Foreigners are gradually mastering drones and GRKs, but the ace pilots are Ukrainians. How does the “Revenge” Tactical Group fight?!

Speaker 1

Hello, you are watching "Militarny" and today my guest is Dolya, commander of the "Revenge" tactical group of the International Legion of the Main Intelligence Directorate. Welcome.

Speaker 2

– Hello.

Speaker 1

– Let's start from the beginning, let's talk about the group itself, the tactical group, what units it consists of, what kind of organism it is, how it functions.

Speaker 2

Well, essentially, it is a special purpose battalion; one could say, a heavy, mechanized, reinforced, expanded battalion, even with elements of a regimental structure. But first and foremost, at its core, despite all the technology, drones, UGVs, artillery support, and so on, the philosophy of the unit is that it is, primarily, an infantry unit. It was, is, and will be an infantry unit, and all its forces and means, from artillery to all types of drones, are directed toward supporting the work of small infantry groups, which are tasked with carrying out active operations—offensive, assault, diversionary, sabotage, and infiltration behind enemy lines. In other words, it is not a linear infantry unit. It is a unit that always has the task of doing something active, influencing the enemy, and not remaining there in passive defense. But at the same time, it is not linear infantry, and the entire complex of our means is directed toward this special work.

Speaker 1

And in the conditions of the modern battlefield, we constantly talk about the kill zone; what do active operations look like? That is, what preparation and appropriate means do they require, and is some kind of transformation constantly occurring?

Speaker 2

Moreover, not only in kill-zone conditions, but specifically in the conditions of the southern direction, where, for example, we are currently operating. This is a particularly acute problem because we have no forest plantations, no wild forests, and no intact urban areas. We have a predominantly steppe zone or destroyed settlements. Therefore, the movement of infantry groups in such conditions is reduced almost to a minimum. Thus, to ensure this work, a whole complex of circumstances, forces, and means is required, from weather conditions to extensive work on suppressing enemy assets, such as drones, artillery, and reconnaissance capabilities. All infantry groups operating must be as fast, mobile, and autonomous as possible, well-camouflaged, and work quietly, quickly, aggressively, and so on. In other words, it is an entire art where we are in a constant race against the technological growth of our opponent's capabilities. But to this day, despite all this, I am confident that the best and highest indicator of work is the actual result of the infantry groups' work. Because no type of technical intelligence, regardless of how perfect it is, provides as broad and objective information as intelligence gathered directly on the battlefield. Without control of the territory, even with small forces—without infantry control, there is no control over the territory; without confirmation of results by the infantry, there will be no accurate information regarding the completion of one task or another. Therefore, our task is extremely difficult because, first of all, we work primarily with foreigners. This is a total mix of diverse cultures, psychotypes, traditions, and everything in between, which makes it difficult to form into a single doctrine. And the geographical and climatic conditions are exceptionally difficult. Because it is a direct, flat steppe zone, and that is why our tasks are always "marked with an asterisk." They are very difficult for us to achieve.

Speaker 1

We will gradually explore all these topics separately during the interview. And I want to ask you a bit in general about Revansh as a group, because last year, in August, you joined the International Legion of the Main Intelligence Directorate. And before that, how did you exist as a unit? That is, in principle, you were in all the hotspots that have existed during this part of the Great War, not since 2014. And only since 2014 the team has also been fighting. What is the general experience of the team?

Speaker 2

In 2014, it wasn't some institutionalized specific unit. It was a community of people with communications experience, with certain values, who served in various units. But they collaborated with each other, sometimes worked together. Then, we understand that there were many opportunities to work as volunteers. Some were volunteers, some officially served. But this kind of unofficial community existed and constantly, constantly gained and strengthened its combat experience. Before the full-scale war, I linked this community in communication with the Main Directorate of Intelligence, with the army special forces. Thanks to Kyrylo Oleksiyovych Bodan, we managed to organize higher-quality training for these people. We already understood what we needed to prepare for. Even then, we had a profile for more subversive work, for more complex infantry tasks. And during the full-scale war, it formed into a full-fledged unit. We were even lucky to some extent, because we worked both as part of the Shevanbat and as part of Artan. Now we work as part of the International Legion. And we managed to gain experience from all the main power structures of direct active kinetic action that the Main Directorate of Intelligence has at its disposal. Therefore, we accumulated the experience of the most distinguished units, their specifics. This gives us a significant advantage today.

Speaker 1

Tell us about the team. Who are these people? How did you come together as a community?

Speaker 2

These are people primarily with civilian experience, not military experience specifically in terms of education. But these are people who often wanted, specifically aspired to fight more than people who went through all the stages of military education and so on. This circle was not built around some friends or like-minded people, I don't know, to go grab a beer, drink on the weekends. No. It was a specific task to find people who have inspiration, aspiration, a sufficient amount of will, and are generally psychologically ready to maintain a sufficient level of motivation and interest in combat operations under any conditions. These were the main criteria by which this selection was carried out. And this selection, well, there is nothing, you know, Hollywood about it, but it is literally: you go, you find a person, you get recommendations, you go, you talk, you look for common ground, whether this person could fit and strengthen our structure. If such a person is found, they search further within their circle of acquaintances. And fortunately, we managed to form such a certain backbone, a foundation even before the full-scale war, and we already more or less understood who could perform which work profile, who is in intelligence, who is in planning, who is directly managing units on the battlefield, and so on.

Regarding intellectual potential, I believe that, unfortunately, we lost a great deal during the war; especially in the first years of the war, we lost many people who could have realized themselves at a significantly higher level, in a significantly wider range of work, but the situation at the beginning of the war was such that volunteers went to war first, they took the main blow, and unfortunately, it was impossible for none of these people to die. Many such people died, and now I regret, I realize that many of those who performed ordinary functions at the beginning of the war could today be battalion commanders, head sections of the highest operational or strategic level—people who could have contributed very, very much to all the defense forces of Ukraine, not just for their own unit, I would say.

Therefore, the people who were able to survive all these mills of the first years of the war, go through the hottest spots, survive severe wounds, and gain hard experience—they form the basis of the management of our unit. The vast majority, with the possible exception of some separate technical, highly specialized specialists, the vast majority of our entire command and control are people who have been wounded multiple times, people who had direct experience of firefights with the enemy, infantry work, people who met the enemy face to face and participated in the very hottest clashes with the adversary, who lost their closest friends. That is why our collective is so tight-knit, but the main—I will repeat—the main characteristic is not the intellectual level, not some, so to speak, combat capability, but the desire and inspiration to win. The will to win.

Speaker 1

You mentioned foreigners, that they are currently joining the unit, you said there are many; how many is "many," and how did foreigners get to you, basically?

Speaker 2

Well, from the very beginning of the war, I saw huge potential in staffing special units specifically with foreigners, because since special units have many people with rich experience, a broad outlook, extensive humanitarian knowledge, people who are interested in the global situation, knowledge of languages, and so on and so on, this opens up opportunities for us to integrate a foreign combat component into our units. Simply taking people into some brigade and sending an X number of people to fill an X need for infantry might work, but the result is not guaranteed; therefore, a more delicate, surgical approach is needed here to integrate people from different parts of the world into our military realities. And because we have always had many certain connections around the world since the beginning of the war, we had to integrate a certain number of people, and we gained experience working with foreigners. Since billions of people live in the world, this resource is actually almost unlimited, and we can replenish our units—if we create normal conditions—practically infinitely; this potential must be realized, because Ukraine's mobilization resource will eventually be exhausted, which creates serious social tension and serious pressure on society. I understood immediately that foreigners—people who of their own free will wish to gain military experience or join our struggle—do so primarily not because of some financial motivation, as some might think, nor because of some other mercenary motivation, but primarily because Ukraine's main resource is its moral advantage in this war. All these people who arrive—this is the first thing they say—they understand that by joining the side that has the moral advantage, they fulfill many of their internal expectations of themselves. In this way, they try to be part of adventures, to be part of history, and so on. Therefore, this is the primary motivation of these people.

