09:37 – Johan No.1
Hi LW, my post got stuck in the filter if you find time to let it through.
09:57 – Johan No.1
MRF response below to your post yesterday 2023-03-19 15:26 – 15:26 titled – “To be or not to be source-critical?”
There have been many comments appreciating the good tone and that it has been educational, etc., so this seems to be a positive discussion?
I continue as before in the same spirit you started – my “monopoly analysis” and your expressed desire to provoke a bit.
One thing I wanted to ask is why you often move from discussing with me to starting to discuss about me – as you do in this post. That is a discussion technique I am not used to and I am just curious.
A bit of calibration regarding sources – we have open sources to relate to, some of our sources get information from the army either from soldiers or officially. I have guessed the Accent man and Gregg has confirmed it himself regarding himself.
Then there are sources that have bits of truth but you have to filter hard to get the grains of truth – Girkin for example and Rybar.
Then we have the Twitter gods where one should write “unconfirmed” after their post.
Then there are formal sources – UA channels.
We have long discussed that UA has rarely been caught lying but the Russians have been caught every day and we have given UA high credibility.
If a number on manpower comes formally from UA – if we have a better source than that, can one not also phrase it?
I can absolutely accept a +/-10 margin of error but to completely reject formally communicated information – is there really grounds for that?
Then we have Western assessors versus Russian assessors – I choose to use sources from Western assessors and completely ignore officially communicated Russian information.
However, I sit and trawl Slava and the other swamp sites not to be too positive 😀
From these open sources that we have now evaluated, we get information – I call it puzzle pieces, which we evaluate and rank. We take the likely puzzle pieces and use them to get a probable sequence of events going forward.
-I think it’s fun to predict in the swamp so I do it, you are allowed to.
-Others want to wait until something has happened before they comment – that’s allowed too.
-You also like to predict in the swamp actually because you often discuss what can or cannot happen 😀
You call your reasoning source-critical but what you do is write that everything around Ukraine is uncertain so possibly they have worse conditions than we think – we interpret it too positively.
Then you believe we underestimate the Russian capability and that we (or at least you) have anxiety and are worried that Ukraine cannot achieve its partial goals to return to the February 14, 2022 borders or in the worst case that Ukrainian motivation fails and they give up continued warfare in about a year or so.
You rarely respond to the “facts” (probably the correct bits of information) I try to present from sources we should trust with your own facts but you write the above circular reasoning that everything is uncertain and subjective, and spice it with a bit of “monopoly,” “free fantasies,” and “dreams” to, according to your own statement, provoke a bit.
And with this post of yours that we are now discussing, you question the sources as a whole instead of going through them one by one. I do not find that constructive for continued discussion at all but rather an attempt to diminish the credibility of all our sources with one post?
Your stance is absolutely not a neutral stance (perhaps you never claimed that so I risk putting words in your mouth here) or to be source-critical as you present it – you have a very strong opinion on the matter where you question Ukraine’s ability to win the war = regain its territory (absolutely not the same as Russia winning the war!).
– now you are absolutely entitled to that opinion but I just want to point out that it is not some kind of “grumpy old man questioning” – it IS a strong opinion that you have because you have anxiety about it according to your own statement, and then it must be strong I think?
We have had these discussions about UA manpower, ammunition shortage, and now the seven points and seldom do you provide source references or information, it comes a subjective-something, everything is uncertain, sources cannot be trusted, previous discussions are not considered at all and all paired with your strong opinion that Ukraine may give up continued fighting going forward (about a year) or at least not manage to retake terrain to pre-2022.
-all this is okay to think, I do not judge that, but I question that you constantly refer to great uncertainty and that you do not know while at the same time having a strong opinion on the subject.
Now it got a bit extra funny because the day before yesterday you questioned my statement “We know that Ukraine has higher manpower, better-trained soldiers, and more equipment than a year ago.”
Then it totally flipped – I used the same source that you yourself used and could show that you were unable to interpret your own source, and moreover, you were very assertive on the issue with my “monopoly” analysis.
Access to armor is a very important part of Ukraine’s capability, I think we can probably agree on that.
You believed that Ukraine would get/has gotten fewer tanks than they have lost – a downward trend in materiel can only be the conclusion.
At the same time, the truth was that they lost T64s but received more Western tanks, modified T72s, and captured serviceable Eastern tanks than they lost, so they were both qualitatively and quantitatively stronger than at the start of the war.
