11:08
Now I had to wait for approval again, so I’m splitting the post;
It’s good that there is a lid on Kherson and Kharkov because that means things are happening there. The offensive in Kharkov also means that the Russians cannot start moving BTGs from Belgorod to Kherson, and those were probably the only reserves they really had.
Now we must first endure the media’s trumpeting about Severodonetsk.
My interpretation is that, by and large, the 4 NG and territorial brigades in the city have retreated to Lysychansk and that the Russians have paid a very high price for the city with their best units. Exactly what the frontline looks like we will probably know in a while. Siversk is probably another place name to keep an eye on as the Popasna offensive seems to be fizzling out because Lysychansk must be evacuated before it becomes a bloody street fight, if it does.
For those who thought Ukraine would sacrifice NG and territorial brigades, we now have confirmation that they care equally about all units.
11:11
It’s good that there is a lid on Kherson and Kharkov because that means things are happening there. The offensive in Kharkov also means that the Russians cannot start moving BTGs from Belgorod to Kherson, and those were probably the only reserves they really had.
Now we must first endure the media’s trumpeting about Severodonetsk.
My interpretation is that, by and large, the four brigades in the city have retreated to Lysychansk and that the Russians have paid a very high price for the city with their best units. Exactly what the frontline looks like we will probably know in a while. Siversk is probably another place name to keep an eye on as the Popasna offensive seems to be fizzling out because Lysychansk must be evacuated before it becomes a bloody street fight, if it does.
For those who thought Ukraine would sacrifice territorial units, we now have confirmation that they care equally about all units.
11:11
I interpret the losses as having burned through the VDV and the marine battalion that the Russians had in front of Ukraine at the Inhulets river crossing and their second wedge coming down from the Krivoj Rog direction. They are heavy on IFVs and light on armor and were, as far as I understand, in fairly decent condition. At both contact points, Ukraine has advanced, which means the Russian line has fallen back and they have taken losses. In Severodonetsk, they are attacking dismounted with special forces.
If they keep the pressure up across the entire Kherson front, which they seem to be doing, it is difficult to move BTGs to the gaps that arise. There have probably been two quite battered BTGs on the eastern side of the Dnipro near Kherson, and then it seems there are at most two motorized BTGs in the area (condition unknown). The rest must probably be holding Kherson, and at least the Spetsnaz battalion marked in Kherson on the unit maps is in Lyman and Severodonetsk and appears to be dying. If the Russians have to choose between Kherson and the area “inside” Inhulets, they would likely choose Kherson and they do not have enough for both.
—
Now the big question is what can the Russians bring forward beyond this to try to plug the breakthrough at Inhulets and the second wedge pressing down from the Krivoj Rog direction. We know there were 120 T62s and 20 Grad systems on the way up, they have emptied Crimea of everyone who can hold a weapon, and there was a load of T72s in Melitopol a few days ago.
If Ukraine keeps the pressure up on the southern front, there is always a chance they will have to reinforce there as well, but otherwise, it is probably a “tank battalion” of T62s (that’s how it was described and I interpret it as them forming a unit), some infantry battalions, and a bunch of T72s that are currently available. This is a composite unit with poor communication and made up of reserves and other branches. Notably, we have never seen IFVs on the trains, so it seems they prioritize tanks, hence I think there will be some infantry or the old classic cluster on tanks.
—
Where will they be deployed? To get inside Inhulets where Ukraine is causing trouble, they need to cross either Khakovka or Darivka and then move across open fields towards the contact area. We can probably assume Ukraine has accounted for this in their planning and that a column moving through these two points will have a tougher time than the infantryman who survived two mines yesterday (unpleasant footage, so maybe inappropriate).
