2023-04-09

12:38 – Johan No.1

I find Defmon’s numbers on spearhead units very interesting, as some god posted in the thread.

At the Dnepr, it corresponds to what has been circulating before from various sources (maybe the same primary source…) and at the southern front it is perhaps 15,000 less than I had imagined, but the Russians have also lost enormous amounts at Vuhledar for months now, they never stop attacking, and they deployed 8 brigades at the southern front before they gave up there.

The big kicker is up in northern Luhansk, they went from 130,000 to 50,000 in that area, this war’s great mystery that they never got out of the starting blocks up there.

This is only BTG and Defmon was clear about that, so it is not a total number and today there are probably 50,000 total down on Crimea across all branches?

The numbers came out roughly as he presented but are some kind of average? Some front sections have taken bigger losses than others, maybe the BTG in northern Luhansk are more complete than at Bakhmut for example, and that was quite detailed – but I guess we should read the numbers as they were presented?

However, this is the first summary we have had in a long time and it should not be dismissed. Good job Defmon.
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1644496904712069126?s=20

To this, maybe add 40,000 LPR/DPR soldiers mainly at Donetsk, so the Russians’ BTG numbers are lower there, and at Luhansk.

I think that is pretty close to the truth since the total was around 350,000 some time ago?

Then we have the losses and then the constant replenishment of 20,000/month + whatever was possibly left in the training camps.

Against this stands an offensive reserve of 100,000 UA plus the rest of the Ukrainian army.

If we simplify greatly – the army keeps the pressure up everywhere they can and the offensive reserve attacks on one front section – anyone can see that they will break through on any of the front sections.

Right now the Russians don’t have much more to send – there are no 300,000 soldiers waiting anywhere because they have not increased the pace of mobilization. We can assume this because we see no videos at all in the feed like there were in September 2022.

If they break through the southern front at any of the attack vectors, then 15,000 + 10,000-20,000 will voluntarily move down to Crimea.

Ukraine then parks a brigade at the bridges over to Crimea and you can then repeat the exercise with roughly the same numbers for Ukraine but minus 30,000 for the Russians…

Bakhmut is a bit wider than that, up to the Siversky Donets presumably and also including Severedonetsk?

To this we have the whole discussion about them being very short on armor and likewise very short on key personnel – it looks VERY bad for the Russians and another Russian retreat (panic, leave everything) could very well be around the corner.

I think Mick Ryan is spot on with one exception, I believe Ukraine has the capability to bring forward units against several fronts simultaneously so it doesn’t matter what the Russians’ intelligence situation looks like. They will only get confirmed that UA can attack at A, B, and C and that there is not much they can do about it.
https://twitter.com/warinthefuture/status/1644818516808470530?s=46&t=_CH2m2qURWrFnaHG_HsnkQ

Many scream about logistics, that is what it will come down to. The USA has already delivered vehicles and other things for a functioning logistics chain.
https://twitter.com/infoagestrategy/status/1643785763929063424?s=46&t=_CH2m2qURWrFnaHG_HsnkQ

This person has probably guessed more than me but they also include numbers for heavy vehicles, unknown source and great caution on that.
https://twitter.com/skadefron/status/1644665621811011584?s=46&t=_CH2m2qURWrFnaHG_HsnkQ

Kreminna or northern Luhansk I guess and this is what a buildup looks like 😀
https://twitter.com/ukrainenewslive/status/1643838746280722433?s=46&t=_CH2m2qURWrFnaHG_HsnkQ

More movement, hard to know if it’s now or last autumn but beautiful atmospheric footage so it got included 👍
https://twitter.com/ukrainenewslive/status/1643839937668587520?s=46&t=_CH2m2qURWrFnaHG_HsnkQ

Here a lot of infantry are standing and wondering how wide the Dnepr is, the same as Erik14 posted earlier or another?
https://twitter.com/herrynapit/status/1644577660155363333?s=46&t=_CH2m2qURWrFnaHG_HsnkQ

Something that has struck me for quite a while is that all Russian videos are always scripted and you can see how it is a performance while many of the UA videos are genuine. I think it’s because it’s so chaotic with the Russians that they need a director to make whatever they are filming look somewhat professional?
https://twitter.com/oldirtyronin/status/1644394031042920452?s=46&t=_CH2m2qURWrFnaHG_HsnkQ

Just want to highlight that UA’s own BTR4 has wading capability. There has been much talk about AMX-10 but these have it and they have been seen wading with some type of open vehicles and BMP I think as well.
https://twitter.com/kiborgzzz/status/1644803475606315010?s=46&t=_CH2m2qURWrFnaHG_HsnkQ

Now there is a bit of a warning on this one because it could be from the retreats northwards as well but I think this is from Dnepr last autumn and operation Badanka?

If it can’t be proven wrong, it feels like we did have an operation Badanka but not on the scale we hoped since they pulled out the VDV weeks before it collapsed.

I hope DenGamle is still following the thread so he can start sleeping again because this was a sensitive point for him, I got a lot of flak for it 😀
https://twitter.com/herrynapit/status/1644309976415113216?s=46&t=_CH2m2qURWrFnaHG_HsnkQ

Waiting times…

13:05 – MatsExtrude

+1 Thanks for a very good summary!

Even though I am a bit more set on May than April, I’d be happy if they start the offensive any day now… Getting tired of waiting! 🙂