12:39
+1 to the blog as usual.
I have looked for some post about the cruelty of war that was brought up today but found nothing so I’ll join here, it was an incredibly good blog post today that calibrates a bit. Over time you dive into strategy and who wins. As LW writes, you must never forget what happens every day and that can never be said too often, strong links. The 7000 Ukrainian prisoners of war will come back in very bad shape if they come back at all.
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Nice that it is read Anders and thanks for kind words 🙂
13:08
Now I think the smoke is starting to clear after Lysychansk and it seems according to – the Twitter Generals, so not official statements – that Ukraine has some footholds left in Luhansk Oblast – Bilihorivka and the factory area with the tricky name Verkhnokamyanka. Sometimes there is artillery so the Russians have to retreat, sometimes fighting. I may also have mixed up Bilohorivka with some other town with the same name further west (with Ivanivka it went so-so the other day despite highest caution after the big chaos day…).
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The point is that partly Ukraine is denying the Russians the whole Luhansk Oblast = a flytrap but then it also signals a bit about Russian capacity there now, that they are too weak to push Ukraine away and take the whole Oblast so the bunker dwarf is happy.
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This goes against the Deepstate map a bit and as said the generals but it would really be Ukraine’s thing to do so high probability that they are there and poke things that hurt the stranded whale on the side.
13:40
For us following Kherson I want to again highlight that for at least the third day in the daily artillery list Kyselivka is included.
There is of course a risk that it is the one further north but it comes after Blahodatne and the communities beside Kyselivka further north are not in the artillery list so I think there is a high probability that Kyselivka is now under Ukrainian control for at least the third day. The artillery list is official but there is the risk that it is another location that is causing some friction. It should then reasonably mean that they have taken the ravine just south of Kyselivka and have a decent defense against Kherson because the Russians have probably pushed in their human wave counterattacks now one can guess?
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Comfortable artillery range to lob shells into the head of all fixed defenses in Kherson and everything else of interest and that they also have the bridges under indirect fire from 777 and band howitzers (previously HIMARS) now. Here one should probably not underestimate the sniper/Stuka effect of guided ammunition or HIMARS. An artillery shower gives a probability to survive but here the chance to survive is zero and you know that someday, just not when, you will be standing smoking and following an incoming shell aimed at your exact hole or T62.
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At Kherson the next thing to watch is probably Bilozerka because it seems natural, IF one wants to retake Kherson by force, to press from Bilozerka. A bull rush down from Kyselivka looks a bit risky.
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Apparently FIRMS works worse if it is cloudy and it was at the beginning of the week according to someone and then I think not much happens during weekends and I have thought it updates during the workweek. If you have a 3-day one it is still quite lively at Davyidiv Brid. The characteristic half-arc of fires around the Ukrainians’ wagon fort – the forest west of the community Davyidiv Brid, has been replaced by a string of fires down towards Khakovka.
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According to last week I do not think it is Russian artillery pounding Ukrainians so far down, if that were the case of course ap-cool, but rather Ukrainian artillery sweeping away the Russian defense down towards Khakovka. What we know is that one side is shooting at the communities between Khakovka – Davyidiv Brid and that the fire is moving further and further south.
Scanning the twitter generals it seems the Russians are still conducting counterattacks against Davyidiv Brid -That crossing would have made Rommel green with envy as the counterattacks happen over open fields and before that they have to get up to UFA on a country road, and the US sees everything happening in the Russians’ sandbox.
(by the way according to unconfirmed someone wrote in the thread that they waited until they replenished the depot in Khakovka for three days before they knocked it out – they really seem to see everything it seems).
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At Kherson the only other thing of interest is that it is burning near Bilozerka (besides every depot in Kherson and Khakovka is on fire 🙂 ) and at the Southern front it looks very quiet. I had thought it would get a bit lively there but FIRMS does not say so.
13:57
A little popular author angle on the third world war is always that the West’s superior technology would be shot down by secret Russian weapons (and now Chinese weapons but these books were from a few years ago) so the technological advantage became obsolete and then it was down to who had the most tanks and best trained infantry.
