11:05 – Johan No.1
Long discussion about the start of the offensive in yesterday’s thread, and apparently I got dragged in on the sidelines but saw it too late to jump into the debate; we had a tidy dinner with pleasant conversation as usual –
The UA themselves have announced that since April 10, 2023, they have increased the intensity with the intention to go on the offensive going forward.
If you are on the defense, you do not conduct reconnaissance battles, fights, or waste ammunition in the way they have done since then.
It increased gradually, with a peak around April 20 and then in early May. When it reached a certain intensity and continued to increase while the Russians suffered heavy losses but did not attack much except near Bakhmut, I considered that the UA had transitioned to the offensive and that – their window to start the offensive had opened.
For me, that meant that different fronts were preparing for, and starting, their offensive operations.
We have discussed a lot how the offensive will look, and I guessed that they would start within a window and that each front, army corps, division, and brigade had been given some freedom to act for the simple reason that this is reality and pressing the start button for half a million men while in full war felt quite difficult.
We also received information about the buildup of all units down to territorial ones and roughly know where they have been in the starting position and when.
After May 4, which I considered the start, which can shift a few days here or there depending on how you count, came Bakhmut closely followed by the “Belgorod raid”.
There were some “small battles” on other fronts as well, but these were the bigger events.
The fighting was intense, and in Bakhmut there were offensive operations where several brigades participated.
After that, we have had drone swarms against Moscow, more raids into Belgorod, an astronomical pre-emptive strike, and now the intensity of the “reconnaissance battles” is starting to increase again across the entire front, as they did at the end of April – early May.
For my part, I am not waiting for a clock time when 70 brigades move forward – I consider that Ukraine has been conducting offensive operations for quite some time now and that we get good news every day that we can rejoice in for Ukraine.
They have achieved a purpose with Bakhmut and a purpose with the diversion on the northern front – to divert attention and drain units from the southern front, Donetsk, and northern Luhansk.
What we are waiting for is probably that they take on the southern front. That is probably what most people think of when they see a major offensive – Western-equipped brigades going for a breakthrough of defense systems that, after the ceasefire line, have probably been built the most on the southern front?
For me, it is just the next phase in the offensive.
There is also another army corps that we do not quite know where they will send it, and wherever it appears it will be lively.
Or they might hit with everything they have on the southern front, who knows.
UA has bridge layers and mine-clearing equipment for many breakthroughs.
For me, they are following the big campaign plan so far with the exception that they probably discovered how poorly defended it was up on the northern front, so they are making bigger and deeper raids up there than they perhaps originally intended, who knows?
The fact is that both at Bakhmut and the northern front the defense has collapsed immediately as soon as it was touched.
Anyone who thinks it looks different on the southern front or in northern Luhansk?
All the dissatisfaction with the “offensive not having started” I do not see, and I try to say that in between. So now it is settled 😀
Another diversion could be Transnistria, but then, as said, Moldova’s parliament would reasonably have to ask for that help.
In Belgorod, they have sent in Russian SOF, had to google them yesterday and apparently it is from Spetsnaz they have taken personnel who have then been given other tasks and tried to get higher capability – roughly the best the Russians have.
So now they have finally started to take the threat on the northern front seriously – it took its time.
But they have 2,500 of these SOF and UA has infinitely more they can fight with along the northern front and also a very long front, so this will continue in the same manner.
The latest is probably that they are going to hold a referendum in the “Belgorod Peoples Republic” now and that the ABC liberation movements, three in number I believe, post messages daily about the liberation of Belgorod.
As said – they took a page from Putin’s playbook and now he has to deal with it, hysterically funny.
At Bakhmut, RU is said to have been forced to bring in even more reserves due to losses; the unit maps are all different so unclear which RU brigades are in the area but their half-life could be quite short. Not as short as in their absolute disastrous winter offensives but they seem to rotate. If one may guess, UA indirect fire does a lot of damage.
One thing that is quite significant is what we discussed before that the narrative would become that Ukraine does not want to end the war and that they are killing the children, to get an end to the killing of children the best is to immediately get a ceasefire.
