11:07 – Johan No.1
We have flown Gripen down in Libya so why wouldn’t we be able to fly it in Ukraine?
You can spare a division without the country of Sweden collapsing.
Now the number is not what’s important – it is the signal politics that matter.
We have sent Archer, CV90, and strv122 so the Russians won’t get any angrier than that.
As a country, we will be praised and the PR for Gripen will be enormous.
I only see upside and so far we have delivered, so my guess is that it will be Gripen as well 👍
In 2022, it was exactly the same arguments for why Archer, CV90, or Leo2 would never set foot in Ukraine.
IF we send 12 active planes, NATO could probably deploy a division to Norway or be invited for a long exercise in Sweden?
12:22 – MatsExtrude
👍👌
14:48 – Johan No.1
✊
15:37 – Johan No.1
The debater mixes apples and pears, yes nonviolence is a very effective means of pressure – just look at Ukraine’s liberation which was largely nonviolent.
But you can’t respond to a full-scale war with nonviolence, then you have to first allow yourself to be invaded and then respond with nonviolence.
Then we have hundreds of thousands of civilians who have tried nonviolence and died in the process, is there a limit to the number of deaths one is willing to accept or should one stop if too many die – the important details.
19:45 – Johan No.1
Flew past a note in GP about a violent elderly person with a burgundy walker with Ukrainian stickers who tried to run over a recently retired preschool teacher but the walker got stuck so The Old Man seems to be busy with the neighbor feud or maybe it was some other conflict, who knows.
Doesn’t Zelensky traveling a lot now signal that he feels things are moving forward?
19:51 – Johan No.1
Zelensky will go down in history as one of the greats but damn, this war has taken a toll on him. One of the decisive events of this war was probably when he filmed himself in the middle of Kiev with those in the government who stayed and explained to the US that he “need ammunition not a lift”.
One should not underestimate the unifying force he is and the ability to surround himself with the right competence.
Unfortunately, Russian psyops will probably succeed in engraving some version of Putin in Western media as a great man too, high heels, stripper pole, and crushing defeat in Ukraine completely forgotten. The Russians are simple Don Corleones who shouldn’t get a line written in Western media.
20:21 – MatsExtrude
😆👍
20:22 – MatsExtrude
+1
00:21 – Johan No.1
Pre-party
https://twitter.com/kremlintrolls/status/1692983727775785366?s=46&t=P-Z5Ukp7sA_k0JyY3-qUpg
07:34 – MatsExtrude
😆
10:50 – Johan No.1
If you feel that posts are getting messier, it has been two very intense weeks and then a bit of a cold on top, so it’s not the rum bottle talking – just work stress, simply put.
The Twitter rumors are really reaching storm strength here around RU leaving the front line.
There was a rumor sometime in early July that they were -preparing- for it and we wrote then that since they can’t man all the fortifications, they will need to abandon the front line when it is breached and pull back the units to the next line.
Rather than Lex the French, it would be driven by a shortage of units, although Lex the French will eventually kick in anyway.
(On the subject of the French, Zarkozy just came out as a deeply marinated pro-Russian – Putin’s subversive tentacles have reached quite far, one must admit).
Both at Robotyne and then at Staromaiorske it seems they are now retreating, but if they run short of units, they will do the same with the entire front line between these two towns and retreat to lines 2 and 3.
Now Putin’s poker hand will be visible, pairs of twos guesses Johan No.1
– are the minefields at lines 2 and 3 substantial or have they already passed the hardest part – I know what I think.
-Are there competent reserves that they have held back and that now fortify these lines – the indications are that these do not exist, but that they have fortified with trauma patients and second-rate troops.
If it’s also true that UA has activated the Easter egg night combat, then it will be a rout in the style of the Russo-Japanese War (again) that we will see.
On the southern front, the Russians will have difficulty countering this with their third-rate troops.
There is also an increasing amount of information about partisans behind the southern front and (all of the West’s) SOF operating around there – the hornet swarm seems to be increasing in strength in the area.
There are probably a couple of supply routes – partly Rostov na Don via road and then the railway network with hubs like Tokmak, Volnovakha, Polohy and Vasylivka, and vehicle transport from Crimea or from the ports on the UA side.
They have naturally had depots along the railway network but UA fought them off behind the southern front over a month ago and in the last month have attacked the supplies down in Crimea.
The bridge between Crimea and Ukraine (Chonbar?) is in poor condition and the bridge over Kerch is in various stages of being closed.
Tokmak is usually pointed out by someone in the thread as being within artillery range soon and that is certainly true.
Volnovakha and Polohy have long been within range.
