12:07 – MatsExtrude
+100
Hertling can steer his gloomy submarine as he likes, I sit calmly in your boat, enjoying the spring sun and sipping on an Obolon (but I’m holding off on chips and dip until it really kicks off)!
17:39 – Johan No.1
SpongeBob –
Yes, we know that, in my discussion with MRF I went through everything and we used the Oryx losses and then confirmed donated armor.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.html
Actual losses are higher but for the Ukrainian side probably less unknown and then the distribution is probably the same even if there are more.
Your second questioning makes me cry and I pour myself some Norrlands Guld as soon as the cans can be drunk but you are completely right.
18:39 – Johan No.1
There are lots of videos of fighting female soldiers in the maneuver brigades at UA.
When I did my military service it would not be possible because in combat we men would completely lose focus on fighting and instead try to help the female soldiers and protect them – that was the story in the 90s why women should not be in spearhead units.
Ukraine’s female Russian killers probably don’t need much help, they look extremely competent and at least light years more capable than the undersigned👍
18:40 – Johan No.1
If it was unclear, I think the 90s attitude was idiotic.
18:48 – Johan No.1
Thanks for that GUGI has been very active in the Baltic Sea and you can google AS-26 yourselves.
Dry submersible with long bottom time and gripping arms.
If you can tie their carriers to the location it’s case closed (which we already knew).
The only thing is that it is very strange because they could have operated the submersible in stealth mode from Kaliningrad and not exposed themselves this way – satellites have caught everything and you can see when the submersible is gone from the deck and so on.
– some source criticism and examination of evidence before fully jumping on this.
11:40 – Johan No.1
Now Bakhmut has almost been forgotten, but I think the delaying battle through the built-up area is still ongoing.
The confirmed “red” (Russian) area on Deepstatemap has shifted quite a bit in two weeks.
That’s probably how it should be, and the most surprising thing is probably that the Russians haven’t advanced further in Bakhmut.
According to Gregg, it was the ELITE (in capitals) that was now deployed, the definition of which is unclear but we already know that VDV and “real Wagner” are fighting in Bakhmut and one hopes it is Spetznaz.
But we have also been told that the army withdrew its units from Bakhmut, so maybe it is Wagner’s hard core?
I remember when I was in some thread writing at the beginning of the war and the discussion turned to naval mines outside Odessa and about half of the thread participants suddenly started talking about mines when the Swedish was otherwise good.
A couple of them had not been seen as suspicious before that.
This thread is quite well-moderated in the sense that direct attempts at Russian psyops are weeded out quite quickly, which is appreciated because they are everywhere otherwise and drown all sensible discussion.
We are supposed to compete with their full-time job in our spare time and they have manuals and training on how to manipulate discussions, and if that doesn’t work they crash it instead or if they can’t shoot down the message they go after the messenger.
In many places, you also get mass-reported by pro-Kremlin until you get a warning or your account is locked.
Then we have the worst in other forums who agree with you and then sneak in their message and then you are so happy to have support from something living (not just Siri) that you unknowingly spread their message for them.
Nice that it will soon be over and ideally you would want them all to be classified as terrorists 😀
I have joked a lot that when things start going south for the Russians, they will start calling Ukraine the aggressor and that they want to stop fighting (=freeze the war) to save the children.
And that all pro-Kremlin debaters spread the message about ceasefire.
So far, there have been none that were not known/suspected and some have probably latched onto it out of pure ideology (but they are almost the worst), I thought there would be much more of that but maybe it is coming?
However, the Russian debate programs have completely flipped from superior, derogatory expressions about Ukrainians and vivid discussions about all the death they will unleash.
To nervously looking around and starting to wonder if Ukraine will take the war to Russian territory or not.
How the power struggle in Russia goes, we don’t really know, in the good old days it was at the parade on May 9 when the West ticked off those who had been purged during the year from the list, we learned from some god in the thread.
Someone in the thread raised the thought that maybe it is not entire agencies on one side but an overarching group of, for example, conservatives/traditionalists who have formed a network.
We know that Girkin was very fond of the Soviet Union, WW2 etc. and is really an idealist Russian style, the rest of the world sees him as a war criminal.
If one guesses, they are even worse than the criminal clan because they will want justice after this.
We will definitely get the stab-in-the-back legend and a story that it was NATO who beat them by cheating.
The direct extension of that reasoning is that if they just prepare better next time, it will work.
That feels like Soviet 2.0.
You remember that Zelensky met Biden in Poland at the end of February to discuss what peace terms he can live with.
Now it is a month until then and of course there is some probing back and forth with the Russians.
The question is whether this is done without Putin’s knowledge or not.
I think there must be a large group that does not belong to Putin’s inner completely burned circle but who are also not the conservative Soviet enthusiasts?
Then there are the broad masses on that which are probably not impossible to ignite?
The tensions must be enormous in Russia now is probably the only thing one can say for sure.
Right now it is much about weighing capability and somehow making it so that RU is not counted out and that UA is not as strong as we hope.
Many pro-Ukrainian debaters take that position and we have had a couple of rounds with that before –
Reverse Darwinism applies to the Russians, they lose proportionally more at the top and lack commanders at all levels and key personnel. They must have that.
