09:55 – MatsExtrude
Medvedev usually blurts out all sorts of things so I don’t know if one should take it too seriously..
ERIK14 is basically saying the same thing but better 🙂
10:16 – Johan No.1
Oh, was I the only one worried 🤣🤣
10:30 – Johan No.1
The positive thing is that RU can’t show new destroyed UA columns but there is no shortage of videos with fallen Ukrainian soldiers, UA is taking heavy losses.
However, there isn’t much activity on Slava and the other swamp sites, they were livelier before. You almost get the feeling that they are struggling to find good news to spin.
Now they are presumably rotating the units at the southern front?
In the area west of Vuhledar, UA is not far from the main defensive line and if you look at the map of fortifications it looks like a weak point with nothing behind it.
A bit over 5 km until they break through the defensive line after having already covered 15 km (approximately and if I read the map correctly).
RU seems to have committed quite a lot of their offensive reserves already (if you are to believe Twitter rumors) so the big question is naturally how well-fortified the main defensive line is and how large the task force behind it is.
Once through, they widen and spread out like a fan and then the “Azov thrust” is delivered.
Then we have the weak point east of Vuhledar but we hear nothing about that attack vector.
At Bakhmut it’s pretty quiet due to opsec but from what we hear, UA is pushing the Russians ahead of them.
Berkivka is contested according to Deepstate, things are happening in the Soledar area and Klischivka has sounded like it might fall any day for a week now.
Then there is a risk of misunderstanding but I thought I saw somewhere that there has been movement in the built-up area too.
According to Gregg and Deepstate, RU has moved the 80th Tank Brigade from northern Luhansk to Bakhmut.
That they are reinforcing even more presumably means the pressure is heavy?
That they seem to be reinforcing Klischivka I find interesting, I know the terrain is dominant and it is a formidable fort but sending armor into defense there is like asking to have them knocked out and the 80th tank regiment is supposed to be defending there according to Deepstate. Klischivka is half surrounded and reachable by drones and artillery from three directions.
A bit of wild speculation which is always fun.
The first deviation from the big campaign plan was probably that RU can’t give up northern Luhansk because they have no border defense at all which became obvious during the Belgorod raids. The area will still fall over time but it’s not the first thing you give up when you have to choose. If you give it up, the length of the border with Ukraine becomes three times longer than what they have to defend today and even a Russian general can do that math. The first thing to give up is the Dnipro front.
That said, the fortification maps suggest that there is a NS defensive line through Svatove and nothing behind it – when you break through that line RU will have a very hard time defending northern Luhansk even if they intend to. The “revolving door” takes UA down to the city of Luhansk.
When we have discussed the “number game” and that they are very short not only on armor and infantry fighting vehicles but now also reserves, the question actually arises – how much defense is there DOWN on Crimea?
In all scenarios discussed, everyone has always assumed that Crimea is fortified – 50,000 has been thrown around as an absolute truth but it could just as well be naval personnel, depots, rear units, airfields, etc.?
Are there any elite units down there now that they have existential problems up at the southern front?
When I sat counting brigades back then I also assumed that RU would have numerical superiority down there.
At the southern front UA was supposed to have 20 brigades total which then swung up into the darkest Donbass “behind” Donetsk.
Today there are 40 brigades in this area and we start guessing that 10 can be transported to another front.
Now UA attacks with 1/3 of the units at the southern front and these are really big movements.
When UA makes its excursion across the Dnipro and puts pressure on the NS defensive line through Melitopol and then plugs the entrance down to Crimea, not all brigades are presumably needed for that guarding?
We learned from David D that the 20 CAA defending Crimea are anorexic.
Then they have had to send everything they can up to the southern front and the units retreating from the Dnipro front to defend the land bridge to Crimea have probably partly lost their heavy vehicles, they have taken losses, are wet and they were no better units to begin with – BARS, Rosgvardia, DPR, LPR and a few more units.
If UA meets the NS defensive line through Melitopol from the west, they have isolated the southern front from Crimea.
Since RU has been busy behind the southern front, one can almost begin to suspect that the land bridge down to Crimea, and the Crimean peninsula, is a weak point.
Then anyone who can read a map can see that when UA has broken through the defense in the eastern part of the southern front, it is a fairly isolated southern front that will need to retreat immediately, either settle towards Crimea or try to retreat eastward. It will be overtime for the air force and army aviation that week.
If there is one thing RU has excelled at in this war it is withdrawing from threatening encirclements – they have been good at that.
I can’t see anything other than that the southern front is doomed and we are only in mid-June.
The charm of the above is that it doesn’t matter what RU does – if they pull units from somewhere else UA hits there instead. Right now RU is reactive and sends reserves to areas with threatening breakthroughs and weakens other areas. They have demonstrably weakened the Dnipro front to a point where they wouldn’t be able to hold it in case of a river crossing.
Does anyone think they weakened the Dnipro front before they emptied Crimea of everything that can fight?
