10:21 – Johan No.1
Has it come up that Antony Blinken is going to visit everywhere (of course it has because Erik14 was lively yesterday)?
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. We posed the rhetorical question yesterday about who has given Kazakhstan guarantees – my money is on the USA.
It feels like things are moving very quickly now to encase Russia behind a wall of NATO. I don’t think Turkey and Hungary will be allowed to continue as they are for much longer because now they are meddling in geopolitics, and they are absolutely not the right size for that.
Here you probably have the figure of 500,000, I believe; note that it does not say the army, it does not say maneuver units – it says soldiers.
https://twitter.com/FriaUkraina/status/1629754494970994695?s=20
This presumably includes all soldiers in Ukraine and Russia who are in any way involved in the war.
Depots, training camps, rear areas, railways, air bases, oil depots, ports, the navy, and finally down to the soldier running across the field towards a Ukrainian trench, really hoping that today is not the day it starts flashing as he runs past rows of Russian corpses lying so close together that it becomes some kind of hurdle race to death.
The spearhead is never large, and even in the brigades, the proportion running towards the trenches is not the large mass – there is maintenance, artillery, air defense, and all sorts of units that do not have that task.
These others are also even worse at that task if they were given it.
However, it is at the spearhead that they go and die, and during January – February, losses at the spearhead should have been the absolute majority.
For my part, I feel it couldn’t be much clearer; I probably should have left it already but had a relapse.
Then ISW speaks frankly about Russia not being able to mobilize endlessly, and their (qualified) conclusion on that is that it is a myth (one uses ISW when it supports a thesis, elbow to the side of Erik14).
https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1630095090105614341?s=20
It has been a while since we discussed mobilization, but it did not come up in Putin’s two speeches; he barely mentioned the Ukraine war on the anniversary or the pep concert.
I firmly believe that if Russia wants to be able to freeze the front/handle defense, they need a large number of troops, and right now they absolutely do not have that.
They can only get that number through mobilization, and with each passing week, the likelihood decreases that they can get out what they mobilize (if they mobilize) in defense before Ukraine’s offensive starts.
If they hold the ground the second half of April, they have 1.5 months to get soldiers into trenches with personal weapons and able to handle man-portable air defense systems and anti-tank missiles – I already consider that impossible today.
External factors affecting the Ukrainian offensive this summer are hard for me to see after China’s peace overture – it contained no hard demands.
The USA has asked Ukraine to end (win) the war as quickly as possible, and especially Germany has emerged as a tough Russia-killer in recent weeks – Go Deutschland, all is forgiven the Ål.
Macron is going to China for some peace mediation soon, but relapses into abuse must be expected, and if the Germans hold the line and are as troublesome for Ukraine as they were against a Ukrainian victory, it helps the Ukrainian side a lot.
It no longer seems that anyone seriously demands territorial concessions or a ceasefire.
China does not appear to threaten to send troops or offensive weapons – and if they were to send offensive weapons, Russian crews would need at least half a year to learn to operate the Chinese systems, I think, if they can even learn them at all?
The world has moved towards some kind of acceptance of the fact that Ukraine will try to liberate its country by force this year. If they were to fail (which I do not see), there would be a reassessment and reversal as usual.
Even the UN could agree on a resolution on the matter to beat up on Russia.
Zelensky is currently going out hard with demands for tar and feathers and the whole battery of “you-have-lost,” but I am quite sure that when Russia is thrown out, or leaves voluntarily, interest from the EU side will cool down quite quickly, and it will be the usual long delays and evasions, and the rogue state Russia with its criminal clan at the top will be open again for business as usual. The world is not fair.
The factors that could make Putin leave Ukraine are all long shots; even the peace overtures are long shots.
Outside the long shot list are the Russian attempts at an offensive this spring and Ukraine’s offensives this spring. Exactly in what order even the parties themselves do not know, but the idea that Ukraine would sit on its hands this spring is impossible – the whole country is building up towards a spring offensive, and it would be deadly for Zelensky to start wavering on that – either the Russians leave before the spring offensive or they do it after.
The Ukrainian bow is drawn to the breaking point, and Putin is glued to the target with his head hanging. Not releasing the arrow or drawing the bow until it breaks is impossible – it will be a bullseye straight into Putin’s soft parts, and we are talking about a longbow from 30 meters here.