When you have such a big factual error that you completely avoid and then move on with – “The difference in substance between Johan and me when I choose to put on these grumpy old man source-critical glasses is that I cannot agree with many of his ‘We know that…’ statements.”
That, at least in my opinion, lowers the credibility of your questioning of my sources.
People see information very differently; if nothing else, this thread is a brilliant proof of that.
People often interpret information based on affiliation, how they themselves perceive the source from which the information comes – in general terms and not directed at you so it is not misunderstood.
I believe it is HMS Repulse who usually points out that if during this war one has chosen to attack positive Ukrainian information, one has been right more times than wrong, and if one has chosen to attack Russian information, one has been wrong every time.
What source criticism should tell us is that the pieces of information we get from credible Ukrainian sources are the best we will get and that they should be the starting point for further discussions – at least that is what I think.
No one else needs to think that because this is a free forum to discuss in and we should maintain a good tone – which we mostly do, which is good.
Then I want to emphasize this again – you HAVE a very strong opinion on the matter and that is that you doubt Ukraine’s ability to retake the terrain to before February 14, 2022 (I assume that you then doubt their ability to liberate the entire country because that follows automatically) and that you are worried that Ukraine will not hold out if they take losses (you believe that in a year Ukraine might start to falter) and finally you are quite sure that we underestimate the Russian capability.
-this is your position in what we are discussing, you rarely refer to your own sources and there are many subjective arguments and a bit provocative towards me with “free fantasies,” “daydreaming,” and “monopoly analyses” (which in itself is completely fine and I meet you at the same level which I have no problem with).
Now I am thinking about this positive interpretation of Ukrainian information and that you have now questioned my monopoly analysis and sources – what starts our spring offensive in my monopoly analysis is a diversionary offensive at Bakhmut.
If there now is a diversionary offensive at Bakhmut – does that then increase my credibility with you and can we rise above this discussion about us disagreeing on the sources?
Finally, you pose the rhetorical question of whether we should continue the discussion – I absolutely think we should continue the discussion because these are important topics we are discussing and it is very good if we can clear up inaccuracies and reach consensus where possible.
09:58 – Johan No.1
What the hell!
09:58 – Johan No.1
MRF response below to your post yesterday 2023-03-19 15:26 – 15:26 titled – “To be or not to be source-critical?”
There have been many comments that they appreciated the good tone and that it has been educational etc., so this seems to be a positive discussion?
I continue as before in the same spirit that you started – my “monopoly analysis” and your stated desire to provoke a little.
One thing I wanted to ask is why you often go from discussing with me to starting to discuss about me – as you do in this post of yours. It is a discussion technique I am not used to and I am just curious.
A bit of calibration regarding sources – we have open sources to relate to, some of our sources get information from the army either from soldiers or officially. I have guessed the Accent Man and Gregg has confirmed it himself regarding himself.
Then there are sources that have bits of truth but which you have to filter heavily to get the grains of truth – Girkin for example and Rybar.
Then we have the Twitter gods where one should write – unconfirmed – after their post.
Then there are formal sources – UA channels.
We have long discussed that UA has rarely been caught lying but the Russians have been caught every day and we have given UA high credibility.
If a figure on numbers comes formally from UA – if we have a better source than that, can one not also phrase it?
I can absolutely accept a +/-10 margin of error but to completely reject formally communicated information – is there really grounds for that?
Then we have Western assessors versus Russian assessors – I choose to use sources from Western assessors and completely ignore officially communicated Russian information.
However, I sit and troll Slava and the other swamp pages so as not to be too positive 😀
From these open sources that we have now evaluated we get information – I call it puzzle pieces, which we evaluate and rank. We take the likely puzzle pieces and use them to get a probable sequence of events going forward.
-I think it’s fun to speculate so I do it, you are allowed to.
– Others want to wait until something has happened before they comment – that is allowed too.
– You also like to speculate actually because you often discuss what can or cannot happen 😀
You call your reasoning source-critical but what you do is write that everything about Ukraine is uncertain so possibly they have worse conditions than we think – we interpret it too positively.
Then you believe that we underestimate the Russian capability and that we (or at least you) have anxiety and are worried that Ukraine cannot achieve its partial goals to return to the February 14, 2022 borders or in the worst case that Ukrainian motivation fails and they give up continued warfare in about a year or so.
