10:02 – Johan No.1
Reply to MRF 2
3
JOHAN – “Do you consider Russia to be more competent than Ukraine here?”
MRF – I am sure that most in the thread, probably including myself, underestimate the Russian capability. That does not mean they don’t have lots of problems. But they do have capability as well, which has unfortunately been demonstrated over the past year.
Do they?
What capability do they have?
I’ll give them one thing, they have excellent subversive operations and an ability to infiltrate countries, but that is because the free West does not do that. A bit like a bully who gets away with it because the others are the adults in the room.
Otherwise, just like me, you have seen since the start of the war how they have abandoned 40% of the conquered territory that they cheated their way to with Germany’s and France’s help and without declaring war, on the contrary they assured them that they would not attack UA but felt threatened by NATO and that it was self-defense.
– They have launched 5000 missiles that have had zero impact on the war because they shoot them at cities and soft targets.
– They have lost Moscow.
– They have 97% of their army in Ukraine.
– They have achieved absolutely nothing with their winter offensive.
– Putin is wanted for war crimes.
– The economy is in free fall.
And so on endlessly.
Can you not describe some of the capability they have that makes a difference because I have probably completely missed it here, it would be interesting to know what you see that I don’t?
Are you thinking of Bakhmut, Avdiivka or northern Luhansk?
Or Vuhledar?
What they have done all these years, however, is to claim with the same sweeping rhetoric that you use that they have that capability and that they are a threat – which has given them many advantages over the years, but when the cards were finally revealed they probably didn’t even have a pair of twos.
4
JOHAN – “We know that Ukraine has higher numbers, better trained soldiers and more materiel than a year ago.”
MRF – Do we know that for sure on all points? Ukraine, for example, has more than three times as many visually confirmed tank losses than the reinforcements now promised if I have counted correctly. They have clearly lost many soldiers and units that were the best trained at the outbreak of the war. They have more soldiers of course, but how high is the combat value?
MRF – “The big problem, however, is that you leave out the other part of the analysis: Is what they have enough for what they need to do. If I need 500,000 as a down payment for a new house, have 100,000 and save another 150,000 in a year, I have certainly a clear financial improvement. But I still don’t have what I need to buy the house. That level is missing throughout your reasoning.”
I don’t know how you calculate here but you are wrong in any case and this is probably the most important point of all?
Ukraine has lost 477 documented tanks (which is fewer than actual losses!).
They have been promised deliveries of 735 tanks, for example 460 T72s which have largely been delivered.
From Oryx, UA has captured from RU – 550 tanks, 264 AFVs, 607 IFVs and 98 APCs. We know that all of Eastern Europe’s workshops are working to get these vehicles operational – did you count them?
I think they have more tanks than at the start of the war and above all they now have better T72 modifications, T80/T90 and Western tanks. The majority of the lost tanks are also T64s.
Both quality and quantity are better than at the start of the war so you probably need to recalculate there.
We agree on more soldiers but then you question the combat value. I would say high since they received 28,000 volunteer applications for the “storm brigades” that are to lead offensives?
The fact that they hold Vuhledar, Bakhmut and Avdiivka argues against your suggestion of lacking morale and combat value, I think?
Also, a significantly larger portion of soldiers have now undergone NATO training than a year ago.
Here you are simply wrong and it is quite sad that you mock in terms of what you miss in my monopoly reasoning when you yourself come forward with this with high arrogance, but that also partly explains your derogatory expressions which come from not having taken in the right data.
5
JOHAN – “What do the Russians have more of than a year ago in your opinion?”
MRF – “Probably nothing except likely soldiers. But this analysis also requires another step: What is what they have enough for? We know that it is not enough for any extensive advances and to change the situation in the war in any significant way and there is no need to argue about that.”
MRF – “But how far is it enough to hold what they have taken? That is the big question mark. They have had time to prepare defenses and they have a shorter front with shorter supply lines now than last spring. Ukraine has so far not shown that they can break through more well-defended, well-organized fronts.”
This was a very good start because here we almost have consensus 😀
So they have more soldiers than at the start of the war but the same or less of everything else.
Now it’s not much larger numbers they have, since Wagner and DPR/LPR are heavily decimated and were not included in the 190,000 at the start of the war so the question is whether they actually have fewer total numbers today but that is a bit speculative and depends on how you count.
They are indisputably shorter on armor, infantry fighting vehicles, ammunition and CAS than at the start of the war – it’s good that we have consensus here too.
It is also quite obvious that they cannot advance – consensus again and fun.