I had thought that this would be peddled by quite a few debaters in the West and that Macron and (at the time we discussed it last year) also Scholz – world peace and save the children.
Now we have really only heard Orban and one of the co-founders of the MP put forward this brilliant solution to the war.
China has to some extent tried to mediate peace recently but it is far from as openly pro-Putin as Orban threw himself into.
For me, that says that Putin has very few who are willing to push his line to keep land in Ukraine.
Further on the same subject – Ukraine is currently invading the country Russia and the collective West continues to provide weapons as much as they can handle.
The red line was discussed a lot last year and few, including me, probably believed we would see these ravages and that they would steal a page from Putin’s playbook.
Most understand that Russia is digging its hole deeper and deeper.
The last two cards Putin now has to play are full mobilization and trying to dangle the nuclear threat.
It seems like this spring’s conscripts have been sent to Belgorod?
At least I haven’t heard of any general mobilization, and what could be more urgent than defending its wide-open land border that Ukraine storms across whenever they feel like it and invades towns with 40,000 inhabitants?
My guess is that Russia cannot carry out a general mobilization of a million men for the simple reason that they would be a bigger threat to the country Russia (the elite) than to Ukraine.
We’ve heard a bit about the nuclear threat recently, and I don’t think much more can be said there; if you want to gain the status of an absolute pariah, then you launch some nuclear weapons. There are those who doubt that the chain is intact and that if Putin demands nuclear weapons, nothing will happen – I believe it.
According to Russian debaters, front-line pre-fighting along the southern front is increasing.
11:05 – Johan No.1
Posting this as a separate post below 👇
(excuse the thread spamming).
16:43 – Johan No.1
We all know why they are pre-fighting the left bank of the Dnipro.
https://twitter.com/pstyle0ne1/status/1665005894185148418?s=46&t=EVt2Y_uS9mtHHb5YEALe8A
18:39 – Johan No.1
Full speed on the pre-fighting at the Dnipro part 2
https://twitter.com/slavauausa/status/1665010033870946308?s=46&t=EVt2Y_uS9mtHHb5YEALe8A
19:08 – Johan No.1
Zaporizia good news 👍
https://twitter.com/azovsouth/status/1665040170138173441?s=46&t=EVt2Y_uS9mtHHb5YEALe8A
08:09 – Johan No.1
The Russian army is bombing Shebekino with thermite, yep you read that right 😳
https://twitter.com/thedeaddistrict/status/1665222242786062336?s=46&t=yEFHa6rQ6WOGQg018mXG0g
08:18 – MatsExtrude
Russia committing war crimes against its own population… (Is that war crimes, by the way?)
The question is whether they will claim that Ukraine is responsible…
11:04 – Johan No.1
Long discussion about the offensive start in yesterday’s thread and I apparently got dragged in on the sidelines but saw it too late to jump into the debate, we had a tidy dinner with pleasant conversation as usual –
UA themselves have announced that since April 10, 2023, they increased the intensity with the intention to go on the offensive going forward.
If you are on the defense, you do not conduct reconnaissance battles, fights, or waste ammunition in the way they have done since then.
It increased gradually and a peak was around April 20 and then in early May. When it reached a certain intensity and continued to increase while the Russians took heavy losses but did not attack much except near Bakhmut, I considered that UA had switched to offensive and that – their window to start the offensive had opened.
For me, that meant that different fronts were preparing for, and starting, their offensive operations.
We have discussed a lot how the offensive would look and I guessed they would start within a window and that each front, army corps, division, and brigade had been given some freedom to act for the simple reason that this is reality and pressing the start button for half a million men while being in full war felt quite difficult.
We also got information about the buildup of all units down to territorial and roughly know where they have been in starting positions and when.
After May 4, which I considered the start, which can shift a few days here or there depending on how you count, came Bakhmut closely followed by the “Belgorod raid”.
There were some “small fights” on other fronts as well but these were the bigger moves.
The fighting was intense and in Bakhmut there were offensive operations where several brigades participated.
After that, we have had drone swarms against Moscow, more raids into Belgorod, an astronomical pre-battle bombardment, and now the intensity of the “reconnaissance battles” is starting to increase again across the entire front, as they did at the end of April – beginning of May.
