10:09 – MatsExtrude
Thanks!
Avdiivka just turned into a real thriller now that reinforcements were chosen to be sent in!
Nice that you find your way back to the positive!
10:57 – Johan No.1
High confidence that veteran units who are absolute gods at clearing trenches and know their mechanized combat will now smash into a new CAA of newly mobilized and run over them.
If they just get ammunition for indirect fire and AT, they should be unstoppable.
11:04 – Johan No.1
Look at this beautiful fireball that once was a refinery in Moscow 💥😀😎
https://bsky.app/profile/johanno1.bsky.social/post/3klc42hemtz2g
13:07 – MatsExtrude
🔥👍
19:53 – Johan No.1
Putin is starting to panic-ask for peace 😂😂
https://x.com/jayinkyiv/status/1757473318058197031?s=46&t=Vah3JXV31B9lXwZOK5gF7w
20:06 – MatsExtrude
🤣 Now he has probably comfort-sucked the last tubes of Kalles.
09:45 – Johan No.1
If we start with some positive Twitter rumors this morning, which we can’t fully confirm yet – we have discussed that we can ring the bell for Avdiivka when the counterattacks play out but that it doesn’t look bright (based on major negative changes at Deepstate) and that the only sensible counterattack would be up near Krasnohorivka with mechanized forces.
First of all, there were no changes in Avdiivka on Deepstatemap yesterday and it has been moving daily for a week – that is positive.
It is now rumored that Ukraine has brought forward offensive reserves in the north, signaling a desire to stabilize the situation in Avdiivka. It is also rumored that the politicians share this desire.
It is also rumored that Ukraine is loosening up on ammunition again because they are confident that the support package from the US will go through – this naturally means a quick death for Russians in trenches in Avdiivka when the artillery tubes rev up.
First of all, this strengthens the thread’s assumption that Ukraine still has offensive reserves, right?
The second is that we will soon see one of two outcomes – Ukraine carries out its offensive resulting in the Russian advance being pushed back, and then RU has a new well-equipped CAA in the area along with the usual sacrificial lambs and Ukraine is reactive – this will give us a good picture of how superior Ukraine is here.
The other outcome is that they fail, but that’s not fun to discuss 😀
The coming week around Avdiivka will tell us where this war is heading.
Then we have Gazpromneft’s refinery on fire, I will return to why this is significant further down.
https://x.com/ruinwanderer/status/1757208561447207259?s=46&t=Vah3JXV31B9lXwZOK5gF7w
We probably have an explanation for why the Russians have made progress – SOF and VDV in Avdiivka. This hasn’t been mentioned before and I don’t see any on the unit maps. The question was asked in the thread some time ago without answer but Pravda should be reliable. RU has always pooled its better capabilities to places where they want breakthroughs.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/12/7441494/
Today everything changed (again) when the Gazpromneft refinery burned down, so below is how the pessimists view life in general now that I have guest-starred there for a few days – it was quiet for too long around spectacular liberation feats in Russia and in my moments of pessimism I wondered if that was why Zelensky looked so nervous when he awarded Budanov the medal, and that’s why Budanov got the medal – Zelensky had told him on behalf of the West to stop liberating Russia. So far it has been two oil terminals or refineries this week and there are many left. And when nothing happens for a while it breaks that pattern.
Then Macron canceled his trip to Kyiv, why?
https://x.com/noelreports/status/1756645988985430523?s=46&t=Vah3JXV31B9lXwZOK5gF7w
I still had difficulty accepting “active defense” and whether it was driven by manpower shortage, ammunition shortage, or political motivation. It was clear that Zalizhny wanted resources for large offensives and that he was out.
Budanov’s saboteur swarm naturally hasn’t run out of drones or winged grenades so if we don’t hear anything, changes have presumably occurred.
On the contrary, their IT minister just went out and declared that they have thousands of long-range drones that can reach Moscow and St. Petersburg.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/12/7441488/
Now Viktor wrote yesterday that TASS reported that Tucker had discussed off the record with Putin and that he was ready to negotiate. This was therefore the purpose of the interview and what PerraG55 reasoned about – now it has come.