In your second paragraph, you question my reasoning as monopoly analysis because we have not yet seen Ukraine manage this?
We know that they broke through prepared defenses at Izyum and at Kherson they increased pressure + choked supply until it became unsustainable.
Now that UA has received NATO training, all materiel for breakthroughs, has been dry looting for months and command has been months in Germany for their sandbox games – it is very likely that UA will succeed with breakthroughs.
Then you miss the most important point of all – if you break through a defensive line at one point, the entire defensive line then becomes obsolete. I often write this with a Lex Frenchmen after to make it as clear as possible.
If a large part of Russian units are on the southern front in defense, a breakthrough at one point is enough to get the whole front moving. Now it is a defense in depth but the same principle applies for all lines and they have probably built 2-3 at most where they are strongest and only one bad one where it is weakest.
It is somewhat in the nature of things that the attacking party looks for and finds the weak point – Lex Maginot Line.
They have already shown at Izyum that they are capable of breaking through prepared defenses with mines, so we know they can manage that.
They haven’t done this yet on the southern front, but the likelihood is high that they will succeed, and I am convinced they will – but until they have done so, it is of course possible to think that the Russians might hold what they have taken.
Even though they have already left 40% of the conquered area, I should perhaps point out that they have not so far held the territory they took very well where Ukraine has chosen to go on the offensive, so why you think they would succeed better now is not entirely clear to me 😀
10:05 – Johan No.1
6
JOHAN “Then you insist on your ‘quantity is a quality in itself’ but do not want to discuss that the Russians are not mobilizing.”
MRF – “That the Russians are not officially mobilizing is not the same as them not adding soldiers, for example last autumn’s and this spring’s (gradual) conscripts, which has been discussed here this week. There are also signals of hidden mobilization on a smaller scale. I think you tend to ignore the facts here. That the Russians cannot produce more soldiers is probably their least problem.”
We know the numbers they have in Ukraine (or involved in the war), so there is no large gray zone pool to dangle here, actually.
Claiming that without sources is probably even worse than quoting Budanov, I think (if I have interpreted you correctly)?
The factor you miss above is the losses, which are massive.
Putin has demanded that they take Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizia Oblasts before the end of March 2023, and he has replaced the combat leadership every couple of months throughout the war.
We agreed that they have not managed offensive operations particularly well.
Wouldn’t it have been reasonable to mobilize 1-2 million men to achieve the combat goals that Putin demands so strictly that generals get fired every month?
They have combat goals that they do not achieve, and throughout the war they have failed to achieve the combat goals – so why don’t they mobilize so they can achieve their combat goals?
Since “quantity is a quality in itself” apparently, the reasonable thing would have been to flood Ukraine with infantry?
They also threatened in January that if a single Leopard 2 came to Ukraine, there would be general mobilization.
No, it is absolutely not their least problem to produce more soldiers; it is one of their biggest problems right now in a sea of all the other problems they have.
Otherwise, they would have done it, I think, or how long do you think they should wait before they mobilize and go and win the war?
7
JOHAN – “You are becoming quite alone in the world believing that Ukraine will not liberate its country or be forced to give up.”
MRF – That is not my view. I feel that you see the world through a very positive filter when you claim that most experts agree with you. You also really don’t know what the analysts connected to the USA, GB, etc., who have much more information than you and I, really think about the situation. That they assess that they should support Ukraine with offensive weapons now finally is not automatically the same as the defense leaderships’ analysis of the situation being that Ukraine will drive the last Russian out beyond the 1991 borders this summer or even next year. I hope it is positive, but I really don’t know.”
Sure, I exaggerated a bit there for effect; it’s always fun, and you usually do that with words like “wishful thinking, dreams, free fantasies, and monopoly analyses.”
I don’t really know how to start here, but when the war started, Kyiv was supposed to fall within three days, and I didn’t see that after a few days, and that’s where it is from. Now most experts have probably calibrated themselves, but for example Pasiikiivi thought UA would have a hard time.
Before the war started, my best-case scenario was that UA would lose all terrain east of the Dnipro – I was that misled by Russian propaganda.
I am open that I spice things up positively and am aware that some sometimes read too much into everything to make a point.
Until Kherson, we cheered for every little meter they took and exaggerated it – I have also been open about that.
Then we can agree that I have calmed down a couple of magnitudes, right.
Most expected a UA winter offensive, but then RU went all in and has decimated its own capability. That is better than a UA winter offensive – we have also sorted that out.
