10:24 – Johan No.1
Yep, there is a discussion among credible pro-Ukrainian debaters who are very critical.
I can’t see it and I think it will soon become clear whether they are right or not because they put quite a lot of effort into criticizing the Ukrainian command here.
Then I wonder how they know the ratio when UA formally announced 1:7. I think some of them have contacts inside a unit that is taking losses and is resigned but that probably does not reflect the situation at large.
Getting rid of “real Wagner”, VDV, and Spetsnaz before their spring offensive is pretty good.
10:59 – MatsExtrude
+1
11:03 – Johan No.1
I have never had a total number on Wagner actually and we laughed heartily at them in the beginning which was a bit shameful, they have adapted their tactics best really.
However, I think they are fighting against the competent core right now.
So the question one should really ask is whether Prigozhin is prepared to use up his life insurance?
Without Wagner he is nothing, presumably?
Defmon has had VDV in Bakhmut for quite a while and Gregg has discussed that they encountered three new brigades in Bakhmut about, what, 2-3 weeks ago and then another brigade came, which he confirmed once more by giving the numbers for the brigades that left Kreminna for Bakhmut to 4. He distinguished between Wagner and army brigades.
They have been fighting with their (relative) elite units since January 6 so it is quite reasonable that both VDV and Spetsnaz are deployed in Bakhmut. It was marine infantry and Spetsnaz who went and died at Vuhledar and up at Kreminna it is VDV that disappears in the forests.
VDV has probably been fighting quite a while in Bakhmut and I am the only one on the whole planet who believes that Spetsnaz fights there and I base that on a tweet with a unit map. What matched with that tweet were the Ukrainian units that participated in the counterattack so 50% confirmed 😀
The delaying battle in Bakhmut is in full swing, it cannot be interpreted any other way, and the very definition of a delaying battle is that you give up ground for dead Russians.
To get the most out of it, it is probably important that they do not advance too far north of the city and that is probably where it is messy?
If the Russians can keep up the momentum, UA will retreat from the settlement of Bakhmut, and if they cannot, UA has a presence in the city, which we will know about soon enough.
11:04 – Johan No.1
Also Spetsnaz at Kreminna who went and died, and at Soledar at least VDV.
11:52 – Johan No.1
Well, 80% was an assessment from one of the larger credible sources, you can probably google it.
Up until January 6th, what you write is correct because then the Russians sacrificed newly mobilized and DPR/LPR forces.
After January 6th, they have deployed the offensive reserve – we know that, right?
You have first-hand information from the Cossacks that Wagner has sent in its (relatively) competent reserve into the fighting.
Bakhmut has been counted out many times 😀
You can actually turn your reasoning around –
– why is uncertain troop numbers a disadvantage for Ukraine and an advantage for Russia?
– which source do you base on that the number of soldiers deployed is unknown?
(Bodanov gave us 326,000 in Ukraine which was close to the figure of 350,000 someone came up with. Then we have Forbes’ numbers on that).
Your calculation examples are always theoretical and end up with us underestimating Russian capability but overestimating Ukrainian capability.
I base my examples on figures we have received from Western or Ukrainian sources that we trust.
If the figure that they had taken 80% losses came from sources we trust, why should it be questioned?
The Russian army is not quite like all others but 80% in my book means many Wagner units knocked out.
We don’t really know how they have formed up but if we say they have had 8 out of 10 “brigades” knocked out, significant?
The Russians have conducted their winter offensive and achieved nothing.
Ukraine has been on the defensive.
I see smart warfare here, what do you see?
How do you explain that the Russians have not succeeded in taking Avdiivka yet?
Since Ukraine themselves tell us that they have 14 newly established brigades, the territorial defense has received IFVs, and they have told us that they will go on the offensive soon.
– this is something you do not believe in, is it the sources (Ukraine) you question then or how do you reason about it?
Ukraine has also given us an official casualty figure, was about 15,000 and now it is probably 20,000 one can guess – is that also wrong?
We KNOW that the Russians always lie and Ukraine is often in the same ballpark as other independent assessors. Shouldn’t we then rely on the information we get from the sources we trust?
Throwing in a – there is a large uncertainty factor that makes Russian capability higher but Ukrainian less, what do you base that assumption on?