If you connect everything as a true pessimist always does, Biden has refused to send things that can be sent directly with his signature (sending lots to Morocco instead), the EU promises big but sends nothing at all, Budanov’s havoc dies out, Zalizhny is out, Zelensky promises “active defense” and TASS writes that Putin wants to negotiate.
And one can assume that the West has used the deliveries to pressure Zelensky to both not attack Russia and then be forced into negotiations.
But today everything changed – refinery knocked out so Budanov keeps going and the new leadership shows a willingness to hit the Russians in Avdiivka – the pessimists’ dark sad worldview retreated before a light blue shimmer supported by soothing elevator music.
The single biggest threat Ukraine faces, and also why I have taken the opposite position all autumn when it has come up that Russia is a big threat, is that the West feels that Russia has successes on the battlefield and starts looking into their own stockpiles and feels that here we need to replenish pronto or else we can’t defend ourselves.
There are many paid pro-Russians left in the West who haven’t been weeded out yet and they will start pushing hard politically that we must build up our own defenses for the good of the country.
The Chiefs of Defense throughout Europe are already worried because they believe they have too little material for national invasion defense.
They are naturally thinking completely wrong because it is the perimeter defense that is important but they have a lot of influence as experts in the field and they have clear requirements and job descriptions.
Simply put, no country has resourced a fully sustainable invasion defense but countries comfortably distant from the perimeter defense need no defense at all because if it comes to the point that Belgium and Portugal have to defend themselves against invasion, it’s already lost.
Throughout the war we have read how the Czech Republic buys hundreds of CV90s, how Poland is sweeping South Korea for artillery and tanks and how ammunition from new production doesn’t reach Ukraine because others’ contracts are prioritized.
That is why I have been worried about Avdiivka, northern Luhansk, Krunky and what else – if the Russians start gaining some momentum it will immediately trigger the same reaction as during the spring offensive but reversed.
The media will headline doomsday articles again, all Chiefs of Defense in Europe will stand gravely serious in front of parliaments with their flip charts with material that must be bought now and bought politicians will start pushing the line hard.
It might even become election issues.
Wait and see when Swedish peace and some debaters become infinitely interested in a strong Swedish defense 😀
Then there is nothing to send to Ukraine and it doesn’t matter how much is in the account because there is nothing to buy.
We are already halfway into this but the West chose to open up a bit when the spring offensive dangled before them as a possible war winner.
Now the West is bruised and there is a risk that everything plays right into Russia’s hands.
The best thing that could have happened would have been if Ukraine had ammunition so this round of RU offensives was smashed already during the buildup as before and then they could have announced their own offensive or struck at a weak point. It was not exactly unexpected that the Russian army would come under some pressure like this before the presidential election.
Do not underestimate the risk above – it is a sufficiently attractive purpose for most politicians to get lost in.
Add to that – “what if Ukraine loses all the equipment or loses the war, then we stand there with nothing ourselves, irresponsible”.
Hard to argue against something like that in parliament, right 😐
If Ukraine now releases the ammunition again, there will be enormous losses for the Russians until the election and RU has brought forward its strategic reserves at Bakhmut, northern Luhansk, Avdiivka, and the southern front, so there are good reasons to assume that the Russian strategic reserves are largely used up now.
Before this round, about 50% were used.
Ukraine still has a larger offensive reserve and if they just get that damn (🤬🤬🤬) ammunition sometime, they can resource the next offensive.
They will show that they have offensive capability in Avdiivka now, but the thread already knew that since we have gone through it before.
I am more than reasonably curious whether, when Congress approves the support package, everything is already loaded on transport planes or if there will be a long lead time.
If this morning’s harvest of Twitter rumors is correct, we are straight back to positive-positive and the counteroffensive at Avdiivka is a biggie even though the area itself has no decisive significance because it signals how well UA command and control works and the condition of the defense. A litmus test, simply put.