Speaker 1

And as for the first foreigners, they were some kind of acquaintances, I understand. And what is the spectrum of countries overall now, if that can be described? It can.

Speaker 2

Undoubtedly. It is impossible to clearly divide them into categories. At first there were some, then there were others. Of course, in the first years of the war there was a wave of Westerners, people from the Western world, but over the long haul, not everyone from prosperous countries is ready to serve and fight for years and years. Therefore, the focus later shifted to countries with a lower social and economic level. And many of those who began to join already saw in this the building of some kind of full military career in Ukraine, or after gaining experience in their own [country]. I don't know, anywhere. But our contacts have nothing to do with this. These are simply our acquaintances—military instructors, other military personnel, former military, people with such a military mindset, experience, including a political motivation to fight for Ukraine, who saw in Russia an ideological enemy of the free world, the West, and Europe. And therefore, all these people were in contact; we immediately began to accumulate and test them, to see how it all works.

Speaker 1

I was looking at YouTube, you have French-language videos there, Spanish-language videos. Accordingly, obviously, there are people from different countries. This is, again, some kind of internal communication of theirs with their friends, acquaintances, when they invite [others] to join. How does this recruiting work among foreigners? The war has been going on for five years now, the big one, and overall the tenth. So that

Speaker 2

To describe all the motives of people from different parts of the world, we would probably need five hours of airtime to describe it all. To put it simply, if a country, conventionally speaking, is more economically prosperous, then a person's motivation will more likely be political. If the country is poorer, then a person's motivation will often be professional, meaning with the goal of gaining experience, building a career, or some kind of naturalization here with us in Ukraine. For them, it is an opportunity. That is the principle by which they can be divided.

French-speaking volunteers—well, one could delve into a certain psychoanalysis here, because France, for example, is a country with a rich, very rich military history. But modern European men there do not feel, for example, that they can realize these desires, dreams, certain childhood worldview orientations, and so on, in European armies. Therefore, feeling this frustration, having perhaps 10 generations of military personnel in their lineage, but lacking the opportunity to serve in their own army exactly as they would like, they come here and thus close their internal gestalts. And this only benefits us, because for us, it is reinforcement, it is help. We try to create all possible conditions for these people so that they feel comfortable. Not everything, of course, is in our hands. We do not control salaries, we do not control a lot of bureaucratic processes, but everything at our level—organize, prepare, provide, monitor, help, direct. We always try to accommodate as much as possible, because it is the moral duty of a Ukrainian to fight in any case. This is our constitutional duty. These people are not obligated to fight for us. Not obligated. And I don't put it that their motivation is something on the same level. I believe that we must… They give themselves of their own free will, with a desire to join. Many of them have died. And we must be as grateful as possible to them. This is not an obligation. These people can break the contract at any moment, turn around and leave. Therefore, on our part, we facilitate it in this way.

Speaker 1

Well, by the way, when talking about foreigners in the defense forces, it is also about the fact that they can terminate their contracts and leave at any moment, the extent to which this turnover occurs, and what this process looks like.

Speaker 2

This is an important strategic task for the state, which is very sluggish in these processes. If a person serves here for years, starts a family, is oriented, declares, and shows by all their behavior that they are ready for a long term of service, we must facilitate them receiving citizenship and transitioning to a contract as a citizen of Ukraine. Because they have deserved it more than many of those who received this citizenship by birthright. Therefore, there is turnover, of course, but in my opinion, the turnover is related to problems with the integration of people in this unit. Many units are not ready to work with foreigners. Plus, I believe that the level of material support is critically low. And it's not just that they aren't earning, they are incurring serious losses because of this service. And this begins to affect their families, their loved ones, their relatives, and they simply cannot provide for them for a long time, which contributes to them returning home quickly. Because on average, we are talking about a salary of a thousand dollars. When we talk about people from countries where their average earnings are significantly higher, these are ridiculous funds. And if we talk about people, even from countries called the Third World, then a thousand dollars is not a super high salary even by their standards.

Speaker 1

May risk one's life.

Speaker 2

All the more so. I believe that all these speculations about allowances for such work, for days of assaults, for staying in positions, and so on—that is all well and good, but in the conditions of a large [force], there is such a Roman proverb: "a large army is always disorderly." I'll say it in Russian because I don't remember. In Ukrainian. There is always chaos in a large army. Therefore, all bureaucratic mechanisms must be simplified. From my many years of experience working with foreigners, regardless of their position or the work they perform, their salary should be fixed and be, for example, at least 3 thousand dollars per month. Regardless of whether it is combat work or logistical work. They free up the capacities of our society. They serve as a support for society, which then has time to catch its breath, recover, and so on—to prepare people. Therefore, regardless of their type of work, their base rate should be higher and fixed. For us, for the commanders, those who employ these people in the most critical and difficult sectors, this is an opportunity to strengthen controllability. Because when a person understands that they are going and yet their financial issue is resolved, they can concentrate on combat work and it is easier for us to work with them. But when a person has to carry out a combat mission, and at the same time has to fend off their wife on the phone because utility bills need to be paid somewhere on the other side of the world, it is difficult for them to concentrate on combat work. In my opinion, this is obvious here. Therefore, the state should direct more resources and intensify efforts on how to come up with a more complex, convoluted bonus mechanism. Like the tallies of those captured, tallies of those killed. Other people can perform an extremely difficult task without firing a single shot toward the enemy. Without firing a single shot. And people might go and accidentally take ten people prisoner, you understand? Therefore, of course, the result on the battlefield is the criterion by which it is easiest to evaluate everything. But the base, at least the material one, should be passive.

Speaker 1

On the other hand, Ukrainian citizens who serve in the military would also like to have a fixed high salary. This is a task

Speaker 2

for the state, of course. I am ready to receive a lower salary than a foreigner. I think a Ukrainian citizen who does not want, for example, to go and serve, probably would feel more at ease if someone went instead of them. Yes, so I believe that any Ukrainian citizen who is obliged by law to serve must serve, with or without a salary, depending on the capabilities of our state. Because a foreigner is an additional resource. It is a weapon—however cynically that may sound, we are talking about people, but it is a weapon that we receive, it is an additional tool. And what weapon to receive, how much to pay for it—that is already the responsibility of our entire society. Because war is not the task of the government exclusively. It is the task of our entire society. Therefore, a Ukrainian here is not a competitor to a foreigner in terms of salary, but a Ukrainian is the one who uses their services in this case. If we are to translate this into certain economic categories.

Speaker 1

By the way, a video recently came out on your Revansh channel—subscribe, by the way, in case you haven't yet—with a captured Russian. He was captured by foreigners. How do Russians in general react to the fact that such things are happening? And in principle, Russians know that it stands against them. Slava

Speaker 2

God, thank God, they rarely understand who specifically and in which areas is acting against them. These are the results of serious cybersecurity measures and not only. I'll say regarding that video you're talking about, to this Russian it was absolutely…

Speaker 1

I don't care,

Speaker 2

Whoever met him, whoever took him prisoner, he is a phenomenal person, incapable of any manifestations of reflection, of the awareness of what he is doing, where he is. You know, him even like… Maskarta deep-state, and this is a deep-person, an absolutely caricatured character, absolutely incapable of any reflection. He was absolutely not concerned that he was taken from the panamovna. For him, it was not something strange. In principle, given the level of propaganda they are fed, he shouldn't even be surprised by this, because

Speaker 1

protocol

Speaker 2

They just don't fight. This didn't bother him. At first, he thought they were some Americans, meaning the USA, but I'll say it again, this didn't bother him. He was worried about the possibility that his funds had been stolen, because he had relocation allowances, salary, and this was the main common thread throughout all his thoughts during the interrogations. As it went along, he mentioned whether his card had been swiped, what the commanders were doing with his card. Despite the fact that he was sitting there wounded, having miraculously managed to survive, he thought about this money. This was a bit shocking for us, not for him. But as for combat qualities, despite all this skepticism toward this person's worldview, their character, and their life experience, despite all this, this Nikitka spent two months, if not more, sitting in the bushes, informing his leadership about every passing drone, discreetly receiving supplies, recording all groups that passed by him, being as close as 10 meters from some groups, even ours, which failed to detect him more than once during reconnaissance searches. As a soldier, he proved himself to be very, very high. Why is this the case? I think it's due to this certain Russian fatalism, the awareness of doom among these people, who know that they are safer there in the bushes than returning or trying to clash with their leadership, because that would have meant guaranteed death for them. This is what ensures the high effectiveness of the deployment of this Russian infantry, including in our sector.