And that the Russians would succeed better this spring than when they burned through a bit under 60% of their last (usable) offensive reserve is impossible – it can only go worse whatever they undertake this spring; they peaked this winter.
The miracle at Vuhledar – I stopped ticking off the brigades at Vuhledar when the DPR drew the saber and stormed across the fields – I counted 7 brigades they had made use of.
They then had five (5) more brigades in the area (this is so tricky with the units, but when you go in and study an area in detail, I take screenshots from the unit maps to go back to).
After the big chaos day, it never stopped – there have been several attacks over open fields, a very successful Ukrainian counterattack, and a completely failed Russian counterattack against the Ukrainian counterattack.
And finally, an attempt to encircle Vuhledar with brigade strength (not all battalions, low numbers and all that…) which crashed completely.
Now there are several reports that they are rotating units at Vuhledar and pushing in new brigades, transports to and from Vuhledar through Mariupol, which Ukraine is trying to destroy as much as possible with indirect fire.
We are then talking about roughly 12 brigades that are no longer combat capable (low numbers, not all battalions from the start, etc.) – and that is at a single front section.
You understand why the chief of the chaos at Vuhledar was promoted, right?
So that he would continue sending brigades to their deaths – there is now resistance in the Russian army against unnecessary death, we can be absolutely sure of that – a big crack that we should watch out for.
This has been mentioned before, but Russian collaborators are starting to leave for the sun down in Crimea now. Where have we seen that before?
https://twitter.com/DachiOf/status/1630144700760961026?s=20
We know that the rats started leaving Luhansk before the Russian offensive on January 6, or the non-offensive, began.
Another factor besides Leo2, China turning its back on Russia, and ammunition shortages is actually that the LPR and DPR have started looking for an out – I add that to the very long list of reasons for the Russians’ Ardennes offensive here.
It will be very interesting when history is written to find out why they chose all-out war on January 6, 2023.
Around the city of Donetsk, I now see almost only 1st and 2nd Army corps on the unit maps.
That could result in the old ceasefire line and Donetsk becoming an invitation to a feast rather than a defense, and Matsextrudes analysis will hit with a bang.
10:45 – MatsExtrude
+1 This was a mixed bag!
I would like to discuss some of the points more closely, unfortunately I’m short on time (my to-do list has turned into an overly extensive backlog).
10:46 – Johan No.1
Matsextrude – looked at Avdiivka and the extent north, where the line runs today it is lowland and waterways and Ukraine has the heights “behind”.
There aren’t many Russian units in the area either.
Ukraine has some really heavy hitters in the area.
-I don’t think it looks threatening if you also factor in waterlogged ground, difficult terrain, and general heavy rain?
What do you see that I’m missing 😀
11:00 – MatsExtrude
+100 Really good review of the situation.
Now it feels like the weather has already started causing trouble. Otherwise, I thought the Russians would increase their offensive and rather peak within a few days. Possibly the air has already gone out of them (except around Bakhmut), even though they probably got resupplied with ammo etc.
It may be that we will see frozen positions until the ground supports it but I hope next that they continue attacking at e.g. Vuhledar so we get to see them take further losses. Surprisingly quiet around Kreminna or maybe it’s just quiet for now.
An attack directly into Donetsk was a loose speculation from my side. I expect the AFU to do something unexpected later on. Then whether it will be that or some kind of feint somewhere.
Moving towards Melitopol feels like the most sensible and it will probably end up like that, but whether that will be the first thing they do or if they will try something else before (or in parallel)…
Ah, now you tricked me so I stayed here anyway… 🙂
11:15 – Johan No.1
The backlog is growing 😀
11:26 – Johan No.1
Sunflower, from yesterday I saw your comment.
The little I remember was two procedures during dismounting from infantry fighting vehicles –
When they slowed down and it was an active target there was a burst of fire and then “forward march” (which often sounded like ..”march on” or even less clear but if there was a MARCH command then they opened fire). For me that meant continuous fire in fire teams until you reach the target, the fire team partner runs past you up to 10m and tries not to run directly in front of you and you put double shots into the terrain ahead where you think someone might be lying, repeat.
You shoot in the direction of the enemy – hence the ammunition consumption because you don’t stop shooting during the alternating advance until you reach the defense you are to storm.
