2023-01-10

10:50 – Johan No.1

Yesterday, we basically received preliminary information that the Archer and other offensive weapons (Strv or CV90) will be sent. The number is definitely not clear, but 18 Archers have been circulating among journalists who have no clue?

It was the conclusion of an excellent week where the entire free West partly clarified that they are with Ukraine until the entire territory is reclaimed and that top-shelf Western armor is inbound.

All the very strong reasons that have existed for why they would never be sent, or any Western armor at all for that matter, disappeared overnight. Written in stone no more.

I guess most have acted in good faith and been convinced that the arguments against Archer, CV90, Leo2, or all Western armor (IFV and MBT) in general were good. The best one was that the only workshop for Archer was in Boden, resources couldn’t be moved, and therefore it was impossible to send Archer.

Others have been that Bradley and Abrams were only for NATO countries, there are no Leo2 to send, maintenance issues, problems for Ukraine to operate them, and all the other arguments against.

At the same time, the world’s most advanced air defense and artillery systems are being sent and manned by Ukrainian crews who are doing a brilliant job.

At the same time, HIMARS is causing more damage than thousands of Leo2s could, so diplomatically they have been locked for a long time.

But… There has also been an active Russian influence operation against Western armor because they absolutely do not want Ukraine to get superior offensive capability; they have enough problems with HIMARS that they didn’t really see coming until it was too late.
I think we saw the death throes of that from Musk who immediately went out and announced that the tank’s role on the battlefield was over, so it was completely unnecessary to send MBTs to Ukraine, end of argument.
(that Musk commenting on tanks in favor of Russia should have convinced the last doubters).

The probability has always been 1 that top-shelf Western armor would come, a logical step, and the sad thing was that it took so long. Not for us who had to sit disappointed in the thread feeling that we understood nothing of the real world outside our boy’s room but for the Ukrainian lives that were spilled completely unnecessarily.

They could just as well have opened the floodgates in May so Ukraine would have come fully equipped to its autumn offensive in the Russian low point now before mobilization. Then the remaining residents of Mariupol wouldn’t all have frozen to death this winter when hungry and cold Russians take the last food and heat sources.

Now I also understand that intense diplomacy (horse-trading) has been going on behind closed doors here and that if it had been practically possible to open the floodgates earlier, it would have been done.

I have tried to sneak in a course change regarding Germany and France, with the highest possible discretion that I think has passed under the radar in a neat way 👍

There is no longer any reason to be critical. I think it is wrong to try to “hold together” when some buddies betray in the worst possible way, and there has been quite a lot of betrayal. Do you keep a good face with a partner who is notoriously unfaithful?
However, you don’t need to hold grudges when the worst betrayers are finally forced into a corner and the only way out is to turn around and try to be the best in class. A trait I may not value very highly but it obviously works – France will forever be remembered as the country that first gave Western (light) tanks to Ukraine, Macron will make sure of that.

What we care about is that the goal is now achieved – Ukraine has now received its Western armor and can win the war, and none of the Western leaders hesitate anymore or try to mediate with Putin; he understands that door is closed. The last puzzle piece is in place.

Hence the subtle course change that would impress any diplomat.

At the risk of being a bit biased, I think that now that the floodgates have opened, the government’s and the military’s communication about the Ukraine war has been excellent – 100%.

They have landed completely right, and if we are over a few Archers with accompanying few CV90s or Leos (who knows), Sweden as a country has done a lot and you might get that strange warm feeling in your chest that you’ve heard about and should be able to handle (i.e., not a heart attack).

By the way, I watched the press conference with Ebba yesterday about the electricity support. As an abused electricity underclass, it was important enough that I paused work and watched the entire conference with the most critical possible glasses on. She was well-informed and the support highly reasonable, the built-in flaws had no directly obvious solutions. Overall, a pass in Johan’s opinion from the electricity underclass.

Sure, hope is a stretch when it comes to the electricity bill, but the government has managed to communicate reasonably about the Ukraine war lately, and there must be a lot of discussions going on within the JEF forum but also the free West where Sweden is presumably an active party. Not least our role to strengthen the northern shield against Russian aggression.

And where we now also take the lead role for the EU – we can set the agenda for the first half of the year here.

I am still convinced that Russia will turn inward during 2023, puzzle piece after puzzle piece falls into place, and the only thing now missing is a Ukrainian offensive that takes ground.

The risk list is empty, which is quite a liberating feeling.

If there is any curveball, at least I don’t see it coming, it would be China then, but if they want to do a Russia in Asia, they can do that and see how fun it is to get the USA on top of them like a ton of bricks. They might even be completely history-less and try to take out some carrier group at Guam with bombers 😀

12:02 – MatsExtrude

Well written as usual!
What worries me is whether Ukraine already has what they need for an offensive or if they have to wait and hold out for promised material in the meantime. And if they have what they need to hold out at Bakhmut.

13:04 – Johan No.1

If anyone thought HIMARS hadn’t made a difference, Russian artillery down 75% but of course counter-artillery is included in this and the artillery radar.

https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-1-10-23/h_553d0e2c95ca773e3501285c84e70dbc

13:15 – MatsExtrude

Granted, they did pour on enormously for a while, so a 75% reduction from the peak is probably still quite a lot, but really nice to see that it’s drying up!

13:37 – Johan No.1

I am not a little surprised sitting here watching the Russian winter offensive play out in real time on some spy satellite.