Speaker 1

So he was this infiltrated fighter who went through what the Russians are doing now?

Speaker 2

They are constantly reporting to their leadership that they have already taken much, much more. And so that this, maybe this, you know, little flags

Speaker 1

and therefore

Speaker 2

Something like that, they need to pull in a group somewhere that would be located, say, in our rear, in order to prove some successes on the front to their leadership. But this group suffered losses during its infiltration and got lost. He had one other colleague, and the two of them were left. By the way, the colleague served for several years in the Russian airborne troops and also had considerable military experience, but he died during mopping-up operations on our part. And then he continued to operate and act there on his own. That is, it was a group that was broken during the process and shifted format to just such a, well, sort of, group.

Speaker 1

observation

Speaker 2

such a maneuverable observation post.

Speaker 1

You have been in this sector, in the Stapna-Hirska sector since January, right?

Speaker 2

We are in Zaporizhzhia periodically

Speaker 1

We fight

Speaker 2

since 2022, every year. We absolutely do not miss a season, so to speak, in the southern direction. We fight every year; most of our operations have been carried out specifically in this direction. Therefore, we have been monitoring the entire situation, the changing situation in this area, since the very beginning of the full-scale war, resting from the situation in Enerhodar, then Vasylivka, then there was a long period of stabilization on this front, then there were battles at Kam'yanske, and now, accordingly, there is this Stapna-Hirskyi direction. We operated in the Huliaipole direction at one time, in the area of Zelene Pole. We are constantly, constantly moving around here, but most of all,

Speaker 1

indeed,

Speaker 2

Our efforts were concentrated in this direction.

Speaker 1

The Russians were pushed back a bit, around May, it was an operation like that. Tell us about their actions now in Stepna-Hirska, what is their goal, what are they doing?

Speaker 2

Their tactics are absolutely, globally unchanged. They constantly supply new waves of soldiers into their spiders. They already have a developed system for this pushing of individual fighters, small groups, along the same routes. And just as water wears away a stone, they, by continuing to constantly, constantly infiltrate these groups, suffering losses, achieve a certain level of success. Because, you say they were pushed back, but if you look at it in retrospect, it is the dynamics of such a wave, which nevertheless constantly, constantly crawls and advances upon us. And we need serious measures related to troop management, specifically the concentration of our forces and means. Because, you know, in the tactics of war, whether for the Russians or the Ukrainians, at the very core, mental characteristics lie at the foundation. Russians have always been such a large, clumsy system, but if it took on something, it gradually scales it, builds it up, builds it up, and it will be difficult to compete with the massiveness of this phenomenon. They won with the fiber-optic revolution of their time and are constantly, constantly increasing these capabilities. They came up with this poncho tactic – penetrating at night with these thermal insulation suits. They continue to scale it, scale it, and apply it. As I say, it's like with such a large, clumsy enemy, but if he already hits you, it will be very painful and things can escalate. And Ukrainians – it is still the mindset of people where everyone lives a bit on their own small farmstead, and everyone organizes their own nice household. But to unite all these households into one industrial machine, we encounter the problem of mental Tamanshchyna, the particularity of Ukrainians. And we have had this problem since the very beginning of the war. In Bakhmut, when you jump into some basement, it's being stormed by 5 Wagnerites, while there are 70 people in the building. But some are watching, "dear", we are killing children on the tablet, while others in the next entrance are fighting, and these people do not communicate with each other because they don't even know who is from which unit. And these 60 people could be from 50 different units, which do not have a common command and cannot concentrate their forces and means and distribute them correctly. Whereas the enemy consistently acted centrally, struck the seams between our units, understood this problem—the enemy always understands this problem very well and does not actively use it. Therefore, the forces of the stormtroopers were often significantly smaller, they were not forces that suffered losses, but we, having a sufficient level of infantry, could not provide defense because there was no coordination. Now, if the Russians can maintain an intensive infantry offensive—of course, not on the scale as before, because the situation does not require such masses of infantry, it is more rational to insert small groups, and a smaller amount can constantly maintain this flow. We are moving toward technologization. But when it comes to technologization, resources must be correctly distributed among all available forces in one sector. Because we might have five FPV crews and in a separate organization one FPV crew. And in this one, there will be drone means, so to speak, more than in all those five combined. If they were coordinated correctly, they could be used effectively. Regarding the infantry, I see an extraordinarily great problem in the level of training at the BZVP stage and in the level of supply. We constantly practice having adjacent brigades or other units—we ask them and propose to train

Speaker 1

their

Speaker 2

people with us. I will not say which units, which brigades, which battalions. This is often not the fault of their commanders. They work with the resources they have. Their staffing principle is through mobilization. Our staffing principle is through volunteers. That is to say, no one gives us people; we look for them ourselves. Nonetheless, despite this, we try to share everything we have, our surpluses, to train these people. Because they are often used irrationally. And I believe that it is criminal to some extent, having such limited human resources as Ukraine has today, not to use them as rationally as possible. Preparing these people as much as possible, maximally. Well, this starts from simply treating people, so that their health level is suitable for performing these tasks. Next, supplies and the understanding of how to act with the supplies, equipment, and gear they are given, and so on. Well, unfortunately, as I say, this all stems from certain mental problems. For Ukrainians, it's as if we prepare for some short distance; all together we can have serious motivation, but for the long distance, we begin to close ourselves off in our little hamlets, and the enemy takes advantage of this. He knows this, and has always known this, and will always hit our very weak side.

Speaker 1

Well, when we talk about the use of new technologies, we say that the innovation cycle is about half a year, 3-6 months on average. Do the Russians have such an innovation cycle? It's just that now we've even added strikes on the General Staff and the destruction of Russian robotic complexes. Do you see an increase? I

Speaker 2

I see that the Russians are scaling up what gives a real result on the battlefield, regardless of how many resources need to be spent on it. That is, we often try to find some solutions that make the process cheaper, and it may not be super effective, but it fulfills some need. The Russians are placing an emphasis on powerful optics. I see that the level, for example, in our indilyanka, at least we have been fighting mainly with Russian paratroopers for more than a year now, so the level of training, the shooting experience of these people, the equipment—it is improving.

Speaker 1

Does not degrade.

Speaker 2

It's definitely not degrading. When we spoke with those same prisoners, we see that in some places these people sometimes exceed the average training of even our elite sub… not elite, top elite, but conditionally speaking, the shooting level of a Russian paratrooper may outweigh ours—no offense to our paratroopers—simply because they expend serious resources. So, Nikitka spoke about more than 20 thousand, it seems, rounds spent over 20 days of training. That is, they fired a thousand cartridges per day. This is a very expensive story. And that's why, I say, the Russians try to concentrate and scale everything still effectively. Like, we say, well, the artillery is outdated, the artillery is obsolete. Yes, but when you have the ability to concentrate 10 barrels on one section and constantly replenish them if there are losses, then it produces a result. And the Russians take advantage of this. Howitzers, regardless of how long ago they were created, they constantly and stably try to replenish supplies, restore positions, restore guns, in order to maintain high concentrated artillery fire. Regarding the city of Zaporizhzhia, you see, it is the city suffering most from KABs. They scale this process, you understand, its effectiveness. They attack the city with FPVs, like Nemy, also their effective development. As for UGVs, yes, in logistics they sort of try to apply them, well, I don't see strong scaling, because it's easier for them to put a person on a motorcycle who will perform a similar function, because they have enough people and enough motorcycles. We don't have enough people, not enough those who can ride a motorcycle, so we need UGVs. For us, this fills our need in the shortage of personnel, and for them it's better—this rarely worries them. But

Speaker 1

Anyway, the count of those destroyed has already reached thousands, meaning they are being used. Take care.

