10:14 – Johan No.1
Saw below from Grankovitch a couple of days ago who had a second page to the Forbes calculation that I had missed.
If you look at the Russian low point it is quite clear why we have been so upset that Ukraine did not get Western armor in September 2022 and have been nagging about it since then…
It also seems that the assessment that they had 150,000 remaining effective units was reasonable.
I think that DPR, LPR and Wagner are added on top of these Forbes estimates but it is not entirely clear.
Between September – January 6 they tried to let DPR/LPR and then newly mobilized take the full brunt and save their better units, for example through the retreat from Kherson. These 150,000 were probably in as good condition as possible at the offensive start on January 6.
The Russian offensive excursions during the autumn were mostly Wagner against the Bakhmut – Siversk lines.
The calculation comes from Ukrainian Forbes and is thus not completely pulled out of thin air one might say and correlates with other assessors – but we do not know if everyone has used the same source of data of course.
https://twitter.com/Volodymyr_D_/status/1605199927927259136?s=20
It was probably one of the great mistakes of this war not to give Ukraine what they needed already last summer. An offensive with everything extra at that low point would likely have decided the war.
There was no doubt that it was diplomatically and politically deadlocked; the Russians were far ahead on the escalation ladder with NS1-2, obliterated cities, castrations, and tortured five-year-olds, and then in the autumn came the missile attacks on the power infrastructure.
Why nothing was sent is still a mystery to me; maybe I am looking for too complicated explanatory models when there are none, but I still believe that China had a hand in it, as Forbes apparently wrote (I don’t remember the publication..)?
I have also, as is well known, believed that China has supported Russia more than we have been led to believe; the signals have been many but nothing is confirmed, of course.
When HIMARS created chaos in the Russian supply chains in early autumn and the ground held, the upcoming spring offensive could have been played out already last autumn over a war-weary and anorexic Russian invasion force.
There were 150,000 soldiers + LPR/DPR/Wagner in very poor condition.
Especially since the entire VDV was trapped in Kherson, imagine if they had managed to push down towards Melitopol and encircle the VDV already then…
Now this did not happen, but we are heading towards the same low point again quite soon because the Russians’ attrition rate is 50,000 – 60,000/month (1:2 and 30% – 40% non-war-related injuries) and Ukraine’s capability is sharply increasing with its newly established brigades and deliveries of Western materiel – that is fact (except for the 1:2…)
Moreover, the losses are high among the last 150,000 capable units they had left, so what they will meet with going forward are mobilized troops from autumn and winter who have had months of training.
How good were we after 4-5 months in the military service, and here it is also Russian training where they have already run all the training battalions and the competence to Ukraine for a few kilometers of potato field, so who trains them is not entirely clear.
Moving on to tanks, you quickly see that Western deliveries will significantly close the gap, and then a well-driven Western tank with competent warfare is worth many Russian ones.
Then the question is probably whether at least 30% of the Russian tank fleet is in the rear with technical faults. Every time UA has taken over an area, they have found significant amounts of armor standing with technical faults. Would it be different now?
(The shrewd one then says that UA has the same amount of technical faults but all of Eastern Europe services their vehicles so they get them back into combat, whereas Russia does not have the same maintenance chain in place).
I, who am positive, obviously counted low for Russia, +350,000 for UA and then I probably had 300,000 for the Russians, which was evidently low?
These are cold facts and figures but they say nothing about how resources are used, and we already know how resources are used – Vuhledar compared to Izyum, for example.
Then the calculation was up to the end of December – in January and February the Russians have taken astronomical losses.
What we see today is also a year of Russian tactical adaptation – let that sink in. I am very skeptical that they will come back in round two.
To me, it looks like they will never be able to fight as well as they did in January-February 2023 and it has gone terribly – they have simply peaked while Ukraine is running with springy steps and a broad smile on the upward curve still.
10:18 – Johan No.1
There are now two real obstacles left to pass on the road to a Russian crushing defeat –
-will Ukraine manage offensive operations against defensive lines.
-will the Russians manage to mobilize enough to freeze the fronts.
The answer is yes to the first and no today to the second, in my opinion.
-We have very clear indications that Ukraine has learned to breach defensive lines and we have secure information that they are getting the materiel needed to solve the task, mine-clearing equipment, MBTs, and bridge layers, for example.