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I understand that Russia is not at war with the West but even in Ukraine GPS works and the Ukrainians have intact communications. It was mostly the Russians who sabotaged themselves by knocking out all the radio masts in Ukraine they needed for their own radio communication. I have not quite understood that because the radios we used were between each other and could be heard if you were within range. Then someone had to bridge if it was too far away.
Besides that there was some fixed communication point in the rear with cable, kind of.
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Anyway, now that the Russians are about to lose the war – if they had the capacity they would have tried to lay smoke over the sandbox the US is looking down into and how the Russian ants move to and from command posts and depots.
That they have not done it now means in my world that they cannot do it which in the long run means to me that the US technological advantage is total and cannot be jammed. Clouds are probably the worst thing for eyes from above but if I understand correctly there is IR capability too?
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There are now so many anecdotes of how the US first locates a high-value target and in the command posts’ case they were moved daily. Then they wait for optimal damage outcome – in the command posts’ case when the generals arrived at the meeting, and then they strike. The other base in Melitopol, they waited until the Russians had driven everything alive from the first base there before they rained glowing tungsten balls over it. The depot at Khakovka, the never-ending Kherson airport, etc. etc. This is just like it always was in the movies when they waited for the terrorist leader to show up at the meeting and then they struck, kind of.
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This differs from the fixed targets that can be logged over time and then you have partisans/SOF/stay behind but just when it is deep in the rear and it moves from one day to another it signals to me a wonderful technical capacity to read the battlefield that the US has and that will make the same sloppy mess of whoever the next rogue state is that wants to try to throw down the white glove in front of us the next 100 years. Both the intelligence gathering but then also the analytical ability and capacity because it is a whole country to cover here. I am very impressed.
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After all it is this intelligence gathering and the ability to follow targets in almost real time, every day at least, that has made first 777 and then HIMARS such potent weapons. It is a tough close fight between the Ukrainian infantry, intelligence gathering and long-range weapons.
14:11
There are a few different underlying factors in that, Drillbit. One is that the West praises Ukraine and mocks Russia, you have to take it for what it is and it should be done. Ukraine is taking hits and the Russians are better than human wave tactics, but the West are the pals who don’t abandon.
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Then you have the decisive events, what we are currently seeing is Russia’s Armenia moment with the logistics, the general staff can only sit and watch as their entire supply chain goes up in smoke. This has been built up over a long time and we have guessed and hoped. No supplies, no war, it’s that simple.
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The other is the offensive capability – when Ukraine had the big forest party west of Izyum early in May, I, as usual, got an allergic positive shock. The other quite consistent and more moderate side was THEN that Ukraine was on the ropes, exhausted and had no offensive capacity at all. Now in July, they have conducted a neat delaying battle near Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and have gone on the offensive in Kherson and on the southern front. Same there, we try to anticipate and hope and cheer Ukraine all the way to the finish line.
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If you look at where we stand today right now, there aren’t many who sense that Ukraine is on the ropes and will give up in the coming weeks anymore. It’s as few as those who claim that Ukraine’s only option is to accept peace and frozen front lines where the Russians get to keep Crimea and Donbass. Even the worst pessimists are starting to sense a dawn here and have either gone silent or changed their opinion on the matter and believe in Ukraine’s knockout victory as it should be.
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Now I went 10 steps ahead again but that was to make my point. The only time in the whole war I was disappointed was Lysychansk but that seems to be resolving quite well anyway, everything else that happens is another step towards victory and total Russian humiliation.
14:21
We know one thing, Sallad, and that is that the Ukrainian command has 100% control over whether there will be any campaign from Lukashenko or not, and if it gets serious, the Poles’ leash won’t hold.
That Putin would get to open a second front that cuts off Ukraine’s supply routes to the West in the worst case will probably not be allowed unless Ukraine can absorb the blow themselves.