Speaker 2

easy to destroy. It's clear that they are building up, but it's not as important for them as, for example, it is important for us, that's what I'm trying

Speaker 1

to say. You said a lot about training and said that you have your own training and you invite other units to join. Tell us, actually, how it is structured, whether, for example, the experience of foreigners who come is applied, because they are often experienced military personnel, as I understand it, how it all comes together.

Speaker 2

The best candidate is a person without military experience, a person in absolutely good health, but without military experience, because then there is no need to break stereotypical notions about many, many things, since the task is precisely unification—to unify all fighters of absolutely different origins. Nevertheless, we use certain psychological characteristics of people. We understand that people from southern countries, with a more hot temperament, find it psychologically harder to stay in one place for a long time under psychological pressure such as artillery shelling, FPV attacks, without the ability to respond; they are more easily demoralized, but for active operations, assault operations, fire raids on the enemy, where a short aggressive impulse and the ability to retreat are needed, we can start tailoring these people for such work. People with a more, so to speak, phlegmatic temperament perform better in the roles of those securing positions, those who can perform fortification work, settle into defense, track changes in the situation in the area for a long time, and so on. The basis of our training is a complex of our classical tactics of "Small Groups, fire control of intelligence," specifically the seventh department of active actions, which has always specialized in this: long marches, maximum physical endurance, autonomy of "Small Groups," working in elements such as a pair, independently, in a group of three people, four people; that is, these are always "Small Groups" with wide functionality, with engineering training, a high level of navigation, a high level of communication, who understand how to use four types of communication simultaneously, who have experience working with different types of weaponry, who have experience working with different equipment, who can have several specializations—meaning a person can perform functions both in fire support groups and in reconnaissance, assault, and drone groups, and so on, and so on. Of course, within the internal structure of the unit, there are people who specialize in each direction, but fundamentally, every fighter at any level must still be a reconnaissance infantryman. We have separate training for Ukrainians and separate training for foreigners, where we fight against various stereotypes and their various whimsical ideas about our realities. Then, at a certain moment, mutual integration takes place, because, you know, Ukrainians are also not a colonial empire that has hundreds of years of experience working with other ethnicities, and Ukrainians, for example, are absolutely non-chauvinistic people; they don't know how to manage foreigners or how to, you know, deal with them. For them, these are absolutely the same people as themselves, so they perceive them as absolutely the same, which is why some different behavior begins to shock them and, on the contrary, leads to full-blown conflicts. And it is necessary to explain and spell out for a long, long time, first and foremost, to the Ukrainians that, guys, in this case, you are the masters of the situation here, and your task is to teach these people, explain, achieve justice if something there doesn't suit them. This, by the way, is a universal value that governs everything; everyone understands the language of justice—what is right, what is wrong—if this is proven in detail, spelled out, and so on. You know, you could write a master's thesis on this.

Speaker 1

write on psychology

Speaker 2

different ethnicities, different social groups from these ethnicities—this also makes a serious difference. Because certain societies are quite monotonous, identical, quite uniform. Some societies in some countries are so stratified, so classed, that people from one country can appear more different than people from different countries. Therefore, this is a wide spectrum of work. We understand that for us, post-Soviet people, everything is in one way or another more or less the same. Everyone grew up similarly in relatively poor conditions; everyone has a similar understanding of the world. In some countries, people live in one country, but in absolutely different worlds; they have different ethnic origins, different religious beliefs, different financial statuses, and so on. In other words, this whole mishmash of absolutely diverse, multicolored, multilingual people and so on must be integrated into our conditions. This is a very difficult task.

Speaker 1

And is this training taking place at your unit or is it at an international one? No, there is

Speaker 2

training is mandatory BZVP, which the International Legion provides, because every military unit has it, there are training centers for units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that carry out basic training,

Speaker 2

then they staff various units with them. The International Legion conducts its own special training for foreigners, for Ukrainians, basic military training is conducted in the same way, from a legislative point of view, as for all military personnel, but there is our

Speaker 1

constant

Speaker 2

Permanent training at the stage of recruitment, before people officially become military personnel, already after they have arrived without basic military training, meaning this is a constant, constant, constant process. A person cannot simply finish basic training and then just carry out their tasks; they must constantly maintain a sufficiently high level of professional competence and constantly adapt to dynamic conditions that tend to change very quickly. Because, if you compare the war in '22, '23, '24, '25, '26, these are often completely different wars that require very, very different approaches. It happens that someone from the command staff goes for a couple of months to some training courses, or after an injury, and returns after six months, and they can no longer understand what they need to do. Because in five or six months, the situation has shifted so drastically. Those who were inside the process do not notice this. But a person from the outside no longer knows, no longer remembers how to act here.

Speaker 1

What vacancies do foreigners most often apply for? And in general, what is the current trend regarding the involvement of foreigners? It's clear that at the beginning of the invasion, well, there was probably some kind of fairly large influx.

Speaker 2

Most people still come to us, first and foremost, for positions as scouts or infantrymen. They need to gain this experience. And after that, when we realize that a person is competent enough to move into some technical field, adaptive enough to communicate with Ukrainians or their colleagues, then we can integrate them into any type of work. From medicine to drones, to whatever. But I will go further and say that the majority of applicants, 90% of applicants, still come for the infantry anyway.

Speaker 1

That is, this is

Speaker 2

it's not that we artificially imposed this method. In principle, a person comes and writes, I want to be an infantryman, an infantryman. Well,

Speaker 1

assault soldier, you have a vacancy on the site.

Speaker 2

Assaulter, yes. This word, perhaps, is a bit… it narrows, it will need to be rewritten, but it narrows the scope of these people's work a bit, because, as for such assault actions, well, that's already, you know, the tip of the iceberg, and of all the functionality that people are prepared for, that's already just mastery. When everything has been passed, you have to go, carry out these assault actions, and then you still have to execute a million different options in order to stay alive. Because now the problem is not in the battle itself. If previously our main principles were movement, reconnaissance, delivering fire damage—meaning we didn't go [to] the enemy, destroyed the enemy—then today reconnaissance is carried out 24/7. Fire damage along planned routes or along routes that someone happens to think of, that is also carried out 24/7. And as for movement—that is the main task, which

Speaker 1

Needs to be done.

Speaker 2

The hardest part. Not even the combat itself. In combat, responsibility already rests directly with the fighters. Therefore, you know, for a long time after the Cold War period and later, this entire Western doctrine was built on delegating authority to platoons, companies, or squads. The more responsibility there is at the lower level,

Speaker 1

the better.

Speaker 2

Now we realize that the situation has completely flipped. This stage, when we let go of the control of the process, is super small. It is half a percent of the entire mission. Without route reconnaissance, without mine clearance, without constant coordination, without support, the group cannot reach their destination. Even during combat, the group often guides FPV assets, drops, maintains support, and we orient them on how to withdraw, where to enter, and so on. Therefore, the current workload on the headquarters, which was previously thought to be that they should plan the task, provide support, and that's it. "Further, boys, you fight there on your own." No, now the headquarters are those who work 24/7. And the main principle of management is the continuity of the execution of this management.

