2023-01-24

11:24 – Johan No.1

Callout – many of us are scouring all the videos, is there anyone who has a good video, preferably drone footage, of these mass infantry assaults? Hundreds across open fields?

I would like to save such a video in the archive because in the future many will not believe it.

11:52 – Johan No.1

A very strange statement/appeal came from the US in the media the other day, that Ukraine should wait with its offensive until they have received Western weapons. Zelensky has also roared back, which is unusual.

So surely a Ukrainian winter offensive beyond the ongoing one in northern Luhansk was in the cards, but if one guesses, the Russians preempted it with their winding January 6 attack in Ukrainian uniforms which has now turned into offensive operations everywhere.

Ukraine themselves have talked about an offensive in March, which is a somewhat strange time because the frost has thawed and it is before it has dried up – I have guessed that this is not correct.

Exploiting cold, darkness, and frost would be smart, and then passable terrain is probably needed later in spring, May?

The reasons for the Russians’ all-out war could be several: they might have wanted to preempt Ukraine’s offensive, they wanted to preempt Western weapons, and they might have tried to strengthen their negotiating position ahead of upcoming talks?

If we set aside the whole negotiation, positioning, etc. and look at the war-technical aspect, what is happening?

The Russians are now deploying their elite units between Kamyanske (Dnepr) – Kreminna and are taking incomprehensible losses. They are not advancing and Ukraine is still holding back its offensive reserve – it is by no means a sharp situation.

That Ukraine is taking heavy losses goes without saying, we know that and we don’t talk about it because it does not benefit Ukraine. They have some battalions from various brigades at the active front instead of entire brigades, which allows rotation and restoration of combat value much faster than if a whole brigade is completely worn down. This places high demands on coordination, so wizard-level there as well.

According to Gregg, the queue is long for a place in fighting units and we knew earlier that UA had formed 2 + 1 new brigades and now three more were being formed, so no acute shortage of personnel or materiel, they have just created a new distribution in the middle of an ongoing war 👍. The new Azov assault brigade has T72s and a mixed assortment with BMPs as we saw the other day.

VDV in Kreminna has failed according to Gregg and there is no reason to distrust him (but they can of course send more and try again), with a bit of luck this will be the 76th’s last battle. Previously, one of its regiments has been destroyed (according to Ukraine) and there are probably two left. It is unclear which VDV lost (were destroyed) a couple of BTGs in Kherson but likely the 76th was among those who took losses during the final battles before they were withdrawn as they were east of the Inhulets river and were probably a rapid reaction force when Ukraine pressed. We know they sent 2 BTGs to Kreminna and have taken quite large losses there and that they were at Soledar.

At the southern front, the Russians have deployed two brigades (8 BTGs) from the 58th(?) combined arms army for the offensive. I now understand that it was first a surprise attack that went badly for the Russians and then there are now reconnaissance battles that Russian bloggers have hyped maximally. My cautious hope that they were holding back units was thus completely wrong because they went all in immediately and failed.

It is reasonable to believe that these are Guards units fighting at the Southern front?

The fact that it came to an abrupt halt is significant because it means that Ukraine has had sufficient defense which means they have not needed to weaken one area to reinforce another, and they are holding back their offensive reserve…

Now the unit maps suck but it seems to be mech and NG that they ran into at Orihiv?

Saw videos this morning with Russians crossing fields in some kind of World War I style offensive. Very far from the fully mechanized Red Storm and the Southern front would have been perfect for that with flank protection from the Dnepr, 2-3 mech brigades overrunning the defense.

We can probably be quite sure they are very short on armor, which is a very big positive 👍

Also want to remind about the discussion that they would be completely exposed on the flank from Ukrainian long-range fire from west of the Dnepr if they tried to attack at the southern front. They were surprised by artillery they apparently did not think existed.

Air brigades over those open fields should cause enormous damage and then IFVs and MBTs will open up, they have 12.7mm – 30mm so infantry will not even get within shooting range.

Now there are flags for an even more Russian winter offensive by Ukraine, this could be an attempt to get more materiel or it could be serious.

We read that they have deployed newly mobilized from training camps but whether they have already been sent in or not we do not know.
There are Twitter rumors that a Russian offensive is underway in northern Luhansk and that could be where they are sending the newly mobilized from the training camps?
That would then be between Kreminna – Kupiansk and I have wondered why they have not tried to push down along the eastern side of the Oskil river for a while so it is not entirely unreasonable.

It would then coincide with Ukraine’s attempt to get past Kreminna and could get quite messy.

Previous offensives have lasted longer than 3 weeks so there is probably gas left on the Russian side here and with so many aircraft shot down (6) they are going all-in in the air as well.