You rarely counter the “facts” (probably correct pieces of information) I try to present from sources we should trust with your own facts but you write the above circular reasoning that everything is uncertain and subjective, and spice it up with a bit of “monopoly,” “free fantasies,” and “dreams” to, according to your own statement, provoke a little.
And with this post of yours that we are now discussing, you question the sources in their entirety instead of going through them one by one. I do not find that constructive for continued discussion at all but rather an attempt to diminish the credibility of all our sources with one post?
Your stance is absolutely not a neutral position (which you may never have claimed, so there is a risk that I am putting words in your mouth here) or being source-critical as you present it – you have a very strong opinion on the matter where you question Ukraine’s ability to win the war = regain its territory (absolutely not the same as Russia winning the war!).
– now you are absolutely entitled to that opinion but I just want to point out that it is not some kind of “grumpy old man questioning” – it IS a strong opinion that you have because you have anxiety about it according to your own statement, and then it must be strong, I think?
We have had these discussions about UA numerics, ammunition shortage, and now the seven points, and rarely do you provide source references or information, it comes as some subjective something, everything is uncertain, sources cannot be trusted, previous discussions are not considered at all, and all paired with your strong opinion that Ukraine might give up continued fighting in the future (some year) or at least not manage to take back terrain to pre-2022 levels.
– all this is okay to think, I do not judge that, but I question that you constantly refer to great uncertainty and that you do not know when you at the same time have a strong opinion on the subject.
Now it got a bit extra interesting because the day before yesterday you questioned my statement “We know that Ukraine has higher numerics, better-trained soldiers, and more materiel than a year ago.”
Then it completely flipped – I used the same source that you yourself used and could show that you were unable to interpret your own source, and moreover, you were very boastful on the issue with my “monopoly” analysis.
Access to armor is a very important part of Ukraine’s capability, we can probably agree on that.
You believed that Ukraine would get/has gotten fewer tanks than they have lost – a downward trend in materiel can only be the conclusion.
At the same time, the truth was that they lost T64s but received more Western tanks, modified T72s, and captured serviceable Eastern tanks than they lost, so they were both qualitatively and quantitatively stronger than at the start of the war.
When you have such a big factual error that you completely avoid and then move on with – “The difference in substance between Johan and me when I choose to put on these grumpy old man source-critical glasses is that I cannot agree with many of his ‘We know that…’.”
That, in my opinion, lowers the credibility of your questioning of my sources.
Information is seen very differently, if nothing else, this thread is a brilliant proof of that.
Information is often interpreted based on an affiliation, how one perceives the source from which the information comes – in general terms and not directed at you so it is not misunderstood.
I believe it is HMS Repulse who usually points out that if during this war one has chosen to attack positive Ukrainian information, one has been right more times than wrong, and if one has chosen to attack Russian information, one has been wrong every time.
What source criticism should tell us is that the pieces of information we get from credible Ukrainian sources are the best we will get and that they should be the starting point for further discussions – at least that is what I think.
Then no one else needs to think that because this is a free forum to discuss in and we should maintain good tone – which we mostly do, which is good.
Then I want to emphasize this again – you HAVE a very strong opinion on the matter and that is that you doubt Ukraine’s ability to regain the terrain to before February 14, 2022 (I assume that you then doubt their ability to liberate the entire country because that follows automatically) and that you are worried that Ukraine will not hold out if they take losses (you believe that in a year Ukraine might start to falter) and finally you are quite sure that we underestimate the Russian capability.
– this is your position in what we are discussing, you rarely refer to your own sources and there are many subjective arguments and a bit provocative towards me with “free fantasies,” “daydreaming,” and “monopoly analyses” (which is perfectly fine and I put myself on the same level which I have no problem with).
Now I am thinking about this with positive interpretation of Ukrainian information and that you have now questioned my monopoly analysis and sources – what starts the spring offensive in my monopoly analysis is a diversionary offensive at Bakhmut.
If there now is a diversionary offensive at Bakhmut – does that then raise my credibility with you and can we rise above this discussion that we disagree about the sources?
Finally, you pose the rhetorical question of whether we should continue the discussion – I absolutely think we should continue the discussion because these are important topics we are discussing and it is very good if we can clear up inaccuracies and reach consensus where possible.
09:58 – Johan No.1
Sorry for the full thread spamming.
11:16 – Johan No.1
MRF – response to your post.