Speaker 1

And are there many Mediterraneans, operators of AA and GRC, that is, using such technical means, which have basically become the means of our war on a mass scale?

Speaker 2

There are many in the drone sector. In our case, it's dozens of people; there are different technical levels there. For example, our pilots, mostly our aces, are Ukrainians, because they have simply gained enough practical experience that it is now hard for anyone to catch up with them.

Speaker 1

Goodbye.

Speaker 2

We constantly integrate foreigners; this process is to increase our capabilities, because it is clear to everyone that strike drones are the main means of fire damage today. And this is what is used most for the destruction of the enemy, both by the enemy against us and by us. A lot. Regarding URCS, we mostly have Ukrainians, but gradually there are… Because our URCS operators are former wagon support group members. This field is simply dying out; it is outdated, so we transferred these people mostly to the robotic systems section, the unmanned robotic systems section. Mostly Ukrainians are there; they are also being supplemented by foreigners, gradually increasing, increasing. And they have a constant request. As a commander, I receive requests from them stating that we need and are considering foreign candidates. Therefore, they are integrated easily. They are integrated in the artillery. At all levels. The headquarters also cannot function without foreigners. We have plenty of foreigners at the headquarters who translate, communicate, and explain. Because even if I had learned any language, still, from that language, he will be able to correctly convey both the emotional nuance and the importance, and place all the necessary accents. Therefore, without them, managing the foreign element within our units is impossible.

Speaker 1

And how many languages do you know?

Speaker 2

I personally only know English at a decent level. I am learning Spanish with mixed success. I have many Portuguese-speaking people in my unit. It is a very difficult language because there are so many of those…

Speaker 1

Specific pronunciation, articulation. Specific pronunciation,

Speaker 2

articulation, as you said. Therefore, at my age, it is no longer easy for me to master everything so quickly. But this doesn't stop me from finding people who can fill these intermediate gaps, so the controllability is quite high. I won't say that it's everywhere. I don't want to brag that only we managed it, or anything. But it really is a difficult task. And I see that many wanted to integrate foreigners but failed in this task. Because it requires serious nerves, flexibility, and an understanding of human psychology. In order to resolve conflicts, stabilize the situation, teach, explain, spell it out. Often, people who are straightforward, with military experience, find it hard to cope with this. That's why there aren't that many units. For example, a few months ago, during Fedorov's tenure, there were many conversations about increasing recruiting

Speaker 1

foreigners.

Speaker 2

And there, in my opinion, slightly overstated expectations are being voiced about filling up to 50% of the entire infantry element with foreigners. Theoretically, this is possible. Purely theoretically. With the level of funding that was declared, it was possible. With the scheme that was proposed—not to a military company, but specifically to a private recruiting company—it was also possible. But the question is how to distribute this resource. If you want to distribute this resource simply across linear brigades, then it will turn into an international scandal for you tomorrow. Therefore, it is necessary to scale those units that have successful experience. There aren't that many of them. I know there is a movement emerging in Khartiya, and a few more units in other brigades. Something else is coming along for us there. I wouldn't set figures of 50% for this component, but the units that are currently showing good results can easily be increased 3-4-5 times.

Speaker 1

And how many people came this year? I

Speaker 2

I just can't

Speaker 1

say numbers. Well, hypothetical. Look, I'll tell you

Speaker 2

so that I have many times more candidates than the ability to place them in positions. Not all people can simply be brought in, even if you have the financial resources. But again, I say that the resources far exceed our capabilities according to our staffing structure.

Speaker 1

And how much time passes from the moment a person stated that they want to, got in touch, applied to the unit, and can arrive? How long does it take?

Speaker 2

time? First, there is a person, she interested us, we checked her, she is there on security issues, everything is fine with her. Her physical level is normal, everything is fine with her medically, okay, this takes some time, a week, two.

Speaker 1

Does she close all of this here? No,

Speaker 2

partially we begin

Speaker 1

work

Speaker 2

purely online, so it is quite specific and complex because all security aspects need to be taken into account. Next, the most important thing is that we must have a place for this person. That is, we cannot—we don't just take everyone indiscriminately, we are simply fully staffed.

Speaker 1

Well, many people could envy you for that.

Speaker 2

Well, I don't envy myself because our workload is quite high, and accordingly—thank God, not due to losses—but still, people get exhausted; they need time for recovery, rest, and so on. The load on us is quite high, so I would like to have more of this human resource, which could rotate internally and show better results. Indeed, we have never faced the problem that other units have, where there is a shortage of personnel. Well, this is because from the very beginning of the war, from the very beginning of the war, we placed a huge emphasis on recruiting, because we understood that even when there are waves of volunteers, queues of people wanting to join, they won't be there tomorrow. Therefore, all these possible channels—all possible channels—somewhere there, meaning, they defined the mobilization age, there should already be enough communication so that if it were lowered, people there would already know where to go. I will even say that we, together with the OZDG, are preparing people; we have many 17-year-olds who want to join the army after they turn 18. They participate on a voluntary basis—meaning it is not related to military service—they undergo some kind of preparation, regulations and all aspects of military service are explained to them, and after turning 18, they come to us as candidates. Of course, we value these people, trying to view them from a long-term perspective as those who can build a military career, then train as officers and so on, because, as they say, this is our future, the main resource. This

Speaker 1

Do you work with youth as part of some community work? Well,

Speaker 2

Something like that, yes, there are a number of public organizations that interact with us of their own free will, and from among them, we are preparing candidates for the future. Because, regardless of what the staffing level is today, there will always be a need tomorrow. Therefore, we try to exceed this level so as not to encounter a deficit. Because it is impossible to perform tasks if you have a staffing shortage. I don't even know how to fight in the conditions in which many units fight that have a personnel staffing deficit. I simply won't be able to explain to my people why they have to sit in a position for six or seven months. And this is not about foreigners; it is even about our own. We try to prevent this. But the realities on the ground are such that, unfortunately, despite… I believe that society does not fully realize everything that is happening. And these things about rotation every two months, and the military command even makes concessions. It says, let's do everything. One must understand that it is not a habitual desire to keep people in positions for a long time. Often it is simply impossible to carry out a rotation. All these kill zones, despite the grey line drawn here on the map, we understand that conditionally, the strikes—both from our side going to a colossal depth of the enemy, and from the enemy's side—cover a much, much greater depth. And carrying out a full rotation on the forward positions is very, very difficult and is associated with an increased risk for these people. And you distract from the main

Speaker 1

topics. It's okay, we haven't gotten sidetracked, we are moving along gradually. And that's very good, I just wanted to ask, you have a vacancy for a mortarman on the website, and now we are talking about how the mortar is becoming obsolete as a weapon in this war. I'm about

Speaker 2

I have been hearing since the first year of this war that the mortar is becoming obsolete as a weapon. The thing is, the mortar is 100 years old or even more, and the idea that it is constantly becoming obsolete—it will never truly go away. In this case, with the increase in the kill zone, as they say, the impact zone, naturally, a means that hits at a short distance is not relevant.

Speaker 1

But under conditions of active hostilities?

