11:26
Then we have the darkest Donbass, the Southern front, and Crimea. From before, we know that the Russians have withdrawn from the Dnieper with the main force, and they defend well with “rear troops,” reconnaissance, or smaller units?
Ukraine is there wreaking havoc with SOF, and there is some kind of demilitarized zone almost instead of a well-fortified defense along the entire Dnieper. This can only be due to the Ukrainian artillery that has now honed its Russian-killing techniques to perfection.
Crossing the Dnieper is a direct threat to the Southern front that must be met, and then BTGs must get on the highway, move a couple of miles to the Dnieper, and then attack Ukrainians in defense under their own artillery umbrella and with direct numbers to CAS – it will be bloody.
Ukraine has de facto already crossed the Dnieper but not with maneuver units. It seems they have kept some maneuver brigades if the opportunity arises.
A push down towards Azov is on the cards; a better opportunity will never come with darkness, cold, wet, and general misery that lowers the combat value of the Russian units. If it can be coordinated with crossing the Dnieper, it could probably quickly force a retreat down towards Crimea.
Looking at how the Russians have positioned themselves, it seems they are preparing for continued offensives against Vuhledar, and I think they are still fighting provincial wars.
Melitopol is outside Donetsk oblast, and when Kherson fell, it is no longer a priority, I guess?
Therefore, an attack on Melitopol by sheer force will likely come in the future, combined with crossing the Dnieper, and then they have reached Crimea, and there it stops and time for HIMARS and 2000 suicide drones until the Russians voluntarily evacuate Crimea.
Then they have the area between Melitopol – Luhansk left to clear.
When they have liberated northern Luhansk from the zerg horde, they comfortably reach the NS supply road needed to keep Donbass alive.
If Ukraine can hold all terrain in defense and simultaneously consistently target all incoming supplies and HIMARS away the depots over time in the darkest Donbass, it will become as unsustainable there as in Kherson over time.
Since it is not quite clear where Ukraine’s maneuver brigades are located or their condition, it is difficult to predict whether they plan to attack the darkest Donbass this winter or not.
It is a very long front they need to defend against Russian spring aggression, and for northern Luhansk, it seems both sides have concentrated their forces; perhaps they aim to reach the old ceasefire line in Donbass or something?
However, it is quite a good starting position for this spring when King-Julien must attack out from the darkest Donbass with threatened supply routes, where Ukraine has pushed in all the SOF and partisans they have in the area.
Ukraine’s special forces capabilities are increasing exponentially, and they learn quickly, so the artillery, CAS, SOF, partisans, and maneuver brigades that will be unleashed this spring on what remains will make 2022 seem like the calm in a Buddhist temple.
14:59
A step back with Leo2
https://twitter.com/noelreports/status/1604159659291856898?s=46&t=BPTbQI5O-fBnZ6P8jykvFQ
20:27
Girkin starts talking about fighting against the regime in Russia.
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1604425636671627271?s=20&t=6ad8FyH1ETldCeLaBNx5Fw
20:31
Scholz relapses into abuse very quickly; first there were no Leo2s, and now he demands negotiations.
Incredibly disappointing when he and Macron keep relapsing.
https://twitter.com/ukraine_map/status/1604371145611943938?s=20&t=bQCeB1Sd7tUoCvz5J2T0mA
11:07
Someone wrote in the thread about the Winter War in Finland that it was Ukrainians who largely fought, and in yesterday’s thread someone posted a quote from Putin saying the war was on Ukrainian territory, a positive.
The Soviet Union had Eastern Europe as buffer states, and it was part of their strategy to conduct the war on the buffer states’ territory and preferably sacrifice their armies if possible.
The ones who have suffered the most in the war are the LPR/DPR and minorities in Russia.
When people believed in the illusion of a three-day operation, it was Muscovite units (I call ethnically Russian units from western Russia that) and it has taken some time to adjust, but as soon as possible, they have spared the Muscovite units.
Then we have the HIMARS strikes that probably reach them.
Russia and China are the two remaining colonial powers that got some kind of free pass because they had communist revolutions, I guess. We discussed this a lot last spring.
So far, Muscovite Russia has managed quite well to avoid the war, and what we see as sky-high losses is for them a way to get rid of undesirable troops or it is insignificant from the provinces – Russia has always fought like this.
It is somewhat brilliant to get half of Ukraine to fight the other half; 20,000 – 30,000 fallen among the rebels are de facto Ukrainian citizens.
Therefore, we should not overestimate the soaring losses, and now we see videos of heavy equipment on trains again, these are modded T80 or T90. Old WWII equipment has gone to the rebels.
The first round of mobilization happened in panic, the low point came for Russia, and Ukraine had the critical mass on its side and launched surprisingly (for the Russians) hard offensives.
Every Ukrainian offensive unfortunately lacked high casualties among Muscovite-Russian troops; at Kharkiv, it was DPR and LPR who handled the delaying battle, and at Izyum, Russian BTGs slipped away without their heavy equipment.
At Lyman, Russian BTGs had been pulled back, and it was DPR and LPR who got stuck during the retreat.
At Kherson, the VDV had been withdrawn weeks before, and if one may guess, it was LPR/DPR who carried out Operation Badanka. Small boats, floating in the river dead or balancing on pontoon bridges.
This contradicts my post yesterday about Russia not being a threat within 10 years, thinks the morning quick one, but it does not for the simple reason that if Ukraine moves towards a win, Russia will first sacrifice quite a few more Muscovite units and then lend-lease will probably run out, and we will get back 60% of what we donated in repairable condition.
I guess they have now pulled the Muscovite units to the rear to rest and equip them for the spring offensive.
Those at the fronts are newly mobilized of the second sort, prisoners, soldiers from the provinces or LPR/DPR. Then there is always a fire brigade force of capable units and barrier battalions.
At the NS defensive line in Svatove, it probably looks like that, and at the NS defensive line in Starobilsk and the VÖ defensive line in Luhansk, they have parked the VDV.
To reach a decisive outcome in northern Luhansk this winter, Ukraine must break through the second-tier troops and get to the units Russia wants to protect. Are they prepared to sacrifice them or will they pull them back instead?
Before too long, Ukraine therefore needs to start pressing against the Starobilsk line so the next forced move from the Russians will be to retreat into their own territory well before they planned their spring offensive, so their spring offensive does not start from the Starobilsk line. They will not sacrifice Muscovite units to hold this area, is my guess.
Exactly where Ukraine will stop, I do not know, but the land border is geographical and dominant terrain is smart. However, they should have liberated Troitske as well so the Russians do not have an identifiable foothold in northern Luhansk, but Ukraine is doing what they can here this winter and Troitske looks tricky.
They should also reach the bend in the revolving door and then go on defense in the whole area, partly against Russia’s land border but also against the VÖ defensive line through Luhansk.
Then northern Luhansk is done. According to earlier, territorial today is to be considered capable infantry brigades and they are on defense along the land border. They are not sitting idle but building the best defense they can 24-7.
When the Russian spring offensive eventually, too late, starts, they must along the entire front down to Luhansk attack infantry in prepared defense, and it will go as it always goes – death and chaos.
Are they then prepared to sacrifice Muscovite units for this or not?
You see where I am going, if Ukraine can raise the threshold enough, Russia will not think it is worth going all in in the spring offensive along the Belarus border, the northern border against Russia, and all the way down to Luhansk.
It is an enormous stretch to defend and also why Ukraine must manage losses – it must be enough for defense as well.