10:28 – Johan No.1
At the southern front, they may have committed 20-25% of their offensive reserve?
10:37 – Johan No.1
The fact that there is even a discussion about fighter jets and longer range on long-distance weapons is downright embarrassing.
Tanks are probably locked down now but it took its time.
10:49 – Johan No.1
They pulled units away from Kherson but then lost the southern front for a while for Bakhmut, Soledar, and northern Luhansk.
12:55 – Johan No.1
The 76th from Pskov is soon history.
However, it will get really tough east of the Oskil River for a while now…
https://twitter.com/tatarigami_ua/status/1620616498095226881?s=46&t=olKLow2eQlFLE9NY7YYGrg
16:51 – Johan No.1
Interesting about Vuhledar
https://twitter.com/zimermanerik/status/1620645416995016704?s=46&t=olKLow2eQlFLE9NY7YYGrg
16:59 – MatsExtrude
Good thread and interesting to get insight into why they are attacking right there!
17:06 – Johan No.1
Experiencing a gigantic collective thinking error in the thread today.
They have attacked with newly mobilized troops all autumn towards Bakhmut – Siversk and haven’t gotten anywhere at all.
On January 6th, they threw in the remaining capable units and made progress.
They were maybe 150k and you burn through them quickly. Ukraine is a bit shaken but for a month the lines have held AND they have taken terrain around Kreminna.
When the last capable units are gone, we will revert to how it looked last autumn because that is the level of soldiers left.
Connections are being made with successes now (small ones…) and Russia’s population, which is very far-fetched. Today’s situation has an end date, about a month more…
18:32 – Johan No.1
Things are going so-so for the Russians at Vuhledar according to Dmitri
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1620821247356723201?s=46&t=olKLow2eQlFLE9NY7YYGrg
18:58 – Johan No.1
Wagner 1:2 losses
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1620753396478115844?s=46&t=kUtQ7N38DU8B-Qgv_A-lCA
19:18 – MatsExtrude
+1
19:40 – MatsExtrude
I also don’t think the Russians can continue at this pace any longer than that. Just keep fingers crossed that they don’t manage to chew up too much terrain or maybe most importantly that they don’t take too many cities (both strategically and because they always level them to the ground).
10:22 – Johan No.1
Now I’m getting a bit out of sync again but want to start by agreeing that the West has delayed more than reasonably with their weapons for far too long and that it has prolonged the war. There is primarily one country that has stood out here but it is quite well investigated now, they have an almost unique ability to get it wrong in larger conflicts.
I keep nagging about the numbers mostly because it is an important factor, the other is the losses of experienced soldiers.
I think the negative is reinforced by the fact that Ukraine itself wants weapons and is painting everything in black right now, and they should do that.
Then on top of that we have the zero-progress effect where Wagner has run across the fields and taken a community so everyone gets worried but as an organization they are finished and the same at Vuhledar, the naval infantry is achieving some success but the units are “wiped out”.
The reason I have been jumping up and down since January 6 when I started to understand the extent is that it is the remaining capable units that are getting wiped out. After that, there is no competence left and the VDV is becoming endangered – about 70% of the remaining units are at the active front now according to Deepstatemap and we know what they are doing there, high knees over fields towards prepared defenses and air barrages.
There is an incredible difference between 3-4 months of basic training and the Eastern Front, even old SOF in the international legion fled the field very shaken after a few weeks.
There was talk of a pool of Russian conscript-trained of +2 million or was it 2.5? In the September mobilization they got hold of 80,000 with previous conscription and the rest were straight from the street, we heard.
I find it interesting because de facto there are 100,000 – 150,000 conscripts left from September onwards (because there was an ongoing mobilization over several months that gave 300,000 casualties) who have then received a maximum of 4 months training and are now expected to carry out a winter offensive. Against them is Ukraine’s combined warfare with battle-hardened maneuver brigades.
Enlistment in June and one could probably function passably in individual soldier skills early autumn but it was still group combat?
We have a level of Russian skills here comparable to the two world wars where you got basic training and then straight to the front. And that is exactly what we also see when they do not follow doctrine.
It is not a particularly high number either, lower than what Ukraine has now.