-Mobilization may come now but it has not happened yet. We will see if Putin mentions anything in his speech, or not. I maintain that it is significant since it would already have been needed and with each passing week the risk increases that they won’t have time to train them and push them out in defense before UA has rolled past said defense.
Everything currently on active fronts will see its combat value plummet in this cold and wet weather, and in northern Luhansk a swarm of hornets is raging among 130,000 tired Russians without night combat equipment.
As soon as the subzero temperatures disappear, it will be 0 to +5 for a while with rain reasonably, and then the temperature will rise. March – April are probably not very fun months even in Ukraine, I imagine.
The fronts all look different – on the southern front, defense has been prepared since early spring 2022, in northern Luhansk there are relatively new defensive lines, and in the darkest Donbass it is the very ceasefire line UA must get through (unless they circumvent it…).
At the Dnieper, there are basically no defensive lines at all unless you count the suicide concrete domes standing along the Crimean canal and some newly built lines that you can zig-zag between.
Then the Russians have compensated for poor defense up in northern Luhansk by pushing in 130,000 there instead.
The old truth that you should be 1:3 or 1:4 to be able to defeat an enemy also flies by.
It is then often transferred to the total as some kind of proof that Ukraine will never manage to liberate its country.
First of all, we have had 5 major Russian retreats in far less than a year – Kiev, Kharkiv, Kherson, Izyum, and Lyman. The Russians have left 40% of the conquered area.
Then the other “truth” becomes important, which I have probably also pushed in my total ignorance – higher density in defense makes it harder for Ukraine. I don’t remember who in the thread was right about that all along but Nobel Prize to them.
It has now been shown that higher density for the Russians only means more chaos, and for Ukraine it means more targets for HIMARS – the Russians have no clear advantage from having higher density on a smaller area.
Then you can compensate numbers with competence and/or materiel, or vice versa.
Then you can attack strategically important defense 1:3 which makes the other units across the whole area have to retreat, you create a local superiority and maneuver tactically superior so numbers no longer matter.
An excellent example will be when they can have as many as they want in defense down in Crimea and Ukraine empties the entire peninsula with HIMARS and disrupted logistics with only a few battalions in defense at the bridges to the mainland.
Reasonably, Ukrainian breakthroughs will be preceded by all kinds of indirect fire that decimates the defense and then a breakthrough with Western armor that completely dominates. Numbers then become secondary.
The task force in the rear drives into distance-laid mines and is picked off with 155mm before they reach forward.
Ukraine is going deep and creating a threat that forces the Russians to retreat over a larger area.
This is how it will look on the southern front and northern Luhansk.
For the darkest Donbass, my last reasonable analysis was that if it has to be taken by force, it will be done over time.
The reason I believe the war will end this summer is that either the army will leave or Russia will turn inward once the chess move has been played down towards Azov.
DPR and LPR will also switch sides or lay down their arms.
If that doesn’t happen (which I believe it will and the late summer is long…) the easiest way to take the darkest Donbass is probably to strangle the supply lines, infiltrate with everything you have, and HIMARS away everything you find.
If the Russians try to bring in reinforcements, they will be subjected to ambushes, mines, and indirect fire on the way down from the training camps, and over time Donbass will be worn down until it is possible to retake the area by force with maneuver brigades.
If it takes time, so be it. Then the rest of the country is spared and you have your best units in Donbass for the retaking of that area, and Ukraine otherwise can return to a normal state and begin reconstruction – the war is over for 90% of the country.
A long war with the darkest Donbass remaining is no longer a war that weakens Ukraine, they can handle that volley.
But now I don’t think it will be like that, it will end with a bang this summer.
10:28 – Johan No.1
I think this is very much why the Russians are attacking everywhere right now, link below.
Also note that China has been in discussions with Germany, France, and Italy – clearly they were considered more important to talk to than the UK, USA, or Poland?
My highly personal take on this – Russia has had a negotiation positioning going on with its offensive (we said that already on January 6) and then got China, Germany, France, and Italy on board to be able to keep Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia Oblasts if they conquered them, roughly.
What has just happened here is that France and Germany have gone all in smash-Russ.
Something has gone completely wrong with that plan and it is naturally, to begin with, that UA does not give up any ground at all but then the West after the Munich conference has felt compelled to all come out with various levels of smash-Russ.