Then you can reach all hubs anyway with HIMARS, JDAM, drones and missiles.
They apparently have good control over the supply route from Rostov na Don now and steadily strike vehicles there.
When you get this far, you realize that the Russian logistics and supply are probably in even worse shape than we guess.
They try to get supplies forward by truck to units at the front and every day they lose about twenty.
Someone wrote in the thread yesterday that a brigade needs 18 truck transports per day to be supplied.
So every day there is a brigade that does not get supplies.
Does RU have 18 trucks in reserve every day to replace the lost ones or will it be two brigades the next day, three brigades the day after, and so on, and RU tries to compensate with new vehicles as best they can?
That captured soldiers ask for water first thing says quite a lot.
Then I don’t know if you have followed this but UA also continuously strikes the ports to disrupt those supply routes as well, Berdyansk, Henichesk, Mariupol and down in Crimea.
If I may guess, I think railway transports behind the southern front are now seriously disrupted, land transports cannot deliver anywhere near what is needed, and sea transports are also under pressure.
Everyone talks about the artillery going silent but the same applies to smaller caliber ammunition, MANPADS, anti-tank missiles, tanks, IFVs, water and meat soup.
Now the cunning one thinks that since RU has been on defense they have used less ammunition but that is not true because they have conducted counterattacks like the most aggressive violent barbarians since UA started advancing early June.
They have used astronomical amounts of ammunition in this defensive fight.
The question then is how much has been allocated to those in the main defense line – too little is my guess because if you are in the rear you usually don’t have full allocation.
Is there ammunition available to distribute now – probably not.
Will the units now retreating take everything with them – no.
There is a fairly high probability that the elite units now equipped and continuously trained up to date will face Russian units in defense with poor night combat capability, low on armor, anti-tank weapons, food and ammunition.
The Tsar’s army of 1917 meets 2023 and relives the joy of the breezy Tannenberg.
There is no secret capability we don’t yet know about that Putin can pull out from behind the pole and win the war with.
I hear nothing about columns of reinforcements through Mariupol to the southern front and I hear nothing about mobilization started.
Only one this week which was 4 tanks and some vehicles.
https://twitter.com/anno1540/status/1692574033269735478?s=46&t=8lJOYbXns2jXIKIUgj_3Eg
We always get information when it moves through Mariupol and last year when there was mobilization we were flooded with videos.
Until one of these two happens, the Russian army is well on its way to losing the southern front right now and every day that passes makes it more inevitable.
However, there is a rumor, which is just a loose rumor, that RU will pull units from northern Luhansk and send them “south”.
https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1692668614447378629?t=DMPxrekvJrTel4Z87fZpoQ&s=19
We know they have about 100,000 at northern Luhansk including heavy vehicles and artillery in sufficient quantity. Since these units did not get out of the starting blocks during the winter offensive and have fought limitedly, there are presumably intact brigades left up there.
What does this rumor mean –
-it means RU is having trouble holding out on other fronts, right?
-it means they will weaken northern Luhansk
My guess was that they could pull away maybe 10 brigades but then they have zero redundancy and Ukraine is absolutely not weak in that area and UA also has 10 brigades against the northern front.
The conclusion can only be that whatever they pull away from the northern front is not enough.
Then there was a flash from Erik14 yesterday that UA is advancing with new units towards Toretsk, Ozarianivka and Horlivka. That is the corner we have speculated about that if UA can project a threat from the north it must be defended and it looks undefended.
When we get information about whole brigades through Mariupol – only then are they reinforcements to the southern front.
On the subject of mobilization.
About 3-4 million Russians fled last time there was supposed to be mobilization (number pulled out of thin air…) and presumably they were the most suitable candidates?
The prisons are quite empty of prisoners who can lift a rifle.
Rumors have spread about survival chances in Ukraine.
And above all, how does Putin know that the half a million he is mobilizing are not those who voluntarily go to recruitment offices to be armed because they intend to start a revolution?
Belarus was close to falling, so close that Putin had to send in internal troops, and Ukraine has already fallen.
Does Putin trust that half a million Russian men with weapons in hand won’t get the idea and invade Russia instead?
Because there is absolutely nothing that could stop them if they decided to act. Everyone knows about the Wagner coup and there is some risk that even a Russian mobilized man manages to think for himself?
I don’t think Russia can carry out a larger mobilization.
My assessment is then that this war will continue as long as the existing units in Ukraine can hold out.
The southern front is well on its way to falling, it could take two weeks or two months but it will fall.
Crimea can then be written off.