The combat vehicles have a leader who leads them forward and shoots continuously with the autocannon towards the enemy as long as they can, at some point there is friendly fire between them and the target. A rather delicate balance. Don’t know how CV90 does it but with PBV302 it was like that.
If you unloaded and it didn’t turn into combat it was “on line forward” or something with “alternating advance” where fire teams/groups/platoons covered each other but no fire except if ordered, someone opened fire or otherwise indicated that there was soon a dead combatant in the advance path.
At the risk of memory failing 😀
11:42 – Johan No.1
The Russians are using artillery ammunition from 2022.
https://twitter.com/thedeaddistrict/status/1630503715332292613?s=46&t=Q_QNVdjCpOgPieX_PHYAUA
11:43 – Johan No.1
Oh, what a five I was on that…
11:44 – MatsExtrude
It’s probably no problem. Was just thinking a bit, if I were the Russian I would probably try to find other gaps than banging on at Vuhledar. When I then saw that they pressed towards Kasnohovrika I thought maybe that was the start of such an attempt.
If they can take the way west from there they can then press south to reach Avdiivka from the north. Now they never reinforced with more units so it doesn’t seem like anything more is happening for the moment and the weather probably also stops that (didn’t know a few days ago how damn quickly it would become mud and slush).
By the way, what sources do you use for unit maps? I have trouble finding updated maps.
I have used these but they are almost a month behind https://militaryland.net/maps/russian-invasion/
12:41 – Johan No.1
Unit maps are a source of constant anxiety unfortunately.
Defmon is probably the one now trying as best he can (and it’s not easy) but even there he falls behind.
Militaryland to keep track of UA and usually take screenshots when there are interesting events to see how it changes but yes – it would be good to have an actively updated unit map.
12:44 – MatsExtrude
Yep, but now I have at least ticked off a couple of points so this will be a quick jump in 🙂
12:45 – Johan No.1
Very interesting comment from LW regarding ammunition for direct fire.
It rarely comes up in discussions.
If the Russians have doubled the tanks as artillery they have probably burned through some there too.
Regarding Wagner’s ammunition shortage and at Vuhledar where they got ammunition for one day it was small-caliber ammunition for Wagner (since they haven’t attacked much with armor) and all types of direct fire at Vuhledar one can guess?
It’s not just artillery in the war.
12:49 – MatsExtrude
🙂
12:55 – Johan No.1
He deleted the tweet.
13:56 – Johan No.1
Akleja – sorry but I took another look after Zekeulv’s comment below and I also think that what is written on the grenade matches what is written on the box?
The grenade lying down has a white stripe, the grenade in the box does not.
The grenade in the box has some copper stripe, the grenades next to it in the other box do not.
Can we rule out that the grenade lying in the box from 2022 was not manufactured in 2022?
What is the argument for that then?
14:51 – Johan No.1
It is a purely pro-Russian narrative that is starting to spread among pro-Russian debaters now and it goes like this – Since the Russians only attacked with 190,000, it was quite obvious that it was not a full-scale invasion, right?
The purpose has all along been to defend the West, drain their ammunition, break their will, tire them out.
And then deliver the big blow when the West is on its knees, just wait.
(Qanon anyone?)
I get the distinct feeling that parts of this are making their way into Western media in various ways, but this is at least how the enormous conspiracy looks.
I think a bit more like Darth Putin usually writes – “I remain a master strategist, we are currently not advancing backwards”.
14:52 – Johan No.1
*weaken
15:20 – Johan No.1
Demoted 😭
I didn’t realize it had been a day… terrible, if Dengamle had been here there would have been the square and overripe tomatoes.
Failed counterattack down along M03 is the key, if they didn’t manage to drive in a wedge and cut Bakhmut-Spetznaz it’s a critical situation and time to withdraw.
It stings that it has fluctuated back and forth there because then UA takes (too) heavy losses which is unfortunate.
15:49 – MatsExtrude
The strategy is thus to take as much beating as possible to wear out the opponent and then counterattack? I think they succeed really well with the first part but am doubtful it will get much further than that. 🙂
16:13 – Johan No.1
The bulge as such is extremely risky for the Russians if you look at it from a map perspective?
Looks more like a suicide attempt than an offensive.
There were unconfirmed reports of a counterattack in the last day which should have played out if it was becoming a critical situation.
