10:03 – Johan No.1
I was quite sure that UA would get better progress than this in their spring offensive and it’s lucky that I don’t lead anything at all but sit in my parents’ basement playing Rise of Nations.
With this track record, it’s a bit hard to claim that I believe the war is decided when the Azov thrust is completed but for me, then the war is irrevocably lost for RU.
If they then refuse to realize it, they can do that, but how are they going to reinforce Crimea – it’s not possible.
Crimea will fall over time, it’s carved in stone and all the units that have retreated down to Crimea and all the materiel down there, and all the huge stockpiles, are then lost. Of course, they will try to evacuate the personnel they can by boats that will be sunk in Operation Badanka 2.0 but the stockpiles and the materiel that doesn’t move, and the materiel that does, will largely remain unless they are already trying to move it overland towards Mariupol.
Everyone understands that all the disabled Ropuchas are to prevent sea transports now and in the future.
We have not seen the slightest sign of Russian mobilization except that they are trying to hype it up into a huge threat just as the thread predicted they would do, we are starting to know our Russian now 😀
Now there are rumors that everything will start on October 1, 2023 – on a Sunday and today actually…
Waiting excitedly for all the mobilization videos.
25CAA, which is the only strategic reserve added, is reportedly 15,000 men strong, untrained and not equipped with heavy weapons – untrained shooters basically with some armored vehicles.
All these divisions, CAA and AC they are setting up are at best operationally ready around the turn of the year after a comprehensive mobilization (which we have not seen yet) and then they are like a Swedish conscript unit without combat experience.
They have no ability to function in battalions or brigades and likely the armored vehicles are more of a liability than a threat and they will not be able to operate effectively in units larger than platoon.
What I unfortunately struggle a bit with is northern Luhansk and the darkest Donbass – in the big campaign plan they were retaken after the Azov thrust and Bakhmut and when Crimea was blocked because the numerical superiority then was enormous – UA frees up about 40 brigades from the southern front and when Bakhmut starts moving they can free up about a dozen from there as well.
When UA could walk straight into Belgorod Oblast without being stopped, we quickly realized in the thread that holding northern Luhansk with the NS line through Svatove is considerably easier than trying to fortify the entire arc that the liberated Luhansk oblast would become. It is unprotected today.
The thought we then had was that they would prioritize northern Luhansk before the southern front if something needed to be released and that the Dnipro front would be released first.
This was at the low point that is now and until Christmas after a lowest outcome from the spring offensive – the above has thus not yet happened!
A problem now would be if RU manages to reinforce with strategic reserves in northern Luhansk and the darkest Donbass and try to hold it to the last ditch now that they have learned that mines work and have a few million left.
Then the West must drop all their demands – UA must be allowed to go straight towards Rostov na Don and the northern Oblasts, they must be allowed to use missiles on targets in Russia and the West must accept that they for a third time have prolonged this war and do right at last.
Another guess that we have pushed hard in the thread that seems to be confirmed is that UA received rules of engagement from the West not to attack into Russia even though they felt they could – the morally superior West sacrifices Ukrainian children who are tortured, abused and murdered because we know better 🤬
I think it was Erik14 as usual who posted that a few weeks ago but Zelensky has confirmed it earlier too – but that doesn’t make as much noise.
If RU can just pool everything into a smaller geographically limited area to hold it well aware that Ukraine is NOT ALLOWED to make any envelopment or threaten their depots inside Russia and now spurred on by the fact that mining works, and then continue lobbing missiles for a couple more years on UA infrastructure – that would be both unfortunate, idiotic and very high risk.
Ukraine can absolutely retake all its territory but they must stop demanding that they do it with one hand tied behind their back and a bunch of no-go zones inside which the Russians can rest and reinforce completely protected from fire.
Autumn 2022 was a lost opportunity and the spring offensive has gone infinitely slower due to the mining but also due to the lack of elite air support and some kind of – “give them just enough to survive” philosophy as well as that UA was not allowed to exploit its breakthrough in Belgorod even though they had about a dozen brigades in the area and the oblast was undefended.
There are thousands of Tomahawks in the warehouses, thousands of Bradleys and thousands of Abrams. Portugal doesn’t need any mechanized units at all – and so on endlessly, we have cried over this too often so no point in being depressed about it.
Russia still hasn’t fortified its land border (it’s dizzying to think about…) – now that Free Russia (or whatever they call themselves) has entered a few times again over the past month, it has still only been customs officers.
No one questions that it is Ukraine itself that must liberate its country but the way materiel has been rationed so far and not rationed in terms of the amount of levies is absolutely high risk.
