11:39 – Johan No.1
It has come up quite a bit why RU attacks far ahead of their main line straight into UA defenses and under an artillery umbrella, I tried to discuss it the day before yesterday but wasn’t part of the after-discussion as I was on the plane. There were also lots of kind comments I never replied to because of the flight and the subsequent lost luggage which has now been found.
Yesterday Hasse reflected on it.
At Kherson, VDV was behind regular army units and DPR who took all the hits and then they smashed all UA breakthroughs – Kherson was, by Russian standards, a very successful defensive battle. There was a total information embargo around Kherson but since UA never advanced there I wonder if the Russians maybe fought in a similar way up there?
At Kharkiv, RU had left the rebels and 3rd army corps to defend and they fled together when a combined Ukrainian battle group of brigade size or more attacked in the area (if I understood correctly?).
At Izyum/Kupiansk they had capable units defending in one (1) line with mines and then it was empty behind – as soon as UA broke through the line the defense completely collapsed and apparently the 1st Guards were completely wiped out down at Izyum.
The Russians have probably learned some lessons from previous losses and adapted to the situation one can guess but why do they fight like this – the burn rate must be astronomical?
One of the reasons, I think, is the phenomenon “tour-de-777” which we saw in spring 2023.
We joked then that a battery could wipe out a Russian BTG in defense in one morning if they skipped breaks.
That concept includes drone weapons, all types of artillery and longer-range weapons – Russians in defense are static targets and prey.
Now UA has such a large amount of these weapons that they can do real damage where they choose to concentrate.
The other is perhaps the “Putin effect” and the newly appointed commanders who get replaced quarterly – you go all in all the time to try to survive in your job as long as possible and nothing gives more pats on the back from higher-ups than violent counterattacks.
Even today RU is attempting counterattacks not only where UA is offensive but also at quiet fronts – they are completely pointless. Now, that might actually be exactly what they should do, try to strike at quiet fronts, but since they never succeed with anything and have limited resources it turns into a negative overall.
Maybe they reason that if they attack aggressively now and inflict heavy losses on UA, UA will lose heart early in the counteroffensive or the West will lose interest and stop delivering weapons?
A Potemkin façade then as they have always done where they project a violent and effective defense but there is emptiness behind?
And further that if UA were to succeed with a major breakthrough then UA and the West would be motivated to continue by their early successes?
And then rather die on the attack than be heavily decimated in static defense long before spotting any Ukrainians?
This whole Russian defensive battle breathes desperation from RU and purposeful grinding with a large dose of patience from UA.
Quite a lot of Japanese bayonet charges on the islands of it all.
We have seen the videos where a group wipes out a platoon, UA confirms that RU takes 5 times higher losses when UA is the attacking party and so on. That UA uses the full palette of capabilities very effectively is indisputable and that RU can no longer manage that is also indisputable.
In some places they still have good capability – at the southern front for example. But not at the Dnepr front anymore, there they are completely outclassed.
After the film about CV90 we know that they also have guided ammunition and drones up in northern Luhansk, yesterday I wrote that I thought they didn’t have it but that was wrong.
Around Bakhmut RU is also completely outclassed.
Also quite sure that the information about a couple of armies on the way is distorted – a trickle is coming in all the time but nothing that makes a difference.
What could make a difference is the estimated (on paper) 460,000 from all agencies including Rosgvardia but they weren’t even there when Belgorod was invaded or when Wagner moved towards Moscow.
Where they are is this war’s great mystery, I guess different power factions hold tightly to their private armies because they will be needed for something other than fighting in Ukraine.
A mobilization in January 2023 of some half a million more would have been what was needed but it never happened – pretty sure it is because the power elite does not trust the potential soldiers.
RU is simply painted into the famous corner and the slippery slope. The military bases are not training the next group of reinforcements for Ukraine because they have not been assigned the personnel since the political leadership does not dare to mobilize.
The inertia has been enormous – when the high commanders visit the fronts they are in protected bunkers in the rear and get a tailored picture but then we also have the leadership in Russia in their enormous palaces and lives of luxury.
When you saw how Prigozhin lived you were stunned, the house was a dream and in every closet there were gold bars and bundles of cash.
The situation on the ground has not reached the elite yet because all commanders at all levels do not want to expose themselves and the power struggles we have seen when they accidentally opened a gap in the curtain are probably typical as always?