Certainly, if the weather allows, Ukraine’s offensive will continue through September and they shouldn’t run out of gas before then. The 3rd Assault Brigade has been fighting around Bakhmut for over a month now, for example?
When you sit and try to weigh the capabilities of UA and RU and look at the map and how UA is attacking right now, you get the distinct feeling that if RU manages to hold the darkest Donbass until the end of September then they have fought beyond expectations.
Probably the 1st and 2nd Army corps have laid down their arms during the summer according to someone in the thread who feels alone in that assumption, but RU might manage something for once and there are quite large cities to be retaken, Donetsk, Luhansk, Horlivka, Alchevsk and others.
Now my money is on this ending before the mud and Ukraine pools its most capable units, all SOF and indirect fire over the darkest Donbass they won’t survive long – the slide downhill is oiled.
The supply lines are reached by Ukraine then, so more of a slow strangulation than a defensive battle.
I understand it becomes almost silly to map such huge areas like this but at least on the southern front it is building up to major movements right now and the key to it all is how large reserves RU still has at the southern front.
There are unconfirmed Twitter rumors about RU reserves but abandoning the Dnepr front suggests there is substance behind them.
If they try to push forward new units, which we suspect do not exist, UA will again strike all transport hubs and inflict heavy losses and delay them.
Moreover, all partisans and SOF in Donetsk have been activated and acts of sabotage against the rail network are likely high on the list.
RU troop movements between different fronts will probably become more difficult going forward.
It will be a long summer as someone usually says but all arrows point in the right direction.
I cleared the post of quite a lot of specific location information if it sounds a bit vague and unclear.
10:33 – Johan No.1
One should probably have read today’s blog post before posting, some points were the same and thus repetition…
10:48 – Johan No.1
So far in June it looks like another record month for artillery, special equipment and LV 😀
There is no chance that RU can handle these losses, they do not have unlimited artillery and crews and we have already heard from several front sections how artillery support has almost been absent and counter-battery fire they barely seem capable of anymore.
12:53 – MatsExtrude
Finally got some time to read today’s essay!
Worth reading as always, thanks for all the time you put in!
13:31 – Johan No.1
I’m starting to get the impression that RU has had, or still has, the intention to conduct offensive operations up in northern Luhansk to relieve the southern front?
It seems there have been two very successful HIMARS strikes against two troop concentrations so UA definitely has eyes everywhere up there as well.
It’s interesting because that means they still have some gas left up in northern Luhansk.
13:34 – MatsExtrude
Isn’t there 150,000 up there somewhere just waiting? 😉
14:50 – Johan No.1
Another newly appointed army chief. The one who died in Zaporizhzhia was also new.
Not everyone is dead but the UA war is probably not good for a career.
https://twitter.com/pstyle0ne1/status/1668929162407493632?s=46&t=mrt_KJA86Xq_MZ78Z3CKDA
15:01 – MatsExtrude
The choice is between being invited for tea or becoming sunflower fertilizer.
The younger soldiers aiming for a career at least cannot complain that the older generations are standing in the way.
15:01 – MatsExtrude
The choice is between being invited for tea or becoming sunflower fertilizer.
The younger soldiers aiming for a career at least cannot complain that the older generations are standing in the way.
15:03 – Johan No.1
😂😂
16:20 – Johan No.1
RU attacked with 4 brigades at the western part of the southern front.
https://twitter.com/friaukraina/status/1668968002744614912?s=46&t=mrt_KJA86Xq_MZ78Z3CKDA
16:22 – Johan No.1
Sorry – eastern part.
16:23 – Johan No.1
The attack failed completely which everyone except the screaming Russians expected.
16:27 – Johan No.1
It feels like an ambitious attempt from RU there.
16:34 – MatsExtrude
Maybe it has been AFU’s plan all along..
17:11 – Johan No.1
Hello the thread seems to have good news at Bakhmut?
https://twitter.com/pstyle0ne1/status/1668917989507313664?s=46&t=mrt_KJA86Xq_MZ78Z3CKDA
(Earlier than the five o’clock one?)
17:42 – MatsExtrude
👍
20:27 – Johan No.1
Hello the thread 👇
https://twitter.com/pstyle0ne1/status/1669041994000105472?s=46&t=mrt_KJA86Xq_MZ78Z3CKDA
07:57 – Johan No.1
Rybar expects crossing of the Dnepr.
https://twitter.com/secretsqrl123/status/1669167715821445121?s=46&t=e8YHW4D6GkRovazdpTalfQ
09:37 – Johan No.1
Have you read this on Slava?
Feels like a serious threat since we already know they have reconned the cables in international waters.
Dmitry Medvedev believes that the time has come for the West to pay for undermining the Nord Stream
“If we proceed from the proven complicity of Western countries in undermining the Nord Streams, then we have no, even moral, restrictions left to refrain from destroying the cable communications of our enemies, laid along the ocean floor.”