What is China doing now?
This says something about why “some” have delayed with materiel – they still thought territorial concession was an option.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/18/chinese-peace-plan-for-ukraine-greeted-cautiously-by-the-west
Russia has already begun the process of turning inward because they have gone against Wagner by not giving them recruits or ammunition. Prigozhin’s counter-move will probably be that Wagner no longer participates in the war.
They still have a core of what, 10,000 men who are capable but who then will not fight in Ukraine.
This may also have influenced that UA has made advances at Bakhmut; if they have ammunition problems, they can’t fight, right?
Maybe it is the army’s way of getting at them – letting UA overrun them at Bakhmut and Soledar?
I think Vuhledar was an attempt by the army to show that they match Wagner but I have no evidence for that, just a feeling because it didn’t fit in time and now that conflict has come to the surface. It has been aired a bit on Twitter but should be considered a rumor.
Then Shoigu’s private army is at the front, which is also significant, and that Gerasimov is leading the war is also an important piece of the puzzle – Putin’s inner circle is now personally guaranteeing the war!
Also, we have not yet seen mobilization, curious about what Putin will say in his speech tomorrow and the day after actually but I don’t expect anything of value to be honest. It will be clichés and total dissonance as usual.
Still, we should remember that the Russians went out big in the media and said the only answer to Leopard in Ukraine was general mobilization – Leopard will be in UA in a few weeks.
Another crack that is elephant-sized – Germany has suddenly gone all in and wants to be the best in class at smashing Russ. It is still under observation for now but that shift is a real biggie and if so, hats off if they manage to be as difficult to scrape up materiel for Ukraine as they have been against it before.
Sunak and Macron have also made similar statements so it is starting to feel almost like a united front here which I interpret as good news – the Munich meeting I guess?
It is my conviction that this winter offensive was promised internally in Russia to be either the one that won the war or gave the best possible negotiating position to achieve a territorial concession.
The offensive arose because the Russians did not consider they had time on their side, that is probably quite clear by now.
But of course, they have sold this Ardennes offensive internally as a game-changer to those who matter in the country, and promised that Gerasimov will turn everything for the better and that Shoigu’s private army will shine.
All of Russia now knows about the fiasco at Vuhledar and reasonably understands that the dissonance is total.
It is a completely reasonable assumption then to start from the premise that there are enormous tensions in the Russian dictatorship right now. Putin’s innermost circle and Putin himself have put everything on the line here, all in, and they are not gaining any ground.
If there are more setbacks, it is very likely that it will break and that Russia will turn inward – that is also a reasonable assumption to make.
The time aspect is of course the tricky part, on May 9 last year we got a useful calibration and clearly the country can take more damage than all others without it becoming lively. BUT… they also had three revolutions in less than 100 years so it is really a country of extremes on both ends.
And being under such great (completely self-inflicted) pressure they haven’t been for a long time. This offensive was the last straw to grasp at – from now on it is only downhill and dead Russ.
That is naturally exactly what Ukraine is planning here – to create as many Russian setbacks as possible as quickly as possible to throw Russia off balance and turn inward and that is also the purpose of the West’s coordinated communication, to increase the pressure.
The next thing to watch for is then real negotiation probes from Russia (and maybe China?) and increased media pressure for a ceasefire to save the children. Gudrun’s statement was almost verbatim repeated by Corbyn in the UK which I found interesting.
We will probably also see the opposite rhetoric break new ground before too long – I wouldn’t be the least surprised if we get a narrative where Ukraine is the aggressor and Russia wants peace. Russia is a misunderstood victim who never intended to torture-murder and rape five-year-old children in front of their parents, a mistake that should be forgiven.
Ukraine’s integrity is truly total both at the negotiating table and in the trenches, you have to give them that, and it will also guarantee them a smashing victory.
You do remember that Zelensky is supposed to meet Biden and the Polish leader in Poland at the end of February. Today’s visit is probably a first probing, one might guess?
Googling all of Russia’s wars, you quickly realize that they have been at war practically every decade all the way back to the Middle Ages (exaggeration for effect!). It is rare that they manage to refrain from jumping on some neighbor, diving into a civil war, or waging offensive wars against countries as far away as Japan or completely unnecessary ones like Afghanistan.