12:03 – Johan No.1
+1
12:10 – Johan No.1
Now the Russians have probably already left 40% of the conquered territory.
And shown with all desired clarity that their offensive capability is over now this winter because they have conquered nothing of value.
Then of course it remains what Ukraine will do and we can only put the pieces together and guess so far but it’s not really much wishful thinking and free fantasies when you look at their increasing capability and the Russians’ declining capability. The fact that they take entire factories to renovate 800 T62s speaks volumes 😀
No one seriously believes that Russia will come out victorious in this anymore or that they will keep anything of what they have conquered?
12:20 – Johan No.1
Here you have a suggestion on the numbers for Wagner MRF –
https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1634998624957657090?s=20
12:20 – Johan No.1
Here you have a suggestion on the numbers for Wagner MRF –
https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1634998624957657090?s=20
21:35 – Johan No.1
You got many good answers MRF 😀
In these discussions I always feel that because you try to paint a different and nuanced picture, the truth must be somewhere in between what I see and what you see, and that’s how the discussion always starts which of course is wrong because it doesn’t have to be that at all.
If I stick to numbers that Western analysts have consensus on, you stick to theoretical reasoning and assumptions, logically hard numbers should be a safer bet?
The Russians should have mobilized to be able to use their manpower pool but they have not done so. It doesn’t matter that they have the numbers on their side because they don’t mobilize those numbers – that whole reasoning falls completely flat.
There is no Western analyst today who does not believe that the Russians will be thrown out of all of Ukraine.
I personally think we think too highly of the Russians, we have been misled to believe that the Red Army is a threat and then it can’t just end like this. There must be something more.
Isn’t that basically what you are saying – it can’t go this damn badly so we must be too positive me and Erik14, that we should be more cautious and not be misled to believe that the Russians are exactly as lousy as they are?
But they are so lousy, every day we see it. They have not succeeded in taking Avdiivka in a year, they have left 40% of conquered territory, they have united NATO, they have united the EU etc. endlessly.
800 T62s, constant videos of various units having ammunition shortages, artillery down 70% etc. endlessly – how much proof do we need to accept that they are scraping the bottom of the barrel.
Then I of course agree that Erik14 is hopeless, he posts every night for a whole year and does his best for the timeline and the blog – let him burn 👍
Now it’s probably me who is – free fantasies, psychotic, mental case, daydreaming, clueless etc.
Don’t feel that you negatives have had to endure the same rain of invectives and condescending tone that follows me in this thread if not every day then a couple of times a week 😀
06:29 – Johan No.1
Brilliant night shift Eril14 👍
Contributing two that together become one –
https://twitter.com/girkingirkin/status/1635323759581356033?s=46&t=KLjqvkbGJ_68l2NwK3U-rg
https://twitter.com/flash_news_ua/status/1635385414503780354?s=46&t=KLjqvkbGJ_68l2NwK3U-rg
06:35 – Johan No.1
So it was to Erik14, not the copycat Eril who tried to push in.
07:09 – MatsExtrude
ERIK14 always does a great job with the evening and night shifts!
08:46 – Johan No.1
Yep, they have had conscription and then 8 years of war where probably hundreds of thousands of conscripts gained combat experience?
Early 2000s the USA started training Ukraine’s officers and since 2014 there has been a big push to train the Ukrainian army.
I remember around 2015-2016 when pro-Russian debaters started complaining that Ukrainian battalions began to behave tactically in the field, alternating advances etc., and that it was proof of US training.
Now they have a year of war where they rotate units for rest and reinforce the battalions again – capability and experience are transferred to the new reserves.
10:04 – Johan No.1
The map below that Erik14 posted absolutely suggests that the delaying battle has begun inside the city of Bakhmut and that over time they are gradually retreating step by step. It could very well be that RU never reaches the western edge because UA pushes back or they run out of gas, but TODAY the delaying battle is ongoing.
https://mobile.twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1635046267394076672?cxt=HHwWgMDR9dr67LAtAAAA
And the summary below, I think, clearly shows the reasonableness of the plan to hold Bakhmut, also by Erik14.
https://mobile.twitter.com/IgorKar03352504/status/1634883908180537346
Someone is at least afraid that UA will ruin the whole party at Bakhmut, and Erik14 also writes about this in his night reporting.