When we see what Ukraine does with the logistics behind the southern front and Crimea in a few months – do you think they can repeat that in the darkest Donbass and northern Luhansk when they get all indirect weapons platforms free?
Yep!
The fact is that Ukraine could take Moscow if they wanted when this chain plays out but since they are not deeply entrenched imperialists they will not do that.
Then I unfortunately suspect that someone leaked to Russia that Ukraine will not attack into Belgorod because against Ukraine’s 10 brigades there are just a few Russian ones half-asleep.
After the Belgorod raids, Russia is not the least bit afraid of a third invasion and has barely fortified the border – does that feel like a logical action if you have just been invaded?
Or is it a double bluff 😀
The subject of Russian influence operations –
– Why does the NYT publish Ukrainian losses? We have considered in the thread since the start of the war that it does not benefit Ukraine.
– Why did WAPO publish the whole narrative together with CNN that the Ukrainian offensive is stuck and that they cannot win?
– Why is Zarkozy suddenly pro-Russian.
– Why does GP have articles suggesting that Ukraine should give up land, just like Zarkozy.
At least I smell a coordinated Russian influence operation trying to talk the West down, I actually thought it was over but there are far too many articles on the same theme right now. Why almost all publications are from the USA is highly unclear.
These articles are paraded in pro-Russian channels as truth from credible sources in the West “the American military,” “the US government,” and so on.
https://twitter.com/pstyle0ne1/status/1692773622744584681?s=46&t=QNg4iHQfXFjZ4TfrhvkoXg
Now the Russians, as always, are their own worst enemy so their tactic to appear strong when they could barely stand upright fooled no one except the Russian commanders who have now sacrificed the entire offensive reserve to avoid getting fired.
The dissonance is actually total right now, “Ukraine cannot win, give up land, surrender,” while a Russian in a trench slings the mash bucket on his back and shuffles 10 km south.
This war is so many shades of tragedy that one cannot bring oneself to find the above funny but my god what a failure this imperial dream is.
If we try a slightly more serious analysis – what is the Russian battle plan on the southern front?
They have Azov at their back, they have failed to establish bridgeheads at the Dnieper, they have (soon) abandoned the front line at the Zaporizhzhia front and no reinforcements have yet arrived at the fronts.
The only reserve left is a portion (unclear how many) of the 100,000 up in northern Luhansk. They are supposed to be enough for defense up there, to reinforce Bakhmut, Horlivka and finally the southern front.
Russia takes proportionally higher losses than Ukraine due to combined arms warfare so they cannot hope that Ukraine runs out of gas before they themselves are finished in the area.
We are flooded with videos where a platoon gets two wounded but takes out two dozen Russians, every day all week.
We don’t get a single video of destroyed Ukrainian vehicles anymore, one single stryker was the latest that flew by – if there were destroyed Ukrainian mechanized companies we would have seen it.
So what is the Russian plan?
Could it be this (Russian) simple – before the spring offensive all army and front commanders were ordered to hold every meter to give the impression that the Ukrainian offensive was going badly and they activated all their channels in the West to try to broker peace because that was the last card they had left to play.
If the Russians had been serious in their intentions to hold conquered territory they would have launched a large mobilization of maybe a million men in January or April and probably then could have achieved some kind of braking effect but that hasn’t happened, right?
It doesn’t get more fun than this, when the Russian defense has weakened enough there will be a retreat and a not insignificant number will retreat down to Crimea.
Those who retreat down to Crimea will not get away from Crimea while Ukraine can move all its brigades from the southern front and Dnieper front to other fronts except the 2-3 that plug the land bridge down to Crimea while Ukraine pours HIMARS and unleashes drone swarms over Crimea.
It is well known that it is my belief that this should be enough for Russia to turn inward but if it does not, you have almost the timeline for when northern Luhansk and the darkest Donbass fall – 2-4 months of pre-bombardment, deep sabotage followed by an offensive that achieves its combat goals within 3 months maybe.
If you can retake the most well-fortified fortifications of this war then you can retake northern Luhansk and the darkest Donbass as well, right?
For the Russians to stop that tidal wave they still have to mobilize and then we come back to Putin’s problem about whether the half a million who allow themselves to be mobilized do so because they want to fight in Ukraine or if they intend to commit revolution…
Putin is backed into a corner and is on the way to losing the war. The Russian influence operation should be disregarded in its entirety, it is downright embarrassing that after 1.5 years of war where Ukraine has shown absolute integrity the Russian subversive activity is allowed to continue unhindered. At the same time, it’s good that Russia has not yet managed to talk the West down so Ukraine is allowed to win the war.