Ukraine also needs the Azov strike for its domestic politics, Zelensky is not immortal. The reshuffle of the defense minister suggests that a lot is going on beneath the surface here and setbacks reinforce negative currents and Russian subversive activities are waiting for the right moment.
I am of the opinion that what has now been communicated in terms of materiel is okay but not the war-deciding weapons package that would never need to be delivered. Why they don’t make a move on it, I don’t know, it’s hard to get an overview from the parents’ basement room unfortunately.
The Azov strike is well on its way to being delivered and then we’ll see if the country Russia can handle that blow or turns inward, which is what my money is on.
Historically, there have been major movements in Russia during this type of crisis and this will permanently change the country Russia, is my guess.
A fairly attractive outcome would be if the second to last colonial state became decolonized (which is the latest trend right now for everyone except old communist countries apparently!) so the country becomes a significantly smaller threat going forward.
They will probably try for a round two but then they are considerably weaker and after something like this we get 50-60 years of a militarily strong West before it should start disarming again.
Geopolitical atomic bomb is what we’ve said a couple of times during the past year and you almost have to look hard for a more fitting word. All because a little lonely caviar-eating friend in Altai started feeling immortal and full of all the caviar and wanted to go out into the big world.
10:07 – Johan No.1
Now that the 72nd brigade has been annihilated maybe we understand how badly off the Russians are?
When they made their last glorious assault over the potato fields near Bakhmut it was together with the artillerymen and logistics and they all died an ignoble death completely in vain.
The fact is that medical and logistical troops are being sent to the fronts so they are really starting to run out of sacrifices here –
https://twitter.com/golub/status/1703650718307995785?s=46&t=3ZM1YF0Pp0pWzvO4MGZJuQ
On paper the brigade was thousands strong and a bright red square that people were worried about, in reality it was maybe 500 together with the support units without heavy vehicles – an infantry battalion poorly trained with cooks and logistics as riflemen who ran straight into a huge ambush and were wiped out.
Previously they have withdrawn units that were heavily decimated but now they have to keep fighting until they are finished.
Just in Bakhmut the 83rd GAAB, 9th and 200th motor rifle brigades are in at least as bad shape. I recall the 4th brigade also took monstrous losses.
There is a whole bunch of BARS and thousand-strong units in the area that are battalion strength, BARS a bit better but the thousand-strong units are terrible and poorly armed.
Notably in Bakhmut there are now a large number of VDV regiments in the battle lines, unclear where they came from actually because earlier some VDV were pulled down to the southern front where I thought they were from but I haven’t followed the movements for a few weeks.
Maybe there was a larger offensive reserve than I thought in the form of VDV, some regiments have always been in that square for unknown reasons so they might have been in training camps near the border or something?
106th and 98th airborne divisions as well as two independent regiments are in the area.
There were some VDV regiments in the Svitlodarsk-Popasna line for quite a while if I remember correctly.
Bakhmut is a flytrap as we have written countless times – the area ties up RU units and that plan has absolutely fulfilled its purpose. Completely according to the grand campaign plan.
The charm of it all is that if RU gives up that area Horlivka, Alchevsk and ultimately the city of Luhansk are threatened so they don’t have much choice.
They can fall back to the very long Svitlodarsk – Popasna line and lose the entire area west of it but it is a very long line that must be manned which they don’t have units for.
Fun with lots of fortifications until you realize they require resources you don’t have to fulfill their function.
It’s starting to look denser with units at Robotyne and thinner at Staromaiorske – now they have been on a sharp mission for two weeks so there is a small gap in the map reconnaissance.
I think they have pulled more units from the Dnipro front as well.
I am quite sure that a lot of units between Staromaiorske – Vuhledar are very heavily decimated and they haven’t reinforced with new units there except for a few brigades – notably UA is very strong in that area too, a number of units with hard bite.
It also looks like they have further weakened northern Luhansk, it seems there are two spetsnaz brigades left as offensive reserve instead of three now.
Up there you should however be aware that there are a number of brigades that are fully resourced and have trained quite a while – not everything is empty shells and finished.
“Same for Ukraine” says the negative directly very disparaging but no, that is not the case – they had resourced a winter offensive that did not happen because RU in panic started their own and they defended “9:1” all winter and spring until the spring offensive started.
Yes, the brigades that fought at the active fronts, mainly the Bakhmut front, are today in very poor shape but there were a few of an enormous offensive reserve and the 3rd Assault brigade still continues its offensive operations and they almost started the spring offensive.
Ukraine has a lot of offensive reserve left, at Robotyne I think they have used 2/3 now and have 1/3 left if I read the brigades correctly.