Speaker 2

If there is a return to maneuvering on the battlefield without mortars, you will not be able to intensively inflict damage on the enemy. If you have some special geography in the area, for example, very forested terrain, or there are some rivers, or some other way to get close to the enemy, then what is a mortar? These are the capabilities to intensively inflict fire damage, with 120mm caliber, for example, or 80mm, or 60mm, and so on. Our artillerymen are people who know how to work with all types of mortars, with all types of MLRS available and accessible to us, with all types of artillery available to us – 152-caliber howitzers, 155-caliber. And these are people who work on heavy bombers. Because I sat, looked at these guns, and at one moment realized that the ideological successor of artillery is the heavy bomber, which similarly carries a heavy shell, weighing many kilograms or a large explosive one. And so that people do not feel like retrogrades due to certain conditions and their lack of involvement. In

Speaker 1

certain periods of non-involvement. We

Speaker 2

they retrained them all—or rather, didn't retrain them, but gave them an additional specialization as operators

Speaker 1

heavy

Speaker 2

bombers. This ideologically continues the philosophy of that same artillery. Because when there is a paired TM, where two TMs fall into the enemy's hole, the result is even more "cheerful" than as a result of artillery work. But then again, we are talking about the conditions of an operational stalemate. The enemy infiltrates, seeps through, we do something there, we counterattack. Everyone understands that drones, just like machine guns in the First World War, led to an operational stalemate. The dynamics of combat operations are extremely low, wildly low compared to other combat operations. But it has never been the case that, conventionally, some "crowbar" didn't have a counter-move devised for it. I am sure that either a means of counteraction or more effective means of destruction will be invented, which sooner or later will bring maneuver back to the battlefield, and the drone will become an important option, but not a decisive one. Therefore, it is a matter of time. It is simply a matter of time. This happened in many wars. War always moved from stalemate to breakthrough. Again stalemate, breakthrough, stalemate, breakthrough. That is how it always was.

Speaker 1

I just wanted to ask, under what conditions is the return maneuver possible? In other words, is it some kind of means that can stop drones?

Speaker 2

You know, that's not quite it. We are proceeding from the point of view, as you know, of neutralizing this problem. For example, there was the machine gun, which locked down the battlefield in the First World War, but then the tank appeared. The tank no longer operated in this targeted manner against the machine gun.

Speaker 1

He didn't prove himself at all in the First World War; they didn't understand how to use him correctly.

Speaker 2

But then certain people

Speaker 1

realized that this

Speaker 2

revolution, mechanization arrived. Everyone understood that this was the future. And it wasn't a means against a machine gun. It was a means of breaking through the front. Because it could carry firepower and was protected from those means that did not work against it. I think that this means, which will revolutionarily return maneuver to the battlefield, will not be a means of countering drones. Because perhaps a countermeasure will appear, but it will be until the stage where the drone adapts. It is always countermeasures and adaptation. There was a lot, they almost jammed the radio, then optics appeared. Now they are thinking about some myth-catchers that the mysterious Anglo-Saxons are developing. Or whether the Americans already have something, or the Chinese have something. All these tales are circulating, while we have seen nothing on the battlefield. And I think that this means should be a means that can quickly transport infantry from one place to another. No matter how fantastical it may sound. If we analyze the sci-fi of the past, then one way or another, everything moved roughly in this direction. Something will appear, a means by which we can quickly move infantry units, or armor somehow, whatever it may be. Through these grey zones, so to speak, there could be a serious maneuver revolution, so to speak. What could it be? In reality, there are already certain developments. They have penetrated here to us very weakly so far, but in the West, almost everyone understands that these are mobile flying means, not on the level of a helicopter, much cheaper, much more maneuverable, more stable, which can transport infantry and firepower to a sector, and they will be safe from mine strikes, from artillery strikes. They can be, they can be destroyed by those same drones, or those same any

Speaker 1

-which. Any weapon can be destroyed. Weapons can be destroyed, but

Speaker 2

if this ensures mass, then imagine if, hypothetically, the artillery and drone sections are breached and, so to speak, some forces numbering several hundred end up in your TU. That's it.

Speaker 1

Torychi, at Bravani they just announced a competition for such means, airbags there, or something similar. This was a recent event and, as it were, for development prospects. On

Speaker 2

Unfortunately, while we are announcing this, I am very afraid that the opponent will think of it first.

Speaker 1

Well, this is a signal to everyone to speed up. Need to

Speaker 2

to speed up, yes. I hope that the opponent will not watch our interview carefully enough.

Speaker 1

You know, it will. The thing is, it will, and it will even be translated into Russian by artificial intelligence and posted somewhere on their resources, unfortunately.

Speaker 2

I hope that the people who will be analyzing will be insufficiently influential to convey the importance of this element that you just mentioned. But as one of the options, I consider it very promising.

Speaker 1

By the way, I read the book "Isersi on the Evolution of Operational Art," and there he reflects specifically on the First World War. What he developed in his theory was what was applied in the Second World War. But it mentioned that the task of the machine gun, which had a great influence on the course of combat operations, was to pin the enemy infantry to the ground, to stop them and lay them low. And then the artillery destroyed them. I visited a manufacturer of unmanned robotic complexes who specifically works with strike assets. And he says there is some application scenario: pin down enemy infantry using an armed strike drone and then finish them off with FPV drones. Is this the application? I think,

Speaker 2

With all due respect to this person and his vision, perhaps I am not competent enough to criticize him in any way. In our realities, the prospect for UGVs is primarily logistics and, first and foremost, the evacuation of personnel. We have significant results regarding the evacuation of the wounded; the improvement in indicators is largely due to UGVs. It is an inconspicuous tool that operates dispassionately, no different from evacuation groups; logistics is the same. We have these conditions and we have problems. Evacuation and supply. This was supposed to be performed by CASEVAC, the delivery of supplies, or a foot group doing this. We simply take this and replace it with a robot. Therefore, it is effective and it will gain traction. Regarding the enemy. The enemy sits in holes. The enemy digs in. The enemy is in bunkers, in ruins. And therefore, a strike tool. It is difficult for kamikazes to drive over ruined terrain. They get tangled in the wire,

Speaker 1

to snag, to flow. In a fiber optic tangle.

Speaker 2

In a fiber-optic tangle, generally, yes. They simply spotted it in broad daylight and destroyed it with a drone. We don't see an effective application, well, for us, for example, in our conditions. As far as I know, in urban areas, it sometimes works better. Regarding strike UGVs, those that should be valued with machine guns, various types of cannons, and so on, we can't do anything with this tool against an enemy who is in some kind of fortification. But we can't ignore this thing, because, again, in dynamic conditions. Let's imagine the Kursk operation. And let's imagine that during the Kursk operation there were many strike UGVs. The enemy's communication collapsed, so to speak. And quite a few of our infantry groups were conducting ambushes. Well, I see paratroopers there, the 72nd Brigade, if I'm not mistaken, there were many clips where they ambush enemy logistics in the rear with infantry groups. Let's imagine that we somehow delivered a UGV in such conditions, of a breakthrough, of dynamics, which simply took a static position under some bush by the road. And we don't have the opportunity to quickly fly drones or FPVs there to hit that equipment. So such a UGV with a machine gun stands there, and it simply shoots everything that drives by. Well, it makes sense, it might yield a result. It could be used against enemy groups that broke through somewhere in the rear and holed up in a house in a conditionally controlled zone. I saw in our sector, if I'm not mistaken, the 131st reconnaissance battalion, a year or a year and a half ago, such a house, and a UGV with a speaker and a machine gun operated against this house. Through the speaker, it seems, they gave a voice signal to the enemy. After the enemy came out, the infantry captured them. But where the infantry could have encountered contact and suffered losses, they didn't. Therefore, I don't think it's a revolution. It can simply replace the infantry in some aspects. A drone is something new, you understand, all the evolutionary branches. A drone does not have the characteristics of full-fledged aviation or full-fledged artillery, or a fleet, or infantry. It has many other characteristics. Therefore, it is developing as air defense, as a strike tool, and as logistics. Anything at all. And a UGV for now is something that duplicates the functions of a bit of equipment, a bit of human functions. It's just that it isn't afraid, as it independently performs its job.

Speaker 1

You just said that fire support units should be transferred to NRK. I

Speaker 2

I just wanted to

Speaker 1

to see

Speaker 2

NRKs that move and shoot from

Speaker 1

machine guns, from Brownings.

