieper, Ukraine has the capabilities and they gladly conduct offensives in a 1:5 numerical disadvantage because they are the world’s best shooters, so the conditions are now there.
Just as RU and Ukraine both hold back a strategic offensive reserve, as we have long written, and now Zelensky just confirmed the above – right as always.
We can only hope that Russia burns its capabilities in Donbass and sends forces north so the scales tip in favor of UA.
UA has the air force, they have FAB, drone coverage, strategic drones, EW, helicopters, and naval vessels.
Everyone who didn’t sleep through history lessons also knows that Crimea is not defensible.
If Ukraine does as they please, then it’s definitely game-on ahead, provided Europe doesn’t manage to crash the party again. We have been surprisingly creative before together with the USA.
I am ashamed of the USA and Europe, but that is offset by an increasing respect for Ukraine 👍
We saw this trait back in 2022, enduring endlessly with stabs in the back from their friends to eventually come out on top requires a tough person, woman, man, or other gender identity – all countries hope they are equally tough but give up after two weeks instead when put to the test once per century.
Then the country has a national trauma to process after that and they promise “never again.” I can imagine what it does to self-confidence to do like Poland and make the same mistake 100 years later, almost time to shut down the country if you manage to prepare for yesterday’s war twice in a row.
Will Russia fall before the Azov thrust, Operation Free Belarus, or the Great Invasion of Bryansk?
The velvet gloves that Europe has put on, that Trump is Krasnov, and that China is propping up probably allow Putin to stay at the table unless a killing blow comes from a street-smart Ukraine.
The Azov thrust is a deadly blow and FIM will probably open the fine whiskey just like that and then get scolded by his wife.
Actually, Ukraine needs a little help to be on the safe side, and if the Russian bastards don’t dare do anything in the Baltics, then Poland and the Balts should cross the border into Russia instead.
Finland too – restore Greater Finland.
Can we afford to take chances any longer?
I know it will never happen, but I wouldn’t take the risk if I were a dictator, if we end up with a summer in 2023, this war could be over with Russia having the advantage. Then Ukraine will have a lot of negative things to say about Europe and probably take what they believe they are entitled to through the underworld eagerly cheered on by the FSB and GUR. I have now understood that Europe doesn’t even work with a risk list, but we should.
I have full confidence that the Azov thrust will be delivered with elegance and be as deadly as a hungry cat seeing a boiled shrimp.
Heck knows why Trump and everyone else has taken Lukashenko under their wings right now, have they all caught wind that the country is about to fall instead of him joining the war – something is fishy about that anyway because he is treated like a rock star by everyone, Xi, Putin, Trump, EU.
Anyway, Zapad 25 is officially over, and all forces are returning to their staging areas, right?
(rhetorical question, more to come).
You all remember the grand campaign plan and when UA has isolated Crimea and taken the NS line through Melitopol – then they have lied an immense number of brigades at this now shorter front line and can open an attack vector NE straight into the soft parts of Donbass.
Then it will get lively for real.
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From the Ukrainian General Staff’s reported 223 battles, 206 battles were distributed among the reported fronts as below. Pokrovsk reached a peak with the second-highest score since the summer offensive began in early May. Otherwise, more modest numbers and decreasing in some places.
Good vibes at KWIA, low artillery.
In the second half of July, the enemy reduced the intensity of its assault operations
It comes as no surprise that the Russians cannot maintain a constant intensity of fighting, although it remains at a fairly high level.
For example, in the first ten days of July, the average daily number of assaults was almost 186. In the second ten days, it was 178, and the third ended with a figure of 171.5. In the first two days of August, the figure is currently 155 assaults per day.
It is important to understand that the nature of the fighting is also changing. Now, the enemy often sends 2-3 people to attack, and there are no herds of fifty or so, as was the case at Progress a year ago. Also, recently, the Russians have been willing to crawl around in “invisible cloaks” for several hours or even a day to reach our positions. We should not forget about the tactic of “flag-wavers,” which is used purely for media propaganda, but with huge losses.
https://x.com/deepstate_ua/status/1952439363713057006?s=46
Less than 1% of Ukrainian territory has been occupied by the enemy in the last 1010 days of the full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine.
