10:51 – Johan No.1
Sorry for being quite off-topic, but I want to oppose the idea that our Elon is somehow the richest in the world. He must declare his income and wealth because it comes from entrepreneurship, but being able to plunder resource-rich countries in Africa for generations is much more lucrative, and there are people in the countries I’ve worked in who make Elon look like a summer worker at McDonald’s. They also have absolute power over lives that he lacks (if that is worth anything).
When I worked in Angola, it was the Dos Santos clan that had been in power for 28 years or so, and an enterprising daughter, Isabel, was promoted as a self-made feminist who fought her way through a male-dominated world in Western media. She was thoroughly corrupt and an utterly evil person who is now wanted by Interpol.
Others were philanthropists living in Switzerland and donating to noble causes. The story goes that in 2010 the clan felt their reputation was becoming tarnished, so they hired a top-ranked advertising firm from the USA to improve their image. Meanwhile, they continued plundering the country, but it was drowned out by all the positive news the ad firm drumbeated (made up).
So who were the Dos Santos? In the 1500s, when the Portuguese arrived, they saw an opportunity to make a fortune, so they became intermediaries for the Portuguese with slaves. Simply put, they acquired the slaves whom they then sold to the Portuguese, and over time they became a valued partner to the Portuguese, and the family spread into the parts of the administration where they could operate. When it was time for independence, they were on the right side (of course) and managed, after having murdered quite a few opponents, to seize the presidency, which they held until a few years ago.
They did this by ensuring that all the generals from the independence struggle were kept satisfied with enormous benefits paid from the state treasury.
When we have been in, for example, the UK—we lived for a while in Bath and Edinburgh—and in Portugal, you always meet the children of Angolan power who study abroad. Their student life is so far from an average Swede’s university studies, where you scrape by with exam anxiety. They live the student life because they enjoy it but have everything extra and feel just fine. The only ones I’ve seen who felt better are Kuwaitis.
The Dos Santos family is filthy rich; rumors went that the president had bought a large island in the Mediterranean and built an airport so that if there was unrest in the country, he could take a helicopter to the capital’s airport and then a private jet directly to his own island.
What is known today is that China and Angola created a company where all the oil went in, and the price the company bought the oil for was $20 per barrel (or something), which was paid to the country Angola. The oil was then sold at market price in China, and a select group of Chinese and Angolans shared the company’s profit. You might remember when oil went up to $200 per barrel for a while—a tidy profit. Apparently, the president himself had 5% of the profit, and then it was distributed among others, some of whom were his family. Per year, Angola earned between $30-50 billion from those $20 per barrel, so you can guess how much was distributed to the privileged each year.
Then there were all the grants from a supportive West before that; Sweden had built a “Sweden village” and a large apartment building in the capital for all Swedish aid workers, about 600 at most, and when they left in the early 2000s when the war ended, all the apartments and houses quickly fell to the ruling elite, and so on endlessly, where aid money rarely reached anyone other than those who were already billionaires.
Gold, diamonds, minerals, other metals, forests, agriculture, fishing – all controlled by a small circle. A few years ago, the generals decided to enter agriculture and were able to buy about 80,000 hectares each in the various provinces. All purchased with stolen funds and then legalized. How much land does the largest Swedish landowner have?
15:37 – Johan No.1
Well written and an argument that I think is entirely reasonable.
Addition to Jonas, but now maybe you know more than I do, but haven’t we heard about 1 km deep mine lines?
Then they alternate tank mines and troop mines, and the density is said to have been completely insane.
Then Erik14 wrote that they had 26 million mines at the start of the war, so there should still be some left in the barns.
Lex Maginot Line is that if you have broken through at one place, that line is then obsolete.
With the memories I have of training fields full of orange juice mixers, it is my conviction that UA fights in the best way. IFV is a battle taxi; you fight with a squad or platoon, and the staff has full information from drones, and then tanks stand 4 km away and provide direct fire on all identified targets.
