11:21
I don’t think the NATO resistance has to do with Russian investments. However, I DO believe there is a group that consciously or unconsciously serves Russia’s interests and that saying no to NATO is high on the list right now.
No normally functioning Swede can scroll through Slava posting the absolute worst of the worst of rotting corpses in triumph and then think that NATO is wrong?
I have always believed that we manage well with a strong defense in alliance with Finland but understood that neutrality in Sweden is synonymous with disarmament, not that one wants peace but prepares for war. NATO complicates the possibility to disarm ourselves.
15:07
Below is an interesting graphic about the Russians’ BTGs which I think correlates with what the blog has written and it made me ponder a bit about the Russians’ remaining capability which is one leg in how the war will unfold 🙂
https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-04-08/is-putin-losing-the-war-the-balance-of-the-first-phase-of-the-conflict-in-ukraine.html#:~:text=A%20shock%20force%20of%20between,unit%20of%20the%20Russian%20army.
—
According to scattered OSINT, Russia attacked with 120-140-170 BTGs, we take 120-140 for the exercise. For BTGs the blogger usually writes – 10 tanks, 30 IFVs, 200 infantry and 800-1000 men total. It can probably vary a bit and before the spring offensive some BTGs were probably rather understrength than reinforced. I believe that VDV, naval infantry and Spetsnaz are included here but there are certainly reconnaissance companies not included in the statistics and not all Donbass rebels are in formed BTGs but quite a few are on the unit maps.
—
The Russians took heavy losses in the first offensive, reinforced with 20,000 – 30,000 according to OSINT and before the spring offensive managed to scrape together 90-97 BTGs. After the first offensive, after reserves were added, they thus had a capability reduction of maybe +/-30 BTGs. This was after they pushed in new armor (trains from Vladivostok among others) and new personnel so the total number of BTGs that have been non-combat capable after the February 24 offensive was higher, my guess is quite a bit higher because otherwise 20,000 – 30,000 (not all are combatants!) would have yielded more than 90-97 BTGs but it could also be that drivers, tanks or IFVs are the limiting factor here.
—
A Russian BTG is not combat capable solely due to dead or knocked-out tanks/IFVs, after 2.5 months many vehicles must have maintenance and there are likely vehicles in the rear that are not drivable, we have wounded/dead key personnel and also BTGs that are so worn down they cannot fight due to lack of drivers/gunners/armor infantry/battalion commanders but still have a few hundred men left. I get the impression they are not sparing here, before May 9 they pushed hard in headless offensives and still had to top the madness of the February 24 offensive.
—
The Russian army was under 300,000 according to Google and includes exactly everything, engineers, rear, train companies etc. Somewhere around 180,000-200,000 in combat units has been suggested. To date they have thus been running quite a lot of available units and have train guards and cooks left so probably need to start mobilizing from the reserves which are stated to be 2,000,000 men. If the same distribution applies there are probably 600,000 men to take from for combat units and of varying quality but there is probably already a shortage of key personnel. There was no general mobilization and they have to try to find those who do not resist too much dying in a potato field in Ukraine and like rubles. There are some low-hanging fruits left to pick, units from Syria for example and the 10,000 that were in the parade maybe?
—
Looking at tanks, the aggregated losses are 1170. The blog has shown that Oryx is at 60% of that with, according to Oryx itself, an obscene backlog. What is not included in this figure are the vehicles that after 2.5 months of war and Russian neglect now stand in workshops or are undrivable behind Russian lines. How many that is we of course do not know but that all Russian armor would be rolling I find very hard to believe, our tanks were in poor condition after a two-week exercise. That Ukraine has had eyes on every knocked-out tank is not reasonable either, there are knocked-out vehicles behind front lines where there has been movement, the soldier who knocked out the tank did not survive and they have not been reported.
—
How many are left then, according to many OSINT 3000 total (there is a guy on YouTube who has looked at all Russian depots and counted tanks that look drivable and got the same!) that the Russians could get into a condition to fight with and that they have lost up to a third. Some uncertainty but if they had large amounts of the latest models, why are T72As being sent out in Ukraine? Now a tank is not a number, it is its ability to conduct combat and they thus have about 1000 tanks left to reinforce with here which can be assumed to be older sometimes unmodified models and have less punch than those we have seen in combat so far. Which have done quite poorly except for turret flights.
—
It is not possible to speculate on the Russians’ reasoning around 120-140 BTG line-up before February 24, they seemed to have thought it would roll into Kiev directly and had booked tables at restaurants so maybe more of an expeditionary force? However, they had between maybe mid-March and April 17 to move down everything available so more than this was not easily accessible. They have been moving all the way from Vladivostok and Wagner from Mali. This is reinforced by the fact that they are now pulling units from Syria because Putin is probably not very eager to give up his position down there.
—
Round 1 was a crushing defeat and the combat goals were revised in Round 2 to – Kharkov, Donetsk Oblast, Luhansk Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast and Odessa and they have not achieved any of them. What condition these 90-97 BTGs are in today we only get from the daily losses and it does not look good if you are Russian.