Now it seems like maybe two HIMARS could solve that together with the air force 🙂
14:41
I liked NGB’s summary in yesterday’s thread at 23:00 which I read in the pre-talk before today’s blog post came.
It summarized so incredibly well how it feels to be Putin and I hope everyone read that very neat and well-written summary.
14:48
Sure, I exaggerate for effect but it’s quite a big hit they’re taking right now.
Then you have to add blown-up railway bridges, train derailments, and some loose rails here and there that they haven’t discovered yet.
The Russian truck fleet is probably in worse shape than the now blown-up depots and above all, we’ve seen what Ukraine does with long convoys of vehicles on the move?
Especially if they happen to be full of ammunition and ignite at the slightest touch.
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Then not to forget the partisans and again, a truck full of ammunition is an easy target.
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It varies on different fronts but I think the Russians can forget about getting ammunition to Kherson now. The southern front is a bit easier but with lots of SOF/partisans there. Over in the east it’s business as usual for a (short) while longer until Ukraine moves the whole orchestra there.
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Logistics is not something you can rush forward in a panic to an entire army, it’s a spiderweb of supply depots that has been built up over quite a long time. I don’t know how many of the total number of depots Ukraine has blown up and how much ammunition was in the bigger ones but when it starts to be hits like this, it’s probably main depots supplying entire front sections?
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What’s missing are the mother depots of all depots deep in the darkest Donbass but for those you might need 300km range.
15:03
I also want to highlight that Girkin aired in his latest piece that he believes Ukraine will use 300km HIMARS (which they haven’t received yet as nothing is confirmed, it should be added) to take out all Iskander launchers and all other launch platforms for long-range weapons they can reach. Those 4-5 missile carriers in the Black Sea might also be in danger if Ukraine gets these weapons or are the long-range missiles easier to shoot down than the 80km ammunition because that apparently goes right through the air defense screen here.
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When the war eventually ends, Ukraine will be able to maintain what, a 30-40-80-300km demilitarized zone inside Russia along Ukraine’s border and all offensive weapons that enter this demilitarized zone will get 2 warnings and with the 3rd it’s a hit or something. It will work perfectly.
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Maybe that should be done along the entire EU eastern front when the war eventually ends, you write into the conditions (doesn’t matter if Putin signed or not) that there will be a demilitarized zone and if Russian offensive weapons move within it, it will be grilled BTG. Then if needed, all movements of nuclear weapons platforms will be taken out immediately and some other stuff. Kind of like Japan and Germany got even though they don’t demilitarize the country because that probably isn’t possible but they introduce such strict movement restrictions on all offensive weapons that they can only use the weapons against China 🙂
17:01
Yes, of course it does but I guess a few analysts are still needed today too 🙂
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I know quite little about this, the only thing I know after all the hundreds of anecdotes is that the US knows when a needle in the haystack Ukraine – a staff, gets a visit from a general for a two-hour staff meeting, and can get the information down fast enough to the right unit for an operation. There are quite a few links in that chain that have to work for it to be a bullseye.
Especially since Ukraine didn’t have (pre-HIMARS) weapons systems that were area-covering so you probably have to factor in deployment as well I think.
17:08
Almost by coincidence, 1000 guided shells have just been delivered, really good that they simultaneously got the entire guidance package (that can probably be attached afterward to already delivered units?) 🙂
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Isn’t this 1000 hits right in the middle with a 155mm shell as long as the target is stationary?
For example, there probably aren’t more than 300-400 tanks total buried along Kherson and the Southern front if even that, I think? A bit hard to estimate since we don’t know the condition of the shells they’ve put down there.
What we do know is that they reinforced with 120 T62s of which 30 went into defense on the southern front and the rest thundered up to Kherson.
19:07
Don’t know if this has been posted before but Spanish media have apparently reported that the country will send 10 Leopard 2A4s to Ukraine and 20 M113s.
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What if this is what the defense minister was hinting at, that Germany allows all countries with Leo2s to donate what they can to Ukraine?
You do remember that the Netherlands promised to donate quality “armor” and artillery.