Besides that, my assessment is that the war will be over this summer, based on the Russian low point and UA high point and the probable date for the spring offensive.
Sure, it could be an area in the darkest Donbass that they retake over time, but then 99% of Ukraine is already in a normal state and investments are rolling in.
I actually think RU will blink before then, but if it happens, it happens.
A unanimous thread thought I was wrong when I claimed in the spring that the critical mass was in UA’s favor and that they were preparing an offensive reserve. Then came Kharkiv, Kherson, and Izyum.
You ran the same – “UA is reasonably at the breaking point” then as now 😀
A fairly large part of the thread thought UA did not master combined arms warfare, which I thought they would manage, and then they showed that they did master it.
I also think the fact that Russian allies are betraying is a very clear signal of where this is heading.
I think like this – looking at how the war has gone so far, the probability that they will liberate all their territory is sky-high.
I don’t see that the Russians have any new factor that could change this at all.
You write defense lines – I write lex the French.
You were completely wrong in point four regarding the materiel, but we agreed that the Russians are short on most things.
I hope my answers above make you know a little more now and above all no longer have daily anxiety because it wears on you, says my friend in a bunker in Altai with his mouth full of caviar.
I understand that it’s fun with words like free fantasies, daydreaming, monopoly analyses, and what else, but there are also hard numbers to relate to, and not everything is always subjective.
Constantly moving the goalposts to “that is completely unreasonable” after Ukraine has done the “completely unreasonable” countless times, after writing that they would never be able to manage it, fortunately has an end date 😀
Then I think it’s sad that we have to go back to zero instead of taking the discussion forward; why can’t the previous posts that I have now cut and pasted from above be the starting point for the next discussion in cases where they are hard numbers from sources we value highly?
This will have to be today’s post, I had a fun one about the Wagner – FSB connection but that will have to wait until tomorrow.
10:31 – MatsExtrude
Good job JOHAN NO.1!
But, here I choose to take MRF’s side regarding the number of soldiers.
NOTE does not mean that I don’t want a spot on the boat 🙂
What might be forgotten is how many might still be secretly mobilized.
We are admittedly not completely sure that it is happening but there are several sources talking about it (and I am not thinking of pro-Russian fanatics).
If they are taken from former conscripts who actually have some training, they might not be completely useless either even if they probably need refresher training.
If we assume that it has been going on since New Year’s (though it could have been since September) and assume they undergo three months of training before reaching the front. Then they would start showing up at the front roughly now..
We have absolutely no idea how many it could be (if it even exists) but let’s speculate further:
If it is 20,000 per month (not unreasonable, Russia has quite a few inhabitants and they should also have the resources to train that amount) then it is just enough to cover losses.
If it is 50,000 per month (starting to sound very high) but if that is the case you have to add 100k every three months.
We have no hard facts on this, it is just speculation but at the same time it is not completely unreasonable that it actually happens to some extent.
We are a bit surprised why Putin has not chosen to mobilize (or declare war) and it could possibly be because it was previously considered that the influx of soldiers was high enough. Now the desired result has not been achieved and therefore talk about those 400k has started.
Does it then really matter? Quantity is a form of quality but I still believe it does not have much significance. Sure, it complicates things a bit for Ukraine but I am convinced that the lack of materiel in the end will be decisive as well as the Russian ability to retreat as soon as Ukraine makes a breakthrough.
10:34 – MatsExtrude
+ 100
Regarding your previous post about the number of soldiers, I threw in a wildcard (in MRF’s favor even though he doesn’t mention exactly what I write about) but here I can only agree with absolutely everything!!
10:42 – Johan No.1
There was a part that disappeared in the rush – the Russian materiel which was supposed to be under point 1 but it works here too 😀
We were informed that they had 1800 tanks, 4650 IFVs and 2100 artillery for the winter offensive. Mid-January works as a conservative start for the exercise, in reality the winter offensive started January 6 but we don’t know exactly when the figures are from.
With previous assessments of materiel, my guess was that this is what they could scrape together.
Especially since the workshops are now filled with T62s being modified instead of T80 or T90…
Today, March 19, they have lost – 3532 tanks, 6853 IFVs and 2568+507 artillery.
On January 15, losses were – 3106 tanks, 6183 IFVs and 2094+437 artillery.
So they have lost the following in two months –
426 tanks
670 IFVs
544 artillery.
At the same burn rate they will be down to zero –
TANKS – by mid-July.
IFVs – by mid-October.
ARTILLERY – by mid-July.