Gregg confirms that the counterattack has played out?
Now I lean heavily on Gregg here in my gloom but what I read is that the counterattack has not delivered, they are taking heavy losses and the “bag” continues to widen – that’s when it becomes a critical situation.
Now I probably should have read all that in Deepstatemap and a bit more but it didn’t happen, I waited for the counterattack and was content that they were not in Bohdanivka and that Deepstate hopefully was behind, but Gregg confirms it looks bad 😀
A big bag that UA in their warcraft snaps off is perfect but that doesn’t seem to be what we see here…
They have done what they could.
*A big disclaimer that we don’t yet know how the counterattack has played out but it’s all bad news here, it’s pretty hard to escape.
17:35 – Johan No.1
Trying to bring clarity to this. Usual sources are silent, despised pro-Russian have some. Opsec of course applies.
Until RY has gone north along M03 they are very vulnerable point. UA holds dominant terrain north of where they stand according to the latest map update.
It slopes down towards Yahidne/Berkhovka and is an advantage for UA in counterattack – if it’s a mechanized brigade and they have the height advantage it’s 3km shooting range with direct fire and explosions.
According to pro-Russian rybar the 46th (airmobile) brigade left Dubovo-Vasylivka and it was 19h since they updated.
There should have been a UA counterattack from the north during the day.
Deepstatemap updated at 00:38 last night (probably) and if opsec applies he might be behind?
(He wouldn’t update from Russian sources, would he?)
What Gregg says about south of the river in southern Bakhmut is in order, UA would always retreat there.
He probably hears from territorial units in Bakhmut.
What Gregg really says when I read better is that the RY wedge towards Bohdanivka is moving and that UA is conducting counterattacks NOW (when he posted which Börjesson probably knows).
That is after both Deepstatemap and Rybar last updated at least.
And we have had a whole day here.
I misinterpreted Gregg – the counterattack from the N has not played out.
I return to my earlier position that when it has played out we will know if there will be a retreat or not and that my faith in UA is unshakable 👍
Dengamle – no overripe tomatoes yet, you have to wait until the next map update before you start throwing but first check if Bohdanivka has fallen.
Sorry for the relapse into pessimism.
17:56 – Johan No.1
Then I suggest cherry tomatoes.
17:56 – Johan No.1
Then I suggest cherry tomatoes.
18:06 – Johan No.1
Unshakable ✊
21:37 – Johan No.1
Scoop –
https://twitter.com/friaukraina/status/1630646281197502475?s=46&t=IzUlTWOKTvNJX8srmdzPLA
06:24 – Johan No.1
Release the 2500 suicide drones https://twitter.com/rybar_en/status/1630697885875548160?s=46&t=KdodyW-PZ1oNizP5CXH94Q 👍
10:14 – Johan No.1
Bakhmut Holds ✊
If the 17th Tank Brigade with the paratroopers along the M03 fails, it’s a critical situation. I have a low probability that they will fail completely, and the Russians seem to have created a small pocket according to Deepstatemap, which could become dangerous for them. Even a Spetsnaz soldier gets wet in heavy rain.
A discussion that probably has never come up – first it was Wagner in Bakhmut, then north of Bakhmut they brought in 2-3 VDV regiments, and now they have rotated in 3 Spetsnaz brigades and a motorized brigade.
I don’t think Defmon has caught on to this yet, but yesterday’s tweet matches Greggs that they have sent down three brigades from Kreminna, and these Spetsnaz are positioned behind Kreminna according to Defmon.
The logical thing would be to throw in the best you have for a breakthrough, right? (Or have I misinterpreted the unit signs?)
-So they have basically exhausted Wagner and three VDV regiments north of Bakhmut, that can only be the conclusion?
South of Bakhmut there are also 3 VDV regiments, and Ukraine has pushed them back several times there.
So there are 6 VDV regiments around Bakhmut that have likely taken very heavy losses – that’s very good.
Was up in the thread – the Cossack looks tired but confident of victory.
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1630248548674736128?t=m-yVgoUeZ_vifIwMjfU8WA&s=07&fbclid=IwAR0IEucKwPqwRi9REIt4bXClT-n6BvyOIwluw93ZyljPWXePofCkNbJn6e8
Then we have soaking wet and tired Spetsnaz against a tank on top of that.