Tactically smart for the Russians would have been to go on defense and try to ride out the winter and then strike with a spring offensive when they had prepared as well as they could. They weave in some trolling from Belarus and local offensives now in winter to disrupt Ukraine’s offensive, but the main purpose would have been to hold all terrain.

Vuhledar – Siversk has zero strategic significance, so what drives the Russians to go all in is that they now have VDV, Naval Infantry, and Guards in high-knee attacks; just waiting for Spetznaz to join the circus as well.

Silence from Belarus.

It is absolute madness to waste all the elite units for a few kilometers of potato fields on a secondary defensive line; the main line runs Kramatorsk/Slovyansk down to the stalemate line Horlivka, and behind that is probably another one, and then the Dnieper…

Meanwhile, Ukraine has prepared its maneuver brigades for its winter offensive, resourced and ready.

This signals to me that Putin and the Russian command are forced to try to achieve a decisive outcome in the near term; they feel they must accelerate the timeline and have no other points on the agenda than this, the very definition of having painted themselves into a corner.

I believe that the West’s course change and promised arms deliveries have resulted in exactly what we discussed a few weeks ago; you remember sending a company of Leo2 and promising 500-1000 more that never need to be sent. The signaling politics is central.

It has been preceded by absolutely murderous indirect fire during the autumn, which has increased to spectacular base massacres in recent weeks. It is difficult even in defense.

Now this offensive did not start today, but the West’s course change was not sprung from nowhere last week either; the two came close together in time, but the offensive depended on the West’s course change and indirect fire.

Someone wrote the Ardennes offensive above; we will see how many of the elite units they dedicate to this offensive, but it is actually full speed between Vuhledar – Kreminna. It is a long front, and 2000 dead and wounded per day or more drains the elite units quite quickly, if it is they who take the brunt.

Interspersed with a CNN article that Russian artillery fire has dropped 75% makes one start to wonder if this might end quite quickly; the question is how much they are investing in these offensives?

The Ukrainian maneuver brigades will cut through everything mobilized since September quite promptly, and it has always been the elite units/capable units that could put up reasonable resistance, but they are now being consumed rapidly in one of the most pointless offensives I have seen. From a war-technical perspective, this is really frustrating, but in the bigger picture, it is almost too good to be true.

13:48 – MatsExtrude

+1

13:49 – MatsExtrude

+100 I meant, of course.

13:57 – Johan No.1

I usually can go into one topic at a time in such detail, and last time it was the submarine violations. Hypothetical, illustrative, and highly probable analyses that would never be provable because everything was classified or secret, and the little that was declassified was never enough. It got stuck even though we actually managed to prove that U137 was not an accidental violation to some people’s great annoyance. That there is still resistance to declassifying everything today I find interesting and hope for a white paper in the future.

Otherwise, some daily newspapers a few times, and yes, there should be more writing because it is very rewarding.

13:57 – Johan No.1

They have presumably resourced the winter offensive but need to get Western armor for a spring offensive, I think.

15:30 – Johan No.1

Very interesting, there is nothing in the feeds so this is something to come, and we should know most of it. Today, people have probably guessed everything that exists now 😀

It will be a lean January, but I would have really bet money that the Russians were not prepared to sacrifice the VDV that remained; the Naval Infantry was in infinitely poor condition before, and the Guards were probably not summer-fresh either.

The old rumor that Putin works for NATO becomes more likely every month that passes.

15:38 – Johan No.1

A couple of guesses are that they realize they cannot manage to go on defense.
That all deliveries of armor are decisive.
That Putin understands that my favorites Macron and Scholz are not playing double.
That the winter offensive is so threatening that they try to preempt it.
That LPR and DPR are on the fence about switching sides.

Don’t forget that all analyses have been that Putin is quite satisfied with a frozen conflict or a long war here, everyone.

Right now, he is emptying the barracks of elite units in a pointless offensive. It is quite clear that Putin does not consider a long war to benefit him and that he must try to achieve a decisive outcome now in winter.

Why doesn’t he just let the mobilized be sacrificed in the first defensive lines and then have the warmed-up and fed VDV take over in the main defensive line? Offensives cost a lot, and why can’t the Russians go on defense now in winter, inflict damage on Ukraine while preparing for a spring offensive?

There is something here that makes Putin feel he does not have time for this; what is it…

16:21 – Johan No.1

There is some risk that it will become a car chase in the villa area when other walker-bound people take to the streets to silence you after reading this faltering text, a violent chase in slow motion with wildly swinging net bags and flying honey jars.

A Ukrainian winter offensive is to exploit the situation before the mobiks-meat wall with old Mosin rifles makes its entrance on the scene. They take terrain and try to get at the elite units so that the Russians are forced to choose between retreat or keeping them.

Then the worst possible start for Putin in spring with Crimea surrounded, northern Luhansk lost, and the whole Donbass HIMARSed.

But now Putin is losing the war entirely on his own by committing all the elite units he has left at Bakhmut, with the risk that I don’t know how many he is committing here…

16:27 – MatsExtrude

Ha, ha, “a violent chase in slow motion with wildly swinging net bags…” I can see it in front of me!!

19:50 – Johan No.1

Apparently posted in the economics thread.

The video of the KSP in the basement in Soledar.
So we got to learn defense in urban areas?
Fortified basement.
Grills on windows so nothing can be thrown in.
Downspouts for grenade chutes.
Shoot diagonally from behind because then they take cover as if the fire came from the front.
Feels like Ukraine is running the whole manual in Bakhmut and Soledar, what brigade grillers they have gotten there.

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