10:42 – Johan No.1
This one will be long, sorry…
Reply to MRF on my post last Saturday where you wrote (freely from memory) that you did not believe for a second that DPR and LPR would switch sides, they are hateful fanatics who have lived in this world since 2014 and know that they are enormously hated in Ukraine as well.
Open sources below so it is easy to google – insanely interesting.
I think the interesting thing is what is caused by the Russians, what is psyops and what is the actual situation.
If we first try to figure out ethnicity, how many Russians live in different oblasts,
Donetsk – 38%
Kyiv – 13%
Kharkiv 25%
Luhansk 39%
Zaporizia 25%
Crimea 58%
Mykolaiv 14%
Kherson 14%
Odessa 20%
I think you can immediately see that the Russians acted somewhat randomly here; they didn’t care about Kharkov, but Kherson was supposed to become Russian.
What you can absolutely see right away is that except for Crimea, the majority are Ukrainians (or were…). Down in Crimea, it is naturally the Russian military that balances it out.
In Donetsk, for example, 62% are (were!) ethnic Ukrainians, and Donetsk, Kyiv, and Kharkiv are the most populous oblasts.
The Russian language,
About 19 languages are spoken in Ukraine (roughly…), Ukrainian is the dominant one and Russian is second and roughly half as large.
In 2004, they did a poll on who speaks Russian at home, which I find most interesting; how that fits with “half as large” I can’t answer.
Crimea 97%
Donetsk 93%
Luhansk 89%
Zaporizia 81%
Odessa 85%
Kharkiv 74%
Mykolaiv 66%
It also seems to be widespread in Kiev, and over 80% identify as “Russian-speaking” overall in Ukraine.
There are some contradictions here, and I guess the language issue is sensitive.
If you disregard Crimea, quite a few were happy to speak Russian but did not want to live under Russian rule, I take away; Kharkiv resisted strongly, for example.
Can Ukraine “forgive” the geographical areas LPR and DPR?
They are supposed to join the EU, so starting a hate campaign with some ethnic cleansing in the east will not go very well if they also want to join the EU. It will be reconciliation of the whole thing.
And how they voted for different presidents,
https://www.eurasian-research.org/publication/geography-of-the-presidential-elections-in-ukraine/
Some interesting bits – Leonid Kuchma wanted to approach NATO and Donetsk voted for him. He became president before he did that, and both candidates were old arch-communists. https://www.quora.com/Is-Leonid-Kuchma-a-pro-Russia-or-pro-Western
In 2004, it was between Yanukovich and Yushchenko. Kharkiv, Zaporizia, and Kherson all voted for Yanukovich – how have they positioned themselves regarding Russian occupation?
What is interesting then is that the whole country voted for Poroshenko in 2014.
In 2019, the whole country (except Lviv for some reason…) voted for Zelensky.
We do not know how the “free republics” DPR and LPR would have voted, but we quickly see that Russian strongholds like Kharkiv, Zaporizia, and Odessa all voted for pro-Western candidates.
Everyone remembers “Maidan,” but before that, it was the Orange Revolution that was really the start of everything. For example, I did not know that autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk was already on the table then.
That was probably because they were Ukraine’s powerhouse and wanted to keep the resources within the oblasts and not send everything to Kiev?
However, it is very important to note that the SBU, GRU, parliament, and supreme court all rejected Yanukovych’s rigged election and attempted coup in 2004, and unanimously supported Yushchenko.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Orange_Revolution
In 2010, Yanukovych won over Tymoshenko in what was considered a fair election. Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Kherson voted for Yanukovych.
This article from Reuters is very interesting; Yanukovych never intended to crash EU rapprochement, quite the opposite actually. Reuters has high credibility as a source,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-russia-deal-special-report-idUSBRE9BI0DZ20131219
The fact was that earlier in his career, Yanukovych had worked for integration with the EU, so Donetsk and Luhansk, when they voted for him, should reasonably have known that he was pro-EU?