2023-03-19 22:43 – 22:43
“One more response in Johan’s and my marathon tonight. Namely about Russia’s capability (Jn1’s post at 10:02, search ‘response to MRF 2’).”
I continue to address you directly even if you discuss about me rather than to me, I think it is more straightforward in some way.
First, I just want to remind you of what you wrote so it doesn’t get lost – “I am sure that most in the thread, probably including myself, underestimate the Russian capability. That does not mean they do not have lots of problems. But they actually have capability too, which unfortunately has been shown during the past year.”
I continue in the same spirit as you started earlier – “monopoly analysis” and your desire to provoke a bit.
Ukraine was absolutely prepared for a winter offensive and I think most believed that. I looked at the probability of it and also considered that since Russia would benefit from a long war, they would go on the defense this winter. Many analysts also agreed that a long war would benefit Russia.
A statement from the US flew by in January urging Ukraine in media channels to wait with their offensive until they received Western armor.
(is Reuters okay as a source?)
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-officials-advise-ukraine-wait-offensive-official-says-2023-01-20/
The first week of January everything changed – the West promised to send tanks and they promised unconditional support all the way until Ukraine regained all its territory.
Then the conditions reasonably changed as well?
You posted things I wrote in December 2022 based on the information available then.
Now this was known earlier by all involved parties naturally, only that we in open sources got everything at once with a bang. You remember the feeling of jubilation when everyone outdid each other donating tanks to Ukraine’s cause and then nearly crying when the VDV went and died in droves over the potato fields.
Now Russia chose to preempt Ukraine’s offensive with its own, and we have the results of how that went.
The big mistake I think you are making – that doesn’t mean Russia had the capability, but they chose the least bad option, I think?
Russia had a numerical/capability/capacity on January 6, and today, March 20, they have significantly reduced it because they went on the offensive on January 6.
If Ukraine had chosen to go on the offensive at the same time, who knows how it would have gone, probably very chaotic, but now they chose to go on the defense.
It is hardly proof of Russian capability that they went on the offensive on January 6, rather panic mixed with desperation to try to achieve a decisive outcome before Western arms deliveries reached Ukraine – this is my opinion.
This opinion of mine would be strengthened if it turns out that the Russians have reduced their capability with their winter offensive, thus giving an opening for Ukraine’s spring offensive – we will see and we will probably return to this reasoning.
Then for a little calibration – Ukraine will suffer hell of a lot of losses this spring and summer, but this is not something we usually bring up on the forum because we have not considered it beneficial to the Ukraine discussion.
There will be piles of dead Ukrainians before this is over, orphaned children and widows crashing.
Quote from you MRF – “So please Johan, do not respond to my arguments one more time with claims that more or less directly imply that I believe that.”
Yes, you are right, your opinion in the discussion we are now having is that you are worried that Ukraine will even be able to retake the borders of February 24, 2022, and that if the Russians can hold out at least one more year, the will to fight may start to falter among Ukraine/the West.
When have I claimed that you believe Russia will win the war, was it recently?
Win the war by conquering all of Ukraine or just the oblasts which are the latest battlefield?
I cannot recall that, but the amount of information circulating is quite high right now – if I have done so, I take it back now, fairness must prevail.
Now you enter, in my opinion, a flawed reasoning about Russian capability, I quote you below –
“These capabilities can be anything: Well or reasonably trained units with equipment that can inflict significant losses on Ukraine during offensive attempts. Competently built rear defense lines with fortifications, minefields, etc., which will make advancing time-consuming and resource-demanding. Russian air force which, despite many rumors to the contrary, does not seem to be inactive or just grounded. New troops with high morale who can tie up Ukrainian troops at several points in a continued attempt at a war of attrition. Continued artillery and missile fire that adds to the economic damage to Ukraine which is already enormous (but in 49 out of 50 cases is never mentioned or factored in when the forum speculates on when Russia due to sanctions will become so bankrupt that they must stop fighting because of it)”
The reason I have been doing somersaults since January 6, 2023, is because the reasonably trained units with equipment have been decimated this winter. We have followed reports of which VDV regiments have fought where, when the “real” Wagner was deployed, when the naval infantry went and died, and the two Spetsnaz brigades that have taken hits.
Those who could inflict significant losses on UA during an offensive have been heavily decimated by a Russian winter offensive – the Russian capability is greatly reduced.
