FORGIVE RUSSIA EVERYTHING? Putin pressures the West! Ukraine risks being left without money at the worst moment?

Speaker 1

The latest political events, we analyze them together with a guest in the studio, this is Oleksii Buryachenko, president of the International Institute for Security Studies. Mr. Oleksii, welcome, my friend.

Speaker 2

Greetings, friend. Glad to see you and warmly greet all our esteemed viewers.

Speaker 1

Our American correspondent, Dmytro Anomchenko, just provided such a worrying perspective in the report. Beijing and Moscow may be betting on November to negotiate about Ukraine without Ukraine. For the viewers, I will explain that on November 18-19, the APEC summit will take place in Shenzhen, China. Everyone will be present there, clearly. Clearly, Trump will be present there, and perhaps Putin or someone representing him will be present, perhaps even Putin himself. Oleksiy, the situation we have is that the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Defense Forces are giving a harsh asymmetric response. In particular, we saw an attack on the Omsk oil refinery yesterday. Who actually holds the levers of war today, the levers of the situation in general? And are we, Ukraine, among them?

Speaker 2

We are among them. Well, let's start from the end, then move to the beginning, we'll return to ATES, because that will indeed be a relevant topic now. We have many levers. First of all, the Russian-Ukrainian war; it is impossible to… to conduct the entire dialogue about it without Ukraine. Although, of course, the Russians want this now. I think you have also seen the statements of Ushakov, and Peskov, and Putin himself insists.

Speaker 1

Well,

Speaker 2

of course, in order to talk about Ukraine without Ukraine, like simulating some kind of hypothetical Yalta-2. Russian

Speaker 1

The press calls her that.

Speaker 2

I am surprised by other things as well. The fact that the Russian press calls it that and that they are pushing it all over the world does not surprise me. These are their propaganda information narratives. I am surprised when our expert community calls this Yalta-2. That is what surprises me, because it doesn't even smell like that, excuse my lack of political correctness. Because this Yalta-2 is not needed in today's format, neither by China, nor the USA, nor the Trumps. Well, why would they want to bring Putin closer, bring him out of international isolation and, accordingly, bring him up to their level? Meaning, it won't even hypothetically be a Yalta-2? Meaning, it's nothing more than Putin's whim? Of course, it's a Putin whim, and he will just try to get a photo of the three of them. Preferably, these three people would be bent over a map of the world—some kind of propaganda story like that. And the icing on the cake is that a question about the Russian-Ukrainian war must be integrated into their agenda for five minutes, so that they can discuss it. Of course, they will practically agree on nothing there, because it is not within their competence at all. And their interests in this region differ greatly from one another. They have no common denominator.

Speaker 1

And the theme of the summit, basically, is not…

Speaker 2

Of course, but the summit is one thing, as we will now say regarding the wish lists. That is, I am trying to explain to our viewer that it is impossible to sit down at the negotiating table there, at the Asia-Pacific Economic summit

Speaker 3

cooperation,

Speaker 2

draw IALTU-2 in five minutes and try to find a solution to the Russo-Ukrainian war. Because China has its own pros in the continuation of the war, and its own cons.

Speaker 1

And most importantly, their strategic goals.

Speaker 2

Of course, there is the Black Sea, for example, and so on. There are many subtle nuances there. There is no common coordinate system, that's what I'm getting at. And as for Trump and Xi Jinping themselves, they certainly have central negotiation themes in China. And Putin is definitely not among them. Well, Xi cannot forbid Putin from attending the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. This is obvious, because they have allied relations. More precisely, not allied, but rather partnership ones. Because allied is more about Iran and North Korea. But nonetheless, they have, let's say, a history of mutually beneficial partnership. Let's put it as diplomatically as possible. But Xi Jinping, I'll be honest, Oleksiy, would be much more interested in meeting separately with Trump and separately with Putin. And not to bring them together, and not to take that photo of the three of them. Because he would understand that even his status is lowered if Putin stands between them now. Because, after all, two powerful economic states—China and the USA—are roughly comparable in magnitude. They are economically interdependent. We have spoken about this more than once, remember, in our games. But what does Russia have to do with this? Russia is now trying, just not as I see it. And here I probably disagree with Mr. Dmytro in the thought that they are not trying, together with China, to decide the fate of the Russian-Ukrainian war, or to influence Trump. It seems to me that Putin, in his desires for negotiations with Trump, is actually trying to influence Xi Jinping to push this common agenda. Meaning Putin says, I want a photo, I want a five-minute conversation about the Russian-Ukrainian war during our talk, and in exchange I will give you a trilateral meeting with Ukraine, and perhaps, if you satisfy everything, perhaps I will come to the G20. Which Trump strongly desires—to sign something, it doesn't matter at all what it is. I think that,