RU seems to be approaching full panic in the darkest Donbass now. On the Bubble list we also have that the 1st and 2nd are throwing in the towel and it seems they have left the darkest Donbass to them now.
https://twitter.com/glasnostgone/status/1705889621668680167?s=46&t=rWLUn0KL6rGBnPHUnvq3Eg
Then we have civilians who knocked out LV in Crimea with molotov cocktails which is always fun to see, civil disobedience Gandhi-style (with a bit extra violence).
https://twitter.com/euromaidanpr/status/1705853823158280575?s=46&t=rWLUn0KL6rGBnPHUnvq3Eg
This was already up in the thread but for my archive – violence against civilians in Izyum. That the UN cannot bring itself to call it ethnic cleansing is very strange…
https://twitter.com/euromaidanpr/status/1705861579965608077?s=46&t=rWLUn0KL6rGBnPHUnvq3Eg
If Dengamle’s mission went well (which it seems to have done, Mauritius is supposed to be completely cleared of Wagner now according to the daily reports) then you can guess what went less well – the tie he chose for Budanov, this is what it looks like in reality when you blindly trust that old is best, it’s not 1729 anymore…
https://twitter.com/bopanc/status/1705501975683494214?s=46&t=NIKWGl_RnQU2SnRzDZS3FQ
10:50 – MatsExtrude
Thanks JOHAN NO.1 and welcome back!
14:20 – Johan No.1
Many kind comments under my post today, was a bit short on time today but everything has been read even if there were no replies 😀
Some risk that the criticism of Budanov’s tie will not be well received by (or the one who chose the tie), so it’s probably good that he is hard to reach in Africa even though they seemed to have gotten to Wagner in Sudan.
14:20 – Johan No.1
*well received by Budanov.
09:53 – Johan No.1
The Lions
https://twitter.com/ukrainiansquad/status/1707019339268833343?s=46&t=AvFfCTwPPZs09ozwdAhPng
Guessed that Dengamle would show up after finishing his missions but I have received from reliable sources that when he was at step four in his multi-stage rocket heading to Mali to fight Wagner, he accidentally booked the wrong flight and went to Mauritius instead – apparently he refuses to leave and claims he sees Wagner everywhere and performs miracles, this was last week and Budanov was moderately amused by the hotel bills.
The operation apparently started with Kadyrov and the preparations were downright miserable – to blend in he needed to learn lots of Quran quotes and it quickly became plan B – deaf-mute after heroic deeds in war and a white t-shirt with an easy-to-read and popular quote.
After that, I heard through rumors that he was a waiter at a dinner with the Black Sea Fleet commander before some big meeting and then a visit to a group called Tuaregs, whoever they are, before he was supposed to go to Mali.
I was also honored with a sharp mission after having been out in the cold for quite a while, lots of performance anxiety and wanted to impress Budanov but it was called off. Apparently someone had been sitting at a hookah bar in Grozny and outed the whole setup after too many deep drags when the Russian security service was two tables away taking notes.
At the risk of being repetitive, this war is already over but of course it won’t end until Putin throws in the towel so everyone claiming Russia is winning the war has yet to be proven wrong. However, they engage in the national sport of goal sliding – now it is apparently a Russian victory if they manage to hold conquered territory at any cost for a short period of about half a year. It’s just unfortunate that Ukraine doesn’t play by that rulebook.
The situation today is that the fleet has partly fled from Crimea and absolutely hates the waters west of Crimea for fear of the country without a fleet, military district commanders are being taken out with missiles, the elite air force is subjected to liberation actions at bases all the way up to Moscow, and the strategic bombers have been relocated to bases in the Far East to avoid being taken out on the ground.
https://twitter.com/euromaidanpr/status/1704449825498870039?s=46&t=0t96bzNBrI7VR_82bcLl-g
The Russian artillery is ineffective because it is largely suppressed and has ammunition shortages and the only reason there is any kind of capability left is because they supply “new” artillery so they at least have something left but it is becoming very worn out and very antique pieces, on top of that they have worn-out barrels to contend with and no production.
Morale is terrible in the army and they hold positions by committing their last offensive reserves, VDV, Recon, Spetsnaz, and naval infantry because Putin has demanded not a step back.
One reflection is that you can guess what would happen if Ukraine started firing missiles at military targets inside Russia.
Air defense is focused on occupied territory in Ukraine and around Moscow so if they started targeting the northern oblasts it would be very many targets engaged.
