12:06
During the Cold War there were a lot of war preparations, either explosives laid out or prepared for.
Russia has shown itself more than willing to use the gas weapon so from my side – it’s likely that at some point they either prepared for detonation or rigged all the lines. They knew there would be war.
Gugi, naval spetsnaz and all that are not extinct so they definitely have the capacity to do something like that.
There are probably underwater inspections happening right now of all important cables and pipelines but it’s not easy to find if you’ve buried it in the seabed and the distances are huge. Then you have the trick of detonating it remotely, after all it’s 70m under water (wasn’t it?). With some luck some Russian material will show up in the whole chain or that drones/ships/others have been on site at the right time. This kind of thing usually takes a week or so before you get a good piece of the puzzle.
If they used surface vessels and rigged it just before detonation they’ll be exposed within a few days because then the US will leak satellite images.
12:15
I think the reasoning is important because partly it’s subcontractors hiring subcontractors and the client only has control over the first link in the chain and then it’s often trust that applies. Maybe it’s a bit stricter in the nuclear industry but what I read was that two different contractors together caused the problem by not following the manual – signaling that not everyone was on top of things (otherwise it wouldn’t have happened)?
If not everyone was on top of things that means someone without required training or documented competence and experience has done the work and then something less than that could have been missed, e.g. background check on a person with a non-Swedish background who has worked in the country for 25 years (which is impossible to do a background check on)?
-I’m not implying in any way that this was the case here, at all, but I do think that safety thinking should be increased and the temperature on risk management raised really significantly on EVERYTHING that could cause power shortages this winter.
If it wasn’t the gas weapon you can always create a power shortage anyway.
12:18
Yes exactly, prisoners are not reported at all by Ukraine. In Izyum it was between 17,000 – “a few hundred” that has been suggested.
I was sitting and calculating that and which BTGs were knocked out and guessed at least 5,000 but I think Ukraine would have made a PR stunt of it so that’s probably not correct. Adding up wounded and dead during those days you might get close to the number if a couple of BTGs slipped away. We’ll see at Lyman if they take a larger number of prisoners how they handle PR (it’s okay when Ukraine does it).
12:22
Now China is probably just like you watching how it develops in Ukraine and moving the beads on the abacus and recalculating the probability that they will fare better if they move.
It’s a pretty bad position for those who consider themselves against the free West here and many years of subversive activity to split the free West have just been rolled back.
Now GDP and ability to wage war don’t correlate to 1 but there the free West is even better.
13:02
A little thought – do you think Putin has now issued a new/supplementary general order that all terrain north of Luhansk shall now be held and/or retaken after the retreat at Izyum?
There were headless attacks a couple of days after reinforcements arrived and which have now ebbed out in most places, and now the defense of Lyman doesn’t seem to be retreating in time (even though I’ve read Twitter rumors that Russian BTGs have been withdrawn and they have left LPR/DPR but those are rumors)?
That would be very Russian to do and the Bunker dwarf must do something to look decisive? (The Hypnopad was much better but he owns Homsan, I’ve thought a lot about how to bodyshame his face more and tried something chimp face but it didn’t have the ring that Hypnopad has – it’s spot-on how he looks in the picture. I guess it will have to be licensed use of that with a TM Homsan after 🙂 )
That would then explain Lyman and why the units there seem almost to let themselves be encircled, we follow this in real time and I have logically assumed that the main force has already retreated unless Ukrainian SOF plugged the retreat route but at the same time there seems to be a strong defense remaining in the city?
IF that’s true it’s a godsend for the Russians because according to earlier discussion they don’t have units for a whole line east of the Oskil river, they will defend islands that don’t get overlapping fields of fire.
There are many waterways in the area so Ukraine needs to get bridge layers and get around channelizing terrain/drunken freezing Russians in defense and now the infiltration deep by SOF and reconnaissance from the Izyum pocket is probably done.
Svatove could be exciting if the Russians get orders to hold it at all costs and go into hedgehog mode.
The Russians are probably trying to lay themselves in a N-S line where Troitske will be easiest to defend (because of the border…) and where some retreating units will probably get over time, the whole delaying battle presumably aims to prepare this NS line through Svatove. Other communities with Troitske and Kreminna as anchors then become isolated islands that can first be enveloped with SOF and then with maneuver units with a bit of luck. Kreminna is reportedly half abandoned?
It will also be fun to see if the combat leadership themselves decide on retreat or if they act according to orders, some measures may have been taken here with political commissars (FSB) shadowing the entire staff for example to hedge against problem solving and own initiative.
Now we’re discussing Russian capacity due to mobilization but if the Russians could have produced a better defense in the area north of Luhansk and east of the Oskil river they would have done so since Putin’s orders now appear to be – hold the area, alternatively – retake the area (not entirely clear to me actually). Definitely no orders for general retreat have been given at this time. The Russians would probably also have attacked down from the north in the Kharkiv – Kupyansk area despite it being natural defensive terrain, to try to cut supply. Maybe also further west.
Since it hasn’t happened yet, it reasonably means that Russian resources TODAY are limited. That was probably why they mobilized, and the idea is likely to rebuild the capability over time here.
The mobilized were apparently to train for about a month before deployment according to some videos, and that sounds reasonable, so a month until newly mobilized troops start arriving who are probably good enough for defense and might be used for offense with some luck if Putin gets his way. Where they are deployed will be interesting to see, “retake Oskil,” or something spectacular like an attack from the north or at the Donbass/southern front?