I get distinct flashbacks to the April offensive and every time the Russians have gone all in since then – after a while Ukraine breaks through and wins a bigger battle. If one guesses, they are biding their time right now except in northern Luhansk where the winter offensive is ongoing.

Ukraine’s winter offensive should absolutely have been resourced. There was so much information about the Southern front that I think it is clear the Russians preempted Ukraine, which was probably their intention. So far in the war, Ukraine has let the Russians exhaust their offensive capability and then found and exploited an opening, it is smart to be second.

We know from before that the Russians are planning their own spring offensive but for it to even be called an offensive they need to equip and rest the capable units that remain and they needed a serious winter mobilization. Right now the winter mobilization is conspicuously absent and they are consuming their capable units at a rapid pace.

We also have some kind of generational shift with tanks where they become significantly fewer but more T80 and T90.

In the middle of all this, Ukraine is well on its way to getting through Kreminna and coming out the other side and then it is a major breakthrough again, like releasing a handful of ants on the ground.

We have gone through this quite a few times, but if Ukraine can just get movement going, the Russians are many steps behind.
Another factor is Ukraine’s enormous infiltration behind the Russian lines, which I guess is completely unsustainable for the Russians in the long run; the entire West is there wreaking havoc with their SOF 😀. The less territory the Russians have left, the higher the density of SOF, reconnaissance, infiltration patrols from elite units, partisans, and the SBU.

The artillery obviously did enormous damage on the southern front.

One should probably not underestimate drone-fired wing grenades either; there should be (tens of) thousands now, and if they shuttle them daily and drop their grenades on Russians in trenches, it makes a difference. If nothing else, we have the sniper effect through them; a Russian in a trench has to try to sleep with both eyes open without blinking.

There was a period of “relative” calm until January 6th, then we were distracted for a while by the Germans having full internal conflict and terrible media discipline regarding whether they should help Ukraine win the war and protect their children or not – I am still completely spun out in the stands here.

And now it is actually a Russian offensive along all fronts except between Kreminna – Kupiansk, which is rumored on Twitter to be underway.

If nothing comes from Belarus now, it will probably never come; we can be quite sure of that. I thought they had managed some trolling, but maybe it is so unstable in Belarus that all units are needed for crowd control?

How Russia will be able to conduct a spring offensive when they are using up their best units and then not carrying out any general mobilization, I do not know.

It feels quite definite that they are throwing in everything they have now. They have “used up everything” a couple of times, and each time they have had to panic mobilize, and Ukraine has exploited the low point, but if there is no mobilization soon, they are in a pretty bad position.

What we do not know is if there is some kind of agreement left that if they manage to take Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, then the West will put pressure on Ukraine. It should be quite clear that the USA and JEF are not on that train anyway, and if so, it would be the troika + Turkey and Hungary.

But Turkey and all Russian allies have stated that Crimea and Donbass belong to Ukraine, so I find it very hard to believe that France, Germany, and Italy are still pushing this – sounds completely unreasonable?

Therefore, I actually cannot understand the Russians’ obsession with the oblast warfare here, and that is why I interpret it as them wanting to increase their bargaining chips at negotiations.

If it is just Putin demanding because he has lines on a map, that would be even better if that were the case.

Tactically smart would be to open a northern front again; if that is not possible in Belarus, why can they not cross the border at Kharkiv – Sumy again? They do not need to go far in to open a threat that UA has to meet?

Lack of available units should be the answer, as they do not seem to have many units up there?

12:15 – Johan No.1

Now this is my opinion – I believe Russian subversive activity got a boost in Germany after reunification.
The West welcomed the East into its administration, and with that, they got in pure agents loyal to Russia.
Over time, they probably also got rich from it when oligarch money flowed?
(I am not saying Scholz is a Russian agent, just so there is no discussion about that).

It is easy to get rid of opposition if you have no inhibitions, murders that look like suicides or accidents. Honey traps or planting illegal material on someone’s computer – minors, for example. Minors are quite tricky because of the stigma – no one believes “I have never seen this before,” so that probably forces obedience or immediate resignation.

You can directly threaten opponents and then offer big money. What would you do if a Russian FSB cell knocked on your door and said that you and your whole family will die but you can choose the bag with money?
If you have Russia on your side, you have access to a bit of everything.

They use noble causes like the guilt after WW2 to force passivity.

It is the same with our peace movement, an American soldier on Swedish soil and they scream bloody murder, but when Russia wages extermination war in Ukraine, they politely suggest that Ukraine should cede land to save the children. Why they do not scream bloody murder over Russian soldiers on Ukrainian soil, no one has asked them yet.