Another country, was it Austria, also wanted to but wasn’t allowed.
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The Ukrainians are out here every day like the best car salesmen, begging for decent armor. It would be insanely cool if the Germans let this go now because half of Europe has Leo2s in their defense, and every little bit helps or whatever they say.
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Don’t know if it’s true but it should be considered a decent donation?
If a few hundred Leo2s come to Ukraine, I promise never to nag about armor in the thread again, it will be boring to be a Russian in a T62 when they arrive at the battle line, what a fun article to read if you’re not Russian 🙂
(disclaimer, Erik14 has probably already posted this, if not it’s Stefpalm or one of the other quick-footed ones)
19:12
Now we’re getting a bit ahead of ourselves but if you get Leo2s in quantity, it’s the last piece of the puzzle needed for a devastating win. You have the ability to strike deep, pre-attack the defense, air defense and air cover, and now you have the armored fist to decide with. The French ATGMs can slowly advance behind this formidable protection, the French have promised a large number.
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Now the puzzle is complete (if that’s true and not just 10 old Spanish vehicles).
19:18
I’ve also wondered what the Warrior is, the coolest name you can have and then it’s armed with 7.62, isn’t there some law about what names you give here?
19:27
Subject wild speculation but have you noticed that the Ukrainian car salesmen have started moving away from tanks and asked more for IFVs lately, I saw something fly by a couple of days ago. Then they must have MBTs sorted and now they have to try to scrape together enough IFVs for the mechanics. Here is really a chance for Sweden to still shine with 200 CV90s 👍
Maybe that’s why the defense minister was so pleased after the meeting with Peter?
Zelensky has also spoken in terms of modern Western equipment in his recent statements.
22:15
One more thing I think was that they counted on fifth columnists who didn’t exist. Ukraine had probably let it be implied that they existed but they were probably triple agents or whatever it’s called. The story goes that the FSB had embezzled all the billions that were supposed to go to bribes. At the southern front we got to see what damage fifth columnists could cause.
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One observation, however, is that if the Russians had attacked as they did today and the combat goals had been to take all terrain east of the Dnieper, they probably would have succeeded. Then all units along the entire ceasefire line would have been surrounded and Putin could have gotten his frozen conflict. They would have gone around bigger cities and surrounded them with infantry and taken Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia as well.
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I’m starting to understand that Putin wanted all of Ukraine because he needed to crush “democratization” and that would never have worked even if they had attacked better than they did. Possibly if Belarus had launched its Lviv offensive on day one, then maybe, because there are supposed to be 90,000 men who closed the supply route to the west.
22:22
NLWartracker writes that the airbase was +100km from the nearest frontline and in March it was completely packed with materiel.
What they fired with would be exciting to know and since they moved down what wasn’t destroyed from Melitopol, even more packed with materiel.
Things are going well for Putin now.
00:06
In a war it’s always about finding the right mix of different factors.
The Americans’ Sherman was worthless but I’ve got the impression that their infantry from 1943 was among the better ones. Then the Germans had reverse Darwinism from 1942 onwards and their infantry got worse and worse because the soldiers were worse.
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This thing about kamikaze or not, the free democracies always win so that must reasonably mean they had a winning concept.
12:33
Yes, one has more and more time for the daily Gregg actually.
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If Belarus attacks, Ukraine can probably take that hit themselves but if they can’t, there will probably be a Polish response. Does Gregg know this will happen, does the Ukrainian command know this will happen, and so far Ukraine has been gods in golden clothes in defense so no threat at all really, I would like to stick my neck out and claim.
With a bit of luck, the punishment will be a color revolution.
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I have also interpreted Putin’s actions as that he is not the least bit afraid that Russia will be attacked, by NATO or anyone else, because he is leaving the country virtually undefended now.
The reason could absolutely be that he was worried about a “democratization” at the grassroots level, that actually matters more than the natural resources which I probably didn’t quite believe in. However, Crimea I understand and the Black Sea coast.