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/06/the-ukrainian-presidents-big-broken-promise/
He fled to Kharkiv and then to Crimea, never Donetsk or Luhansk as I had thought – you always learn something new.
He was apparently the least popular president ever, in a country of least popular presidents ever.
And he was probably Donetsk and Luhansk’s favorite candidate because he had worked politically there before.
There is nothing really suspicious about Maidan – Yanukovych betrayed Ukraine for Russia in action.
I have seen this kind of thing when I worked abroad; you have loyalty to another party and try to appear impartial, but over time it becomes very clear. I was reading his Wikipedia page about his presidency, and everything was to benefit Russia. By definition, he was probably a traitor under Ukrainian law or something and did right to flee when it became unstable.
This one I don’t think has been so clear before, at least not to me – Yanukovych disproportionately favored Donbass during his presidency.
“By January 2013, more than half of the ministers appointed by Yanukovych were either born in the Donbas region or made some crucial part of their careers there, and Yanukovych has been accused of ”regional cronyism” for his staffing of police, judiciary, and tax services ”all over Ukraine” with ”Donbas people”.[181] Over 46% of the budget subventions for social and economic development was allotted to the Donbas region’s Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast administrations – 0.62 billion UAH ($76.2 million) versus 0.71 billion UAH ($87.5 million) for the rest of the country”.
73% of parliament voted for impeachment of Yanukovych – over a two-thirds majority.
“The Party of Regions voted against the motion (with the exception of one MP) and the Communists abstained”
I cannot find how Luhansk and Donetsk parliamentarians voted.
I wonder if there really was a big conflict between Donbass and the rest of Ukraine or if it was Yanukovych’s presidency and then Russian subversive activity followed by the invasion of Crimea that whipped it up?
When the president was removed, a rally was held in Donetsk by the Eastern Front separatist movement; the picture looks quite empty. Unfortunately, I can’t find a number for them, but if I had to guess, hundreds maybe a few thousand identified with the movement, out of several million.
Then came the “uprising” where they took over all official buildings after the Russians jumped on Crimea – here Russian operators are already pulling all the strings, it is completely staged.
“Russia covertly supported the separatists with troops and heavy weaponry, only later admitting sending ”military specialists”
– it was already widely known then that the Russians let some maladjusted alcoholics stand at the front but behind them were the Russian army’s Spetsnaz and VDV. As soon as things went well for Ukraine, the regular Russian army showed up and restored the balance.
LW often wrote about them getting tanks at the local ICA, if I recall correctly.
Donbass was a powerhouse like Norrland and was probably annoyed that Kiev just took the taxes and didn’t give them anything back. You often read “cut the transmission cable and let them produce their own electricity in SE3” in Sweden, for example, but that has not led to civil war – because a third party is not inside exploiting the discontent (bad example, I know).
Yanukovych favored Donbass significantly, and when he was removed, there was apparently discontent to capitalize on?
EU?
Now you can’t say what DPR and LPR think and feel, but in the other eastern parts, they are quite pro-EU now.
Even the arch-villain Serbia seems a bit keen on the EU, we read the other day.
https://neweasterneurope.eu/2021/02/12/attitudes-to-european-integration-in-donbas-countering-the-myth-of-a-pro-russian-region/
We have seen how the Russians treated Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, especially Kherson which was taken early and was supposed to become a Russian province – they had a Russian version of kid gloves on.
At first, there were wild demonstrations against the Russians, then came the torture centers and ethnic cleansing, then came videos of “Russian support” where people were forced out with Russian flags. And finally, tears and crowded streets when Ukraine liberated Kherson.
We also know from Gammelsvenskby how much they despised the occupiers, and it is right in the middle of Russia-land if you are to believe the maps above. I trust the reporting from Gammelsvenskby and see it as a primary source.
We already know that in the DPR and LPR they have been governed by “warlords” and that it is a more violent dog-eat-dog society than in Russia, which is itself a violent dog-eat-dog society.
I guess many pro-Ukrainians have fled westward over the years?
