11:35 – MatsExtrude
Great reading as usual! 👍
I also believe that Ukraine now has a slight advantage when it comes to artillery, both in quantity, range, and precision. That alone is probably enough to break the Russians. It is basically the artillery they have relied on.
Too bad the Russians have mined like crazy, it won’t save them, but it makes it take time to advance.
Unfortunately, I suspect they continue to mine even further back. On the other hand, if they can reduce them enough it will matter less.
As you have mentioned, a minefield in itself is not a major obstacle if it is not backed up by artillery/troops/drones that can take it out and those trying to pass.
12:02 – Johan No.1
A bit of strategic communication to persuade oligarchs and siloviki to throw Putin under the bus – the USA and EU are trying to find legal ways to send all frozen funds to Ukraine.
We all understand that it is about “hey, if you end the war we won’t find any legal ways to keep your funds frozen and will have to release them.”
https://twitter.com/noelreports/status/1709821009568686511?s=46&t=rVlh3DZ12YBQsUYGNiXBnA
12:04 – Johan No.1
Have a thought about the mining further back, if they have done a “sparser” mining further back Russian style then they can’t go back and densify that minefield because they don’t know where the mines are.
However, of course, they are building more fortifications and placing mines further back now, anything else would be idiotic, but if they have no one to man them with it’s just a ditch.
12:18 – Johan No.1
At some point UA will plug the land bridge down to Crimea, there is administration, FSB, Rosgvardia, the navy and air force down there together with some army units and then a lot of rear, logistics, depots etc.
Right now I think they are trying, if not to empty Crimea of materiel, then at least to move what needs repair out of Crimea via the land route. The bridge seems to be closed?
The Russians are not known for planning three steps ahead so when it breaks at the southern front a lot of units will retreat down to Crimea and then it will be ordered to fight to the last drop in the foxhole.
After that they will try to empty Crimea over Kerch.
Yes, there is probably a chance for a rubber duck 2.0 😀
12:27 – Johan No.1
If the West can classify Russia as a terrorist state and all ABC agencies and it turns out that some gangs have had contact with them then they can be prosecuted under terrorism laws and it opens up for more aggressive surveillance methods (well).
There must be a limit to how much Russia can be allowed to destabilize the West…
12:39 – Johan No.1
If UA gets a wedge down to Azov and “fire control” over the V-E road at Berdyansk or Mariupol then it is probably about 150,000 total if they haven’t retreated before.
That is partly those who are currently in Crimea and partly retreating units including logistics, depots, FSB and Rosgvardia.
A guess but once they are down in Crimea then they are stuck in Crimea…
Yes, it’s not for nothing it’s called the chess move by someone in the thread.
12:43 – MatsExtrude
You have a point there, and if they still send some to supplement mine (they don’t seem to care that soldiers die) the chance is big that they instead contribute to mine clearance. 🙂
No, it is the manning (and lack of artillery) that I think will decide.
10:22 – Johan No.1
The Lions ✊
https://twitter.com/ukrainiansquad/status/1709566565044121633?s=46&t=UKWYtLDmYj70sGD0jeeUAw
If you follow the blog regarding UA losses, they have confirmed at some point that 80% of the wounded (was it?) return to the unit?
It seems that the Russian counterattacks at Novoprokopivka are now over but that is probably what is reflected in today’s obituary?
If you follow which brigades have been decimated, there are not many units with maintained combat value in that area now.
It seems clear that UA has reached and is sniffing around Novoprokopivka and that the counterattacks on the flanks have completely failed. Grankovitch has posted for a couple of days about who has been fighting.
UA seems to have “lost” one of the mech brigades, it fought in the beginning and took heavy losses and is withdrawn. Otherwise, the same units have been fighting since summer – low attrition rate (with risk of some misreading).
According to earlier info, they seem to have committed 2/3 and have 1/3 in reserve and can bring in units.
I think the assessment stands that if RU does not have strategic reserves in the size of CAA to send down to the southern front, it looks very bad for RU now.
Regarding the high Russian losses, I increasingly read “if Russia can handle these enormous losses, won’t they then survive?”.
They portray Russian losses as something positive for them, because they can take these losses they are a bigger threat.
The other is – “if Russia loses so much, Ukraine must lose a lot too?”.
Two wrongs don’t make a right.
As someone wrote yesterday and as we have discussed before, UA losses are 70% caused by artillery.
In autumn 2022, artillery fire dropped by 70% for a few months according to CNN.
Last year at Bakhmut, artillery went almost to zero when UA took out one of the main depots that caused moon craters.
We have countless statements from Russians, both prisoners and on social media, that they no longer have any fire support from indirect capabilities, no one responding in the field.
FIRMS is nowhere near as fiercely red as it was in 2022.
At the southern front at the glorious start of the spring offensive, RU deployed 20-30 Ahkp that were knocked out over a few weeks both in bases and during approach because they did not have enough artillery (my assessment).
Now that Ahkp were knocked out, they use FAB500 extensively so they risk the attack aircraft again, which they probably would not have done if they had artillery.
In these enormous daily losses, surely grk sneaks down to 82mm and some decoys.
However, I consider it quite established that the backbone of Russian artillery is broken now except up in northern Luhansk.
Sure, they get new barrels but the crews are untrained and move too slowly so they get knocked out and fire control is declining so they hit nothing.
Meanwhile, UA counter-battery fire is highly effective.
Also, the Russians probably mostly have dumb ammunition left now while UA has stocks of guided ammunition.
My assessment is that all in all, Ukraine has the advantage in artillery now except up in northern Luhansk.