—
When they have tried this and failed, they will defend Kherson eastward from the western side of Inhulets and then they must fortify Khakovka. They have probably also learned something and are keeping an eye on possible river crossings south of Khakovka. When we reach this point, Ukraine will have achieved the combat objectives for the Kherson offensive because they have locked all the bridges and deny the Russians retreat while tying down reinforcements in a line east of the Dnipro. If an opportunity opens to cross the Dnipro, they will probably take it, but that is a contingency.
—
Step two will probably be the offensive southward from Zaporozhye; they will probably band up one or more brigades through Zaporozhye, probably a battering ram from the 5th Tank Brigade. The next target is Melitopol and a defense west and east along Melitopol-Tokmak-Orihiv and all the small communities along the way. When that is achieved, they can almost sit down and wait for the southern front; the bridge over Kerch is almost within range of something long-range by then.
—
The Russians cannot reinforce Crimea, they get no supplies up to Kherson, the defensive line east of the Dnipro has Ukraine at their back, and the Russians can only try to attack from Mariupol towards Melitopol with what they have available. If there was a train with T80s down there, then they have something. It will always be too little too late, and Ukraine can achieve its combat objectives and then hold the terrain taken.
—
Now this has to come in some kind of sequence, and there is always a risk that the Russians manage to bring up too many reserves, but I think that risk is low. At some point, they will go on the offensive near Malynivka and from the areas they hold west of the Izyum offensive. The 1st Tank Brigade and the two mechanized brigades are still not at the active front, and that is a serious blow. Then they cross the Oskil river and push eastward.
11:12
It is good that there is a lid on Kherson and Kharkov because that means things are happening there. The offensive in Kharkov also means the Russians cannot start moving BTGs from Belgorod to Kherson, and that was probably the only reserve they really had.
11:14
Now we must first endure the media hype about Severodonetsk.
Overall, the four brigades in the city have retreated across the river, and the Russians have paid a very high price with their best units. Siversk is probably time to keep an eye on because Lysychansk may need to be evacuated before it becomes contested, if it does.
For those who thought Ukraine would sacrifice territory, we now have confirmation that they care equally about all units.
11:22
The UN has not condemned much, so it probably won’t jump on it, but those rains are very unpleasant. Now, the Russians have, of course, used TOS-1 as much as they can, but these are almost weapons of mass destruction and really just a matter of definition. Do you prefer to die from gas, nuclear weapons, a rain of small pieces of phosphorus, or a thermobaric bomb? They all deliver nearly 100% lethality where deployed.
11:28
Putin is playing the wheat blockade just like he has played everything else; he doesn’t even have a pair in poker and bluffs as much as he can. The Russian Black Sea Fleet would probably be sunk in a morning if the West wanted.
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The only ones who seem to want to fall for Turkey’s dodging are probably the SVD, who were very wrong in their thinking the other day. Turkey is in acute need of the West’s goodwill and would never dare to really cross them, especially not now that Russia is losing.
11:43
I got my reality check on Russia on May 9. Ukraine was a side issue that is now starting to get really annoying.
The bubbles of revolution, palace coup, or general flight from Ukraine that people would like to see show no signs yet.
The country is too far gone.
Rogue states like Iran, Syria, North Korea, and all African dictatorships keep going with their lobster lunches. We always believe in a collapse when the food runs out, but Angola was so incredibly much further gone than Russia will be with 10 years of sanctions, and they kept going.
12:23
My hope is that Ukraine has locked all the bridges before either the Russians get a general order to retreat or head east on their own accord. If they manage to nest all the BTGs east of the Dnipro, there will be more in defense on that side.
Now, you probably don’t always get everything you want, but the point of the crossing signals that the plan is to lock the BTGs east of the Dnipro.
You are probably completely right that they are under very great pressure at Kherson now because there has been more movement there than there was up at Kharkov and for a shorter time.
12:34
The Russians’ superiority in artillery is probably good, but if you get a quick push in an area and sweep away the defenses, the artillery is completely unprotected; if it stays, it dies, and if you move in a convoy on the road, they are exposed to drones and ground attacks. Then I actually wonder how much they have on the quiet front sections like Kherson and the southern front; sure they have artillery, but is it 10:1 there as it is up by Severodonetsk? After all, Ukraine has 4-6 artillery brigades in the area.