Regarding the competent rear defense lines with fortifications and minefields, the minefields are the big threat and Ukraine has received more anti-personnel mines, mine plows, and mine rollers than we can count, and bridge layers.
We know roughly where the Russians have built their fortifications based on OSINT that has scoured satellite images, and we can be completely confident that UA has an even better intelligence situation and is trying to break through a weak point.
If you get through that weak point, the other competent defense lines become obsolete in that line/sector and must be abandoned – Lex the French.
Russian air force – yes, they probably still have hundreds left absolutely, and then the question is whether they are prepared to go down to zero or not, we will see that quite soon.
Notably, they have not deployed their air force in the Russian winter offensive, which to me signals some willingness not to lose what they have left, maybe they want to keep some as protection of the country Russia?
Ukraine’s air defense is probably the world’s best right now after Israel.
Artillery or missile fire against cities does not win wars – Lex the London Blitz.
Fortifications or defense lines rarely work to withstand a breakthrough in modern war and I think we have seen enough to reasonably assume that the Russian version of fortifications is not overly well built but a minefield is a minefield, absolutely.
Then you probably have to look up a bit and understand that you cannot lay a minefield over the entire conquered area without trying to place it in channeling terrain etc. – in certain places.
If Ukraine figures out an alternative advance route, for example by using bridge layers – then they can completely bypass laid minefields.
Then the same applies with minefields as with fortifications/defense systems – if you pass at one point, the entire mine line becomes obsolete thereafter, it doesn’t matter how many thousands of mines you have laid in that line.
I also want to respond to your last paragraph –
“What I am afraid of and what I claim we still lack somewhat reliable data on is whether the equation of Ukrainian capability reinforced with support from the West / Russian capability with what they have and can get through illegal means will really result in a total Ukrainian victory. The outcome of this war is not binary either. It could end in what must be considered a loss for both parties. Far too many data are unknown and far too many factors govern the complex process that is this war to reasonably say that it must go one way or the other.”
Now that the entire West, which slept through the first half, has decided that Ukraine is a country that belongs to the West and that will be protected and regain its territory (many statements from all Western leaders including Scholz and Macron).
Can you actually show a single war in all world history where the party that the free West wholeheartedly supported went and lost in the end (a bit vague I know, couldn’t help painting and probably wrong too but I give it a try 😀)?
I think we have a strong trend since the Napoleonic wars approximately.
(I’m not thinking Poland or some liberation or civil war in the USA, the bigger conflicts).
The fact is that Russia won some wars when they stood on the West’s side and lost spectacularly when they tried to freeload in between against military giants like an early imperialist Japan.
I think that hundreds of years of statistics as a basis for making the assumption that Ukraine will regain its territory cannot be completely unknown or too large an uncertainty factor – I give it a high probability.
Now NATO is supposed to deploy 300,000 soldiers along Russia’s western border, the ICC has issued an arrest warrant for Putin, fighter jets are coming, tanks are coming, Ukraine is to join the EU and has a high security-political value for the West.
We are just one step away from full intervention, which the West would probably have considered if needed (I think).
In Russia, they have started with food coupons, are sending BT-50 to the front, and will upgrade 800 T62s (couldn’t resist).
11:23 – MatsExtrude
+1 Factual and balanced!
A piece of advice to both of you, try not to take your discussion too personally!
You both want Ukraine to win, you just have slightly different views on how easy or difficult it will be (and how you arrive at your conclusions).
Sooner or later we will get the answer.
I appreciate both of you and your posts!
Slava Ukraini!
14:12 – MatsExtrude
+1 I saw I forgot to give!
14:19 – Johan No.1
Here you can read mines with drone grenades.
Exciting, I guess the Russians have old ones they can trigger?
https://twitter.com/noelreports/status/1637795970430689283?s=46&t=wRdogDiNAq28PKREkKAAdw
14:35 – MatsExtrude
These are also interesting, even though they are about finding mines:
https://www.axios.com/2022/08/29/drones-landmines-ukraine
If you combine both methods, you have a fairly reliable way to clear them.
I don’t know about magnetic mines, but if you manage to hit them directly with a grenade, they should probably detonate as well?
16:17 – Johan No.1
Do we have any videos yet of smiles and backslaps from the war criminal and China’s dictator?
Putin at least didn’t meet at the airport, where did he receive anyone?