You do reconnaissance fighting and withdraw upon contact and let indirect fire soften up the trench Russians or alternatively identify targets via drones or reconnaissance that are then taken out.
I have the distinct feeling that we are dusting off Normandy 1944 here?
15:57 – MatsExtrude
Thanks!👍
15:57 – MatsExtrude
Thanks again, interesting info!
16:39 – Johan No.1
I have too little knowledge about the BARS units but guess that it is as you write, that they called in the reserve that was already available.
At the mobilization in September 2022, apparently 80,000 out of 300,000 were trained and sent to the front directly.
There is supposed to be a huge pool of such, but it was probably also largely those who fled the country immediately, and then they have mobilized 1.7 million in total (if you believe David D), and that is probably a fairly large part of the previously trained pool.
10:50 – Johan No.1
What is happening at Novoprokopivka?
The latest seems to be that the 71st or 70th brigade broke down and fled and that they handled a large part of the defense.
The latest I have found is that UA has repelled RU counterattacks, so another brigade has also been neutralized.
The 1430th in the area was already heavily decimated earlier.
There is not much defense left of Novoprokopivka is a reasonable guess and UA is advancing.
All reserves we know of are already activated today.
Between Novoprokopivka – Verbove we heard yesterday that UA heavily decimated the 56th AAR and the BARS battalions in the area have previously taken heavy losses, and that the 1152nd regiment with T54-55 tanks was knocked out by the Leopards a few weeks ago.
It is not unreasonable at all that UA is well on its way into Novoprokopivka and Verbove because the defense seems heavily decimated.
This one is very interesting because it shows how “long range weapons” have decreased.
https://x.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1709191669630058527?s=20
I have probably pointed out far too often that I am of the opinion that the “Azov strike” is a chess move – then Russia has irreversibly lost the war.
Then the Russians have to understand that themselves too, of course, and maybe they refuse at first, who knows with that criminal clan nowadays where anything seems possible. They have already had a coup attempt and lost a flagship.
There is a rumor that Gerasimov is considering abandoning Bakhmut and the southern front to consolidate – a very loose rumor, so no changes yet.
But until that happens, I unfortunately believe that Ukraine will start feeling that they have to deliver something this autumn and we hope it will be sensible and not too rushed with high losses.
Now to something that goes beyond the original campaign plan if, against expectations, it stops at the southern front – RU has pooled everything they have in Bakhmut and the southern front to hold these areas and have thereby weakened other places.
Can one create a completely new “chess move” now that circumstances have changed (or they haven’t, but the one who wrote the big campaign plan had no good grades in strategic thinking during military service and made a rather basic plan in a cloud of whisky).
Yep, if you land and recapture Crimea from the sea or capture Belgorod for example, I think that could have some kind of equivalent effect, shockwaves in the Kremlin and demands for accountability in the form of a thrashing piñata.
Bakhmut is not devastating enough for RU for me, so even if they announce a tactical retreat to the Popasna-Svitlodarsk line, Putin will unfortunately not fall (I think).
But something will need to happen during late summer, that is crystal clear; if RU gets the chance to bring down their strategic reserves after Christmas to keep the fronts unchanged, it would be very bad, then Putin potentially has his long war. Autumn hasn’t even started yet; in Portugal it was 30 degrees and sunny with everyone not working on the beach.
This late summer will be very nail-biting and eventful until sometime in December – that’s what my coffee grounds say.
The intensity will increase until it breaks and it will collapse because RU has not yet mobilized, only talks it up, and the units currently handling the defense are in very poor condition except up in northern Luhansk, and there are no strategic reserves (yet).
If I may give both FSB and GUR some tips on where RU needs to strengthen so they become weaker on other fronts but also where they are weak today – a win-win whichever way RU moves, and nothing is unknown to anyone.
-Landing on Crimea – every raid is highly embarrassing for Putin so either intensify them or land and go on the defense.
-Landing between Kinburn Spit – Crimea.