The lack of an offensive down at the southern front or Donetsk is a bit of a question mark for me, but Ukraine usually surprises positively, so there is probably a plan around that; maybe they want to keep pulling in units to Kherson, at least the southern front cut – the darkest Donbass has had potential. However, it has been three weeks since they struck Izyum, and a half-nelson at a new location would have been very Ukrainian and logical.
The thread was quite unanimous along with many experts that Russia would not manage a mobilization because it would cause unrest; I think it remains on the bubble list and is simmering.
13:04
Here you have how muddy the ground is, still passable is probably reasonable?
It can surely go downhill fast if it rains continuously.
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1575322151464345602?s=20&t=5xNw2-Cq3_eJ1g_wDaFaIQ
13:11
One thought about the southern front would be that the Russians are pulling units from there to the Luhansk and Kherson areas still, so maybe they let it be so it weakens?
13:34
12:43 is probably what I have been sulking about for a couple of days. The Hypnopad (TM Homsan) has shown to completely lack any barriers whatsoever, which one could guess, and Russia’s population has proven more compliant than we hoped, which one could also guess. For me, it is crystal clear that if Ukraine had gotten top-shelf equipment for this offensive and in sufficient quantity, it would have been almost decided, but now we are balancing on a longer conflict. The area north of Luhansk is fun, but Kherson needs to fall and they need to cut the W-E road down by Mariupol/Melitopol for the stranglehold to start feeling unpleasant for Putin.
If Hypnopad (TM Homsan) manages to slow the Ukrainian offensive and get his narrative that they are at war with NATO, the risk of a broader conflict increases, which could have been stopped with MBTs and IFVs already this fall…
It is a flawed thinking that I cannot understand the logic of; the material is in the warehouses, Ukraine is crying out for it, and they can demonstrably wage war. If the bubble Revolution doesn’t suddenly happen, the Russians will fill the trenches and cities, and even a drunk Russian can hit something with a bit of luck before his breath catches fire from the muzzle flash and he dies anyway.
Ukraine has gone and done the impossible here, but if there is no revolution or general front collapse, they have a hell of a lot of territory to retake and now mobilization is a fact. The risk is that one rejoices like a German here at the high losses and misses the lack of strategic decisions.
Now that the Russians have blown up NS1 and NS2 (I have reversed and am convinced), why isn’t the countermeasure – MBTs as many as Ukraine wants in a week, what kind of barrier prevents sending top-shelf armor?
The Netherlands has +400 Leo2s and that country will never be invaded ever (again 🙂 )
On an almost childish level, I think it is unfair to Ukraine to hold back the equipment they have requested to beat Hypnopad’s (TM Homsan) rolling circus with various weak arguments like we cannot weaken our own defense or that there are no mechanics, but I guess I’ll just sit and sulk positively-negatively to myself.
14:20
Speaking of the Kremlin’s narrative and Russian psyops, and almost off-topic here, they have managed to turn the general perception that it was Russia that violated our archipelago with submarines in the 80s into it being only NATO or just free fantasies today.
I have been in those discussions for many years and followed this and how it has shifted. Some have jumped on it to sell books, others have changed position on the issue, and others have different motives. There is a strong opinion formation in Sweden that Russia never violated us and that it was the West trying to make it look like Russia.
My truth is that Russia violated and the West assisted us and then there was probably some psyops by the West in between.
U137 you think then, yes there are entire explanatory models as to why they did not violate intentionally and then it was the only time, the best is that the CIA had equipment that completely messed up the Russians’ instruments and that the CIA basically steered U137 into Gåsfjärden. In the Skalman thread, it is actually proven that U137 could not navigate wrong, so everyone who claims that is either deceived or does not want to see the truth.
Besides, there was an FRA station a few islets away in Gåsfjärden if they were not on their way to the naval base.
14:38
BD,
Has the defense said that we cannot send CV90 or Archer, that we need them all?
The only thing I’ve really heard is that it would be fast-tracked.
Then that actually applies to all the West.
Refugees (I assume you mean emigrating Russian men), aren’t they actually called deserters, haven’t you slipped a bit in word choice here? If I get a call-up order in Sweden, I am a deserter if I evade and not a refugee, or how do you think? Or can I refuse conscription or call-up orders now, today, according to Swedish law with the reasoning that I am a refugee and then go to Norway or Denmark?
We still have prison for refusing conscription, right?
Don’t know if that was directed at me but your last line and insinuation was pretty silly, wasn’t it?
15:05
Keep in mind here that it is a special operation 🙂
15:13
BenDover – half-back on that about the refugees but you chose that word for a reason so it was worth putting it in perspective, right 🙂
I personally find it strange that there is even a defense/opposition to sending heavy weapons to Ukraine, a government makes many mistakes and this is one of them in my opinion and I find it hard to see that there is anything subversive in demanding weapons for Ukraine as you implied (if that was directed at me).
20:08
This one has been up (I think…) but have you seen that it is snow.
There is a bit of a Winter War warning on this if the Russians come as badly as it looks and Ukraine has prepared for winter.
Then snow also means subzero temperatures and with some luck it will be a short king mud this year.
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1575509648857337859?s=20&t=m3dhYPaMi0mzCLX3gJ4vzw
11:51
Surely it’s only the gas that was in the pipeline itself that is being released?
One way to repair it is to maintain the gas pressure so water doesn’t seep in and then try to cover the hole with a robot without hot work.
Now the Russians have probably shut off the gas and then the pipeline will fill with water, rust, etc. and then you have to write it off. The gas was probably finished anyway but sh1t what a write-off.