Enemy occupied 5842 sq. km of Ukrainian territory in the period of November 12th, 2022 (114,489 sq. km was under occupation on that date) to today (114,493 sq. km is currently occupied). This territory is equal to 0.96781% of the whole Ukrainian state within its internationally recognized borders.
While Russians unfortunately had operational success in the first days of the full-scale invasion, a large percentage of the territory they’ve occupied was liberated through the successful offensive operations in the north of Ukraine, as well as through counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson regions.
Enemy’s offensive actions have continued since November 12th, 2022, and they go on to this day with minor interruptions. One of such offensives, the Bakhmut operation, as a reminder to those who do not remember, took place throughout the fall of 2022.
We hope that this information will get to our American partners to help them get their math straight.
https://x.com/deepstate_ua/status/1957132295451611401?s=46
Kina 🇨🇳 USA 🇺🇸 💥Afghanistan 🇦🇫 💥
🇨🇳🇺🇸 US President Donald Trump will hold a telephone conversation with Chinese leader Xi Jinping
🕵️♀️ This was reported by Bloomberg, citing its own sources. The talks will take place at 9 a.m. US time on Friday.
💬 The article notes that the future of the TikTok app and the “tariff truce” between Washington and Beijing will be discussed. The current 90-day pause on new tariffs will last until early November.
🤔 Other issues that may arise during the discussions include export controls on rare earth metals, which are critical to advanced American technology companies, as well as China’s potential order for Boeing Co. aircraft.
👀 It is worth noting that Trump announced today the US’s intention to return Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.
💭”This may be a bit of a bombshell. One of the reasons we want this base is because it’s an hour’s drive from where China is building its nuclear weapons,” Trump said.
https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22492
Absolutely right, it’s not enough with just drones. This is a hybrid war, and it’s crucial to strike hard at the economy. Ultimately, that’s what yields profits!
As usual, thanks Johan the great, you got me thinking. Here’s a rough estimate of what Russia and #fckptn are costing us today:
Here’s a figure that I can stand by, with all reasonable exaggerations towards the “upper range” but keeping my feet on the ground:
The damn hybrid war during the Ukraine war has cost us (EU) more than 3,000 billion euros (total 2022–2025)
…with an annual rate in the peak year of around 700–1,000 billion euros. I say – Crush the bastards!
OK, this is a rough but defensible (in my opinion) “back-of-the-envelope calculation” of what the Russian hybrid war (including Russian proxy support via Iran/China, among others) has cost the EU in a broad sense: energy shock, additional defense, cyber attacks/industrial espionage, refugee reception, and direct support to Ukraine.
I actually believe that with your help, it will turn out even larger because I probably haven’t considered all the crap?
How I arrived at the figure (rounded off)
• Energy crisis support package: EU countries have allocated/earmarked ≈650–760 billion € (2021–2023) to shield households and businesses. These are direct public costs resulting from Russian gas extortion and price shocks.
• Extra defense expenditures (beyond the 2021 level): EU defense budgets increased from 218 billion € (2021) to 326 billion € (2024). The cumulative “extra part” for 2022–2024 amounts to approximately 190 billion €, and by 2025, it roughly reaches 300 billion €. This increase is directly driven by Russia’s attacks/threats.
• Cyber attacks/industrial espionage: A new Bitkom survey shows losses of around 300 billion € per year in Germany alone, where about half of traceable attacks point to Russia/China (Iran and others are also mentioned). Scaling cautiously to the EU level (Germany represents about a quarter of the EU economy) results in approximately 1.1–1.2 trillion € per year in total cyber losses; attributing about 50% to RU/CN/IR amounts to around 0.5–0.6 trillion € per year. Summed up for 2022–2025: approximately 1.5–1.8 trillion €. (Yes – massive, but supported by German data + known threat landscape in the EU.)