A positive side effect of this war (with a bit of luck) will be that Russia becomes encapsulated behind NATO and cannot commit violence against peaceful neighbors for the foreseeable future.
It is my conviction that this is the only way forward, especially now that we know (guessed, but with Medvedev’s help) their end game; it’s hard to be more generous than that, I feel, not least out of consideration for the lively Portuguese.
The dictatorship Russia does as they always have done for hundreds of years – commit violence against everyone they can reach.
If they get a smashing defeat in this war, they will reasonably prepare for the next one as soon as they can – they have done that for hundreds of years, so that is also a very reasonable assumption.
Then the free West must simply deny them that opportunity, which is what will break the pattern. We will have a better world when Russia can no longer wage offensive wars and their subversive activities are exposed. A bit like coming out of the dark Middle Ages into the Age of Enlightenment.
10:51 – MatsExtrude
+100
Regarding the first part of your post, I agree 100%. I think it is important that we try to maintain a good tone towards each other if the blog (or rather the comments) is to continue to maintain quality and not lose valuable writers. If someone loses their temper and yells at Putin, I see that more as a sign of health. Directing anger at those who deserve it is okay, but not at each other.
Regarding the second half, good situation report!
However, I don’t think we can say “hooray” yet. As I have observed before, Russian losses have peaked around the 1st of each month and hit their low point around the 15th (with a few days of fluctuation).
We saw it again in January and I guess we see the same now.
I don’t think the Russians have completely exhausted themselves (but it’s good that the AFU is taking the opportunity to gain ground).
Towards the end of the week, we will probably see Russian losses start to rise again. Since this coincides with the anniversary of the war and many speculate that the Russians have not yet launched their real offensive, they will surely conclude that it has started then.
But I will stay calm because it just follows their pattern, and in mid-March it will calm down again.
10:55 – Johan No.1
I worked a lot with Chinese contractors in Africa and they usually had their news when you ate lunch with them, and the project management was roughly like a project group in Sweden for the bypass or lock project.
The news was often about the USA or things going well for China, and they were always anti-USA and had quite high opinions of themselves, so they are probably to be considered a counterpart to the West really, and then Russia fits into that geopolitical game perhaps as you write?
11:01 – Johan No.1
Yes, it should reasonably be so if you strip away the positive; when the ground no longer holds, the window is closed.
They started on January 6 and have suffered the war’s highest daily losses until now – the ambition must reasonably have been to achieve something of value?
Yep, then it becomes defensive if Ukraine tries to regain the initiative, my hope is that they have reduced the remaining capable units enough so that they are too few as a task force, but we will see.
11:07 – MatsExtrude
+100
12:06 – Johan No.1
Yep, and the tanks were the offensive weapons Ukraine needed to retake their country, and they arrived early in January. They can’t start taking ground with Cesar even though they are quite effective.
Macron asked Zelensky to give up land,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/zelenskyy-suggests-macron-asked-him-to-give-up-land-for-peace/2587476
Hard to find a German statement but in practice they have acted the same way. They have clearly shown that they only wanted the war to end and by not giving UA weapons and delaying most things, it reasonably meant that a Ukrainian surprise victory was not their first option?
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/19/ukraine-olaf-scholz-says-west-must-keep-russia-guessing-on-sanctions.html
13:17 – Johan No.1
Huge PR with Biden. All UA in green clothes and Biden smiles his whitest smile, chats casually and bumps into Zelensky’s guys – Biden is almost overly clear that these are his best buddies.
Someone wrote above that Biden is betting his political career on this – it certainly looks that way, the man is 80 years old and goes to Ukraine in the middle of a raging war to take sides in the conflict in the clearest possible way, and then you have China and Russia on the other side.
Rarely do you see Zelensky happy like a little child but today he was.
We send a thought to Hypnopaddan who probably groaned a little quietly, took a couple of sleeping pills and went back to sleep.
He probably regrets not taking the billions, the stripper pole and all the models and living his life like a god.
13:39 – MatsExtrude
Zelensky was probably both happy and moved, it shows briefly in one of the videos that it looks like he needed to ease his pollen allergy.
I am convinced that Putin has been walking around with a hefty dose of anxiety since he realized that this is going to hell..