I went out strong in a comment yesterday and have delivered my version of a sincere apology to the person concerned. Will try again to keep a good tone.
When people who contribute quite a lot start writing that they will take a break, I at least think that the debate climate harms the good tone in the thread, and yesterday that was somewhat the theme of the evening.
Maybe I’m alone in seeing this as a future archive – 600-800 comments (and especially LW!) that daily search for the day’s information gathered in an easy-to-read place with accompanying discussions and analyses – there aren’t many like that, I’m pretty sure.
Accompanying support for Ukraine both with cheerful cheers and direct support is incredibly important, and somewhat the blog’s purpose, and I have always seen that the most important thing about this daily routine is to support Ukraine even if they have just stumbled over a branch and bent the barrel on the KSP.
Regarding Budanov’s latest interview (and his previous interviews). I write what I see and am not always pathologically positive even if it looks that way – the other day I became pessimistically very worried about Bakhmut when no one else was, and someone wrote that you can’t trust sources. Now we know that it absolutely has been a critical situation in Bakhmut, that is indisputable. Then the offensive north of Bakhmut along the M03 was played out with the offensive reserves as we had guessed it would.
To give some perspective – when it was happening with Lysychansk I got the whole thread on me before UA withdrew from the city so I had to hide in the economy threads for quite a while – I write what I see.
Then before full calibration I fell for a pro-Russian psyops about Mariupol – they held out for several months after that but the purpose of the psyops was to demoralize and spread worry so the city would fall faster and it was spread further in all its ignorance.
It’s largely about evaluating sources correctly and putting the puzzle together, if you read the “big” analysts you get stuck in their circles. When I sometimes get out of sync after an analysis/article that the thread wants to discuss, it is not intended to crash that discussion at all as has been suggested – I just write what I see that day and the points have been put in place the previous day.
So about Budanov’s interviews – are they wishful thinking and free fantasies that Johan is dealing with? Or could Budanov be thought to have a good information position?
Until last summer, full support for Ukraine was needed because the defeatist mood was total. The pessimistic side that dominated everywhere has had infinitely more errors than those who believed in Ukraine’s ability since the war started, if you think right-wrong is important – it has been discussed several times now.
Then there was a strange dip in morale after Christmas with “the famous 500,000” for a few weeks where you also had to take a stubborn opposite position just because it was wrong.
After Kherson, and especially after Christmas, it has actually been possible to look at this without the most positive glasses on but even when you show with hard facts what lies behind an analysis, there is rarely “counter-evidence” in the counterarguments but sweeping assumptions that it is just wrong, because it is wrong – I find it difficult to take such a discussion forward because the purpose mostly feels like it is not meant to be a discussion.
Then sometimes the response is on the same level which doesn’t contribute to anything…
I occasionally relapse into overly strong positivity to have an effect (have been open about that abuse), China’s peace envoy was a good example (but I still see nothing in that peace proposal that will affect Ukraine’s ability to regain its country) – will try to flag such relapses.
Back to the relevant, what is Budanov as a source – a psyops who naturally supports Ukraine in everything he says but he is also an official communicator from Ukraine and you have to try to evaluate what he says based on these premises.
https://twitter.com/friaukraina/status/1630271485775314944?s=46&t=WdiaXeDBm3AqZUVcvFz-sQ
What Budanov says broadly matches what I also see except for the last two points where he speculates and I am pretty sure Ukraine intends to solve the problem with the 2,500 Russian soldiers in Transnistria with the EU’s blessing. Moldova wants it, the West wants it, and there is ammunition as a bonus point. Not least pro-Russian bloggers are starting to get worried.
For me, Budanov’s interviews strengthen the credibility of, among other things, assumptions in the next post and are for me to be considered official communication from the party in the war that can be proven at least with lies and which can be considered to have absolutely the best information position (after me).
If you try to interpret all the forest of information coming in and want to try to sift out the important puzzle pieces that fit together to create a complete picture, calibration is not so bad and I think Budanov’s interview(s) can be used for calibration if you wish.
We already have the size of the Russian circus, equipment, how much of their army they have dedicated to the war, UA ambitions and other information to place the big puzzle pieces with and then you have to find all the others until the picture becomes clear. We have to guess a bit about UA’s capability but when the home guard gets armor or you get more applications than you need for 14 new brigades, it’s not exactly a sign of weakness I think?