11:53 – MatsExtrude
Thanks, always worth reading!
Speaking of aviation. I guess if we see Russia suddenly throwing in and sacrificing their air force on a larger scale, we know it is their last desperate attempt to achieve success.
It’s really only the air force that they haven’t used up in larger quantities so far.
12:18 – Johan No.1
Yes, I think so too, with the air defense Ukraine has now, it is desperation – they are still there, we throw them in.
20:28 – Johan No.1
It feels like this brigade is preparing for something..
https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1625934470242045960?s=20&t=K0vT8IiRWjT5PdeJXxK2kA
08:16 – Johan No.1
According to FriaUkraina, Krasna Hora is contested (he writes Ukrainian).
https://twitter.com/FriaUkraina/status/1626111768060743680?s=20
08:27 – MatsExtrude
+1
11:09 – Johan No.1
The YouTuber with the male dialect brought up a Russian offensive at the northern front inside Russian territory.
I was quite alone in my belief that it would be a feint from Belarus, which it was not, and probably will not be, because the Russians have reduced the number of units there down to 9,000 (just right for crowd control?).
Besides that, we discussed an offensive down from the northern front for the simple reason that it would be smart to relieve units at other fronts when Ukraine has to reinforce up there.
If you remember during the Kupiansk sprint, they were supposed to defend along the W-E river that ran north of the road towards Kupiansk from Malynivka to protect the flank.
It was dominant terrain with a river and looked nasty.
According to the YouTuber, an offensive from the north will bounce off that defense and then be channeled down towards Kupiansk, which will be a death trap if you look at the topographic maps – Bakhmut 2.0.
Defmon has started marking units up there and we can be completely confident that it will go as it always does – dead Russians.
I get the distinct feeling that the timing is completely broken here.
Maybe Vuhledar came too early, it was not reconnaissance in force considering the number of brigades that were wiped out there?.
But it was the same with the southern front, they sent forward 8 BTGs that were wiped out and then it ended.
Preparation for the offensive should reasonably have been what we have seen since January 6?
After that, the plan must have been to advance at all front sections roughly simultaneously, including the northern front. Now they are doing nothing from Belarus but also there if they managed.
That did not happen – now we have had Bakhmut and Soledar followed by the southern front followed by Vuhledar and some clearing in northern Luhansk ongoing?
It is now quiet at the southern front while they are starting to run out of gas at Bakhmut and Soledar (why else let themselves be pushed back?) but they are accelerating at northern Luhansk.
And they have not yet started offensive operations at the northern front.
If they continue like this, Ukraine will have time to maneuver and meet the offensives where they come one after another… Now they don’t need to because the critical mass has long been on their side but to show how poorly the Russians fight.
The eternal attempt to show that “500,000 men offensive war” is hot air.
IF (which I do not believe) they had an offensive pool of 326,000 + 150,000 – 476,000 men here, they have partly lost 120,000 of them in two weeks and partly the combat value of the whole horde up in northern Luhansk is very low.
The horde in northern Luhansk is according to another source 130,000, so quite close to Gregg’s figure (again!).
https://twitter.com/friaukraina/status/1625399991178088448?s=46&t=YKAWH9ywEqvg1SRykmTZ1Q
Since not all belong to the spearhead but it is the spearhead that attacks and takes losses, offensive capacity should be heavily reduced in northern Luhansk and Vuhledar – Soledar already before the attacks at the northern front and southern front have really started?
-so you can also calculate in the eternal attempt to show that the Russians will not be able to succeed here, 476,000 – (rear + 120,000 dead and wounded + 125,000 low combat value) – not so many!
I took a look at the Ministry of Defence to see if they bought into the “500,000 men offensive” but they never did. I never have the energy to read their updates but went through to early January now and they have had a very balanced reporting. They try to post one or two topics per day and sometimes there is a bit of a news drought.
They wrote this about the 20 new divisions which of course is interesting…
https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1617045166950318081?s=20&t=UJsxUWlPsI0GVr6LDfK24Q
If even Gregg’s territorial battalion gets BMP-1s, it doesn’t feel like Ukraine is lacking armor here?
The equivalent is that our home guard gets PBV302 after a year of war.
There were 27,000 applications to NG storm brigades, apparently going first is not a problem here.
Then we have the new army brigades on top of that, six in number.
And all existing brigades from NG, territorial and the army which probably are not completely understrength if there were 27,000 for new brigades or BMP-1s for territorial. They are if not fully manned, not far from it.
If you ask me, Ukraine is running a pretty good version of “help me I am weak” here while preparing the great blow of our time that will leave a mark in history.
The humiliation the imperialistic and shiny Russian military will be subjected to will probably be wizard level in everything.
As Darth Putin always writes – it’s going well now because we are not retreating.
Some countries in Europe will probably start considering heavily overfunding their defense when they realize that Ukraine can overrun them in a week if they want (some irony, nothing to pick on).
