12:57
This year’s most disturbing film, Rybar so pro-Russian and he lies worse than usual when he says it is Ukraine but drone footage of Russian thermite/phosphorus over Ukrainian defense.
https://twitter.com/rybar_en/status/1607772242024218630?s=20&t=Xf-HBoXOYqoaqU1bSsuE4g
13:10
In March the gas weapon and the siege of the EU’s soft parts, our electricity infrastructure, will be obsolete and if we have made it this far we will get there too. I myself reduced consumption by 40% compared to the previous December (which was probably warmer…) and thus a frozen and trembling middle finger is enough for Putin.
We read everywhere now what the thread has said since the summer, that Ukraine needs offensive weapons (the eternal mantra about CV90). Retired US generals compete to state it most clearly – that fighter jets and Abrams are critical.
I still can’t understand how it can be important to have tanks in every country in the EU, better that the perimeter defense is intact?
If it comes to Portugal having to defend its country with armor it’s game over anyway, same for Belgium and the Dutch.
Someone in the thread wrote a few weeks ago what we haven’t discussed for a long time – there are CV90s out in Europe too and we can only hope that someone comes to their senses and realizes that it’s better that Ukraine beats Russia so the perimeter defense is intact than that they need the armored vehicles for their own defense in a few years.
Now everyone has done a group project in school and knows it’s not simple but we keep hoping and Ukraine themselves have left very clear hints that offensive weapons will come in the future.
My guess is that during 2023 Russia will turn inward but it takes more than what Ukraine has achieved today to start that chain of events and that is what we hope they succeed with during the winter offensive. As soon as Russia turns inward all resources are consumed to position themselves (kill some other villain) and avoid being self-murdered.
During the spring Ukraine built up an offensive capacity that played out in late summer/autumn. It has now recovered a couple of months and been set in motion again.
Now the Russians themselves have increased their capacity after the low point and it is harder to go on the offensive than to defend and now there are no clear weak points anymore and the Russians have gone into actively prepared defense – but that it would look different during 2023 is unlikely.
The Russians have an ability to adapt but they also have quite significant actual limitations. Ukraine has initiative-taking down to the group level that would make any general in the West envious, and they have done the best they can with the equipment they have. The limitations are probably the two Western leaders, you know who, and the lack of offensive Western weapons; everything else they really have to end the war, and it is just a matter of an accelerated or longer timeline.
It is probably about achieving several breakthroughs to paralyze the Russian command this winter; if the war ends in spring that would be perfect, but otherwise the worst possible starting point applies for the Russian side in their spring offensive. They have to jump onto prepared Ukrainian defenses and during movement and into UFA, HIMARS goes all in – as many dead as possible. Then they will probably lose motivation quite quickly.
I find it hard to see that Russia can scrape together much more than a decent spring offensive; after that, their offensive capacity should be quite exhausted both in materiel and key personnel. Sure, they can seriously launch human waves with newly mobilized millions, but the country turns inward before that.
In Medvedev’s New Year’s wish where he predicted how the West would develop in 2023, you probably have quite a lot of the Russian plan and how the dominoes would fall if Putin got to decide – if anyone now believed that there was a balance to be achieved with Russia.
If anyone missed it, an excellent example of when you have been sitting in a closed echo chamber and actually started a war on that 😀;
https://twitter.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1607487338401206273?s=20&t=4NYdcEoVTg9BMCnwYZidMw
19:49
I think they have taken almost the entire forest belt south of Kreminna, which gives a significant advantage.
To the north, they are probably at Chernopopivka and Pischane, roughly?
They are trying to encircle but directly east of the town there is an old open-pit mine with dominant height(s).
Then I have gotten the impression that the terrain/forest directly east also has some elevations.
A quick map reconnaissance suggests you can probably get quite close if you move in the forest southeast of Kreminna, and since it is coniferous forest it continues to provide cover.