—
What is the important component in a BTG, I would say that with the Russian doctrine and in attack it is the tank (and IFV but roughly the same ratio there just that the post would be too long) and then you can muster maybe 100 BTGs more + what you now have standing on the front lines in whatever condition it is. The other is key personnel, drivers, gunners, company commanders, battalion commanders etc. and there is probably some shortage.
Considering how the first two offensives have gone we can be quite sure that these reserves are not enough to move the front lines from where they are today and then they have almost emptied the barns of heavy materiel and key personnel.
—
According to experts, the Russians should need 3-6 months for a new offensive operation but if they go on defense, the tank is no longer the main weapon and infantry is quite good (unfortunately) and they can trickle in over time which they already do. What we see is that there is now a window after the spring offensive dies out for Ukraine to retake as much as they have capacity for, that is the sign I am looking for :).
—
If the Russians start fortifying all of Crimea and Donbass proper with infantry in depth defense it will be harder to work and even a Russian can dig a hole if given time. I got the impression from the parade that Putin will just keep doing more of the same so with some luck maybe they continue to bleed out their units in attacks but if this were a normally functioning head of state an order to go on defense might not be far off now. With some luck they first try to dig in where they stand instead of conducting a (Russian-style..) organized retreat to Crimea and Donbass. Anyway, the next month is crucial for whether the war becomes shorter or longer, freezing the conflict and getting away with it I don’t think is an option for Putin anymore with the capability increase the Ukrainian army is now undergoing and considering how his own game plan looks.
17:20
Yes, I should have been clearer there, we have passed the point where Putin can freeze the conflict, and if they go on the defense (for real), it’s only a matter of time.
—
Someone wrote at the beginning that a war is about materiel and money, and you probably can’t put it better than that; Putin is being drained of both, and Ukraine is getting more than they can shoot away of both. Over time, Putin has no chance of holding Donbass and Crimea.
—
Especially with drones and smart artillery, a fixed position is just an easier target than something on the move. Northern Crimea I see a bit like Ukraine lobbing grenades in for a few weeks and then there’s not much left, but they have to protect their artillery from the Russian navy and Russian air force. Now Ukraine is probably conducting mobile warfare and the Russians’ chain is too slow, so one salvo per position and then moving on will probably get you far.
17:37
The Russians have so far dug a hole and jumped into it. Up by Kharkiv, Russian units in defense were swept away.
What Ukraine has done is that they have really dug in on the ceasefire line, and in other places there are dug trenches but above all the Russians’ artillery has ground blasts which means you are protected in a hole.
You would probably be mistaken if you think Russians in defense will do as well as Ukraine in defense.
—
Against guided ammunition, the Russians today are hopeless, dug-in armor is just an easier target and we have seen footage of hits right in the trenches. Sometimes they have even fired a scare shot so all the Russians ran to the slightly more reinforced trench and then they hit with a 155 right in the middle to take them all out with one shot. A front section with 1-2 BTGs can probably be broken quite quickly with some battalion of the new artillery if they have enough guided ammunition. All fixed positions today have probably been logged by the US, so if they don’t move and the new artillery is brought forward, it can go fast. Then as someone wrote today, Ukraine (or with US help) has linked drones with artillery so you can direct indirect fire in real time, that is unbelievably tough and an increase in capability that means it doesn’t matter if the Russians move, they die anyway.
17:53
KF
1. yes, absolutely there is, for the exercise an average was needed but you have the armored regiments with more tanks and motorized with more IFVs and lighter armed troop transports. Then the VDV and Marines are probably the lightest in the context and Spetsnaz have their Tiger vehicles.
—
2. Yes, it’s the artillery but I was thinking about what was the core to get a BTG with combat value (for the sake of the exercise), that is what is the limiting factor when you are supposed to muster a BTG, and then I thought tanks and took the number remaining and divided by 10 🙂 The Russians can throw in infantry divisions if they want but don’t get much kick for that money.
The limitations can really be drivers, gunners, mechanized infantry, company commanders and battalion commanders or the vehicles themselves. If there is an acute shortage of any of these you don’t have a BTG. Mechanized infantry is probably a bad example but out of 800-1000 men, 200 are mechanized infantry, some drivers, gunners and vehicle commanders, and then you have artillery and maintenance. If after a busy day you are left without drivers and mechanized infantry, it doesn’t matter that much if you have 500 men left in the battalion, roughly.
—
3. Yes, the Russians probably have about one more offensive attempt in their reserves I think but it is also insanely difficult to know which key materiel is in shortage. Take tanks, they don’t go into battle without fuel, maintenance, ammunition, a driver, gunner and vehicle commander, and if any of those are in short supply but the others are abundant, there will be no fight. If the above was a best-case scenario, it could very well be worse (which we hope) but we don’t know yet…
—
4. that was incredibly exciting, here you have almost solved the question of denying the Russians the ability to do this again 🙂
18:06
That’s an excellent question because people keep throwing around that a BTG is 800-1000 men but if you break it down (and LW often points this out with the gunners) the fighting personnel is maybe 3×40 + 200 and the rest is support in various forms without fighting function. It is precisely these who take losses in combat along with the armor.