If I were the Russian command, I would be seriously worried now.
What I think will increase the devastation for the Russian side is Putin’s afterburner – he wants something positive for the anniversary but the army only gives him misery, it will be personally embarrassing for him.
Since he is who he is, he will in pure July style demand more of the same for a while longer and the army may not have found its integrity yet and if any army chief does, there are a bunch more who haven’t tried everything yet. What we see now will therefore continue for a while longer.
According to the YouTuber, they have 5 weeks for offensive operations before the ground starts to give way, I thought probably shorter than that but down south it should be in the last weeks now?
Great danger if the Russian offensive runs out of gas within the next two weeks because then Ukraine has three weeks to roll out combined-arms death over the trench systems in northern Luhansk.
They must prevent Ukraine from going on a local offensive for another five weeks.
And the only way to do that is to deliberately sacrifice lives as the situation has developed today.
Then a small prediction – if the Russian offensive from the northern front gets going or something more at northern Luhansk or southern front then the media will latch onto Russian psyops and portray it as a battle that changed the war. Remember the big convoy that ended in running out of fuel and be confident that this will end even better.
The Brits believed that the Russians deliberately pushed out victory texts in the media about Vuhledar and Soledar when it happened as lively news outlets pushed them out as absolute truth as usual.
I was watching KOS’s video about breach according to US doctrine now on the morning train. The group’s alternating advance looked a bit funny to say the least.
We who have the 90s as a reference point in everything including warfare remember that air superiority was everything and that in offense attack helicopters were central (ahkp). Mi24 was the big threat for example and Apache a game changer that would pop up and down behind the trees.
Since last spring, I have believed that UA does not need air superiority because they can deny the Russians it with LV.
I also believe that ground attack and AH-64 roles have largely been replaced by drones and guided munitions.
We know that UA has received “conversion kits” to make ground attack aviation’s ammunition smart – then they can release it at a distance, which makes them an indirect weapons platform.
The role of aviation is no longer central in combined arms warfare for the simple reason that other branches can accomplish the task at lower risk and cost (in case of lost aircraft).
That said, air and army aviation are of course good to have if you still have them, but the question is probably whether we will even see AH-64s from Ukraine offensively targeting ground targets on an active front with air defense and not trying to lob the ammunition from a distance.
Now I am thinking about a breakthrough of defending Russians or defense against attacking Russians.
A Russian column on a highway is somewhat made for ground attack/AH-64, and that role is difficult to replace with anything else in the way they solve the task. It is also suitable when you need to cut something beyond artillery range and above all, they complement everything else, and there is never enough of them.
We know that UA has received mine-clearing equipment; I have been nagging about it for a couple of days because I am curious. I guess it is for distance-laid mines for sudden breakthroughs; they have existed since WWII, basically.
And now that we have seen KOS, probably also the mine plow according to US doctrine, they probably had mine rollers before?
We have mentioned the bridges before; they have also received bridging equipment.
We have written this often since January 6, but UA is most vulnerable right after the breakthrough when they try to secure the “bridgehead” on the other side of the defensive line.
Russian doctrine is a counterattack with extra everything to immediately break the breakthrough, but since January 6, they have on their own decimated these offensive capable reserves, and that is why we have been jumping up and down – there is soon not much left that can function as a capable task force.
Then we have the role of Western armor in this. Russian armor does turret maneuvers at the slightest touch, but Western armor can take quite a few hits, probably enough to achieve the breakthroughs they seek.
Distance-laid mines have long been part of doctrine; for example, they were supposed to close the Fulda Gap with them. At Vuhledar, I don’t think the Russians cleared mines close to the offensive, probably they thought an area was mine-free and drove through it?
I have seen videos of a mine roller going first, but it is never clear why things turn out the way they do, does UA knock out the mine roller with a 155mm and then continue advancing?
Distance-laid mines have proven to be able to get right inside the Russian unit commander’s decision circle – suddenly and unexpectedly, which they probably hate, and they have shown themselves completely unable to handle it.
As soon as they become stationary, they are open to indirect fire, so the logical thing is to do exactly what they do – keep moving.
The alternative is 155mm or hammer-death from the barrier battalion.
They have simply figured out something that works, and in this offensive before the frost thaws, the Russians will fall for the same rope trick endlessly; there is too little time for them to adapt tactically.
Will they learn the trick during Ukraine’s offensive?
They have the systems, but how many/how much?
Then you can have enough mine rollers that always go first and some discipline, and they lose their value. Ukraine has of course factored in this weapon and will handle it.
Ukraine’s spring offensive is resourced with the tank deliveries and will be devastating.
The time for it is reasonably sometime in May when the ground has dried up.
Before that, there are certainly openings for local counteroffensives and land grabs when the Russians have gotten too lost on some front section ahead. Already now, this has been done at Bakhmut and at Vuhledar and probably also at northern Luhansk, but that is only to consolidate positions, not deeply.