Over a couple of days, I have linked to credible sources showing that –
-the range of Russian artillery has decreased sharply.
-the age of knocked-out platforms has risen sharply and more and more are being withdrawn.
-artillery from the 40s has been knocked out at the fronts.
The conclusion can only be that Russia cannot handle artillery losses at all and their most important capability is very heavily decimated.
An assumption then is that UA losses have gone down by that 70% caused by artillery?
Sure, it is very unfortunate that attack aircraft and Ahkp can still move and Lancet has proven to be a weapon a Russian small mech-dunk soldier can handle unfortunately but you don’t win wars with that.
Then we can be absolutely sure that the thread has been right when they considered that RU has been “short” on armor for quite a while now.
The number of knocked-out T62 and T54-55 as well as a general lack of armor in general speaks for itself.
The same probably applies to IFV although I have not studied that closely late at night.
The Russians’ defensive lines are probably their worst enemy – they have armored vehicles in defense that Ukraine locates and then knocks out with either guided ammunition or drones. You don’t win wars with static defense.
The Russians simply have so few armored vehicles left that Ukraine cannot find enough to knock out.
Several of the largest depots on the Russian side of the border are also completely empty now – if they had been gradually replenished from the rest of Russia before vehicles went to the front, we would have seen it on satellites.
What we also see now is how VDV, Spetznaz, Reconnaissance and naval infantry as well as the last capable guards brigades are worn down to zero.
This IS de facto the Russians’ last offensive reserve which has gone from +50,000 at the start of the spring offensive to I don’t know how few right now?
VDV regiments are at most reinforced battalion strength, Spetznaz and reconnaissance a few hundred per regiment, and naval infantry has already been diluted too much to count.
83rd GAAR in Bakhmut would have been under 1000 at the start of the spring offensive and they took a couple hundred losses immediately.
It is possible that there are some Guards brigades left that have not been heavily decimated up in northern Luhansk.
What then remains are those mobilized between September 2022 and today.
Those with previous experience were sent to the front immediately and those trained have at least up in northern Luhansk gotten almost a year’s training. Nevertheless, social media and captives testify that in many cases they have basically received no training at all during 10 months.
Training seems extremely uneven which feels very Russian.
The task they get is either to run across a field westward and that has failed since January 2023 except in Bakhmut.
The other task is to lie in a trench system and absorb UA combined arms warfare.
First they are ground down with artillery, then chased around for a while with drones, then infantry groups are dropped off from IFVs that have experience and capability far exceeding the mobilized Russians who lie in a hole and shoot.
Not infrequently they then run down into the reinforced trench and hide – this is more victims than a threat.
Where they manage to put up some kind of defense, the UA group then has a direct line to a Leo2 4km away that sets off explosives with direct fire on all targets or guided ammunition or drones.
That Ukraine switched to this grinding is to keep their own losses down – “number game” we called it somewhat untechnically when it started in Bakhmut.
We know from firsthand information that all UA hard vehicles are artillery magnets and that all larger troop concentrations are consistently subjected to indirect fire, but good luck taking out infantry swarming forward at about thirty attack points through defense systems – it’s not possible.
What they have sacrificed here is time, which they have considered they have, and I also believe they do – summer is long in Ukraine and we have already discussed that it will not be stopped due to weather.
I believe they have the time because the West has not been talked down by the Russians, but they have time until the New Year. After that, RU will be able to send a couple more CAAs to the fronts and replenish the defense systems behind where UA then stands – so not unlimited time.
There are Easter eggs left in the form of new attack targets and I believe the Easter eggs Storm Shadow and night fighting have done great damage to the Russians in the trenches.
The West has done its best to be the adults in the room – no fun in Belgorod, no targets in Russia, and not too many IFVs or MBTs because then Putin might get upset.
Despite this abuse from the West, Ukraine has accomplished the impossible-
-Ukraine has denied RU air supremacy.
-They have denied RU the western Black Sea, if you remember 2022, UA could not fly over Kherson because Moscow’s air defense system lay like a wet blanket over the whole area.
-They have reduced the imperialist Russian artillery to endangered 82mm mortars.
-UA has acquired its own air supremacy with drones.
-They have engaged all of Eastern Europe to help with finished damaged hard vehicles and we know that hundreds of MBTs are returning from workshops.
Also take a look at Oryx at what has been delivered, thousands of vehicles. Then we learned a few weeks ago that Leo2 was standing and shooting accurately with its thermal sights 4km away at the 1430th regiment’s T54-55 which does not have that range.
The donated vehicles, even if they are old Eastern vehicles, are in good condition with the latest aiming devices while the Russian team gets everything with old unmodernized vehicles that are just victims.
PTGB and APC have proven to work very well as shrapnel-protected buses and deliver 12.7mm on target and UA has received thousands of them. 4000 in addition to IFVs.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.html
The Russian army is more and more infantry without hard vehicles, all the 1000-level units don’t have many hard vehicles, VDV is light on that, BARS is probably not mechanized either and so on and then a general shortage of them.
Sure, they have some capability left up in northern Luhansk but it is now mostly mobilized units without direct combat experience.
I constantly follow the RU brigades at Robotyne, Staromaiorske, Bakhmut, Dnepr and so on and more and more of the angry red squares are empty shells now – it looks really bad.
I will cancel the account if this is not part of the big plan we see now. Will of course come back as Johan No.2 then but it’s important to promise big.
My money is that UA still has gas and that quite soon the tempo will also increase at Dnepr, further east at the southern front and at some new cool point where RU has weakened.
Positive-Positive thus.