13:42
I think I need to clarify the part about the Russians having pushed quite far south of the town of Oskil now, so a rout northwards is unlikely. Borova has also lost its significance as a strategic point.
What is, however, ongoing 24/7 is killing Russians in that area; it has been going on since the big 777 blast, and when the big elephants made their guest appearance, the question is what capability enhancement there will be over at Severodonetsk by abandoning Izyum, really. When the responsible commander is standing weighing his beer crate by the roadside to welcome the reserves, and what appears are trickles of infantry hanging their heads like only a kindergarten class on a field trip can when they have gotten tired.
But unfortunately, they will manage to exfiltrate unless they mess up something incredibly…
13:51
Hi Micke,
I’ll continue on your latest post from the day before yesterday here since otherwise it might die out,
Yes, you point out the obvious that infantry is more exposed than if they are in armored protection, but since this is open fields and a new era with drones and guided artillery and maybe also more effective anti-tank weapons/wire-guided etc., I think you run a greater risk of losing a high-value armored target than infantry that is spread out over an area. The Russians don’t really have area brigades/area-covering fire to try to hit moving infantry. Right now, Ukraine is trying to advance community by community, one at a time, and the fighting often takes place over the communities themselves, and they move in covered terrain where possible or strike at night. They conduct infantry combat supported by armor. There is a lot of pre-bombardment even from the Ukrainian side.
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At Dayydiv Bridge, I probably imagined that they would conduct mechanized combat and take down to Khakovka at night, go on defense eastwards, and grab the whole area “inside” Inhulets between Khakovka and Kherson, but they haven’t done that. It is almost the same conditions as Sweden’s purpose with our mechanized combat – to strike against landings and airborne assaults and take them out as early as possible before they establish themselves. Because there is a river at the back. I have somewhere felt for quite a while that they will work forward community by community and move the positions forward but that we won’t see mechanized combat as we are used to, and I have guessed that it is because they want to save the maneuver brigades so they have something to defend the national border with when the Russians are kicked out, dead, or possibly almost dead and voluntarily limping across the border.
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So what does Ukraine (the army brigades) master today – urban combat I understand was considered one of the harder tasks, and Ukraine seems to master it divinely, also mobile defense/delaying combat (evidently), how to use artillery effectively, guerrilla warfare and CAS. Tactical retreats and then they retake the communities immediately after leaving. They also seem to master night combat, which is also the advanced school; our attempts at night were mostly wrong maneuvers and chaos rather than combat, it was reconnaissance that usually conducted raids on our billets just to annoy that had figured out night combat. Add to that excellent cooperation between the branches; in Mariupol, there were six different units from different branches, and anyone who has done group work knows how easy it is, it usually crashes after the first meeting.
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The above is really quite a good rating for the Ukrainian army. Under the circumstances, low losses are another; for example, in Vietnam, the US won but with astronomical losses.
Then we have the combat plans, exploiting openings, tactical adaptation, and world-class problem-solving, and one can guess that there is a helping hand from the US in the command. You also write that Sweden had professional officers, so I simplified, which is completely true, but Ukraine’s officer corps has been trained by the US since 2003 and the entire army since 2014. That’s almost half an officer’s career.
Now maybe I am making a mistake, and it is that Ukraine shines because the Russians are completely worthless, but I don’t think that VDV, Spetsnaz, Marine infantry, and Recon can be that bad, and they have deployed all in large numbers.
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The only thing really missing here is mechanized combat at battalion level or above and cooperation between branches—air, army aviation, artillery, and armor—for this combat.
I have given it some serious thought; what you write is what we have all learned and how one should use their mechanized and armored units. I agree that the armor has so far acted as you describe, sometimes even standing in open fields shooting, which is almost suicide. Right now, there are many videos of advancing armor, and then it’s only in columns, and all have their barrels at 12 o’clock.
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What I remember best about mechanized combat is that in one morning a battalion could be standing with the juice mixers on without having reached even line A on the map, so what is a sufficiently important attack objective to take the risk? I could probably think Khakovka would have been one, for example.