-Opytne has every chance to become a new Davydiv Bridge if you look at the maps. There you could get LPR to waste a few brigades (and that is why RU is attacking now to regain the terrain they lost).
-If UA retakes Kurdumyivka and Ozarianivka, it could become threatening for Horlivka.
-The Kreminna forests seem to revert to whatever Russia puts in there disappears – also a possibility.
-Around the Dnipro it also looks thin for RU now, really thin in places.
-Then you should always read Erik14’s night shift carefully, I was quite proud to guest star the day before yesterday so late but didn’t manage the deepest night posts in time.
According to a Russian blogger, UA is pressing at Novomykhailivka and approaching the 2014 ceasefire line.
https://twitter.com/Ukrainene/status/1708966536034029996?t=PDRyuL9EbcUR2jlNc9FMOg&s=19
-Belgorod, what more needs to be said about this undefended oblast.
-The obvious breakthrough point that UA is building towards you have to figure out yourselves, Erik14 gets to keep a five hundred is the clue.
I count nine weak points in the Russian front that would have varying consequences for Russian command in the Ukraine war if UA increased pressure there.
The only way for RU to strengthen is to weaken other places and at the other places they cannot weaken because then there will be a breakthrough immediately.
We are definitely at a point where RU needs to abandon some area to consolidate, the rumor about abandoning Bakhmut and the southern front we examine a bit closer without committing to it at all, it is just a rumor for now –
If UA takes Kurdumyivka and Ozarianivka there is an acute risk of a breakthrough and RU then needs to fortify Horlivka and the Svitlodarsk – Popasna line closest to the breakthrough point and then gradually occupy that line northwards.
There are really no tangible units left, when we at the start of the spring offensive went through all fronts it was up in northern Luhansk they had a redundancy of about 10 brigades or so and they have probably moved this reserve south now.
What you then have to take from are the units on the active front around Bakhmut and if you do that you weaken yourself, domino pieces.
A tactical retreat and falling back to the Svitlodarsk – Popasna prepared defensive line is on the cards and that is to counter the risk of an acute breakthrough.
(I call the defensive line that, it doesn’t run exactly like that but it is a prepared line between Horlivka and up to Lysychansk).
However, all brigades will be needed in the new defensive line between Horlivka – Lysychansk so not much consolidation will really happen other than straightening the line but no brigades will be freed, that is my guess.
The southern front can play out in two ways –
Either they hold all terrain according to the current general order until they can no longer hold all terrain and then there will be a sharp breakthrough with devastating consequences – UA is building towards that now and RU is trying to hold out with everything they have.
If you want to stay one step ahead, you can abandon the Dnieper front and go on the defense at the land bridge to Crimea as well as in a NS line through Melitopol; there is prepared defense there, so someone has at some point thought about it.
The question, however, is whether the remaining units at the Dnieper are actually sufficient for this; I tend to think they are already too weak.
You then get a kind of horseshoe defense between Melitopol and Mariupol where the majority of the units are, and then you try to hold the land bridge down to Crimea by mining and blowing up the bridges.
This won’t win a war, but maybe you can buy a little more time than the hard breakthrough that then results in the race to Crimea.
The day the Dnieper front is abandoned will also be the day when Ukrainian drone swarms, CAS, and army aviation go all-in, and if the surviving troops after the gauntlet are not enough to man the new defense, it’s game over immediately.
There is every chance that the southern front collapses overnight and units spontaneously retreat down to Crimea while other units receive no information at all and remain in their trenches.
The area behind the southern front is so large that it will look really bad for RU, and they will also suffer too many losses to continue spinning the narrative that they are winning.
And they will also face the fait accompli that Crimea is only a matter of time from falling; it is not possible to reinforce the peninsula, and the drone swarms ebb and flow day and night until the brave defense tries to cross the Kerch Strait in a Badanka 2.0, only to then throw in the towel.
The amount of supplies on the peninsula is enormous, so it will be a bit like old times’ war spoils; there are also aircraft that cannot be flown home and ships under repair.