12:56 – Johan No.1
If they have thrown in Spetznaz as well, then everything is going up in smoke 😀
Exactly, now is the time to deliver materiel, I had a weak moment before Christmas when I thought the West would fail but then it brightened up, but the risk is quite high that they give too little too late.
You have to see the Russians as mold or cockroaches; if you remove 80%, they come back a few months later, so you have to completely eradicate the weeds.
14:58 – Johan No.1
If you count brigades from all branches, they should have +350,000 men.
These are units that function in the roles the maneuver brigades did at the beginning of the war.
After a year of war, for example, the Territorial brigades should be capable infantry brigades.
Gregg says the Territorial is 250,000 men, they have doubled since the start of the war.
If you guess, the volunteer units have also been greatly expanded over time here, and then there is a plethora of battalion-sized units from all kinds of branches that function in defense along the very long border against Russia and Belarus.
Zelensky spoke of one million men under arms, which can be considered total defense.
To put it in perspective, Russia attacked Ukraine with fewer than 350,000 men, and today Ukraine’s brigades are probably very well trained together and have demonstrably high capability, unlike when the Russians attacked, and that was before they were wiped out and resurrected a couple of times during the past year.
15:53 – Johan No.1
In case it wasn’t clear, I am talking about Ukraine.
18:24 – MatsExtrude
Well written as usual!
19:06 – Johan No.1
MRF, I have tried to counter exactly this echo chamber by trolling pro-Russian sites and enduring their videos on Ukrainian corpses way too much.
We are now at a turning point (again), I have made the best analysis of the situation I can, and I do not believe that the Russians, as it looks today, will last beyond midsummer. I am not entirely confident that Paasiikivi is on the same line and probably should just because of that hedge my bets a bit, but it looks that way.
Now I get endless criticism for my previous analyses simply because the situation is constantly developing and changing.
For example, the sluice gates were opened with Western weapons after New Year, and then one could have ignored the other big sulking day before Christmas when I was so attacked in the thread that I completely beaten went and hid in the economic threads for a few days and used up all the band-aids.
That said, and with a couple of empty beer cans on the table, I really only see two paths forward, assuming the West does not fail, and that is negotiations in the spring where the elite in Russia protects its name and money and pulls out of Ukraine, then it’s mid-year, or they really try to survive in Ukraine and then they are out before the year ends.
I usually write all the parameters way too often and now I don’t remember them, but surely everyone else does.
There are a couple of beautiful milestones here, one is Ramstein, the second is the missile attacks January 15-20, and the third is Russian mobilization from January 15. When they have played out, we can calibrate again. I had also been waiting for statements from China in the coming months for guidance (my contacts in the PRC have told me).
12:24 – Johan No.1
Just want to add that support must come exactly as written in the blog, a lot and fast – you don’t take chances with a country like Russia and if you deny Ukraine momentum, the risk increases.
Then I completely agree with today’s blog post, the Russian low point was in September before the Russian mobilization got underway. We sulked quite hard during the autumn when we realized that Western armor was never delivered and it was for the simple reason that at that time it was easiest to throw Russia out of Ukraine.
Now the Russians may be creating another low point entirely on their own and winter generally lowers combat effectiveness, but a winter offensive will burn through quite a lot of materiel so a large amount of offensive weapons need to be supplied, a very large amount, but that’s no news—we have been chanting about 200 CV90s since last summer.
Diplomatically, politically, and technically there is today no obstacle for all types of offensive weapons, that disappeared with NS 1-2 and the worst torture murders of children and all the castrations made rounds in the media. That it took until January 2023 to get started is naturally terrible but we have discussed that countless times.
If tanks have now been unlocked diplomatically, it is naturally only a matter of time before there will also be advanced aircraft and ground attack. Helicopters should not be forgotten either. Long-range weapons in all their forms are also okay after all the destroyed electrical infrastructure.
IF China had reservations, they should now be withdrawn since everyone wants to give Ukraine top-shelf tanks.
With a bit of luck, maybe the Ramstein meeting will take a comprehensive approach?
I interpret the pitch-black headlines as positioning ahead of weapons deliveries so far, it’s time to get worried when all maneuver brigades are on active fronts and Ukraine begins to give way. Now Ukraine is setting up new maneuver brigades so I don’t see that risk, but if it “breaks” over a larger area than an individual farming village with its associated potato field in Donbass, maybe it’s time to start thinking, but we are absolutely not there yet. Ukraine has withdrawn to dominant terrain just west of the town of Soledar and is lobbing in artillery.
If they are completely exhausted, out of ammunition, soldiers, and strength at all front sections, then they have completely fooled me at least.
