09:48
A somewhat incomprehensible will to die, 3 left in the platoon, why don’t they give up?
Have they completely misinterpreted those 10 BTG that were lost at Izyum and they just went and died instead?
09:54
Now the maps and reality are probably starting to catch up and it’s clear that the Russians have a first line for delaying combat a bit west of the Luhansk Oblast border and that they are preparing defense on the NS line that goes through Svatove. Erik14 posted a video of armor crossing the Oskil river so not only reconnaissance and SOF east of the Oskil river but also mechanized. DefMon posted that map a few days ago.
We never got photo evidence of Ukrainians in Svatove because the Russians rushed in 20 BTG in the area east of the Oskil river and seem to have gone on the defense where they could. At least they didn’t try to retake the bridgeheads over the river (which should have existed before the reinforcements arrived otherwise there wouldn’t have been any bridgeheads) as I have interpreted it. I had thought they would abandon all of Luhansk Oblast north of Luhansk for a very simple reason, the one below, but Svatove might still be required to be defended and they probably don’t dare do anything against current orders.
Since the Russians can’t plug all the holes, they have had to choose to defend the terrain east of the Oskil river by weakening the Lysychansk – Severedonetsk area. The critical mass has long been in Ukraine’s favor and after the Izyum capitulation they have 20 brigades that can move west, southeast, and south.
The northern border should reasonably be defended by territorial forces supported by a battalion-sized task force from a maneuver brigade covering an area. They have mined and prepared defenses along the entire northern border that was abandoned earlier and now they are probably doing the same with the newly regained stretch — mines, dug-in trenches, fixed artillery targets, MANPADS, and an organized defense. Then they probably move forward the heavier anti-tank screen gradually, one would guess.
If Ukraine manages to retake Severedonetsk they can advance towards Starobilsk, Luhansk, or down towards Horlivka/Donetsk, all advance routes through areas the Russians haven’t had to defend for quite some time and/or where unit density is low (for a while longer).
It is also the case that about 30 BTG in varying condition are “stuck” north of Severedonetsk and up to Belgorod, just under 30 BTG are stuck near Kherson, and 10 BTG were lost in the Izyum pocket (some of the 30 BTG north of Severedonetsk are just shells). That’s 70 BTG out of what, 130 available (not sure, guessing)?
This while Ukraine just freed 20 brigades for the revolving door towards Luhansk and then another few dozen when Kherson (quite soon) falls.
Since the Russians both cannot reinforce with new units now when they have some trouble with the will to die and have taken heavy losses, the force ratios have changed dramatically in Ukraine’s favor here.
If you believe the unit maps, the vast majority of remaining BTG are west of Volnovakha behind the southern front. That wedge southeast of Volnovakha would probably be a pretty nasty chess move, it’s enough to get to Boikivske with artillery.
After that, there are a few tired infantry battalions left in the darkest Donbass and it’s only a matter of time before LPR and DPR turn their weapons against the Russians to get back into the fold.
It also seems Argus is right here because the Russians are starting to step up attacks on Bakhmut which is probably the only area along the entire front where they can conduct offensive operations. Or, it seems there have been local counterattacks in Kherson still but that is more part of the defense rather than a will for offensive operations, I think?
In an oblast near you in the near future, the remaining NS supply lines will be subjected to long-range weapons and embedded reconnaissance and SOF. First it will probably be the NS railway through Starobilsk and after that the supply lines NS east of Ukraine’s border.
Now there is significantly more logistics than we/I had guessed, at Izyum they have reportedly taken logistics and materiel for several brigades so probably there are huge logistics stocks in the darkest Donbass, Rostov na Don, and Crimea for now so cutting NS supply lines won’t cause starvation and weight loss directly. But it makes it very difficult to move reinforcements to different front sections.
Now we got a bit spoiled with big sweeping victories but reasonably the next move should be brewing. We have always discussed three operations, Kherson, Izyum + revolving door, and then the southern front so it’s not unlikely there will be an offensive at the southern front quite soon. Maybe they are waiting for some brigade to band there or for pre-battle suppression to finish?
I still think it’s very unfortunate that the West hasn’t sent armor and fragmentation protection from the top shelf but you have to give Ukraine credit for making the best of the situation and what they had. What they lack in technology they make up for with motivated soldiers, leadership, and skilled PR.
Then the wildcard Russian collapse has climbed a few notches on the list here, the Russian units overrun at Izyum seemed to be in very poor condition. Now the southern front has been fortified for a few weeks into the war but guided ammunition and HIMARS against a long logged static defense is probably quite tough for the Russian in the trench. It’s all about when more high-value targets run out and they can start removing T62s from defense. I think this has been going on for a while but it’s cloudy so the firms don’t give anything.
If Ukraine can park itself southeast of Volnovakha in a sustainable defense then we have reached the “beginning of the end” of this sh1t war provided none of the wildcards get there first.
12:22
They have been denied retreat into Russia, the governments in LPR and DPR have tried.