12:56
In the Kremlin and the various inner circles, it’s probably a big game of telephone and who to trust. If you guess, there are a couple of different circles who, for different motivations, want to see a change at the top. Different rumors are planted, false trails to smoke out the snitch, and then in the middle of all that maybe Putin’s health really is fragile.
What I take from this is that half the leadership layer in the Kremlin will probably be burned out by midsummer from all this positioning where the shortest straw means you either commit suicide or put on the wrong underwear in the morning.
13:41
I’m quite curious about how much the Russians have left to protect the empire with?
The army was supposed to have 280,000 men in combat, 40,000 special forces, VDV, Spetsnaz, and what else was included?
How much of this is actually in Ukraine?
When we went through the losses for the guards tank army, I got it to around 3:1 killed-wounded ratio, so it should be around 100,000 men out of combat readiness, and then they have +100,000 more in Ukraine or something?
—
The point is that it’s quite unfair because while Ukraine has to defend along its entire border, even where it’s quiet, the Russians can go towards zero in the entire empire and throw everything into Ukraine; no one else has threatened them. Apparently, Belarus is now emptying its warehouses of armor and sending it to Belgorod. An early probe here in the thread was that they start making a Russian and operate landing ships off Japan and circle around so they don’t dare to take a chance.
13:48
Great to learn something new so early in the day, excellent post 🙂
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just one thing was that Ukraine had around 1800 artillery pieces in various configurations total at the outbreak of war, I have no idea if all were deployed, just a number that seems to be floating around.
13:59
Have Jan, yes, here there were many counterarguments 🙂
Now I based my post on what flew by and it’s not a hill I’m willing to die on, I have always perceived SvD as quite balanced. I take back my statement.
Now Swedish generosity from hundreds of years of peace has probably once again collided with realpolitik that we have avoided since the Soviet Union fell, and one probably has to calibrate a bit longer before everyone has caught on that it’s a new playing field.
14:28
MIA can probably include captured or deserters so not everyone is buried under a ground boil or collapsed trench wall.
Now we actually don’t know how many prisoners Ukraine has taken, which I find strange because you would almost brag about that, but I have thought they keep completely silent here to protect their own prisoners of war, now it probably works so-so but you don’t need to provoke more than necessary. Or maybe I just missed it.
If you look at lost armor on Oryx, 60% are knocked out and 40% (roughly) are track damage or abandoned.
15:32
No, because the bunch they have in Poland you won’t even find a thread of when they’ve taken off like a spear straight east in Ukraine and stomped everything Belarusian that dared cross the border on the way to Kiev.
That is a red line that the buddy who betrays Lukas probably does best not to cross because who will arrest and torture all the annoying democracy-seeking Belarusian citizens when his army is plowed down in Ukrainian potato fields with Polish footprints on their backs.
As punishment, there will also be a color revolution by day.
Something like that 🙂
16:16
Now one is a bit cautious about jumping on new place names around Kherson after the big day of chaos and in the radio silence that prevails one starts to become quite interested in what is happening here.
—
If you run a week on FIRMS, there is more activity at Kherson and the southern front than before, so something is definitely happening at the southern front too, pre-bombardment?
11:07
It’s good that there is a lid on Kherson and Kharkov because that means things are happening there. The offensive in Kharkov also means that the Russians cannot start moving BTGs from Belgorod to Kherson, and those were probably the only reserves they really had.
Now we must first endure the media’s trumpeting about Severodonetsk.
My interpretation is that, by and large, the 4 NG and territorial brigades in the city have retreated to Lysychansk and that the Russians have paid a very high price for the city with their best units. Exactly what the frontline looks like we will probably know in a while. Siversk is probably another place name to keep an eye on as the Popasna offensive seems to be fizzling out because Lysychansk must be evacuated before it becomes a bloody street fight, if it does.