During November and December we discussed Ukraine’s winter offensive and that the purpose of it must be to take terrain. They want to give Putin the worst possible start ahead of the spring offensive.
Ukraine probably hasn’t said much about a winter offensive themselves, it is ISW and other experts who have pointed out the value of such from time to time and we think we see signs of preparations.
Now that the rounds are going in the media about the Russians’ plan for mobilization, this reinforces this reasoning because even 500,000 men can go on defense in fortifications and shoot in the direction of Ukraine when they have learned to shoot after this new round of mobilizations.
They preferably want these newly mobilized not to go on defense but instead be forced to attack Ukrainians in prepared defense. Ukraine’s fortified land border against Russia should continue all the way down to the height of Luhansk from where it is today when it’s time for the Russian circus to start up in spring, if possible.
Right now I think we are fooled by the old classic that Russian BTGs are going to zero – it looks like they have unlimited reserves because they fight like they do, but they are going to zero.
Do the math yourself – 100,000 soldiers / 2,000 killed and wounded per day…
If you remember, these runaway losses started already in September and we sat with calculations on how long they would be able to keep going and then came the mobilization.
It looks like Ukraine has problems because they fight as if they don’t have unlimited reserves because they are preparing for an offensive and saving lives.
Now today it is understood that Ukraine has not started any winter offensive (yet) because the Russians did it instead with their best units. It is extremely difficult to know how many of the best units are being consumed now but I think we have confirmed that they have deployed VDV and Guards at Soledar together with “real” Wagner + T90.
At Bakhmut probably also better units and down at the Southern front at Vuhledar they have deployed marine infantry.
If they attack today with their elite units over such a long front and in defense at Kreminna there is a chance that they have deployed the main part – I really don’t know and am just wildly guessing because it has been quite a while since I had a handle on numbers, skill, etc. A Guards brigade today can consist of completely newly mobilized amateurs but have a name that suggests elite units and when 76 VDV is moved it can be as few or as many as you want. It’s Hitler’s map war in the bunker all over again.
Just yesterday Russian bloggers wrote that Ukraine is gathering more and more at the Southern front while they themselves have weakened there, both at the Dnieper but also south of Zaporizhzhia so they can attack between Vuhledar – Siversk. It feels very much like a last attempt to reach a decision, bet everything on red in the crayfish trap.
We have also received information that the Russians are moving newly trained mobilized from Belarus and in the Belgorod region to Ukraine.
Erik14 continues posting about Kreminna and Ukraine is approaching, it is not entirely clear if they have presence on the outskirts yet with more than reconnaissance but they are sniffing around the town itself. It is so tight that the Russians sent 76 VDV to Kreminna.
I am of the opinion that Russian psyops have started up again, we are scared with the idea that the Russians will set up 20 new divisions but zoom out and it has taken them five months to take the town of Soledar at astronomical losses and the only thing they have taken is the town in front of dominant terrain with enormous fields of fire.
Then we get worried about intense attacks in Donbass and that the Russians will mobilize half a million men, the connection is made that if half a million more fight as well as in Soledar, then it will be critical.
It won’t be because in Soledar it only started to move when they began to consume elite units.
Then the rounds go that the Russians have no problems with maintenance and materiel again.
One should be very clear that if the Russians had no problems with maintenance at all then the artillery would have continued with its 60,000 shells/day and not dropped 75%. Then there are different reasons for that and the Russians naturally strive to increase capability again if they can.
One should also understand that if the Russians had trucks, tanks, and personal weapons from the top shelf we would not have seen 50s-era materiel in combat. We might have seen it with LPR and DPR because the Russians are super stingy but the infamous T62 battalion that was sent to Kherson was to top up VDV defense with tanks because there was a shortage.
What is often forgotten is the lack of key competence, there is a screaming shortage of battalion commanders, company commanders, platoon commanders, snipers, tank gunners, tank drivers, artillerymen, etc.
You don’t solve all these problems with 500,000 men and 20 new divisions.
I have been of the opinion that Russia will manage another round of mobilization if they handle it neatly, but that Belarus will not. Now I think the signals are that they are trying to carry out such a large mobilization that it will be felt among the broad masses as well over in Muscovite Russia. The question is whether they will really get the citizens on board this time?
At some point, even the mobilized must understand that they can turn their weapons against the Kadyrovites instead of allowing themselves to be desecrated, and the jungle drum spreads lightning fast.
I am moving popular revolution in Belarus and striking Russian soldiers a couple of notches up on the bubbling list.
Yes, I feel that I went a bit against the current today, but I write about what I see.