15:10
There have been a couple of days now with reports from the Twitter gods about reinforcements to Luhansk.
The window for something nice there maybe never existed since they defended the terrain east of the Oskil river.
It also seems to have stopped at Lysychansk – Severodonetsk or maybe there is just very good opsec going on.
But, the units have to be taken from somewhere, either you weaken up by Belgorod (since absolutely no one threatens Russia and they know that…) because there are a few brigades up there, or you take them from the area east of the Oskil river. If you take them from east of the Oskil river, it will go faster there going forward.
I still think Ukraine should simulate a threat against Belgorod to tie down units there, exactly how is the tricky part.
Or they have managed to persuade some volunteer battalions to go to Ukraine or emptied their last military bases.
Do you think they can move units back southwards?
Right now every troop movement is highly interesting because it means they become weaker elsewhere.
This is the last NS supply route that Ukraine eventually wants to reach, the one that goes outside their land border, like Milerovo and the other hubs, then the spinning behind the front lines is over.
16:00
Also a bit curious about the Davyidiv Brid towards the Khakovka offensive. The last defense will be in Kozatske which is a natural defense and even without Putin’s order to fight to the last DPR soldier, it is likely that they will try to hold it as long as possible; running across the dam on foot in the middle of the night probably works too, even if it’s just a battalion or two. The problem is if 25,000 men try to cross the Dnipro in a panic, then it will all just be Russian.
However, they should have gotten closer to Kozatske by now and then the area westward towards Snigurivka, and Snigurivka but Gregg’s report of a failed attack sounded worrying. Theoretically, they can take quite a large area without being within artillery range from the left bank of the Dnipro.
It was about two weeks ago that they should have had fewer than 10 BTGs left between Khakovka and the front lines and then they brought up a couple more for counterattacks. Mathematically, the defense in that area should be quite soft by now. Any indications that they have received reinforcements over the Dnipro on a large scale or brought anything over from the city of Kherson?
The bridge over Inhulets is supposed to be cut?
16:10
Now that mobilization is a fact, you understand why Ukraine went on the offensive.
There should reasonably be another move here before the trenches are filled with maybe half a million more. They are on their way and it’s just a matter of time before they arrive at the front.
Of course, they do this 24/7 but they review their defense because a flank attack from the north should come with the numbers now mobilized.
Again, if Putin manages to prolong the war, the risk increases that others will side with Putin here, there are some countries sitting on the fence and hesitating.
Then you are still waiting for relief elsewhere, that something serious happens in Iran, everywhere -stan and something more so it becomes “domestic political” sweaty for the Russians. You should even be able to get something going inside the country, minority areas that have contributed proportionally too much to the war?
16:13
One can probably agree that if Ukraine had MBTs and IFVs from the top shelf, this counteroffensive would have gone even better.
So far it hasn’t been decisive and maybe one should ask in the EU if it would have been better for the war to be over today or to continue into 2023. If you feel it would have been better with an end to the war, then the decision not to send armor was wrong.
16:48
This map is pro-Russian but I think here that things that are bad for the Russians and posted by pro-Russian sources might have a grain of truth. This map fits well with Gregg who has maintained that Ukraine is sniffing at the Luhansk Oblast border (or a while ago they were not there but east of the river if you want to be picky). I still believe that some things have happened/are happening but opsec prevails. The map didn’t cover further north but there is probably movement there too. The bridgeheads were taken and they have expanded eastward.
The other thing I find very significant is that the Russians rushed 20 BTGs to the area east of the Oskil river.
If they fail to hold here, there probably aren’t many more reserves to push in there and they will withdraw from this area and probably go into east-west defense over by Luhansk – Severodonetsk maybe?
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1573801422310805506?s=20&t=l7P8VCuiqeZprgGd5w89-Q
20:11
Ukraine should not attack in Kherson, Phase 1 to deny the Russians retreat seems to be something Putin is now helping with himself.
At least the city of Kherson they should actually lay siege to.
There is a distinct for/against in the thread regarding the city of Kherson and the for side is morally right – it shortens the suffering for the inhabitants of Kherson.
-but at what cost?
Right now it feels like the units in Kherson are being pushed a bit too hard and this latest hit is similar to what happened right at the beginning when they went west from Davyidiv Brid.
I think they can continue with stand-off weapons.
06:21
Then it seems there has been a Russian demobilization, on top of everything else it is front-line duty day one in some places. Since the mix of old-young, healthy-sick, conscript-not conscript is total, you can guess it will be roughly what runs across a field towards Ukraine ready to take up arms when the soldier in front of them sits down.
06:37
Probable five on this one but the style must be maintained.
Does it actually have any consequences if Russia declares war (girkin so not the highest gear on this)?
https://twitter.com/tpyxanews/status/1574122237547929601?s=46&t=HSDxL6C-OJD7C0-qMcuOtQ
Once upon a time the plan was probably that China would guarantee DPR/LPR security when they were liberated and voted so it became a frozen conflict (if not all of Ukraine was taken). Putin’s visit to Xi must have been to discuss what is now playing out. The rumors were that China is starting to pull back rather than support Russia?
By the way, there were many (including me) who argued that Russia would not manage general mobilization. This partial mobilization plays out like a general one because they are Russians, looked good on paper.
The guess was that they arm an opposition and it would be fun if that’s true 😀
06:54
Great, the Russians are getting beaten up also up by Kupiansk east of the river Oskil it seems 👍
https://twitter.com/andrewperpetua/status/1574227857903058947?s=46&t=HSDxL6C-OJD7C0-qMcuOtQ
13:09
Regarding Russian aircraft raining down, Erik14 (probably) posted a video about a week ago of Russian aircraft dropping dumb bombs where they have to fly over the target. The discussion then was that losses would probably skyrocket if they run their bombing campaign like this. Could be related?
Regarding the losses, there were first two weeks of sky-high losses and then a bit of a break, but now we have 2-3 days of sky-high losses again. I find it very hard to believe that the Russians can sustain this level of losses for many more weeks.
Up by Oskil, there are about twenty battalions in varying condition that are now being worn down, and these are Guards units. At Kherson, all elite units are trapped thanks to NATO’s employee of the month – V. Putin. What remains after that are a lot of LPR/DPR regiments and some ethnically Russian units that were previously empty shells and have now been filled up.
However, you have to give the Russians credit for holding out well at Kherson, but the outcome is given, just a matter of time.
It will also be the elite units’ last battle, simply put, unless they try to pull them back before they get overrun.