10:37 – Johan No.1
Pretty annoying that you immediately have to read about there being no flights, that dialogue with Russia is important and all that. If we get depressed by that, then Ukraine will too.
Do you remember the discussion about Bakhmut where the officer went out and urged calm and that the population should stop worrying? That was probably in December?
That’s why the media’s defeat articles should have been absent and there should only have been tribute articles to Ukraine – to boost morale.
Pretty sloppy of Biden to make such a statement about the F-16, I think, but he can have a senior moment.
Then Scholz and Macron should also stop stating that dialogue with Russia is necessary. When will they realize that it is Ukraine that is fighting the WHOLE war and at least in Macron’s case, Ukraine has managed extremely much better than they usually do in big wars, and Scholz should have the good manners to just donate equipment and keep completely quiet.
It is up to Ukraine how they want to end this war and no one probably enjoys being treated like a small child after they have shown themselves to be T-rex.
10:49 – MatsExtrude
+1
10:51 – Johan No.1
Just as I wrote this, NOEL posts that Scholz has cleared things up, here you can probably say that Scholz got it completely right 👍
https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1620336913113825280?s=20&t=yjEJosFTMnFd8qxtiq6qgw
11:08 – Johan No.1
If it had been newly mobilized troops attacking, I would have given it a probability of 1, but now it is all capable units that remain and they want a breakthrough.
I don’t think there is a plot twist in this Ardennes offensive, it is just as poorly executed as we think it is.
We must also not forget that there are 3500 knocked out + 1500 (maybe) with mechanical failures in the rear and over time there are fewer and fewer rolling off the equipment.
11:11 – Johan No.1
You have to see Ukraine as a desecrated victim, you can never blame them for anything and they must be supported with positive statements until the Russians are gone. The slightest negative hint is misinterpreted and also magnified by the Russian side.
11:45 – Johan No.1
Missed that Zelensky has no interest in negotiating with Russia at all in the current situation, or similar.
That reasonably means that some kind of discussion about negotiations is taking place, otherwise we would not have had this statement.
My money is still on the Ardennes offensive being to position themselves ahead of negotiations.
There was also something from Scholz and Macron about the importance of dialogue with Russia.
12:02 – Johan No.1
Here are UA losses of armor, fully replaced just by captured ones.
https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1620340632303865858?s=46&t=gIdT6dLNi-t-ads-v4wWSQ
12:08 – MatsExtrude
Good thing I reloaded the page so I didn’t have to be second on that! 🙂
12:16 – Johan No.1
I think it looks cold for a couple more weeks. Then when the frost leaves, it won’t be deep mud before it starts raining, so that’s also a factor. A third is that it was apparently sandy soil up in northern Luhansk.
Right now the Siversky Donets is frozen.
So if the mud comes, it will be difficult and then it will be a few calm months more, what, sometime in May?
During the Cold War, and then there was surveillance we probably don’t want/can’t go back to, the Russians knew most things.
As long as they continue their subversive activities, these holes will exist, then you can make it difficult with visas and similar.
The West has woken up, absolutely.
18:05 – Johan No.1
Things like this make you understand that Ukraine is not desperately short of anything, they are setting up new brigades.
https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1620157855583330306?s=20&t=3b8cLH7kAyf58yuET4wX_g
09:48 – Johan No.1
Some new information yesterday, 9,000 Russians in Belarus. At one point it was 20,000 – 25,000 so quite a large number have been relocated.
This matches the information that units have been moved down from the training camps to Ukraine.
Then the question is whether it is down towards Kupiansk or if it is for some attack between Sumy – Kharkiv which would be logical.
-that it is not a trolling from Belarus is a mystery to me and I hope it means they are fully occupied with crowd control in Belarus…
It seems like both the offensive to retake the terrain east of the Oskil river and an attempt to retake Lyman are ongoing?
Of everything going on, that is actually the most serious because it will become very chaotic and there is no natural defensive line where they have to run across open fields towards fortified settlements in the way we see in Bakhmut.
It can probably be offset by the fact that there is a lot of cover and with a bit of luck there will be columns trying to push towards Lyman that can be disrupted with ambush fire.
The two guards brigades that were a bit north of Kreminna are according to Rybar on their way towards Lyman, or the unit maps are just messy and there are more brigades in the 144th motorized rifle division in the area.
It is not the easiest to keep track of anything anymore, units are wiped out and replenished with newly mobilized and have an unpleasant name and it is a forest of brigades that no one knows what they are doing.