Now this is not linear and it doesn’t end exactly at zero, it naturally ends before reaching zero.
Is there anything indicating they will lose less going forward?
No, not if a single drone unit takes out 10 tanks in one night shift…
10:46 – Johan No.1
Can’t be bothered to post another post but this is what I’ll write tomorrow 😀
After Accentmannen’s latest, I choose to interpret the red area as Russian and ignore the disputed area in Bakhmut.
According to him, there is photographic evidence that UA is inside and clearing the red area and the factory area holds.
Previous discussion that the delaying battle is coming to an end is thus obsolete because it did not reflect the situation on the ground but was a misinterpretation of the map.
I have high confidence in Accentmannen and he shares the opinion that RU has been channeled into fighting in the town intentionally.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnj1Q22Vroc
10:48 – Johan No.1
Have we discussed a boat spot Matsextrude?
There is a waiting list that changes daily…
10:56 – MatsExtrude
I believe they had 6-7,000 tanks from the start (wrote a half thesis on how I came to that which I managed to save but haven’t had the energy to redo).
I don’t think your figures are correct about when they reach zero in total..
BUT I think you are right if we count what they dare to deploy in Ukraine.
11:01 – MatsExtrude
Yes, I first volunteered to sit in a dinghy behind the boat but later you invited me to the wheelhouse behind DENGAMLE.
But maybe I have “accidentally” fallen overboard since then? I sometimes insist on speculating about things that might be to the Russians’ advantage (would like to keep my boat spot if I can) 😉
11:02 – MatsExtrude
+ 100 even though, as I said, I see possible ongoing secret mobilizations as a (negative) wildcard that might have a minor delaying effect.
11:35 – Johan No.1
3106 + 1800 + 30% with technical failures in the rear is not far from your number, right 👍
11:44 – Johan No.1
Yes I did, offered boat spot stands 👍
11:44 – Johan No.1
Yes I did, offered that boat spot stands 👍
11:56 – MatsExtrude
True, depending a bit on which number you calculate the 30% against!
12:13 – Johan No.1
Yes, I included technical failures on knocked-out vehicles too maybe…
12:22 – MatsExtrude
Thanks, thanks!
12:57 – Johan No.1
Couldn’t hold back any longer, right?
Isn’t it you trying to take credit and honor from me or something?
With few exceptions, you have never wanted to discuss anything on the merits but write the above nonsense.
I spent some time this morning responding to MRF on the merits and stooped to his level which according to him was “monopoly analysis and a bit provocative”.
Am I not allowed to do the same then?
Since we have gone through that I should not be ambivalent – back to your medication and stop your poorly disguised pro-Russian psyops, you outed yourself as exactly that long ago.
13:22 – MatsExtrude
Yes, and then I misinterpreted you a bit I see now and realize that we agree.
We count from different angles but arrive at roughly the same result.
The uncertainty probably lies mostly in how many they can build/repair per month (can’t be many enough to really matter) and whether they dare to take from other fronts (can’t be more than a few hundred if they don’t want to be completely defenseless).
Now it might not be tanks used first but they surely have some other armor ready if a popular uprising should occur after all.
08:26 – Johan No.1
Will we know if Xi canceled the visit already today 😀
Personally, I think the Chinese will have to back down, it won’t be good for Putin regarding the Ukraine war.
However, the Chinese do want Russia as a raw material colony, so there are probably broad smiles and handshakes there.
09:57 – Johan No.1
MRF –
I want to flag that there are seven response points after your comment last night, and true to my habit, this got quite long, so I spread it over a couple of posts and today’s thread spamming 😀
It’s a good discussion and both you and I got good answers from many, so I’m happy to continue with that. I have tried to keep the tone level you set when you called it monopoly analysis and expressed a desire to provoke a bit.
I usually try to respond in the discussion and then post a guide, but starting fresh as you usually do might be better, especially when it’s a new day?
I’ll do like you and quote your claims and respond below, that wasn’t so bad.
For context, I probably need to include what you quoted from me first since we have a whole day in between.
Worth saying that before the war started, I agreed with you, but 2-3 days into the war it was pretty clear to me what a fiasco this was.
1
JOHAN – “haven’t I already covered the numbers, equipment, and ammunition countless times?”
MRF – “Yes, but I miss the level of detail that would be required for me to feel more convinced. Also – and this applies to several other things as well – part of the problem is that we don’t really know how things stand on these fronts. How many operational tanks does Ukraine have left – how severe is the ammunition shortage? Can the West supply enough to support the extensive offensives Johan paints?”