—
I must admit here that I don’t quite understand how you can squeeze the other 500-600 into the artillery, trucks and air defense in the picture 🙂 but there are probably rear units too, maybe someone who has better knowledge, cooks, maintenance base, battalion commander’s staff etc.? 600 would feel like a more reasonable number here. Now cooks and rear units can also shoot from a hole but for some type of mobile warfare it is probably limited to these.
18:37
30 BTGs with offensive capability out of the 90-97 BTGs they had on April 17 (I read the part about the others in static defense)? If you limit yourself enough, which it then seems, 20-30 BTGs can unfortunately deliver a serious blow. However, the area they have chosen is open plains peppered with small communities and they will expose themselves to fire from both flanks since there are probably defenses even west of Severodonetsk?
Maybe it’s important not to stay too long in Berestoye..
When you look at their offensive at Izyum, they took the forest belts and didn’t get much further after that.
—
Do you think they will try a broader advance with flank defense or all against Berestoye? The question is a bit silly considering what we have seen so far, they seem capable of absolutely anything.
—
It would be good if they both try to dig in where they stand today and not gather in Crimea or Donbass proper, now their positions are reconned and they are not optimal but just what they have managed to push forward to, and then wear out the last according to your post above?
—
Do you think there are further reinforcements incoming besides these 30 BTGs with offensive capability?
19:14
I think there are more and more fires east of the Dnipro near Kherson, a few days ago there was a red dot on the peninsula right at the mouth of the Dnipro and now there are fires in 9 places and also a bit inside Kherson.
Pre-emptive strikes on rear, staff positions, artillery and maintenance that have been moved away from the airport after having been knocked out 19 times?
—
The fires in Izyum are basically gone in the last 24 hours it seems.
20:44
Yes, we are all trying to figure out what remains in the best way we can.
The BTGs that have been/have been up by Belgorod, can the Russians move them down towards Siversk?
My take on this is that the supply route down to Izyum is threatened and that Belgorod cannot be left undefended so they will need to hold back units on the Russian side of the border for defense.
Ukraine can fill up with artillery and some mixed units up towards the border, numbers interpreted as a threat.
—
In Kherson, the offensive power doesn’t have to be exhausted, just that Ukraine has enough defense so that commanders on site understand it’s suicide to leave the protection in the city, after previous moderate attacks they are still quite far apart and it’s VDV, guards, marine infantry and spetsnaz according to the unit maps. They can thus have quite high combat value for defense and be the reason Ukraine is not advancing there, or you are completely right 🙂
—
Along the southern front there hasn’t been heavy fighting, but the Russians have probably deprioritized the southern front for Kherson and Donbass. For example, BTGs were sent from Mariupol towards Popasna among others.
—
Otherwise, it’s excellent for Ukraine if the Russians try to encircle Severodonetsk over open fields so they wear out the last they had for offense. The strategic value is low and is more what they think is within reach than a win. That they could hold that encirclement if they surprisingly succeed when they approach the end of their capability is quite unlikely.
21:00
There is something about FIRMS sometimes, usually in the morning there isn’t much red, I fell for that a couple of times. Now I always use 24h; if you click CURRENT next to HISTORICAL you get an average over the day.
If you go back further you can see that there are no fires at all before a certain date and that it slowly increases over time.
I thought it was an interesting update on the blog where FIRMS correlated well with Russian BTG positions up near Izyum.
For my part, I take FIRMS as an indication that something other than forest is what has ignited, then it can spread a bit.
21:01
It could be during the update or something.
21:15
This just came from the pro-Russian side but they claim that a Ukrainian official stated the defenders’ number in Azovstal to be 1000, has anyone seen anything in the flow?
As said, they have somewhat faded into the background since there haven’t been bunker busters or major attacks for a while but it should be going down there and eventually there will be food shortages; if it is 1000 or more, the food supplies will probably be depleted quite quickly. I guess they have their own well since it’s so deep?
It must also be absolutely terrible to have major injuries that cannot be properly treated.
23:38
Can’t find the city and the unit maps have removed Ukrainian units but a knocked-out column (again) of guided munitions mixed with regular artillery and explosions are going off freely in Donetsk. I also think the smoke looks quite a lot like Nathan Ruser’s smoke plumes seen on the satellite image from Izyum.
23:48
Posted 17 times in the thread already of course…
11:16
I have also been thinking a bit about that, of course the idea was to come home weighed down with medals like a whisky-drinking war hero with tactical beard and some cool scars when thinking about war in younger years.
The rotting corpses with blown-off faces scattered across the fields in Donbass are a harsh reality check, this is what war looks like and it is chance that decides. Considering how long the front is, the probability is likely high that one will be deployed in battles with heavy losses even as a volunteer.