Same with Rostov-on-Don I guess and especially deep inside Russia but it is in the nearby oblasts where all (12) military bases are located where vehicles stand lined up in neat squares with ammunition beside them and the troops sleep in large barracks made for a tungsten rain.
But Ukraine is not allowed to do that (yet…).
Erik14 posted this rumint a few weeks ago but it is what we have guessed correctly in the thread (again) – that Putin ordered not a step back so it would look like the spring offensive failed – that card has now been played and did not succeed.
https://twitter.com/astraiaintel/status/1706946844029317420?t=dNfute_4e6O9-gd9L7zT1A&s=19
Then comes Gudashand 2.0 – now the entire UA offensive is to be stopped in October. New general order from the bunker-dweller. Then there will be bayonet charges screaming across the fields again which is good news. Nothing drains the Russian imperialist army like a general order in a fit of emotion about the great victory.
https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1706215523933896985?t=vT69cnTf9cJJ07ct5HMTng&s=19
Russia is now burning its last offensive reserves – it is enormously significant that the country Russia has zeroed its army and that it now consists of newly mobilized.
All the experience and capability built up is either in hospitals without legs or dead in a pit in Ukraine – and Putin couldn’t care less. It’s called human capital and it has been wasted in criminal incompetence over the past year where the highlight was the 30 attack divers who died on a hill outside Kharkiv.
That the army has not protested more than it has is a mystery but one way to circumvent protests is that everyone dies and then you send in new ones who don’t understand better and who die before they have time to start thinking about revolution.
The curtain has also fallen and absolutely no one falls for Russian psyops anymore except those who want to – all the threat capital they built up is gone. Even Azerbaijan has stopped caring and is knocking out Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia pretends nothing has happened.
What happened to the red lines?
Lavrov was in the drawing rooms before the war started and now he is laughed at as he stammers through his talking points at various meetings. That Albania’s representative sat and mocked him at the UN meeting must have hurt the Russian imperialist and colonial soul immensely.
I long thought they could simply declare victory and retreat in a huge goodwill gesture but I have understood from the thread’s insiders over time that this possibility does not exist in Russia – those who have staked their careers on the war will go all in until they are stopped. It’s dog-eat-dog.
Then there are the bubbles that the army refuses war and palace coup left and then the real game-changer outside the bubble list that RU will be thrown out of Ukraine whether they want to or not.
Many claim it is impossible but those who claim that never manage to explain why the first 50% was completely doable to retake when Russia was stronger and before Ukraine mobilized or got any Western weapons.
Since the start of the spring offensive I haven’t bothered to push bubbles and outcomes so much because this is the final offensive and better to spend time on that I thought but those of you who have read the thread know the bubble list, the big campaign plan, and the outcome of the spring offensive.
Now everything took longer than at least I expected and I am still quite dizzy from how well minefields have worked in this war (according to Erik14 Russia has/had 26 million mines – incomprehensible). Try applying NATO doctrine with air superiority when the Russians unleash Lancet swarms over mech brigades during their breakthrough attempts, impossible! – those who still claim Ukraine would have had successes with NATO doctrine if they had just followed it slavishly remain stuck in 2022 and need to let go of their archaic view of warfare and embrace the future before it is too late.
That Ukraine is using the tanks as 4km snipers instead of battering rams is something I only see advantages in, the same fire on the target, right, and probably there is some envy about it among the staffs in the West because tanks are expensive.
A lowest outcome from the spring offensive was the Azov thrust, that they got results from the Bakhmut offensive (advancing towards Alchevsk, I believe it said) and that northern Luhansk kept moving forward.
Furthermore, after the lowest outcome of the spring offensive – they take Crimea over time because it was then cut off and the darkest Donbass was isolated with constant sabotage of the rail network and patrols conducting ambushes at all access roads. This was after retaking northern Luhansk.
As I see it, the Bakhmut offensive has already delivered its purpose but it will continue.
The Azov thrust is not far away – the pessimists can argue as much as they want but history tells us that UA is building up against exactly that. The point they break through at is unknown and I have had Robotyne as a diversionary maneuver but it looks like it’s going very well there.
Where I have been on my mission, people are still lying on the beach sunbathing – summer is not over in Europe yet 😀
In northern Luhansk, RU has now weakened enough that UA has started to advance slowly – it will continue. It may happen that RU receives further instructions from bunker-dwellers to carry out a shining offensive in that area but then they only drain their capability even more.
Crimea, anyone with basic general knowledge can see how it will go, right – clustered Russians and drone swarms until they leave completely voluntarily (completely according to the big campaign plan).
Where we are today, basically anything can happen at any time and until it happens, Ukraine retakes a piece of territory every day until the country is liberated.