16:20 – MatsExtrude
Unclear what they are up to but it is not a backslap.
“Wait a minute! What is going on here? #XiJinping”
16:21 – MatsExtrude
Here they sit and lie to each other..
Xi Jinping about the next presidential election in Russia (scheduled for 2024): “I am sure that the Russian people will support you in your good beginnings”
https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1637833786866954240
16:22 – Johan No.1
https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1637820744494206979?s=20
16:23 – Johan No.1
That one must be fake?
16:24 – Johan No.1
I’m no expert at all but doesn’t it look like Putin is not directly locking eyes with Xi with his superior facial expression which is somewhat his trademark?
Xi looks mostly sympathetic in my opinion, both look uncomfortable and would prefer everything to end.
16:25 – MatsExtrude
Definitely fake but funny anyway! 🙂
16:31 – MatsExtrude
Agree! Xi looks almost a bit condescending/patronizing just as they sat down.
16:34 – Johan No.1
This is Putin’s ”Biden moment”, it doesn’t look a second like when Biden brohugged Zelensky.
Chinese are reserved but if you want publicity, smiles and handshakes are never wrong.
18:44 – Johan No.1
Now it’s probably you who usually starts discussing first under my posts and starts with words like ”wild fantasies”, ”daydreams”, ”monopoly analyses” and expresses a desire to provoke a bit with subjective sweeping arguments?
Now you’ve had a discussion of that for a couple of days and at the level you indicated you wanted but you didn’t like it?
So your ”jabs” are good but if I try to get on the same level then it’s bad – just so I understand how you think because it seems quite a lot like there is one order for you and then another order for me here😀
These have been some good days, if you want to know, it takes a little more than an hour in the morning, I save what I’ve written and can pull out the information again – we’ve been doing this for a year now, haven’t we.
Only now do I understand your position on the Ukraine war which I hadn’t fully done before but yes, I gladly spend that hour on normal posts instead of replies to you.
Last paragraph – I do not appreciate you discussing my family, my children or my private life, that is far below the lowest level I want with you and I hope that can be respected!
You got the discussion you wanted to provoke, you were wrong on a couple of relevant factual issues, you didn’t like the tone you set, now you want to go out and do it by going straight at me as a person in a long closing post from your side 👍
We agreed sometime last spring that we wouldn’t write under each other’s comments and then you couldn’t keep away and were back.
Shall we go back to that, for my part a brilliant idea 👍
Peace and lilies!😀
20:20 – Johan No.1
Darth Putin can’t stop mocking the arrest warrant on Putin or the fiasco visit with Xi and this was one of the better ones (maybe second best on that…).
https://twitter.com/DarthPutinKGB/status/1637889218125897752?s=20
20:26 – Johan No.1
According to Skumpan, the average Russian is now starting to use ration cards.
But when Xi is visiting, the entire pantry is opened wide –
https://twitter.com/olliecarroll/status/1637825730854649857?s=20
A sure sign of a dictator, Mugabe and rocketman probably took in extra tax for their birthday to afford the lobster.
20:27 – Johan No.1
Now that I think about it, MatsExtrude posted that hours ago and now it was just Darth Putin, sorry…
20:29 – Johan No.1
Super five on that I see now…
20:35 – Johan No.1
Has this been up?
Russia is inside the NATO country Bulgaria and killing and rampaging.
20:52 – Johan No.1
Almost mandatory reading from Rob Lee who has high trust as a source.
His analysis of Bakhmut and the spring offensive is in line with what we think in the thread.
Defmon seems to have changed his mind because he retweeted this and hasn’t demanded retreat from Bakhmut for a couple of days – good sign.
23:03 – MatsExtrude
🤣
07:20 – Johan No.1
An addition without taking the discussion further because it is now closed – you understand just like I do that I have been very careful to quote exactly what you wrote to me when I raised your position on the issue – it would have been a huge mistake to put words in your mouth that I would have had to eat several times, open goal.
Then if that wasn’t/isn’t your whole position is of course another matter and now it was settled.
A bit of internet etiquette is roughly like this – no invectives, you may perceive it as ”jabs” and think it’s really fun to be ”grumpy old man critical of sources” but for those who spend time on posts with all available facts maybe ”monopoly analysis, wild fantasies and daydreaming” without in any way whatsoever backing up that claim with their own facts doesn’t feel very serious?