Could it be a deliberate tactical adaptation by Ukraine not to conduct this type of combat and not just a lower training level? Much of the footage we see, we don’t know which unit it is, and the National Guard has its own armor, and the level there is probably much lower.
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That said, I actually think the same thing, cooperation between branches and effective mechanized combat in depth should be a notch better than one village at a time and pushing the opponent ahead until it stops because there are too many holding out and artillery concentrated on one point. Could the Russian air force still pose a hindering factor?
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Yes, now I have looked for excuses over many written words, and there is, of course, an obvious answer until we see the opposite that Ukraine does not yet master mechanized combat, but I think they are living gods covered in gold leaf on everything else that one barely managed to learn in a few years…
14:13
There is a strange rumor going around in the media right now that since the Russians cut the last bridge, Severodonetsk is surrounded.
There are ongoing Russian attempts to get in “under” Severodonetsk, that is, between the river and the city to cut it off, but now that we know Lysychansk is on a height curve on the other side of the river, we can figure out how well it is going and will go.
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The Seversky Donets is as narrow as 25m in some places and it’s hardly spring flood anymore?
If Ukraine needs to exfiltrate from the industrial area, they will do it in good order and the last platoons will probably throw away all equipment and swim across, so what. Now they have sent in their best Russian killers in the city who hunt at night and as long as it works well and the Russians die like flies, they will probably continue with that. Moreover, the Russians seem to be weakening other front sections even more, which is bonus on bonus and gives further reason to have a foothold in the city.
15:35
Now I know this wasn’t Biden himself but this is what the US says now and it’s quite clear what they are prepared to provide,
When asked whether the West is ready to provide Ukraine with requested weaponry, in particular, another thousand howitzers and 300 MLRS, Austin replied:
“The United States is ready to provide everything and help Ukraine succeed.”
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/usa-to-continue-support-ukraine-confronting-russian-aggression-white-house/
16:49
Seems like a large ammunition depot exploded in Nova Khakovka, the smoke plume is something extraordinary.
Of course, it could be anything now, saboteurs, helicopters, aircraft or something long-range but it was a solid direct hit.
You probably have to take into account all ammunition depots that disappear in a large smoke plume when calculating the Russian artillery’s ammunition supply here, because in Kherson alone there must be 7-8 ammunition depots in a week.
13:26
Deepstatemap hasn’t been updated for a while now, but as I interpret it, the mechanized brigade and airborne troops are currently engaged in battles in the Izyum area, and the forest area directly west of Izyum that the Russians recaptured has been lost again. Either these brigades or lighter units have come closer to Izyum than in previous rounds. The fighting is, of course, moving back and forth right now.
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A decision to abandon Izyum would be forced in the same way as when they abandoned Kyiv; Ukraine is nibbling at the supply routes from Belgorod – Kupiansk – Izyum, and if Ukraine keeps up the pressure with maneuver brigades and artillery, it will become unsustainable. ISW has marked the Izyum area as “significant fighting”.
The area is also completely infested with infiltrated SOF, and one can hope that there will be a proper rout northwards.
What strongly argues against that is that Ukraine has had to give up a lot of terrain south of the town of Oskil, which would give the Russians the opportunity to exfiltrate eastwards, which of course would be unfortunate, but you can’t have everything at once.
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It is a sign of weakness if the Russians give up that position; it has been the western anchor of the entire front, and no other deep defense has been prepared, but the Oskil River is, of course, a sad natural obstacle that will be defended. It would have been perfect if the Russians were forced into a proper flight rather than just withdrawing. It wasn’t many days ago that we read they reinforced with up to 20 new BTGs down there and tried to go on the offensive southwards, so there is quite a spread in the information right now. I should add that the word BTG is now grossly misleading because I don’t think a single battalion tactical group the Russians have in reserve is anywhere near full strength, probably low on armor and tired of dying. Maybe we should start referring to them as slowly dying shells or something.