UA does not run its battalions to zero regularly and replenish, competence and information are transferred to the new ones. There is also a large pool of battle-hardened soldiers to draw from after 8 years of war.
We have indisputable evidence that the Russians are shining a flashlight deep inside the warehouses – if they had T80 and T90 all transports and workshops would be full of these.
Then we now have pictures of depot areas with rows of vehicles with technical faults. Sure, they have workshops but I get the impression that quite a lot is just driven to these graveyards and left standing there, they exist in Crimea, Rostov na Don, Donbass and up in Belgorod.
We also know that Ukraine has lost the most T64 and received the latest modified T72 and Western armor more than they have lost – they are quantitatively and qualitatively stronger today.
We also know that all of Eastern Europe services Ukraine’s vehicle fleet and this workshop resource is magnitudes better than the Russians’.
They have received 2,500 PTGB for example and with a weapon station they are not completely dumb.
Ukraine has never been stronger in materiel or manpower.
Now is the time – Russian low point which they try to fix with 400,000 newly mobilized and this year’s conscripts.
In June/July they will be on the defensive in Ukraine and China has probably topped up when it comes to PV, PV robot, drones and mines one can guess?
Of course Ukraine knows this better than us and that is also why their spring offensive will be very aggressive with far-reaching goals and not like before when they took the opportunity to snatch back an area that was poorly defended.
Mark Hertling linked to WP which had this passage –
“U.S. and European officials have estimated that as many as 120,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed or wounded since the start of Russia’s invasion early last year, compared with about 200,000 on the Russian side, which has a much larger military and roughly triple the population from which to draw conscripts. Ukraine keeps its running casualty numbers secret, even from its staunchest Western supporters”.
To me, it is biased against UA,
-UA has 20,000 – 30,000 dead + wounded. They have good medical care and a % of the wounded return to the units again. Exactly how many we do not know.
-Mark writes this about RU losses “While UA contends that over 200k RUs have been killed, w/ more wounded, UA has also suffered massive casualties.” so WP misinterprets that to 200k. Non-combat winter injuries are not even discussed and we have received information that in hospitals in Donbass 30% were non-combat injuries this winter.
-RU had about 400,000 in combat units total at the start of the war and reportedly has dedicated 97% of the army to UA.
-Quantity is a quality in itself is constantly flying around but that can reasonably only apply if they are at the active front, right?
The whole reasoning is obsolete to me – what matters is actually how the situation looks today at active fronts.
If UA does not manage to break the Russians’ back with their spring offensive, the whole West has a huge problem because then they have burned through the remaining ammunition and exhausted the maneuver brigades and it was not enough.
Putin gets his way out and it becomes a global conflict.
That is why UA has been dry training both command and units since last fall, they have resourced with ammunition and vehicles and they have surprises we have not yet seen.
Just take the GLSDB that was in stock and which we were told would be delivered – we have not seen them used yet.
All the LV delivered now at the same time as Russian missile attacks have almost completely stopped.
The drone weapon that has worked insanely well where some unit knocked out 10 tanks in one night shift – why not multiply that greatly?
Then Mark H also writes this “1st, comments on the state of the 2 armies. Russian Army (RU): Forces depleted, mauled on many fronts, equipment less capable than when they started …BUT, they’ve had time to harden their defensive positions since Oct. 4/”
If you pass a defensive line it is by definition obsolete.
They have built defenses on the southern front since spring but it is not built by VDV but regular units or civilian work teams and OSINT has mapped them well so UA has even better control than that.
Then there is an open flank towards the Dnepr.
There are three attack vectors and if you think the whole area between Dnepr – Volnovakha is built the same and full of mines you are grossly mistaken.
Mines are always in short supply and attempts are made to mine in channeling terrain or in mine lines but it is impossible that it has been enough for the entire area.
If you pass a watercourse you can completely bypass a mine line for example.
An attacker always looks for a weak point and considering how good control we have of the defense, Ukraine will surely know exactly where to strike.
Then there are new weapons, drones that drop grenades on the defense and guided air bursts – it will not be easy to go up into firing positions in the defense systems.
Hard vehicles in defense will be knocked out before the attack begins, they know where they stand and they have the ammunition for it.
I think Mark Hertling has landed completely wrong in the broader discussion but his conclusion is right – it will not be like a weekend outing and Ukraine will take extreme losses in this spring offensive but they will not fail.
Then we have several events now that hint at how it will go – reconnaissance fighting on the southern front that came far, counterattack at Bilohorivka that became a 3.8 km advance, counterattacks at Avdiivka, at Vuhledar and at Bakhmut that consolidated the lines and continued smaller advances in northern Luhansk.
You have seen that north of Kupiansk the Russians never reached the Oskil river so their flank was secured and they could move towards the city of Kupiansk.
They probably had a 6:1 advantage in soldiers and hard vehicles in northern Luhansk which should have been enough to achieve something at least on part of the front.
Attacking N towards S along the Oskil river looked incredibly difficult for Ukraine but they never got out of the starting blocks even with the flank protection that was supposed to start the entire offensive.
This war’s big mystery after Girkin.
Before the spring offensive has even started, the Russians are pushed back or start becoming passive on most front sections, while the Twitter feed is boiling with videos of mechanics in battalion strength that look warlike and revving engines.