And if you do that for several months maybe it eventually becomes a bit tiresome?
Then maybe, if one wants to keep a good tone, one should not air that the person one is discussing with neglects their family and small children and that one feels sorry for them + posts a link at the end suggesting that on top of that, they neglect their wife?
How I could interpret it any other way than above is a bit of a mystery to me, but the apology is absolutely accepted 100% 👍
I saw four stages in this discussion –
– you find it quite fun to ridicule information without posting anything to support it – you take the position that you are questioning.
– you failed to defend your position when challenged in a completely serious discussion (where I tried to meet you at your level) and start writing about me instead of to me.
– you tried broadly to cast doubt on all my sources.
– finally, you went straight at me as a person through my family.
It’s not very strange that this became a discussion over a few days, right?
EDIT
Yep, free forum and all that and everyone can write to everyone, and above all, everyone can have any opinion (even if the thread cuts down on obvious Russian psyops).
I thought this was a very good discussion with you, I have appreciated these days and reasonably we both now have a better understanding of how the other thinks and so we move on in the discussion 👍
Peace Lilies and let’s keep going 😀
08:34 – MatsExtrude
+1
09:35 – Johan No.1
I wanted to include a “regular” post today, my report from Bakhmut is delayed, it was supposed to come yesterday morning actually after Accentmannen, if that even matters, which it doesn’t 😀
After Accentmannen’s latest below, I choose to interpret the red area as Russian and ignore the contested area in Bakhmut. Now Gregg came with a bombshell that Bakhmut will never fall, so it looks a bit bad to post this now but yesterday was spent on other things.
According to him, there is photographic evidence that UA is inside and clearing the red area and the factory area is holding.
Previous discussion that the delaying battle is coming to an end is thus obsolete since it did not reflect the situation on the ground but was a misinterpretation of the map’s contested area (and maybe also influenced by a lot of highly valued pro-Ukrainian bloggers screaming about the impending loss, were they part of a Western psyops maybe as we aired before).
I have high confidence in Accentmannen and he shares the opinion that RU has been channeled into fighting in the town deliberately.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnj1Q22Vroc
If Wagner gets its materiel from FSB/GRU, what does that say about the situation?
I have always thought they looked well-equipped and assumed Prigozhin opened his wallet but this is probably a better explanation in the middle of sanction times.
https://twitter.com/chriso_wiki/status/1637033274357710849?s=46&t=x9xIkdiY9htHp7KA5vfmCA
If Wagner is being reinforced by other private armies right now, what does that say?
In Gregg’s post from March 19 he considered that new units have arrived in the Bakhmut area which they do not know who they are but guess they are new private armies.
There are a few more layers to this onion that we don’t know about, one begins to suspect.
We must not forget that there are 500,000 more weapons in Russia – they are for crowd control and to keep the provinces in line.
Shoigu’s private army is already in Ukraine.
Who else could this be?
I never thought they would send private armies and agencies to Ukraine but if they do, the country Russia is wide open for citizens to take over, in provinces or in Moscow.
All UA then needs to do is instigate revolution in Russia to get rid of Russian aggression.
Shoigu and Gerasimov fight Wagner but FSB/GRU gives them all materiel and others in the elite support Wagner with their armed militias?
At the same time Wagner has a huge headquarters in St Petersburg and has set up 45 recruitment offices in Russia. And will mobilize 30,000 by May.
In Russia balcony flights happen daily but Prigozhin can claim that all are traitors and that the army is completely incompetent. He can call it war, war, war and also that they will lose the war.
And Girkin has sat and speculated on how Putin will be killed more than once…
I’m starting to feel that Prigozhin and Girkin fit into the picture somehow and we know that Girkin is FSB so there is now a connection if Wagner gets its equipment from FSB/GRU.
Is a hard opposition against Putin starting to form?
Patrushev has been raised as the next candidate?
At least it tells me that what comes after Putin is not better in any way, isolating them behind a NATO wall is probably the only way to get peace and quiet.
I have long wondered if the drone grenades make a difference, we learned a few weeks ago that some GUR/SBU unit knocked out six tanks in one night in northern Luhansk and now another (elite) unit knocked out 10 in one night.
https://twitter.com/warmonitor3/status/1637159784339193858?s=46&t=x9xIkdiY9htHp7KA5vfmCA
Now this is part of the pre-attack before the spring offensive to knock out heavy vehicles in defense but my god what a bloodletting of Russian armor this is – a single unit knocks out 10 in one night!