For those who thought Ukraine would sacrifice NG and territorial brigades, we now have confirmation that they care equally about all units.
—
I interpret the losses as having burned through the VDV and marine battalion that the Russians had in front of Ukraine at the Inhulets river crossing and their other wedge coming down from the Kryvyi Rih direction. They are heavy on IFVs and light on armor and were, as far as I understand, in reasonably good condition. At both contact points, Ukraine has advanced, which means the Russian line has fallen back and thus they have taken losses. In Severodonetsk, they are attacking in a dismounted manner with special forces.
If they keep up the pressure across the entire Kherson front, which they seem to be doing, it is difficult to move BTGs to the gaps that arise. There have probably been two quite battered BTGs on the eastern side of the Dnipro near Kherson, and then it seems there are at most two more motorized BTGs in the area (condition unknown). The rest must probably be held in Kherson, and at least the Spetsnaz battalion marked in Kherson on the unit maps is in Lyman and Severodonetsk and seems to be dying. If the Russians have to choose between Kherson and the area “inside” Inhulets, they would probably choose Kherson, and they do not have enough for both.
—
Now the big question is what else can the Russians bring up beyond this to try to plug the breakthrough at Inhulets and the other wedge pressing down from the Kryvyi Rih direction. We know that there were 120 T62s and 20 Grad systems on the way up, they have emptied Crimea of everyone who can hold a weapon, and there was a load of T72s in Melitopol a few days ago.
If Ukraine keeps up the pressure on the southern front, there is always a chance they will have to reinforce there as well, but otherwise, it is probably a “tank battalion” of T62s (that’s how it was described, and I interpret it as forming a unit), some infantry battalions, and a bunch of T72s that are currently available. This is a composite unit with poor communication and made up of reserves and other branches. Notably, we have never seen IFVs on the trains, so they seem to prioritize tanks, hence I think there will be some infantry or the old classic cluster on the tank.
—
Where will they be deployed? To get inside Inhulets where Ukraine is stirring things up, they need to cross either Khakovka or Darivka and then drive over open fields up towards the contact area. Now we can probably assume that Ukraine has this in their planning and that a column moving through these two points will have it tougher than the infantryman who survived two mines yesterday (unpleasant video, so maybe inappropriate).
—
When they have tried this and failed, they will defend Kherson eastward from the western side of Inhulets and then they must fortify Khakovka. They have probably also learned something and are keeping an eye on possible river crossings south of Khakovka. When we have reached this point, Ukraine has achieved the combat objectives for the Kherson offensive because they have locked all the bridges and deny the Russians retreat as well as tied down reinforcements in a line east of the Dnipro. Should an opportunity open to cross the Dnipro, they will probably take it, but that is a contingency.
—
Step two will probably be the offensive southward from Zaporizhzhia; they will probably band together one or a few brigades through Zaporizhzhia, presumably a battering ram from the 5th Tank Brigade. The next goal is Melitopol and a defense west and east along Melitopol-Tokmak-Orihiv and all the small communities along the way. When that is achieved, one can almost sit down and wait for the southern front; the bridge over Kerch is probably within range of something long-range by then.
—
The Russians cannot reinforce Crimea, they get no supplies up to Kherson, the defensive line east of the Dnipro has Ukraine at their back, and the Russians can only try an attack from Mariupol towards Melitopol with what they have available. If there was some train with T80s down there, then they have something. It will always be too little, too late, and Ukraine can achieve its combat goals and then hold the terrain taken.
—
Now this has to come in some kind of sequence, and there is always a risk that the Russians manage to get up too many reserves, but I think that risk is low. At some point, they will go on the offensive up at Malynivka and from the areas they hold west of the Izyum offensive. The 1st Tank Brigade and the two mechanized brigades are still not at the active front, and that is a serious blow. Then they cross the Oskil river and push eastward.