I assume that in the LPR and DPR they have had the same type of torture centers and devastated the country and that prosperity is minimal there, so they are probably dependent on Russian aid; one can guess how much they now get to live on. But the history has not been written there yet.
The absolute fanatics are probably the administration and the 1st and 2nd Army corps.
Sometime last spring we learned that of the original 25,000 hardcore or so in these army corps, virtually all were dead or wounded. They today largely consist of those recruited during the war, volunteers or not.
We know they have been used even more recklessly than Russian army brigades and that they have complained a lot. Muntz(?) often writes about it.
The administration in Luhansk began moving their families to Russia when UA pressed towards Kreminna.
If I may guess, I think all fanatics and those who have committed crimes will flee to Russia as Ukraine approaches.
The DPR has only controlled about half of Donetsk Oblast and for Luhansk it is probably larger. The entire oblast has never been under Russian control.
If I had lived as a citizen in the DPR and LPR, I would be damn tired of Russian peace now.
When the war ends and EU membership and a job you can live on as well as Western living standards are dangled before them, the provinces will probably be well integrated within 10-15 years.
The administration will flee, we already know that because they did so in Kherson and then they have already sent their families eastward in Luhansk.
The armies have their families left in the LPR and DPR and will of course lay down their arms rather than have the areas completely destroyed.
Before Russian subversive activity really started, it felt more like the Norrland-Stockholm feud or the fight for a free Skåne.
Ukraine shall and will not cede land in Donbass to the DPR and LPR; that is entirely Putin-driven and not good for Ukraine, that proposal is about as good as Yanukovych was for Ukraine.
As some genius wrote in the thread – investments do not come with an imminent threat of conflict.
Above all, how many rebel movements have not given up throughout history and the countries have become very successful.
Personally, I believe the whole picture that Ukraine will never be able to reintegrate Donbass is Russian psyops.
To be very clear, you never said that MRF, only that the 1st and 2nd Army corps will not throw in the towel as I believe and I spun on quite a bit beyond that, I am not throwing around any accusations 😀
Probably in 20-30 years Donbass will be synonymous with a well-paid industrial job and high prosperity. Guest workers from the rest of the EU will go there and work for the cigar-smoking factory owners in Donetsk.
On the other side of the border, famine and diseases rage and they make a living smuggling to the rich Ukraine that pays in the coveted currency dollars and euros.
10:47 – Johan No.1
When I was reading about Yanukovych I realized the extent of the Russian criminal clan cancer. He had 12 billion dollars and lived with gold bars, his own animal something, 50 vintage cars, helicopter, kind of like Pablo Escobar. On an official salary of 2000 USD/month and he came from a sort of street kid family, no money behind him.
Russia’s subversive activity is incredible and they constantly push out the absolute worst in a country.
It made me feel that Europe should seize the opportunity and seriously classify the Russian dictatorship as a terrorist organization so that cooperation with Russia falls under anti-terrorism legislation. That has been well developed since 9/11 and ISIS and can be used against Russian subversive activity legally and effectively.
The Russian dictatorship loves a constant state of crisis. They murder opposition, imprison, drag things out. They have no qualms and can commit any crimes.
Do you think Gandhi-style low-reactivity responses work?
They probably couldn’t care less.
A country of 140 million where 25% do not have running water or sewage and where the elite are worth tens of billions USD and live like gods.
During the Soviet era they used the mafia to control the citizens so the leadership was in cahoots with organized crime against the citizens… now the state and organized crime are almost the same?
This rogue state deserves to be reshaped and I understand that maybe nothing sensible will arise from the ashes but it is truly corrupt, almost incomprehensible.
Russia ranks very high on the corruption index and I have sat and just gaped at the inventiveness of corruption before when I worked in countries in Africa and this is exactly the same but the country has had international recognition.
One wishes every day that the citizens could pull away the veil and take hold of this and one is still surprised after a year how Russian soldiers can walk straight into death every day by the thousands.