I also have an addition to everything being done to overload Russian decision-making and prevent them from sending everything to Ukraine – 300,000 NATO soldiers along Russia’s western border – very nice.
https://twitter.com/anno1540/status/1637256846195998720?s=46&t=EAOI9jEmX-wQoeqqKVlTzw
-You make Georgia shake, you blow up drones in Moscow, 300,000 NATO soldiers at the western border.
-You call for Putin in The Hague…
1.2.3.. then we get some life in Belarus pretty soon I guess.
Everything indicates a very well-coordinated campaign to throw the Russians out of Ukraine as fast as possible, I think.
Unit maps –
I count 1 Armor, 2 mech, 1 motorized and 1 Jaeger – brigades not in the combat zone but in the area around the southern front on the unit maps.
Then two marine infantry brigades have been pulled from the active front – 😀
At the southern front there are today 20 UA brigades not included above.
Overall this feels like a fairly decent number, they have 5 brigades in the rear + the two marine infantry brigades that can be moved anywhere between Kinburn and Crimea and we can be pretty sure that RU has no units to hold defense against Azov along the beaches.
Above all an epic good trick to force the Russians to spread their units over a larger area because now sandy beaches are potential threats all of a sudden, we have seen how they build fortifications all the way down in Crimea 👍
The next quite obvious focus point is Bakhmut – Soledar because there is Ukraine’s absolute elite and we see videos of the advance every day now.
We thought a few days ago that Bakhmut was one of the diversions during/before the spring offensive and it certainly looks like that right now I think?
Northern Luhansk looks like a thin picket line.
This was posted by Fram in the Night a few days ago and I wonder how much the hornet swarm of SOF and their night hunt has played a role here?
They never got out of the starting blocks despite elite units from VDV and northern Luhansk is this war’s big mystery.
https://charter97.org/en/news/2023/3/19/540589/
It is notable that RU unit maps do not respond to this in any way – because they cannot is my guess.
I seem to see one thing in the advance towards Bakhmut – a lot of ATGMs and fewer IFVs and tanks?
Could it be because the Russians are light on armor in that area?
And an early start so the ground maybe does not quite support the heavy elephants (tanks)?
UA has received thousands of ATGMs and with weapon stations on the roof they are a threat to infantry low on near PV and also hard to knock out with artillery and drones if they buzz around.
Does this signal that they are holding back IFVs and tanks for another front maybe?
All exciting questions I think.
Wagner is not exactly notorious for being mechanized and VDV is also armor-light.
UA advance
https://twitter.com/Azovsouth/status/1637358453835309057?s=20
https://twitter.com/officejjsmart/status/1637094962268454916?s=20
Then we have some videos here and there on traditional mech as well of course.
https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1636813051637776384?s=20
These are reasonably battalion-sized units moving towards Bakhmut, and everything is shrapnel protection.
Out with the L200 and truck, and in with the Ptgb 👍
There is little as satisfying and calming as long videos of Ukrainian armor on the move.
It must be absolute agony for a Russian in a trench to sit with their phone and Telegram outside Bakhmut and see long columns of Ukrainian mechanized units driving into their UFA a few miles away; they probably recognize buildings they captured months ago before being thrown out. In the end, you probably even hear the engine noises as a low-intensity rumble that never stops – and all they can do is wait, psychological warfare at wizard level.
Those in various debate forums deeply immersed in Russian propaganda and trying to argue for the criminal clan’s good cause are having a hard time now. The ICC arrest warrant irritates them immensely, and they all nervously glance towards Bakhmut and what is rumbling behind the horizon.
If I may do so, I thought I would highlight Kartograf’s post from yesterday at 12:06; I laughed so hard I shook when I read it. Hysterically funny – tears streaming with laughter. Goal sliding straight down the drain where Putin and his criminal-clan buddies belong.
(if I have upset you, Kartograf, I apologize in advance to mitigate the damage).
“Haha, anyone wanting a quick summary of how well this special operation is going can advantageously study the Russian war goals:
A year ago: To conquer all of Ukraine and reshape the entire international system
Six months ago: To annex five Ukrainian regions
Today: To avoid reparations and war crimes trials
I find it quite encouraging. I imagine that in six months the goals will evolve towards ‘To be allowed to have curtains in the cell’.”
👍