There is more and more noise about a Ukrainian counteroffensive at Bakhmut, a low-hanging fruit if Wagner has taken heavy losses and overstretched themselves, one might think?
https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1635003151593123840?s=20
Yesterday was the big guessing day about how the spring offensive will look and many brilliant proposals, all the proposals had one difference – where the offensive starts. Then they all came to the same conclusion that UA wins.
And then we got #SpringisComing – what a hashtag, it’s hard to sit still… Unfortunately, it hasn’t really caught on on Twitter yet.
I’m really curious about when the ground will bear, mid-April seemed reasonable based on the information that came out earlier but some years spring comes earlier than others and this is a La Nina year when everything is upside down?
If it gets sunny and a bit of rain maybe it will dry up?
In Melitopol there are two days of rain until March 26, for example, never below zero, quite a few sunny days and 19 degrees as the highest one day.
The important thing is probably that the ground holds on the fields, I think, so you are not forced into channeling terrain?
What has Russia not done during its winter offensive – they have only attacked in one or a few places at the same time so Ukraine has been able to focus its entire effort on those points. They left the northern front, Belarus and the southern front (except Vuhledar) alone.
The Russians have also not managed to get inside the UA decision circle except north of Bakhmut and then only temporarily.
Ukraine should therefore do exactly that – put pressure so the Russians have to prioritize (again…).
Then they should try to get inside the Russians’ decision circle.
The first is easy because the critical mass is to their advantage.
The second is also easy because we know from some light in the thread that Ukrainian officers know the entire playbook the Russians have and now they have NATO’s too – they do this every day and will continue to do so.
Considering the losses in Jan, Feb, and now up to mid-March, the Russians have created a new low point entirely on their own here. The number of the (relatively) capable offensive reserve has never been lower in the whole war.
Krinkan posted an excellent summary in yesterday’s thread about the deceased.
Defense lines should also not be a problem considering all the equipment UA has received and the time they have had to train. The number of paving soldiers, for example, suggests that they can attempt breakthroughs simultaneously at several places (fronts).
We went through earlier how a breakthrough will look and that they have reasonably improved NATO doctrine with drone grenades, real-time information and air bursts when shooting goes into defense systems.
We have seen all of this tested on film during the past year.
In my positive haze after coming first in yesterday’s thread, I think we have reached a point where it no longer matters what the Russians do. UA does not need to look for weak points but can go for a breakthrough wherever they want, basically, and at the time that suits them.
However, there are very strong reasons to do this as soon as possible when the Russian low point is reached and the ground bears, over time even the Russian side can strengthen its defense.
There is no reason not to start with a devastating pre-attack where they take out hard vehicles in defense, artillery, command posts and air defense.
They are already working on the rear, but it will be when 777 gets started near the front that we can call it pre-attack. There are probably enough artillery tubes for several fronts simultaneously (and yes, all calibers).
After that, they MUST achieve breakthroughs where they have planned breakthroughs. I am of the opinion that they are as prepared as they can be and that they will succeed, there is nothing indicating the opposite.
Now, of course, we will go through a period of – Ukraine can never manage this – but then one must remember that the Russians have abandoned 40% of conquered territory already and then the Russian winter offensive has achieved nothing other than skyrocketing losses on their own side. You have to look hard to find a more pointless offensive 😀
What is on Ukraine’s hit-list –
-crossing the Dnipro to threaten the rear of the southern front.
-breakthrough of the southern front towards Melitopol.
-offensive towards East Volnovakha and a wedge down east of Mariupol.
-continued taking of terrain in northern Luhansk.
-offensive between Avdiivka – Siversk at suitable places up to at least the ceasefire line.
-voluntary evacuation of Crimea.
-retake the darkest Donbass.
I don’t think they will open any front up towards Belgorod or Belarus.
But… they will try to coordinate the Belarusians’ liberation struggle if possible and more activity in Georgia if possible.
They can also simulate a threat against the northern front through maximum trolling and a little border hopping. The Russian volunteer units might also get the idea to go home across the border together with the Belarusians who are homesick?
One should not think that the Russian team can shuttle units around in days here, it probably takes +1 week to pull out a unit from northern Luhansk and get it down to say Volnovakha once a decision is made.
Preferably, they want as many units as possible to be spinning around on transport routes in the rear so they are not at the active front?