For my part, I am not waiting for a clock time when 70 brigades move forward – I consider that Ukraine has been conducting offensive operations for quite some time now and that we get good news every day that we can rejoice in for Ukraine.
They have achieved a purpose with Bakhmut and a purpose with the diversion on the northern front – to divert attention and drain units from the southern front, Donetsk, and northern Luhansk.
What we are waiting for is probably that they take on the southern front. That is probably what most people think of when they see a major offensive – western-equipped brigades going for a breakthrough of defense systems that, after the ceasefire line, have probably been built the most at the southern front?
For me, it is just the next phase in the offensive.
There is also another army corps that we do not really know where they will send it and wherever it appears it will be lively.
Or they might throw everything they have at the southern front, who knows.
UA has bridge layers and mine-clearing equipment for many breakthroughs.
For me, they are following the big campaign plan so far with the exception that they probably discovered how poorly defended it was up at the northern front so they are making bigger and deeper raids up there than they perhaps initially thought, who knows?
The fact is that both at Bakhmut and the northern front the defense has collapsed immediately as soon as it was touched.
Anyone who thinks it looks different at the southern front or in northern Luhansk?
All the dissatisfaction with the “offensive not having started” I do not see and I try to say that in between. So now it is cleared up 😀
Another diversion could be Transnistria but then, as said, Moldova’s parliament would reasonably have to ask for that help.
In Belgorod they have sent in Russian SOF, I had to google them yesterday and apparently they are personnel taken from Spetsnaz who have then been given other tasks and tried to get higher capability – roughly the best the Russians have.
So now they have finally started to take the threat at the northern front seriously – it took its time.
But they have 2,500 of these SOF and UA has infinitely more they can fight with along the northern front and also a very long front so this will continue in the same manner.
The latest is probably that they are going to hold a referendum in the “Belgorod Peoples Republic” now and that the ABC liberation movements, there are three of them I think, post messages daily about the liberation of Belgorod.
As said – they took a page from Putin’s playbook and now he has to deal with it, hysterically funny.
At Bakhmut RU is said to have been forced to bring in even more reserves due to losses, the unit maps are all different so unclear which RU brigades are in the area but their half-life could be quite short. Not as short as in their absolute disastrous winter offensives but they seem to rotate. If one guesses, UA’s indirect fire does a lot of damage.
One thing that is quite significant is what we discussed before that the narrative would become that Ukraine does not want to end the war and that they kill the children, to stop the killing of children the best is to immediately get a ceasefire.
I had thought that this would be peddled by quite a few debaters in the West and that Macron and (at the time we discussed it last year) also Scholz – world peace and save the children.
Now we basically only hear Orban and one of the co-founders of the Green Party putting forward this brilliant solution to the war.
China has to some extent tried to mediate peace recently but it is far from as openly pro-Putin as Orban jumped in.
For me, that says Putin has very few who are willing to push his line to keep land in Ukraine.
Further on the same subject – Ukraine is currently invading the country Russia and the collective West continues to provide weapons as much as they can handle.
The red line we discussed a lot last year and there were probably few, including me, who thought we would see these ravages and that they would steal a page from Putin’s playbook.
Most probably understand that Russia is digging its hole deeper and deeper.
The last two cards Putin now has to play are full mobilization and trying to dangle the nuclear threat.
It seems like this spring’s conscripts have been sent to Belgorod?
At least I have not heard of any general mobilization and what could be more urgent than to defend your wide-open land border that Ukraine storms across whenever they feel like it and invades cities with 40,000 inhabitants?
My guess is that Russia cannot carry out a general mobilization of a million men for the simple reason that they would be a bigger threat to the country Russia (the elite) than to Ukraine.
The nuclear threat has been heard about a bit recently, and I don’t think much more can be said there; if you want to gain the status of an absolute pariah, then you launch some nuclear weapons. There are those who doubt that the chain of command is intact and that if Putin demands nuclear weapons nothing will happen – I believe it.
According to Russian debaters, front-line pre-emptive strikes along the southern front are increasing.