Today I hope that anxiety increased a couple of big notches. Maybe too much to hope that he overdoses on sleeping pills.
Really good move by Biden to carry out his visit right now as well. I wonder if Putin is feverishly rewriting his speech?
15:21 – Johan No.1
Good consensus on good tone, gives hope 👍
15:32 – MatsExtrude
Now I took the time to read.
+1 Agree on all points.
The Russians will bash their heads bloody and continue to take heavy losses for a couple more months, and when the counteroffensive finally comes, they will be worn out. AFU will also have more modern equipment than the Russians, better intelligence, etc. I absolutely believe that a 1:1 ratio will be enough for Ukraine to pull it off. The Russians seem to run fast when things go against them.
If the Russians are not broken when they again lose 20-30% of the occupied areas so that it becomes necessary to take Crimea and the “darkest” Donbass, it will probably be more drawn out. There they have probably dug in properly over many years.
If so, it applies that the West does not slow down the pace but continues to supply materiel even after the counteroffensive.
Afraid that people will start to get tired of the war if it drags out until next winter, and there is a great risk that Macron, Scholz, and others will return to wanting to discuss peace again and think that Ukraine should be satisfied with what they have regained.
Now I get a feeling that the USA and NATO are starting to get a bit impatient and have put pressure on the EU countries to deliver. I sense that much more will come before we enter April, May.
16:46 – Johan No.1
At the risk of sounding like a disillusioned pro-Russian – as big a bombshell as when the West would be bombed to ashes if they gave even a single nut in support of Ukraine, or the nuclear weapons if long-range weapons came, or the mass mobilization when the Leopard was supposed to arrive…
Or the three-day operation, or the extermination of Nazis in Ukraine?
Maybe I forgot something but the list is long of verbal bombs that never materialized.
On topic – I don’t think China dares to go out officially with anything that would change the war, they will probably try for a compromise peace and then give up.
09:39 – Johan No.1
It should be lukewarm, lots of historical references.
Will he complain and say that Russia is a victim or try to show strength and say that the millennium offensive is coming soon – he should try to project strength and ride on the current offensive?
If he starts to shift the blame, that is a very big puzzle piece. I see Russia as dog-eat-dog where weakness is immediately bitten at the throat.
Then mobilization – the only thing he can do, if he does it, is to announce a lower number between 100,000 – 300,000 maybe.
What will China do?
-Offensive weapons – good luck teaching the Russians to handle everything with Chinese characters, they can’t even manage their own vehicles after training..
-ammunition – they have probably been sending it all along and it makes no difference.
-Chinese military in Ukraine – no.
-hot air and high-flown words about support and some threats against the West – absolutely, costs nothing.
09:45 – Johan No.1
4. that was interesting and to my knowledge has never been brought up before!
For the power in Russia, they probably don’t need the war in Ukraine, they can just continue to ride on the repressive laws and turn inward instead of continuing to live their lives in relative luxury, large size mash jug instead of medium size.
I guess it is too early to end the SMO, famous last words, but sometime either the army or the Kremlin will pull them back.
It would be quite interesting if they did it completely voluntarily in order to turn inward instead on their own initiative.
At least since January 6 they have managed to decimate the army to nothing now so the threat from it is small and the various agencies and private armies can take over.
But wouldn’t it be smart to decimate the army further and then try to negotiate something, anything?
09:52 – MatsExtrude
I believe that Putin sold the war in Ukraine to oligarchs and others by promising them that they will get a share of the land and the seized assets. If that is true, they will not be satisfied with backing down. The war has probably cost many of them quite a lot and if they don’t get what they were promised, Putin loses their support.
Option 4 could of course be combined with a withdrawal. The oligarchs suddenly become portrayed as Russia’s opponents and can be taken care of and then he doesn’t have to worry about them.
09:59 – MatsExtrude
The scenario of further decimating the army to reduce the threat and then turning inward is interesting. 4. could then be a long-term part of that idea. Reduce the army and take care of any others who might be a threat. That might be the way for Putin to dare to withdraw. He doesn’t manage to win, Russia will be battered but he can continue to keep power.
Not so bad (if that’s what you meant).
10:08 – Johan No.1
It’s a bit much today but a lot has happened.