The only thing I think one can say with certainty is that before the offensive starts at the southern front, they cross the Dnipro first to confuse the Russian combat leadership. There are quite a few territorial brigades there now suitable for that exercise, a few more than needed for defense.
We also know that Wagner has overstretched itself and is very heavily decimated – a low-hanging fruit?
Northern Luhansk will probably keep going?
There has been some kind of positioning battle up near Horlivka and that city looks really poorly defended…
Then I have my five hundred on a wedge down east of Vonovakha and SE that I have to live with.
I have “felt” for a while that the Russians are short on everything, that they have pulled units from northern Luhansk is a huge bomb. LW wrote yesterday that there isn’t much that the Russians want to give the impression of behind the southern front either.
On Defmon’s incredibly good map (you always realize how important something is when it disappears…) one has been able to follow over time how it has thinned out behind the southern front and something that has seemed impossible throughout the war suddenly became possible – Melitopol.
One must not forget that 8 brigades behind the southern front performed poorly in the attack on Zaporizhia earlier this winter and are exhausted.
I give a probability of 1 that UA will achieve their combat objectives during the spring.
It will be interesting to see what phase 2 will be here, we already know that they will encircle Russia behind a wall of NATO but we do not want Russia to become a Chinese province because then we have exchanged one problem for a multiple times more difficult problem to handle.
The Russians themselves actually seem to be preparing for disintegration and internal conflicts – they are slowly starting to turn inward, I think one can see?
The cracks are no longer small and are easy to identify but everything is still on the bubble list. I have submitted a proposal that one should be able to predict outcomes on the bubble list but it has to be brought up in the committee and then formally approved and that will probably take a while.
One light brought up the angle that if the Russians only get Bakhmut they declare victory and retreat from all of Ukraine – that was a bit far-fetched actually, I couldn’t make it add up.
Denial of Bakhmut to the Russians has probably denied Putin and his inner circle the straw they needed to be able to ride this out. They have also tried with Vuhledar and Avdiivka but have gotten stuck everywhere.
I am quite sure that Putin promised the winter offensive as something that would make a difference, either good positioning ahead of negotiations or a ceasefire and that China would weigh in.
A victory in Bakhmut they could have at least spun into something, a heavily made-up pig.
Now Putin is left with absolutely nothing and hangs his head and sniffles because he has caught a cold.
The only thing that has happened since January 6 is that the Russian army is in very poor condition and that Ukraine has quietly prepared for its spring offensive which everyone knows is coming and which everyone knows has ammunition, Western armor, HIMARS, and the most motivated soldiers in world history after Patton’s secretary.
Quite sure that the tensions within the power elite and in all sorts of circles are very large. Shoigu and Gerasimov, for example, have personally stepped in and guaranteed this war now.
Not a little surprised that there are not more peace initiatives yet but maybe strength has to be shown to the Russians first before they manage to read the room?
Reading the room is actually something they have been surprisingly bad at, I think, since the start of the war there has been constant dissonance everywhere.
They fit poorly with their excellent psyops and subversive activities so probably the whole Ukraine war ended up inside the decision circle as soon as it took off. Now they could well have read any general’s memoirs from World War I and found out that when the first shot is fired the whole battle plan goes out the window.
My likely scenario for how this war ends was – the Russians negotiate their way out of all Ukraine while they still have bargaining chips in the form of land and they get some kind of acceptable deal where oligarchs’ money is released and they are removed from lists and sanctions eased with a promise of more. And that a cadre of officers get to go to The Hague. Putin is hard to grasp but if he ends up dangling his feet at a gas station after this it will go on his CV.
Right now I see a straight-into-the-wall scenario where Ukraine takes back all its territory by force and then the Russians have nothing left to negotiate about, right?
And that the Russians themselves begin to turn inward and prepare for unrest.
And that -stan leaves the Russian sphere.
It is very self-destructive, now maybe one shouldn’t have had such high hopes for this acrobat group after this year of chaos but above I saw it as pure self-preservation and that it was something they mastered.
As soon as the country plunges into chaos all safe circles and rules of the game go out the window and one misstep and the family tree is cut down.
And the biggest risk they have had three times is revolution which usually does not benefit the ruling elite that much.
I also don’t understand why Wagner doesn’t withdraw and drive in convoy to one of the -stans before they reach zero here?