We have discussed for quite a while that a larger retreat is needed to force their hand, the Azov push may not be enough but a good start and Bakhmut will also hurt.
Videos of mine plows up in northern Luhansk now so apparently they are starting to prepare to advance there too – good.
Definitely missing more Belgorod raids but before I disappeared the presence in those communities SOUTH of the city of Belgorod was constant – they never left.
A thought about UA getting weapons that are being phased out in the organizations – when RU gets intact examples it doesn’t matter.
Leo2 will certainly remain but the Germans are working on a new tank. Same with F-16, Storm Shadow and so on.
They probably dared to send the latest models of artillery.
CV90 is probably the weapon you don’t want to fall into the Russians’ hands, but they needed to be sent.
We can probably send Gripen without worrying because if Hungary has had them, Russia has probably had the opportunity to reverse engineer them?
Now we know what the Russian fortifications on the southern front were worth, and clearly the minefields are a tougher nut to crack than I thought. When we discussed breakthroughs, we envisioned a mine line Xm deep that you break through and then could position yourself for line 2 and 3 and then you were through.
What the Russians have done is emptied the stockpiles of mines in Russia and mined exactly all terrain everywhere several kilometers deep.
They have then mined in the units, and we are now somewhat in the same situation as at Kherson 2022, really.
West of Vuhledar it is a bit unclear, are they sniffing around Staromaiorske or Staromlynivka now?
I guess Staromaiorske.
They are then 6 km from breaking through the main line in that area, and if they have pooled almost all heavy tank brigades there together with a number of elite brigades, it is definitely a focus point.
Right now, the commander of the Zaporizhia front is probably googling asylum, but alongside that he has a threat on the left flank over at the Antonovsky bridge to handle just as he has pulled away the competent reserves from there.
He cannot send them back because they are already in combat up at the southern front.
The burn rate on his units must be sky-high, and since UA started offensive operations on the southern front, they have rotated units maybe three times and tried counterattacks with the task forces – since the Russians are prepared to take sky-high losses in a unit, the units rotated out can probably be counted as empty shells without further combat value.
Fighting with Spetsnaz, marines, and reconnaissance on the front lines is a huge sign of weakness – there is nothing else left to handle the defense with, so the task forces have to become trench defense.
Pretty soon the commander of the Zaporizhia front will need to ask for reinforcements if he hasn’t already. Are there any to send?
The defense in this area has surprised some, capable artillery, suicide drones, AHKP, and attack aircraft with FAB500 – he has clearly managed to retain capabilities when other fronts have been crying out for more.
However, we know that when Bakhmut began to develop into a threat and when the Belgorod raids were at their worst, they pulled a couple of brigades from the southern front, so he did not get to keep everything.
What the southern front succeeded well with was not attacking too much during the winter offensive – 8 brigades at the western part of the southern front and then the big suicide at Vuhledar, but they held back somewhat so there were presumably units reasonably intact.
Now they have burned through them and it is empty behind.
When UA cuts through down to Azov, there is only one retreat route and that is down to Crimea – a quick fix that means all units west of the breakthrough are trapped down in Crimea and will not be able to be moved to other front sections.
Then UA can simply blow up the bridge and block the entrance down to Crimea and then run all the brigades except 3 northeast and achieve absolute dominance in the area southeast of the city of Donetsk.
It will be a long summer but it is only a matter of time.
Now it is crucial that the West sends ammunition and materiel because offensively they use astronomical amounts.
One thing to keep in mind is that if they do not break the Russians’ back this summer and there is some kind of stalled offensive that does not start in the fall due to the West’s willingness to negotiate – then Russia, with China’s help, will be able to rebuild its capability.
This offensive until the end of September when the ground no longer supports is the most important of the war.
It is now that Russia has run out of artillery, maintenance is in free fall, the soldiers are thirsty and remember Wagner’s march to freedom – the low point is now.
Therefore, UA will only increase the pressure gradually, they have not peaked yet, and it is likely that offensive operations will start in northern Luhansk eventually, which would push forward according to the big campaign plan.
Then, regarding Belgorod, I wonder if there is any truth to the claim that the USA et al. asked UA to pause their liberation activities in Russia because the next Belgorod raid should already have happened.
According to the big campaign plan, we are now waiting for the breakthrough towards Azov now that the crossing of the Dnieper has taken place. The Bakhmut front should also move and northern Luhansk push forward.
12:02 – MatsExtrude
+100!