• Refugee reception from Ukraine: According to Kiel data referenced by RFE/RL, the EU’s total costs have exceeded around 131 billion US$ (approximately 120 billion €). Early estimates were around 30–40 billion € for 2022 alone, so cumulatively >100 billion € seems reasonable.
• Direct support to Ukraine: EU institutions + member states have provided three-digit billion amounts (euros) in financial, military, and humanitarian aid since 2022. (The Kiel tracker and EU pages show the extent; the exact ongoing total varies with the method.) Add approximately 100–150 billion € to the large pot.
Rough total:
• Energy ≈0.7 trillion €
• Extra defense ≈0.3 trillion €
• Cyber (portion attributed to RU/CN/IR) ≈1.5–1.8 trillion € (over 4 years)
• Refugee reception ≈0.12 trillion €
• Direct Ukraine support ≈0.1–0.15 trillion €
= around 2.7–3.1 trillion € 2022–2025.
Important footnotes (in an old-fashioned way)
• This is a “rough estimate table,” not a damn balance sheet. Yes, I have made assumptions on the high side where uncertainty is significant. War is cruel and probably costs too little anyway!
• The cyber item dominates. I’m proud of that (my job) and it’s based on recent German empirical data with a proportion to the entire EU.
• Energy and defense involve hard budgetary figures and thus more reliable data.
Then we have all the useful idiots like Orban and others… but I couldn’t be bothered! So you get this, and whoever can, add on whatever else you can think of!
https://kyivindependent.com/what-the-resignation-of-technocrat-dmitry-kozak-tells-us-about-power-in-russia/
What the resignation of technocrat Dmitry Kozak tells us about power in Russiav
The New York Times previously reported that Kozak had privately advised Putin against launching the war in Ukraine in 2022. He also reportedly warned of the dire consequences of a full-scale invasion, including fierce Ukrainian resistance.
This year, Kozak allegedly presented Putin with a plan aimed at ending the war and initiating domestic reforms.
Kozak was born in Ukraine’s Kirovohrad Oblast in 1958. As a young adult, he left to study in Soviet-era Leningrad and did not, throughout most of his career, maintain any professional relationship with his home country.
1/ One year after the destruction of the GRU arsenal in the #TVer region of the russian Federation:
– Why this was the most daring SBU operation at that time
The Special Operations Center “A” of the SBU shared details of the operation in #Toropets, Tver region, which took place exactly one year ago.
Fighters of the SOC “A” demonstrated how, thanks to the coordination and management of the SBU, high-precision strikes were planned and carried out on the 107th GRU arsenal – destroying hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition and a significant part of russian reserves.
Within the Special Operations Center “A” they say:
🎥”Thanks to the coordination and management of the SBU, we were able to first analyze, plan, and carry out high-precision strikes on the 107th weapons arsenal in Toropets, Tver region.” https://www.instagram.com/p/DOvAMmyDHAB/?img_index=6
2/ The Defense Express publication
https://defence-ua.com/photo/udar_sbu_po_arsenalu_gru_u_toroptsi_buv_z_teritoriji_rf_kudi_spetspriznachentsi_pronesli_droni_osint_po_zirkah-392.html
also conducted an OSINT analysis that confirms the version of the drone launch from the territory of the russian Federation and adds technical details of the visual footage.
3/ ‘Reaction and details”
The SBU published a video of the drone launch – the short night footage gave analysts more than it seems at first glance.
The recordings show a starry sky, and by comparing the positions of the constellations with the date of the attack – September 18, 2024 – experts reconstructed a possible launch trajectory .
This gave grounds to claim that the launches were carried out from deep inside enemy territory, and not from the side of #Ukraine…..
🎥
🎥https://x.com/anno1540/status/1968924524084187270?s=46
4/ According to official figures, the intelligent use of long-range drones caused the enemy about $5 billion in damage .