I am interested in the VDV and their death struggle.
What flew by the other day that there were 350,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine – I interpreted that as the total including rear units, was that correct? Did it include Wagner and DPR/LPR?
That is probably in the ballpark of what I have thought remains of offensive units, my guess was around 300,000 if it was in the higher range?
Or it is 350,000 with (relative) offensive capability and I counted low?
The reason I find it interesting is because Ukraine now has +350,000 men in maneuver brigades and on top of that an endless number of battalion-sized units and SOF. I base this on that they have had the capacity to set up another distribution and according to Russian sources are working on another.
If the Russians now attack and burn through 1,500 men/day or more then the critical mass is absolutely in Ukraine’s favor and increasing.
Since January 6, about 50,000 men have been put out of combat readiness and the offensive is ongoing. We all know that it costs to be the attacking party and it is the Russians who are attacking. To then assume that Ukraine has similar losses goes against what is taught, they lose significantly fewer because they are on the defense.
Then Ukraine has resourced for a winter offensive and is on its way to getting materiel for a spring offensive while the Russians have returned to the battle plan for Tannenberg.
It is indisputable that the Russians no longer follow doctrine and they do so because they are low on armor. Period.
We got information before Christmas that artillery had decreased by 75%, now that was naturally the total and they are working to improve their capacity on various fronts.
I assume here that 350,000 men is after they brought in those now participating in offensive operations and not an old figure, right or wrong.
What I am trying to get at is that no matter how I twist and turn this it does not look good and the only thing that can “save” the Russians is another major mobilization.
The later it comes the bigger the window for Ukraine to inflict damage.
In the beginning we were only positive to counter the defeat doctrine. If it was unreasonably positive, what then was the defeat doctrine in terms of excessive pessimism?
The big miscalculation came in September when I had hoped that the West had delivered its armor and it could not possibly have been as passive as it turned out to be.
It was a Russian low point with the entire VDV locked in Kherson and HIMARS making a difference. Had the muscles been there one could have inflicted greater damage on the Russians then but Ukraine did the best they could with what they had.
During the autumn there was quite a lot of concern that the West would not rally but remain passive but the first week of January we got confirmation that the West is closing ranks and that Macron and Scholz have fallen in line.
(well, both Macron and Scholz have started discussing in terms of dialogue now with the Russians again).
The next miscalculation is the Russians’ January 6 offensive which goes against all logic here but in a positive way.
It also came in time as the West opened the barns and all potential allies distanced themselves from Russia, and a whole bunch of other anomalies.
It is absolutely not business as usual here.
I have said for a while that I think we are fooled by Russian BTGs going towards zero in their attacks, the 155th marine infantry has done it and Wagner has done it.
A larger mobilization is today conspicuously absent and then the Russians are heading towards a new low point according to a fairly simple mathematical formula.
Unfortunately, we will have to endure a Russian offensive in northern Luhansk but during February it will probably become clear that this is an Ardennes offensive.
Sure, resources are being used now for Ukraine but they had resourced for a winter offensive, Russian bloggers were worried about the southern front and in northern Luhansk they have steadily worked forward.
This offensive reserve will not be depleted so the question is only how long the Russians can afford to be the attacking party on all fronts. As soon as they run out of gas on some front Ukraine will be there as they always are.
Since they attack on all fronts and losses are as high as they are, they should logically run out of fuel earlier than when they have attacked in a geographically smaller area.
But the weather is now the decisive factor, if the Russians continue until it becomes mud and impassable they have bought themselves a few months, unfortunately.
If I take a step back and look at the whole war and what is likely if you factor in what we know so far, then there will be a Ukrainian land grab when there is an opening and the Ukrainian spring offensive has every opportunity to end the war.
There is a possibility of sabotage here and that is the troika and if they get some kind of feeling but the more materiel that is actually delivered the less of a threat this poses.
They can certainly keep Putin’s dream of territorial concession alive but then the chances increase for Operation Getaway or a palace coup instead.
Considering that Ukraine has Izyum, Kharkiv and Kherson as well as a resourced spring offensive in the bag they are probably not inclined during 2023 to give up land. But one must remember that there are tensions in Ukraine that will surface over time.
Poland probably keeps itself in check because they hate Russia more than anything else but sometimes they go off the rails, the other day they were a bit hesitant about Ukraine’s EU membership for example.