Speaker 2

They're destroying everything. First of all, you try to find that opponent who is there three times

Speaker 1

day

Speaker 2

runs from one bush to another. And there, you have to sit all day with a Mavic, looking every two meters. And secondly, I simply saw their effectiveness as logistical tools, as evacuation tools. And when I read the figures and realized that our guys saved 10-12 lives in two weeks, not only fighters from our unit, but from another. Or when I found out how some of our colleagues evacuated four wounded at once on one UGV, I realized that this is the real result. While machine guns are what we would want, because it's cool, the shooting is flashy, but there are realities. The fact is that it proves itself well specifically in these aspects.

Speaker 1

So, I want to return to artillery. You mentioned MLRS. From what I saw in the video, there is an MLRS launcher on a pickup truck, and it is said that it was created by the unit.

Speaker 2

This isn't some unique thing; we have more than one of these pickups. MLRS is a tool that was invented to stop a large wave of enemy infantry advances. For example, when the Koreans, according to the war canons of the 50s, advanced with large-scale mass infantry in the Kursk region, cluster munitions and MLRS were immediately appropriate there to wipe them all out at once. The Russians, so to speak, snapped back very strongly at the beginning of the war when we were advancing on them. MLRS simply fired across areas, working all day, covering their retreat. Or conversely, it struck populated areas to cause fires and the like. In other words, it is the destruction of large areas and the stopping of infantry.

Mobile MLRS now, when operations are more precise, is used, for example, for thinning out forest thickets. We understand that there are enemy drone launch sites somewhere in the area, but we cannot get our drone in there. If we work the area with MLRS, we can thin out the thickets, and this will create conditions for FPV operation. If it is a populated area where there is a concentration of enemy logistics, transport concentration, operation of their infantry accumulation points, drone groups, repeaters, and so on, by using MLRS, one can cause destruction and fires, especially in weather conditions like those we have now. And this will have a serious effect—not necessarily in terms of destroying manpower, but in terms of destroying the enemy's material assets. Therefore, in some places, as an element of a combined attack, such MLRS are a very necessary tool. The only thing is that this is a fairly fragile system, and establishing normal aiming means, designing them for these homemade MLRS, is a separate technical task that we sometimes manage and sometimes do not. Nevertheless.

Speaker 1

Do you have rendi, actually, based on the unit?

Speaker 2

Yes, of course.

Speaker 1

Like everyone else. Everything.

Speaker 2

It concerns, first and foremost, drones, drone integration, drone air defense; we have serious results regarding air defense, as well as the integration of rocket complexes. And certain secret developments that we will not spoil, but, I hope, we will remember this moment now. If we succeed in doing this and you interview us again, I don't know in how much time, we will definitely do…

Speaker 1

Retrospective.

Speaker 2

Returning to this episode now, and as I told you, this is precisely regarding the capabilities to combat certain means that create this operational deadlock for us and hinder movement. Let's see, I won't

Speaker 1

to talk a lot,

Speaker 2

to take too much upon oneself, but certain ideas exist, they are very resource-intensive. They are also related to the fact that even our friendly countries are not in a great hurry to share their advanced developments. But if we do not receive this voluntarily, then we will somehow push the idea aside, or somehow be able to implement it independently. And so, of course, we are adapting all our means; for us, this is not even some single center. Each, in their own area, has their own special technical bases, laboratories, which are engaged in improving the adaptation of their means.

Speaker 1

PRSZO, that is, it is permanently operational

Speaker 2

a means? No, well, it's definitely,

Speaker 1

this is constant. It's just that you have a video there for VDV Day, you're paratroopers there, with that, there, 247

Speaker 2

-y. These are ours, if…

Speaker 1

Yes, opponents.

Speaker 2

Perennial, so to speak.

Speaker 1

They sent them greetings there. We already

Speaker 2

grew attached to them to a certain extent. Well, I mean, here now, the struggle we have is not just, you know, like, a cold-blooded military one, but it is already

Speaker 1

certain has… Fundamental.

Speaker 2

Huh?

Speaker 1

Fundamental. Yes,

Speaker 2

It already has a certain emotional component. As if nothing brings us more pleasure than the opportunity to mock the 247s.

Speaker 1

Greetings reached there.

Speaker 2

The greetings arrived.

Speaker 1

High quality.

Speaker 2

And I tell you that in recent days, the infantry groups along the 247th have been working well. I think there will be new videos. And, well, we are managing to give them a beating. Although I will say that I do not want to disparage the enemy, because the enemy is worthy. The enemy is stern, tough, audacious. And, well, despite our successes, there were numerous situations where they managed to overcome us. If we even remember the battles in the south, Stepna-Hirska, in this Rombe district, the legendary one.

Speaker 1

There

Speaker 2

Very fierce battles took place, specifically infantry ones, where the entire tactic consisted of who threw explosives into whose basement first. And at one point, the enemy began to suffer losses of about 9 out of 10. Meaning 10 people go, 9 die, 10 go. And despite this, despite the fact that we inflicted colossal losses, and that their infiltration route was simply strewn with corpses. They were able to create critical conditions for the forces we had in defense. Although we counterattacked them, and in this melee they temporarily—I believe temporarily—but they defeated us thanks to huge losses and human resources. But if you take the personal qualities of these fighters of theirs, they act very fatalistically and almost on a suicidal level, and quite disciplined. Therefore, they are a difficult enemy. And we even take pride in the fact that we aren't fighting just some weakling, we are fighting a fierce enemy, very strong-willed. The clash of such wills is happening, therefore this also keeps us sharp.

Speaker 1

PPP LA as well. As I understand it, you have the full spectrum; you mentioned PPO, high results, meaning you have the entire arsenal.

Speaker 2

All possible arsenal, well except, of course, deep strikes, middle strikes.

Speaker 1

There are no middle-strikes and strikes.

Speaker 2

Although I believe that at the level of, for example, battalions, it should be gradual

Speaker 1

in

Speaker 2

integrate Middle-strikes. Because, quite simply, the destruction of enemy MLRS and artillery positions is an important task for us, which creates conditions for our work. This is the condition-forming destruction and suppression of these enemy strike assets. How many FPVs are needed to destroy an enemy MLRS or artillery position? Sometimes very, very many; sometimes we cannot even confirm the result after the strike. If a battalion commander had at their disposal, say, a limited number, a dozen or so Middle-strikes, and if they had the opportunity to use them, then I think it would seriously improve our results. Perhaps some are integrating them into their units, but I believe that this should be general practice. This is a tool that is currently necessary for a battalion commander.

Speaker 1

You know, it is often said that ground troops come to us to learn how to fight with drones. To what extent does the knowledge and understanding of the art of war of those who have combat experience integrate with the use of drones? Does this perhaps give us additional knowledge and opportunities? On

Speaker 2

Whether unfortunately or fortunately, it is a big myth that people come here for some special reason

Speaker 1

to receive

Speaker 2

some knowledge, and then go, I don't know, join a cartel, I'm constantly talking about this, join a cartel. Statistically speaking, people from, for example, Latin America know about cartels just as much as

Speaker 1

and

Speaker 2

we are with you. Therefore, if we are talking about some kind of domestic crime, then we too all in childhood, in youth, in our age

Speaker 1

encounter. I'm not talking about cartels, I'm more about awareness, application. I'm talking about

Speaker 2

this stereotype that there is some centrally planned task to learn and so on. No, people primarily come to meet their needs,

Speaker 1

you understand,

Speaker 2

psychological needs. That I went through such an adventure, that this happened to me in life. How he converts it further, that will actually be shown by circumstance. This person might convert it to write a book. Some person converts it into likes on Instagram. Someone will go on podcasts, someone will actually go into the police or the army and they will tell him, "well look, we know you have such experience, actually confirmed, you will be an instructor." Well okay, maybe he'll start earning more there. But as I say, mostly these are people with internal questions who wanted to fight. And as for how this thought entered his head, I can no longer say for sure for everyone.