The world is not fair and there is a high probability that Russia will continue in the same spirit as before but one certainly wishes that Ukraine can spread its democracy to Belarus and Russia so that this rogue state after many hundreds of years of plundering becomes something better.
This is a real chance to reshape this corrupt cancer that has its subversive tentacles far into the EU but second best is to cut off the tentacles and isolate the country.
10:50 – MatsExtrude
+1 Reassuring reading!
If my theory about monthly cycles is correct (which I believe depends on deliveries of weapons and ammunition) it is enough that Ukraine can hold out a week longer at Bakhmut before the Russians reach this month’s low point. Reading what Gregg writes, he thinks it will take them a week to take Krhomove. I am not at all sure they will succeed.
Of course, Bakhmut can be considered so important that some resources are redistributed there but on the other hand, it seems the chef has fallen out of favor… We’ll see.
11:00 – MatsExtrude
+100 Really good review!
11:04 – MatsExtrude
+100
11:17 – Johan No.1
Pro-Russian debaters have gotten new talking points and it is less and less about winning the war itself and more about Ukraine being at the breaking point in everything, NATO-West hatred, and lots of explanatory models for everything.
Full speed on other forums I think and very impressive how the Russians can get thousands of ordinary Swedes to start arguing the same talking points simultaneously. They have built up a trust capital for their sources that these people like to read well.
11:33 – Johan No.1
Saw that the fight has flared up and that Shoigu was at Vuhledar to get the army to take something, anything.
This affects quite a lot which is perfect 👍
Not even how they shall die can they agree on, completely worthless in every category.
11:51 – Johan No.1
According to this guy, it seems that all the major tank factories in Russia have received large deliveries of T62s to modify.
If they are filling the factories with T62s and not T80, T90, or T72, they reasonably have problems; a tank is a tank, it still takes up space, and instead of a T90 or T80, it becomes a T62 at the front?
There should be 3000 T80s and 600 T90s to send to those factories to make them combat-ready?
No one really believes these numbers anymore, but filling the factories with hundreds of T62s is a huge crack.
https://twitter.com/TheIDGuyy/status/1631760852448694272?s=20
12:24 – MatsExtrude
Yes, they definitely have problems.
I wonder if it is because they don’t dare send in more T-80/90s, but are saving them for defense of other borders, if they have them deployed along the border with trained personnel.
12:29 – Johan No.1
That could absolutely be the case, for the defense of Russia, and they have sent what they have.
12:32 – Johan No.1
I saw a documentary about how the USA keeps old battleships from WW2 in reserve.
They have an entire service corps that, according to different stages, maintains these battleships, and then they have a decommissioning program where they scrap them.
And if they want to put one back into service, as they did during the Gulf War, they have a program for that too.
It is incredibly ambitious and very far from just parking them in a field and opening the hatch.
10:28 – Johan No.1
Do you remember the discussion about it being the (relative) elite that attacked in January and that the (relatively) capable offensive reserve was decimated by under 60% in January and February (around 55% it was, but under 60% sounded better. Hoped for 70%, but in February they attacked with newly mobilized troops in between unfortunately – army brigades).
Now the losses remain high in March and at Bakhmut they throw in the best they have, “real Wagner”, VDV and Spetznaz (if I did not misinterpret the unit) and up in Kreminna it is the VDV that disappears in the forests southwest of the town.
When March ends, there is a high probability that they have seen their offensive reserve of 150,000 decimated quite a bit more if Bakhmut remains open. If they get the idea to attack on the southern front when the command cannot withstand Putin’s demands, that would be excellent, for example.
Apparently there were 4,990 dead during the past week (thanks to MRF). Now maybe the winter injuries are starting to ease, but as known I believe in a 1:2 ratio for the Russian side.
Then they don’t have much operational strength left to plug breakthroughs with, but Bakhmut and the big naval battle at Zaporizia were surely worth it – I have a bit of difficulty figuring out the overall Russian plan here and they probably do too.