12:53
Cannot recommend a nerf gun as a Christmas gift, it was fun the first ten minutes when chasing the kids around, quite soon it ended up on top of the bookshelf out of reach of surprisingly violent kids. I absolutely do not see my own fault in this the same way as my better half does.
Before Christmas, we discussed that Russia/Putin is in full panic.
There is a somewhat deceptive calm here and above all Rybar is occupied with other things (before Rybar it was Girkin who was the canary in the coal mine but he is just strange nowadays), Erik14 has someone else that I always forget and think it’s getting embarrassing to ask for so I don’t.
Everything before Christmas culminating in Zelensky’s visit to the USA signaled that Putin and Russia are under very heavy pressure. The blogger has posted some things in the country Russia suggesting deterioration – increased gun violence and bank runs for example.
Then it certainly seems that Ukraine has started striking the power infrastructure in Russia in response to Russia’s ravaging. We had an ethical discussion about this early in December but I stand by the principle of proportionate response and that it is an effective way to shorten the war.
Since Russia demonstrably can only do one thing (much respect to the one in the thread who said this as soon as the war started) which is to increase violence, there will surely be a winter offensive in some form, even if it is just more around Bakhmut – the Siverskyi line and plans are underway for a spring offensive with further newly mobilized troops who will be as well planned and well executed as they can manage now in the current situation and with some trolling from Belarus.
A guess has been that there are around 150,000 men left of capable units. They don’t need to be intact units and maybe units have been merged but they have combat experience and training. In addition, those remaining of the mobilized, 100,000 – 150,000(?) who are now undergoing training (I don’t know how many have been deployed at the front is the truth). These units are behind the fronts, have heat and food, and I believe they are out of range of HIMARS.
I believe it is livelier at the southern front than we are led to believe, Ukraine’s pressure across the entire front is enough for the Russians to need to send forward reserves at regular intervals and the hospitals were full, we read a few weeks ago. They have started digging trenches in Melitopol which they wouldn’t do if they didn’t believe Melitopol needs defending. What we see at the southern front is probably reconnaissance battles so far to find a weak point with fairly high intensity mixed with preliminary bombardment.
At northern Luhansk there has been a continuous offensive since they crossed the Oskil river, only the intensity shifts and now it is increasing. Kreminna should not be underestimated because after that they deploy the well-established military formation “release a handful of ants on the ground” and scatter in all directions – Svatove, Severodonetsk and Starobilsk. However, they must first take the dominating terrain east of the community Kreminna/North-South road.
Down towards Severodonetsk they can move in cover because it is either forest or built-up.
Up towards Svatove likewise, they roll up the entire North-South defensive line through Svatove as the blogger usually writes.
Starobilsk is probably the next prepared, and manned, defensive line running North-South through the community. It’s probably good to reach it as soon as possible but there you need to get reconnaissance out and artillery forward before rushing ahead probably.
If we have figured this out, the Russians have figured it out and if they can’t hold Kreminna it’s not because Ukraine has been smarter and tricked the boxers off them – everyone has known for months that Kreminna is next. It is because the Russians partly cannot manage effective defense in dominating terrain, forest and urban environment and probably also because they don’t have enough units available. If one dares to guess, it is LPR/DPR and newly mobilized who remain in Kreminna, engaging in previous delaying battles but I don’t know…
Then it probably breaks down with VDV in the North-South defensive line Starobilsk and the East-West defensive line city of Luhansk and it becomes a bit fiercer defense.
If Ukraine is smart now, and they are, they attack everywhere. They absolutely have the capacity for this and then it really doesn’t matter what the Russians do because their units are locked.
When it breaks at one front section you can get far because there is no real depth defense, when the firefighting force is used up it’s empty behind.
We are all sitting and expecting a novel-like start where 30 brigades move forward and roll out from the forest edge. The winter offensive has probably already started and it will gradually increase until it breaks somewhere with a breakthrough in depth and joyful exclamations in the thread.