Speaker 1

I'm just referring more to the fact that we often talk about how we are currently writing the doctrine of drone warfare in Ukraine. And on the other hand, there are people with experience, with some of their own doctrinal knowledge. And you are working exactly at the intersection of our experience and doctrinal experience.

Speaker 2

Certainly, on average, both the Russian army and the Ukrainian army are very highly experienced in practical terms. But the level of this technologization we are talking about is actually very low. Because we are fighting with cheap drones and cheap means made from Chinese components. You understand, both the Russians and we, predominantly. On one hand, a large-scale prolonged war is something that requires a large number of cheap means. There is a significant rational component to this. But I think that if, for example, we take the US army, it may be 95% inexperienced in this regard. But they have such technological centers and such economic capabilities that they will be able to integrate higher-quality means very quickly at all levels. I don't know about the European ones, I won't say. I have a separate understanding of the level of various European armies. It is clear that the Bundeswehr has set itself the ambitious task of reforming. But the Bundeswehr is, firstly, the third ethnicity in the composition of the army is Russians. Therefore, there is such a problem

Speaker 1

significant counter-intelligence.

Speaker 2

Plus, it is a country on the verge of a very serious political divide. Because despite the long-term, many-year dominance of liberal and democratic forces, a significant portion of the population there actually sympathizes with Alternative for Germany. They have their reasons, and they are not always irrational. And the problem is that the leadership of this party is under the serious influence of former functionaries connected to the so-called GDR, those intelligence services of East Germany and so on, who are in turn connected by economic ties to Russia. So, who will ultimately lead this reformed German army? This is still a major question, so Poles must not let their guard down.

Speaker 1

They are not relaxing.

Speaker 2

And the Poles, in their turn, I see that they, and plus, you know, they, there is also a certain struggle of industries within. Americans want to dictate their technological market to Europe. Germans want to restore theirs, because they can sell military technology and their equipment to someone. This opportunity to control and influence this partner. The Poles, with South Korea, are scaling up very strongly in order to have an absolutely alternative technical line. But if we talk about the Franco-Romance speaking countries, from which we actually have the most volunteers, because these people have such a rather fiery warrior spirit, but the level of army modernization wishes to remain better. The French, they have this constant, I don't know, nostalgia, probably, for their military power and greatness, but for a long time their entire military structure was linked to the control of colonies in Africa, in Indochina. And they somehow get very stuck at this technological level; remember those wheeled tanks the French gave us at the time, which, of course, would be effective in the conditions of some bed, conditional Mali, but which in our conditions would be too, you know, fragile of a unit. Well, again, these are all, you understand, very, very different facts. Because, if we do not doubt that the Germans will be able to increase the production of armored vehicles, it is absolutely not guaranteed that German society is ready to go into the army. And the French, perhaps their equipment was somewhat weak, still maintain the highest level of population motivation, regardless even of ethnic similarity—we understand that there is a huge number of migrants there—but the highest level in Europe of people who are ready to mobilize into the army. Therefore, which factor is decisive, so to speak, which gives a real advantage, these are tricky questions. Well, again, I believe that the Americans seriously dominate due to finances, due to their technological capabilities, scientific capabilities, and they definitely do not show those technological levels they have already acquired, leaving it all in

Speaker 1

trump, in

Speaker 2

sleeve, for myself, because, well, the operation in Venezuela, it's clear that it was a pitiful opponent there, but as a counterintelligence, agent-based, military complex, well, 46 seconds, less than a minute the operation took without a single loss; even just from a logistical point of view, if you hadn't thought everything through well there, someone would still have a flat tire, someone would hit a lamp post, and you would still have losses.

Speaker 1

Well, it didn't work out that way with Iran.

Speaker 2

It didn't work out that way with Iran, but here it is already a question of certain political influences. It is clear here that this entire Iranian story has a serious influence because of Israel, which has engaged in a very strong confrontation and could have found itself in a difficult position without US support. Iran is too warlike a state, too resourceful to be forced into defeat by a limited operation, say, an air or sea one, so to speak. Plus, the Americans' weak point has always been that they are slow to understand the mentality of the peoples they encounter. Because this happened in Afghanistan, when they told the local population about the importance of elections, and people looked at them with surprise and said, "Why choose a president? This one is still alive." Because to them, the president is the same thing as, conditionally speaking, some fiery leader; if he is still alive, then why choose a new one? Because these people have not gone through the stages that this society went through, yet a post-industrial product is already being integrated for them. Well, that is a serious topic in its own right. And I will add to this, I believe that the technological level of the US significantly outweighs that of China. Despite the fact that the Americans promote the idea of some, presumably, confrontation with China in order to create these two poles, so to speak, in a world of struggle, this is very important for keeping all their security agencies on their toes. Both intelligence and the army must have a strong opponent. The Soviet Union is gone; now they will focus on China. But China, despite all their capacity for social mobilization, still lags very, very, very far behind on a technical level. And China does not have the kind of military experience that America has, nor does it have a record of military successes. Because, to recall from the fringes, probably, the war with Vietnam, somewhere in the 80s, for about 9 years there with varying

Speaker 1

success

Speaker 2

went. And the results were so-so. That is, the Chinese were more famous for other things, rather than military achievements. So, that's that.

Speaker 1

Well, Russians aren't poor either, but still, they have the equipment, and everything, and the knowledge, and some kind of military tradition, and yet an operational stalemate?

Speaker 2

Well, yes.

Speaker 1

Last question. Russians are preparing the mobilization of 300 thousand. I

Speaker 2

I think more.

Speaker 1

Well, maybe even more. Those are some of the figures being mentioned there now. What will that change?

Speaker 2

Well, sort of. Well, it sort of stimulates activity on the battlefield, will increase losses among the Russians, will give them the possibility of some tactical advantage from time to time. I think that they will advance in many places, will be able to fill the space in many places where our defense forces are almost entirely absent due to the thinness of our lines. Because no full-fledged main line of defense has existed for a long time. There are defense hubs, there are separate places where defense can be formed due to geography, buildings, and so on. And so all the fighting takes place around these places, while many sections remain open, and all of this can be filled with a sufficient amount of infantry. Plus, this could open new fronts. Where and what will these fronts be? I won't venture to guess, I don't know.

Speaker 1

They can

Speaker 2

open new fronts, fully man many of their military units, stimulate activity on the battlefield. This will not provide such a breakthrough advantage, but it definitely stimulates activity on the battlefield, and we will be forced to lose uninhabited settlements, some territories, roll back, and so on. Unfortunately, that is the situation. The question here is who is more sensitive to this, who is more resilient, because on one hand, Russia completely turns a blind eye to the sadistic methods of war on its part, but it is hard to say what the society's reaction to mobilization will be. They are a more hysteroid people, some might snap, as was the case with the Wagnerites. I don't exactly believe in some of that. Simply, there could be some demoralization, the appearance of new leaders against the backdrop of social problems, some personalities may become popular, and so on. For us, unfortunately, everything revolves around politics, there are constant speculations, and no one can bring themselves to take any decisive actions in this regard. Because the whole TCC reform they talk about is something on the level of some magic spell. No one gives it any meaningful substance. Because in fact, the only method of improving mobilization is to increase the number of vans. Let's be frank, scale this process. Regarding some separate aspects of humanizing this process, I think that can be fixed to some extent. But if a person does not want to go serve, they are forced to do so. No matter how, I don't know, with candies, with sandwiches, with tea, I don't know, any way you want. That person will not be any happier because of it. But this doesn't change the situation at all, because there is a constitutional duty and it must be fulfilled. I can give a recommendation to all the avoiders—go to the army yourselves, go to the army yourselves, look for a position yourselves. It is 100% possible to do this, and you will be in much better psychological conditions than when the state, since you do not want to take advantage of such an opportunity, will decide for you.

Speaker 1

I think that this is a very good ending. Thank you for the conversation.

Speaker 2

Thank you.