– During one operation, it was confirmed that about 10% of all adjusted aerial bombs in the russian Federation, about 50% of the stock of 120-mm mines and a total of about 150 thousand tons of ammunition were destroyed .
This seriously limited the possibilities of russian attacks and demonstrated the vulnerability of the deep rear
5/ “Time and navigation”
The key evidence in favor of the launch from russia is the time of the object’s destruction: no later than 03:56 local time.
The distance of approximately 500 km and analysis of the constellations’ altitudes indicate that the drones were launched at night, in the early morning hours, when the constellations Pegasus and Cygnus were high above the horizon.
This allowed analysts to tie the video to a specific location and time.
6/ “Risks and motivation”
Launching from enemy territory was an extremely risky operation, but it had tactical advantages.
– First, the attention of the facility’s air defenses was likely focused on approaches from the west or south;
– Second, controlling the drones from a closer launch area guaranteed higher accuracy in hitting open ammunition sites.
Despite the solid data, experts warn: – the published video may be illustrative or relate to another episode.
Therefore, some of the conclusions are based on assumptions, albeit substantiated by OSINT analysis .
There is also the question of the type of ammunition in the combat unit of the drones and the degree of their modification. The special forces themselves called the strike one of their most daring – and this emphasizes the complexity and boldness of the operation.
7/ “What preceded”
On September 18, 2024, in the #TVer region, strike drones attacked the 23rd military arsenal
https://news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/russia/u-tverskij-oblasti-rf-znovu-vibuhi-detonuyut-snaryadi-na-skladi-grau-u-zhovtnevomu-foto-i-video.htm
of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the tussian Federation.
The explosions occurred at 04:00, after which detonation began.
8/ After the explosions at the warehouse in the village of #Oktyabrsky, russians evacuated the Staraya Toropa railway station .
Several passenger trains were canceled. Others, including “Moscow-Pskov” and “St. Petersburg-Smolensk”, were sent on an alternative route and are running with a delay of about 2 hours.
#RosZMI hastened to report on the destruction of a “secret” russian military facility in the Tver region.
9/ Later it became known that the UAV flights to the 107th arsenal in Toropets caused huge losses for the occupation army .
https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/znischeno-vse-zyavilis-suputnikovi-znimki-arsenalu-grau-v-tverskoi-oblasti-pislya-prilotiv-ukrainskih-droniv.htm
Good quality satellite images showed that most of the BC warehouse was destroyed.
– In the area where the storage facilities are located underground, ground structures were also damaged. This is visible in the footage taken from space by satellites of the American company @Maxar Technologies .
10/ A massive fire broke out, ammunition began to detonate. Then even the sensors registered it as small earthquakes .
https://news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/russia/dosit-brehati-rosiyani-v-isteritsi-cherez-ataku-na-sklad-bk-u-toroptsi-pislya-vibuhiv-zafiksovano-zemletrusi-video.htm
11/11 During the summer of 2025, the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine struck more than 80 important objects in enemy territory
https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/asimetrichnist-dij-i-nestandartni-pidhodi-sili-spetsoperatsij-rozkrili-skilki-rosijskih-obektiv-urazili-vlitku.htm
(excluding command and observation posts, control points, and equipment and ammunition storage bases) and seven more russian oil refineries.
In total, hundreds of long-range strikes were carried out against the rear of the aggressor state.
Images, video and English translation by Lew Anno Support:
🧵1/11 https://x.com/anno1540/status/1968923683847581905?s=46
Grilled BTG 🥓🍞🔥
Because they land/airdrop in areas without Russian bastards, the Russian bastards have to go up on the roads and whine to get there, which equals a lot of dead Russian bastards right away along the roads.
Experts call this the Davidyi Brid effect, make a raid into an undefended area and go on the defensive under your indirect fire umbrella and await grilled BTG.
Since LV is out, the land bridge to the units at LL is urgent. As long as needed, maintain an air bridge to LL until cutting through with a land bridge. Weren’t those the conditions for American units in Vietnam?