12:39 – Johan No.1
CV90 is better than Bradley, AMX10, the Renault vehicles, M113, M117, Marder, and whatever else has been delivered.
Its armament can also take out a tank, which Bradley needs its TOW for.
CV90 has a perfect combo of fire-mobility and it is not sensitive to infantry like a tank is.
The Barracuda camouflage is very interesting if it becomes hard to combat for STRIX or BONUS type ammunition.
Then you have a squad inside the vehicle, so it’s like an ice cream with lots of jam in it.
12:43 – MatsExtrude
CV90 is simply the best!
“Ice cream with lots of jam in it,” that was really good! 🤣
(Hope that doesn’t mean the soldiers are all spineless.. 🤔 )
13:03 – Johan No.1
Exactly Erik14, we are on the edge of a protracted war. It will always be a prolonged conflict because the Russians will never give up, but we can avoid open war if UA manages to retake the 1991 borders.
They are well on their way despite the West’s reluctance to give them the weapons they need for the second Russian low point in this war.
Between September 2022 and January 2023, Russia managed to avoid a humiliating defeat by exploiting the bad weather period to restore mangled capability.
Wild guess is that if given the opportunity, they will do the same this fall?
14:16 – Johan No.1
End of September is a normal year, but 2023 has so far not been a normal year as it rained longer than usual, I have gathered. SE also had an unusually warm winter that we in the electricity underclass needed.
If it becomes a dry autumn, it would be perfect because the only thing that will stop UA’s offensive operations is the ground’s bearing capacity.
Yep, if Russia gets some kind of pause in October and November, they will probably manage to strengthen quite a bit.
14:38 – Johan No.1
Puuuh, your analyses have been so sharp the last two weeks that a plus one hundred is important
15:08 – Johan No.1
I got a red angry face from him just yesterday, he probably didn’t like that I outed his meetings with Budanov but now after the Prigozhin fiasco it is behind us.
It has been quite intense all of 2023 with this and I had to pretend to have a conflict so that Prigozhin wouldn’t get suspicious. You never knew when Prigozhin could show up in some long-haired wig and big beard completely unrecognizable, so you had to be on your guard 24/7.
Then there are a couple of days in the calendar that Dengamle cannot account for – the day of Midsummer, Midsummer’s Eve, and Midsummer Day. All we have to go on is the beer mug emoji and “na moskva” on Midsummer’s Eve, and he does not answer direct questions about those days; you only get back a yellow face emoji with a straight line mouth.
So it is not entirely clear to me whether everything went according to plan or if, as so often before, it crashed completely but the outcome was the best possible – when he invented the cavalry it was one of those totally unforeseen events where he shirked from the village fight with the neighboring village and just wanted to eat an apple.
15:09 – Johan No.1
It is incredibly liberating not to have to play this game anymore, now I understand how the Cold War spies had it and you really don’t envy them at all. Easier to bob around on a boat in shark-infested waters.
15:36 – Johan No.1
Maybe not the world’s best source and some risk that I’m falling for a Russian psyops, but if it’s filmed from the meeting then it’s correct?
You can see the pressure Zelensky is under and how frustrated he gets when others don’t understand.
16:02 – MatsExtrude
🤣👍
16:03 – MatsExtrude
🚢
17:07 – Johan No.1
You have to apply some filter to GeneralSVR, or a big filter, but according to below both Putin and Prigozhin broke the agreement quite immediately.
https://twitter.com/generalsvr_en/status/1677215139089580032?s=46&t=SD3SVeFWNvCCiERiCRh9ow
Is Prigozhin alive, that’s probably the first question?
Then I wonder what happened to those embarrassing revelations that were supposed to come, Prigozhin was supposed to be active in all sorts of shady adult activities and everything was on film?
Having now seen pictures of his house and everything that was seized – they live in another world, the Russian elite, a life of outrageous excess where a bullet to the forehead is just a suspicion away.
10:33 – Johan No.1
Very interesting 👍
Does RU have any other guided capabilities besides what you described for the artillery?
The Lancet drones have proven to work quite well and even a Russian can handle them. Fire and forget feels like it suits the Russians more than complicated five-step rockets.
I thought TOW was tricky because you have to keep the target in sight AND there must be no obstacles blocking the wire.
They even manage to miss those FAB500 bombs.
Then there is this great mystery of the war why they haven’t let the missiles rain down on military targets instead of cities – when they want to succeed they do hit, as in the case of the Antonovsky bridge for example.