Many of those fighting today in the militias are not ideologically convinced of this war but have almost been kidnapped for mobilization.
Do you really think they will fight to the last man? I don’t think so.
If not, what would be a suitable measure to try to improve the negotiating position?
From Ukraine’s side, LPR and DPR must be returned to the country Ukraine. I think most citizens, probably 4-5 million, are quite tired of this now and that EU membership seems more attractive.
You could say it like this – the majority of the DPR and LPR armies at the start of the war are now dead or disabled. The governments should definitely be prosecuted and those who acted in positions but the large mass is probably pardoned.
Then I was going to write that those who want Russia will flee there, but now it seems like the Russians are not letting them across the border.
If you look at the probability of different outcomes, it’s probably quite high up there, but like with everything else, I have no proof until it happens 🙂
17:06
Has this been up, Armenia I can’t make sense of, at first they were the ones to support quite a few years ago, then suddenly they were with Russia and getting beaten, and now Pelosi is there – should we support them again now, need guidance?
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1571231803091943426?s=20&t=HYeBrsfqXY4fVyUPcZ71tw
Possibly off topic but sometimes I feel like I’ve gotten stuck in something that has changed, risking backlash, but I saw the one about G Soros a few days ago and my memory of G Soros is the guy who took on and won against the Bank of England (not positive for the citizens in the UK) and who was said to be behind our 300% interest rate (at least that’s what I read then) and he was the un-crowned king of the predatory capitalists, the absolute worst of the worst. Today he seems almost respectable. How the hell do you wash away something like that and should we support him now too?
17:26
You really want this damn war to end as soon as possible, that the Russians can be broken during the autumn and limp home, and that Putin and the leadership get their rightful punishments whatever they are. Now this thread is probably the last outpost and quite on topic but some days electricity prices and the Green Party draw more attention than dead children in Ukraine so it’s easy for a conflict to be forgotten. Then it’s also the case that the longer it takes, the more traumatized and hard-to-fix the population becomes, it’s not just the fighters who need help after this, the civilian population has been subjected to possibly even worse abuses in the conquered areas…
17:30
So, I want to be clear that I have no opinion on the matter but back then there were just a couple of daily newspapers you got all your information from and that has kind of stuck and here I am +20 years later completely overtaken, same with Armenia.
Yes, I understand that it’s time to start thinking for myself here and I’m mostly fascinated by the phenomenon that it can do a 180-degree turn like that.
Orban’s enemy is my friend unless that enemy is a friend of another friend who is not my enemy but my friend.
18:11
Trying to follow the weather in Ukraine a bit and it doesn’t look like impassable mud for a few weeks yet. Does it really have to become this mud or can it go into subzero temperatures directly from a dry autumn?
Looking at annual precipitation, it’s not the worst in autumn I think?
With that, my thought is that there is still a window for an offensive for quite a while maybe?
19:50
These local offensives have zero value on any level.
Now it seems pretty tough at Bakhmut according to the Twitter gods.
Yes, I read what you wrote, I also think roughly the same, some parallel structure and the Wagner boss probably wants to try to give Putin a win, something like that between friends. Wagner is investing quite heavily there right now.
Desperation? You want to celebrate Bakhmut as a big victory while losing Lysychansk, which was the last big victory, going downhill fast.
Putin is starting to feel a bit weak in the knees, I also see a much less arrogant short man with very small hands at these best of 10 world dictators meetings and even these scum ignore him so it’s clear even to us, he must feel it deep down in his gut.
19:56
For the sake of order, one should write here that LPR wants an immediate referendum to join Russia but that’s not the same as dying for your cause so I call it a draw 🙂
07:23
I’m spinning further on Erik14’s excellent thoughts about Wagner and Bakhmut and Argus’s earlier suggestion that the bunker dwarf is a bit one-sided and will propose that the solution to the current problem is more of the same – human wave now that the armor is gone. It seems quite tight around Bakhmut now and they are working their way forward/inward in the city, definitely a serious offensive attempt.
This has zero value for anything, they are trying to take Bakhmut when they have just given up the entire Kharkiv Oblast and are waiting for a Ukrainian offensive at the southern front and are trapped at Kherson.
Could it be that Wagner is the only unit listening to the man in the bunker these days?
There has been something minor at Mykolaiv as usual which I interpreted as part of the defense, i.e. task force and counterattack, but maybe they also got something going?
I don’t know and as soon as I’ve written this the Russians will start running across the potato fields everywhere but if they don’t, it’s a very clear signal about the state of the Russian army if you can only get Wagner going for offensive operations. Then the assessment of the combat leadership on site is that they can no longer follow general orders and that is probably very hard to admit, they probably prefer to sacrifice a couple of brigades if they can.
09:43
This one was interesting, I can’t quite make sense of it since he says Donetsk and they were in Kharkiv but the unit has been withdrawn to Russia and is probably finished.
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1571603154248007690?s=20&t=JpsgydHXoRv-jagfrDImYA