It’s simple subtraction, we knew roughly what they had left when mobilization started in early autumn and they let these and DPR/LPR take the hit all autumn, we know the losses, wounded (I believe 1:2) and the number of winter casualties in January – February.
We also know that Wagner is decimated by 80%.
And that DPR and LPR have taken enormous damage but I have no numbers, the only thing I remember at the start of the war was that pro-Russian media claimed they were 100,000 strong so probably somewhat less – they had mobilized up from maybe 45,000.
And then that the 25,000 hardcore DPR and LPR soldiers who had been there since the rebellion time were dead or severely wounded last spring/summer.
I have guessed that today they might be a force of 40,000 men left but now they have attacked with 3 brigades at Vuhledar and then probably quite a few of them are dying at Avdiivka and in the Donetsk area and things are going very badly there.
Their “offensive” spearhead is not 40,000 either, perhaps that should be clarified.
Above all, they let DPR (relative) elite units run across the fields with drawn sabers at Vuhledar and Avdiivka so they are probably mostly gone, one hopes.
– 1st and 2nd Army corps should be quite decimated and second-rate, I think.
Bakhmut – according to earlier, if the Russians manage to get past Khromove it will probably become a critical situation. Today it seems UA has deployed units capable of urban combat in Bakhmut and replaced other units so they are definitely preparing for a delaying battle through the town of Bakhmut.
On the eastern side of Bakhmutka there are only mobile patrols left to cause damage, it said a few days ago.
As long as they can hold Ivanivske and the western road, it is perfectly possible to nest even if the Russians stand in Khromove and Bohdanivka, there are several forest belts over the fields and those who remain will withdraw at night on foot over 2 km before they reach Ivanivske.
There is a small danger that as an observer you only see the northern pincers expanding without thinking that UA just pushed the Russians away from the south of the town (Ivanivske and the road) and that they have created more space to move in – as long as they can nest whenever they want, they continue.
We are constantly deceived by the fact that the Russians’ BTG goes towards zero and that Ukraine saves lives, the attacks north of Bakhmut are absolutely madness in every category – it is infantry advancing over open fields against UA in defense who have been reinforced with tanks and IFVs and who fire all indirect fire they have on them. Someone demanded a scope and then they do it until they can no longer encompass because they are dead.
RU is certainly sending down more brigades from Kreminna during March and the fighting continues but now Ukraine has dedicated mechanized and armored units to the area north of Bakhmut AND they have dominant terrain around the Russian smoke cloud and north of that.
We learned that the hills are less wet than the lowlands where the Russians advance so it is possible to drive heavy vehicles up there.
If they manage to slow down that northern advance we are heading towards the following scenario –
They gave up south of Bakhmut and are now trying an even larger scope west of the town which is completely pointless.
If they are stopped/pushed back north of the town they have only one option left and they already have a foothold east of the river/stream – straight into Bakhmut with everything they have to push UA out of the town. It is attractive when the fields are as muddy as they are.
Then UA can conduct their delaying battle through the town and then leave the town when they reach the other end – then they have maximized Russian losses for a place completely without value.
It may happen that the Russians try to expand the scope and press northwest of Bakhmut but there is significantly dominant terrain there that UA defends so they will probably get nowhere there either.
Since UA will meet these units sooner or later they choose sooner, to me it looks like they try to force the Russians to attack where UA wants and they try to repeat Severodonetsk.
I understand that the Russians run their psyops on steroids to try to force Ukraine to leave something they cannot manage to not leave – cheating is kind of their trademark.
Then some Russian milbloggers start to get worried that their team is overextending itself in Bakhmut – which of course they are.
According to earlier, UA has prepared defenses around Bakhmut so it will be just like Soledar when they withdrew from the town – no breakthrough.
We also got a number down by the Dnieper, a bit more than I thought maybe (was up in the thread yesterday from some shining light).
https://twitter.com/friaukraina/status/1632126112556785664?s=46&t=q1Wy-WR3ujjd6Rll-UvRFA