As long as they do not start a general mobilization, the numbers are declining. We KNOW that they have sent down what they had in training camps to Ukraine.
https://twitter.com/FriaUkraina/status/1605485831984074752?s=20&t=5JzKvzW4p0hXzxD1qp3JKw
Flew by yesterday that Ukraine has set up additional brigades, including an artillery brigade. This is in addition to the “assault brigades” they set up earlier where Azov is now an army brigade with its own mechanized unit. Do you think they could do that if the army suffered chronic shortages of soldiers?
Ukraine’s losses in armor were +500 according to Oxy and they have captured as much and probably received as much more when the last armor now arrives, was already 300 vehicles from Poland?
UA – RU is 1:1.5 in armor now according to Ukrainian Forbes. They estimate that the Russians have 1,500 left, right or wrong.
If you look at Militaryland’s map, every brigade is at the active front but all we hear are battalion sizes – hence I have concluded that they rotate.
Now we got a figure on the Russians, 326,000 in UA which should be a recent figure?
Russian attackers lose +10,000/week since January 6, now we all understand that it is the spearhead that is lost and the rear that survives so the last 100,000 have combat value like a barracks guard.
UA should lose a few thousand/week spread over a bunch of battalions and battalions at rest replenish over time and experience is transferred because the structure is intact.
Just the newly formed Ukrainian brigades are probably two divisions here?
It struck me yesterday that it is the Stuka effect with drones and wing grenades now, Russians in trenches have to sleep with both eyes open and they have no defense against it. Wet daytime and subzero at night – perfect for some frozen Russian in a trench soon.
We have been sitting since December discussing when Bakhmut will fall, then Soledar’s impending downfall and now most recently Vuhledar – weeks go by and there are no breakthroughs.
And if there is a local breakthrough it is nothing Ukraine cannot handle, they fall back to the next line which is already prepared as LW well described in today’s post. The main line is Kramatorsk/Slovyansk down to the old ceasefire line at Horlivka where the front now runs, and there are defenses in between.
The weather is probably the biggest problem right now because the window for Ukraine to take terrain is shrinking and as long as the Russians attack it is defense that applies.
If it gets wet and muddy they will have difficulty moving with vehicles and it will be a low point like in December.
I absolutely cannot reconcile Ukraine’s discussion about an offensive in March and pushing out Western materiel to units as fast as possible. We know how tough the Russian team had it at the offensive start on February 24 and that they could only move on roads in columns.
Is there something we are missing here, it is cold for 14 more days and all other forecasts have been completely worthless now when one has been watching the weather all autumn partly for the war but also electricity prices since one belongs to the electricity underclass. Difficult to get a good picture of the ground bearing capacity.
If lucky it will be cold at nights in March and not much rain and then it is passable up in Luhansk?
Now however the weather has been against the Russians all the time so it will probably be a spring without rain and passable anyway, after all it is a La Nina year.
April looks impossible.
Then sometime in May it dries up?
If one may speculate the Russians have a date to relate to here, February 24…
If the ground bears in March maybe Ukraine’s first window to start taking terrain will come then when the Russians are sluggish and tired?
In Kreminna it is a very interesting situation where VDV is reinforced in the city but at the same time SOF is pressing from all sides and “has reached the city”. Gregg confirmed that earlier.
North of Kreminna two guards brigades and some others (apparently) are attacking to try to get down to Lyman. The value of that is debatable if the Siversky Donets is frozen AND Ukraine holds the forest belt south of Kreminna. My gut feeling is that they get stuck long before they reach Lyman.
What looks a bit messier is the attack further north towards all terrain SE of Kupiansk. If you can hold Kupiansk much is won and you probably hold Borova and Svenkove where the crossings are but I don’t really have a handle on Ukraine’s staffing in that area and the Russians seem to have invested in local superiority. They can drive wedges westward along the entire NS defense line through Svatove and at the same time attack straight south from north of Kupiansk.
The Oskil River itself has a forest belt on the eastern bank, a string of settlements, several crossings, and beautiful shooting fields in front that the Russians must cross. And all the artillery can be positioned on the western side of the Oskil River.
It will get chaotic and it already has disrupted Ukraine’s operation to get through Kreminna, but there will be no breakthrough or for the Russians to retake all the terrain on the eastern side of the Oskil River.
With a bit of luck, they will push too hard too fast and Ukraine can regain the initiative as long as the ground is passable.
At the southern front, 8 battalion tactical groups were brought forward for the attacks, guards. The Marine Infantry’s last battle is not included. I don’t know their condition now after the fighting, but looking at the number of BTGs behind the southern front, 8 is not insignificant; it is their offensive reserve they are drawing from.