Speaker 1

that Putin also would not refuse to come to Florida. No,

Speaker 2

I think that Putin, like a cat, will resist with all four paws to avoid appearing there, because information has already come through that Trump invited Zelenskyy there. I was told about this during a personal meeting.

Speaker 1

meetings

Speaker 2

two times. That is, the President of Ukraine is certainly expected to be there, and it is obvious that if both Putin and Zelenskyy appear on that platform, well, it will not be a coincidence. This is a scripted story, Trump's scripted story, and Putin has to make some move. Does he want to make a move now? No, not

Speaker 1

wants. The situation is not in Putin's favor.

Speaker 2

Of course, that is why the meeting at the level of technical groups was rescheduled from the desired format from November 3 to November 10. And, accordingly, the focus is further placed specifically on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit,

Speaker 3

and not at the G20.

Speaker 2

That is, Putin wants to get the desired [results] specifically there, and at the G20, of course, those who always bash Trump.

Speaker 1

I want to ask

Speaker 2

about… Then

Speaker 3

we will out-lift

Speaker 1

this report. Not much longer remains. The main thing is to survive. I wish this for everyone. I want to ask. But in all this, this three-part, so to speak, two-and-a-half-part scheme of dividing the world, as Putin would like. First of all, as it were, Ukraine constantly upholds the principle "Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine." And does Europe uphold it? The principle "Nothing about Europe without Europe," and is this indisputable?

Speaker 2

It's being defended very quietly, to be honest. Because we see that even the Karelian territories have changed recently. And the same Peskov and Ushakov are already formulating that Russia supports the definition of the European representative at the negotiations. It gets complicated with the United States. And that the format of completion must take into account the interests of Europe. That is, they are exactly opposite. The thesis is being broadcast now. Why is this happening? Very simple, because when Europe was united, when Europe understood that its security directly depended on pressure on the RF, then Europe was inconvenient for Russia. And now, when, in essence, in the political agenda of Europeans there is a search for contacts with Russians, internal political destabilization, chaos in the streets, the year '27, political cycles, the proposal of incomplete membership for Ukraine, the blocking of even open clusters. I won't even mention the closure and the political decision. Such a Europe is not united and is chaotic. Of course, it becomes very profitable for the RF. And now there are risks that if Europe does not wake up somewhere and find its own single system of coordinates, that, for the most part, Moscow can motivate Europeans to, say, reduce or stretch out in time the financial support for Ukraine. Thereby, as the United States does, shift the risk not to the aggressor, accordingly, but to the victim. Therefore, of course, we must probably speak these things out loud and warn our European partners that this is another trap. If they are now criticizing Trump that he fell into Putin's trap, well, she is now standing just as one step away from that open trap and has probably already even lifted her foot and can very quickly end up there. And Ukraine can now actually try to play its interests through China, because, as I said earlier, China definitely needs a Russia that is emerging under total pressure, including sanctions, because immediately they will be forced to pay significantly more for what they are paying significantly less for. And against the background of the blocked Armur Strait, where they buy 70% of their oil. In essence, this becomes a matter of national security for them; it is important. If Hormuz were unblocked, China's hands would be free. Here, of course, it would be difficult for us to play our own game, and to integrate, essentially, the agenda. But as long as this is the case, one can play this story with China. This is absolutely not obvious; it is not there. And these are not even discussions among our experts.

Speaker 1

Exactly, because, as you can see, I've already started fidgeting, so to speak. How, what agenda, in what way can we even establish this diplomatic contact? We have formal contact,

Speaker 2

Right?

Speaker 1

And the communication channel that we can broadcast, on what grounds should we even be talking?