Or the environmental movement that has gotten the collective West to shut down its electricity production, preferably also our environmentally harmful hydropower, but buying Russian gas has been very good if not the best.
Shut down Dutch gas production and buy Russian gas.
Shut down our hydropower and buy Russian gas.
Shut down everything in Germany and buy Russian gas.

The easiest thing is always to look at the outcome; if it benefits a country and that country is Russia, then it is foul play on some level (I think). My very personal opinion without any evidence whatsoever.

12:23 – Johan No.1

From everything posted, Erik14 has worked quite hard to compile text, and then the unit maps are quite messy now but a bit of those too and all the open sources we all scour. Puzzle pieces you have to put together 😀

2 battalions from the 76th in Kreminna.
Before that, VDV in Soledar confirmed and maybe Bakhmut.
A guards brigade in Soledar.
Spetsnaz in Kreminna.
Presumed Guards on the southern front because of the 58th CAC.
Marines at Vuhledar.
Probably also good Wagner units in combat that look well-equipped and with Ukrainian uniforms.

Then I think it is an enormous front line between Kamyanske and Kreminna, so they should have committed quite a lot of their capable units.

And that it has not moved a meter all autumn when newly mobilized ran straight into the defense, but since January 6th, Ukraine is shaken. They do not get shaken by a few VDV battalions; it requires high numbers for that.

We know that all elite units have been committed but not how many of them, roughly.

13:59 – Johan No.1

It is so insanely difficult to assess combat capability today; everyone has given up.
I am trying with VDV because they are interesting.

Wagner probably had a hardcore core of 5,000-8,000 that they held back?
Then there were losses between 77% – 90% on the rest, and 50,000 have been rotated.
Now in Soledar, I am quite sure they have committed the more competent rapist-murderers.

Wagner is almost finished now 👍

For those who have the energy, there is a whole horde of other units declared more or less wiped out during the past year, like the 1st Guards Tank and the marine infantry, for example.

14:14 – Johan No.1

😭😭 I have terminated my hybrid contract and will go fully variable at the beginning of February.
Now in January, I will end up well above the variable price, and I am so fuuuuucking angry about it. Spent over an hour with customer service and explained clearly and explicitly to them that they are engaging in usury and false marketing because they should have understood just like everyone else that it was La Niña years.

They earned their pay and twisted endlessly, not even when I quoted what they themselves had said five minutes earlier did they accept it – “yes, but I didn’t mean it like that, surely everyone understands that”.

18:17 – Johan No.1

Just flew past that the marine infantry and some better DPR unit are attacking Vuhledar.
If anyone knows what OBTF Kaskad is, shout out.

There is incredibly little marine infantry left, so sending them into battle is interesting.

21:12 – Johan No.1

I think it’s hysterically funny that the Spaniards were the first in the spring to want to send Leopards and now when they are to be sent, they have been standing in garages and stripped of parts, it’s kind of the very caricature of Spain they live up to here.

21:16 – Johan No.1

Do you think UA has already trained earlier or is it starting now?
They were supposed to be done with Bradley in a few weeks.

I’m asking because the window for the offensive is probably about another month, then it gets wet and we have to wait until what – May.

But there seems to be a hell of a rush right now, I can’t quite figure it out.

21:23 – Johan No.1

There is quite a lot about remote mining now, starting to be a problem for the Russians.
https://twitter.com/rybar_en/status/1617641812570824704?s=20&t=EXtjBjJJQSt7ZWBD8aA5iA

07:02 – Johan No.1

Exciting if true, UA will never give us information but if/when a bridgehead is ever established it will come out on the blogs.
Davyidiv bridge was legendary so worth copying that.

RUSSIAN SOURCE.

https://twitter.com/rybar_en/status/1618031425529446402?s=46&t=aDwiPM_ZRo56lnr48HR0Yg

07:04 – Johan No.1

Russian psyops on steroids right now.
I think everyone understands that they are in panic over the offensive weapons here.

https://twitter.com/irishtimes/status/1617976295010480128?s=46&t=aDwiPM_ZRo56lnr48HR0Yg

08:15 – Johan No.1

Interesting thread that Prigozin sells bad/rotten food to the Russian army.

https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1617824599391244290?s=20&t=N7SH4eSEj9cAeY4Hy7l8xw

08:37 – MatsExtrude

As a contrast to “The Chef’s” junk food (admittedly not at the front but still):
Harri: Every time we go meet @MUkrainci and other defenders we are welcomed extremely well

https://twitter.com/Harri_Est/status/1617969098121707520

Don't forget to donate, Ukraine's cause is ours! Support Ukraine!

Leave a Comment

Scroll to Top