A small thought – I see the UA blog/thread as a support for Ukraine and a historical archive being built by LW and a large number of users every day who post what has happened during the day, a good atmosphere seems to make many want to contribute. Everyone who contributes has their own active lives but is probably very passionate about the Ukraine war and tries to do their part in the way they can, the Ukraine war engages and many have spent a whole year trying to contribute in the best way they can every day (if employers find out about such production they probably double the daily quota). I try to contribute to a better atmosphere as much as possible but it is hard not to get swept up by the dips, become confrontational and then wish there was an editing function.
We had a discussion in the spring that we should not go after the person but try to discuss the matter – which seems quite reasonable?
No one here has been paid or is otherwise obligated to anyone and as long as you support Ukraine and try to contribute in the best way you can, it is reasonably completely okay and should not cause aversion?
We could spend all day chasing each other but I don’t think the value of this as a historical archive or support for Ukraine is very great and the thread will probably die out quite quickly. Those who try to keep a good tone do so to prevent the thread from degenerating into preschool fights and losing its value, that does not mean they are legitimate targets because they do not defend themselves, just that they try to keep the tone. There were a lot of attacks on many people a few days ago and it would be great if we could leave invectives, derogatory expressions and personal attacks behind and argue on the merits.
A couple of important puzzle pieces flew by, the first was that 2000-3000 Wagner troops have been sent to the southern front Melitopol area – why then, aren’t there enough units at the southern front?
The second was another transport of units, I don’t remember which or where but it indicated redeployment of units, moving from one front to another. That shouldn’t have been necessary as each front should already have had its units.
Are they already starting to prioritize?
Then we have Gregg’s latest that the Russians are massing at Pisky – Opytne, 13 regiments and brigades. I think we’ve found the Russians’ last focal point here and it’s time to study that area in detail. +30 BTGs, I guess it will be a lot of DPR units.
And the last from Gregg that UA is now conducting counterattacks in the Kreminna area.
Then we have Bakhmut which is a bit strange – UA is pushing back the Russians southwest of the city but losing ground to the north. With everything going on on all fronts, I think it would be very strange if they gave up the city just before the mud season comes so I stand by that they will hold the city IF they can – and then there should be a counterattack north of the city where the “murder snails” are pushing forward.
If that counterattack fails, or if the settlement Berkhivka falls, it is a critical situation (if you remember the discussion about Berkhivka in the Bakhmut analysis a week ago). Unfortunately, Zelensky has probably started to prepare the ground and everything is cost – benefit. However, the cost increases exponentially when they are to retake the city in the spring.
However, they hold high ground north of Bakhmut and have just brought in more reinforcements but it is a bit worrying when Noel writes that the “murder snails” have crawled up the hills.
Ukraine was shaken on January 6 but has in the past +1 week conducted local counterattacks everywhere and the Russian side has achieved nothing with their offensive since January 6.
It is approaching impassable terrain down south and we have a few more weeks up north, I think it looks like on the weather report because there are heavy rains coming and daytime temperatures above freezing – time is running out for the Russians quite quickly here.
Then I think the Russians have already lost momentum, if the next focal point is Pisky – Opytne that reasonably means they have not built up an overwhelming offensive reserve at the southern front?
That would be very strange because up along the Dnipro should be one of the primary attack goals but it is starting to look a bit thin there with units, except at Vuhledar. That would then be the VDV reserve that Defmon doesn’t know where they are, 4 regiments, which would add some kick.
We must not forget that 8 BTGs have already gone to zero there.
Up in northern Luhansk it has not played out yet and according to earlier there is a risk of chaos but if UA goes on the offensive at Kreminna they have seen an opening and how you leave an opening with 130,000 men in such a small area is a bit of a mystery.
We can probably be quite sure that there will not be a “500,000 man offensive” from the Russian side. That was clear from the beginning I thought but now we have probably reached a point where it is indisputable that it will not come?
The question is whether they will succeed with anything better than Vuhledar-death in the coming weeks, Bakhmut can of course be abandoned but that is a victory on par with Soledar – a total nothing burger in that case.
And above all – can UA manage to take the initiative locally somewhere besides consolidating their positions with local counterattacks before the frost thaws?
It is very unfortunate that the West has dragged itself through this war, thousands/tens of thousands of Ukrainians will die until victory this summer completely unnecessarily but it is what it is and Ukraine does not seem to have any problem defending itself.