What level of detail do you really need, I wonder, but let’s do another round. Below is something that has been discussed countless times in this thread, and your claim is almost strange considering that.
I absolutely think it’s wrong to go back to zero and question everything when all the information below has been available to you many times.
It doesn’t move the discussion forward in any way, but I get some understanding of why you call me a monopoly player analyst if you have missed all this information.
How you managed that, I honestly don’t understand?
Especially in point four (4) you have direct factual errors in the same breath as you think my monopoly analyses are at best substandard.
UA
-We know that UA has +350,000 in maneuver brigades + 14 brigades in formation.
-We know they have been able to form new brigades and that the Home Guard has received heavy vehicles.
-We know UA has at least 1 million men/women under arms, maybe as many as 1.5 million.
-We know they received 26,000 applications to their storm brigades which are to go first in breakthroughs.
-We know from Oryx exactly what equipment UA has received.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.html
-We know from Ukrainian Forbes approximately what UA’s equipment numbers are.
https://twitter.com/Volodymyr_D_/status/1605199916519018497?s=20
-We know Ukrainian losses from official UA sources.
-We know from the unit maps you and I look at every day where the latest reporting is from UA and RU units.
-you can check the ammunition shortage status at the start of an offensive, my money is on it not being severe 😀 I posted a post where I went through it, it was long and packed with source references
RU (here the intelligence situation is a bit worse and I as a pro-Ukrainian may interpret them a bit too negatively).
We know from the unit maps where RU units are located, we have good control over Russian units on the active front and worse on RU units in the rear. We also don’t know the condition of the units but have grounds to claim that after attacks and when they have been pulled back, the brigades are heavily decimated. There are many examples of that.
We know from Telegram videos that – units refuse war and that units have ammunition shortages but we don’t know how widespread it is.
We know that 800 T62 tanks are to be modified and that BT50s have arrived at the fronts, that artillery from the 40s has arrived at the fronts, that MTLBs with naval artillery welded on have arrived at the fronts, etc. endlessly.
Now this doesn’t give the whole picture in any way and I don’t claim that they don’t have equipment but we can probably agree that if they only had T80s, it would be only T80s on the trains, right?
We can reasonably assume that RU was 326,000 – 350,000 in mid-February at the latest and that they have since taken heavy losses. I think Erik14 has calculated 1:2? The other day the US assessment was 1:3 in Bakhmut and then you have non-combat winter injuries on top of that. RU numbers are probably somewhat under 300,000.
I stand by 1:2 in losses which I think is conservative, 1:1 has probably never been a figure in any war since the early 1900s (at the risk of quickly being disproved 😀).
This also includes rear areas etc. and far from everything is the spearhead but we have gone through that many times.
Added to that is Wagner with at least 7,000 and DPR/LPR which may be between 20,000 – 40,000 (according to Muntz they are in poor condition).
Now comes the kicker that you completely miss by a couple of miles – RU numbers should be enough to man the front between Troitske – Dnepr and also the +10,000 who stand at the northern front and a smaller number in Belarus.
Since UA demonstrably manages defense 1:10 according to what we constantly hear from Bakhmut, they can concentrate forces where they want to make breakthroughs, right – pretty simple math?
(I’m joking a bit but they seem to manage defense around 1:5)
Yes, Ukraine will be able to concentrate forces where they want to achieve breakthroughs and according to my post yesterday, they can rotate brigades three times for maximum force advantage.
2
JOHAN “Russia did the same replacement trick with 190,000 men, why can’t Ukraine do it with higher numbers and better equipment?”
MRF – (I’ll cut) …”in what way do you consider these situations comparable? After all, Russia took Ukraine by surprise to a large extent. They also had help from fifth columnists in the south…It’s a completely different situation both operationally and strategically that Ukraine is in compared to what Russia did a year ago. Some advantages – absolutely! But also disadvantages that are difficult to assess…”
The most important difference that you completely miss is surely that the Russian contract army/Russian army, the one that had training and experience, has been heavily decimated?
We know from Forbes above that they were around 150,000 left in September 2022 and we know which units have taken losses from January 6, 2023 – today.
Everything beyond that is newly mobilized with varying levels of training from 1 month to 4-5 months which is inadequate.
Then you don’t quote my question to you about RU already having abandoned 40% of conquered territory so why would it be unreasonable for them to abandon the remaining 60%. I think that is almost the most important indication that Ukraine will succeed because if they couldn’t hold those 40%, why should they then be able to hold the remaining 60%?