Speaker 2

This is very

Speaker 1

Important, is it true?

Speaker 2

Of course, it is an information war. Because the war is hybrid, it involves various things both on the battlefield and in the information space as well. By the way, I am very surprised by the discussion. Sometimes in our social networks, there is talk that the sole source of receiving information needs to be removed, for example, for Ukrainians, when they talk about the marathon. Because this will definitely be playing into the enemy's hands. No, but this is also, in my opinion, worth saying. There are also external communication channels, which also shape the image. Oleksiy, what will you ask? For China, it is not enough to say that decisions should not be made, or even to speak about Ukraine without Ukraine. Well, because this is a very clear motivation for us. For them, we need to speak of their motivation. What are the risks, accordingly, of the cooperation of the RF, USSR, and China in a trilateral format? In the fact that China itself will suffer greatly from this. Communication channels can be absolutely different. Both formal and informal. Broadly speaking, these could be some emergency communication channels, or an expert environment, or round tables. Again, Kazakhstan, the countries of Central Asia, the Middle East, Azerbaijan, Turkey, the South Caucasus. We have partners who are ready to become a bridge. If, for example, some joint initiative were implemented now at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of Foreign Affairs, to support, for example, the Chinese initiative, One Belt, One Road. Motivating that if Russia now slips out of control, out of, accordingly, external pressure, then this project could be under threat. Because Russia will want to renew pressure on Kazakhstan, on the Caspian Sea, support Iran even more, pressure on Azerbaijan, pressure on Armenia, on Georgia, and so on. And this project of China will find itself under serious danger, Oleksiy. Therefore, it is not a problem how to find motivation for China. The main thing is that it be synchronized and maximally conscious by those who will carry out this communication. Whether

Speaker 1

Do we have enough time?

Speaker 2

Oleksii, I don't know. I'm on my own proof.

Speaker 1

I know that with

Speaker 2

China

Speaker 1

establishing the correct contacts is not difficult, but it takes a very long time

Speaker 2

communication channels. Oleksii, I agree, that is their philosophy. Absolutely. They are Confucians. I just wanted to say. When China needs it and when China sees the risks of a change in the external paradigm, then China will react quickly accordingly. Because what China needs, it needs to have relations with whom? With the United States. They are their key economic partner. And the second is Europe. These two priorities are key for China. And the construction of land communication is a tool for implementing their main priority. This is direct access to European markets. Russia is an unstable element in their scheme. And such a distorted version of China's world federation suits them best. Therefore, truly, of course, Trump has interests. And remember, he also said that he plans to come to this summit, which China is hosting this year, somewhere approximately a few months ago. Why? Because of North Korea. Because they followed the storm in the European sea. North Korea.

Speaker 1

always, basically, for a very long time annoyed Kita. Yes,

Speaker 2

Correct. Then, when it was not possible during these two personal meetings to resolve many issues in the Indo-Pacific region, not only the big deal with China, but also the issues of South Korea, the confrontation on the peninsula, Japan, and the threat from North Korea. Once again, we add other countries to that, which are related to the USA, the Philippines, Indonesia. And the icing on the cake, of course, is Taiwan. That is to say, they have many issues that they need to sit down and talk about. And this bridle that Putin is trying to throw over this entire broad agenda between China and the USA, which they are trying to reformat into nuclear deterrence, is very artificial. Because I think, most likely, the talk there—you know—Chinese representatives were in Moscow recently, I assume you read about it. We don't know exactly what the conversations were about, but I am deeply convinced that it was approximately as follows. The Russians were persuading them to join this initiative for a new treaty within the framework of the NPT, which is currently not in effect between Russia and the United States since the New Year. To integrate China into it. China was previously categorically against it. Obviously, because it does not want the IAEA to monitor the increase of its nuclear arsenal.

Speaker 1

Absolutely, he is trying to build up.

Speaker 2

He is still against it, but the issue is something else. Russia probably justifies it in the following way, that this is a great cover for our trilateral meeting, because Russia and the United States are the two largest nuclear powers. And one way or another, China does not force this meeting to actually sign anything. In other words, under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence, Russia is simply trying to drag out this meeting so they can say – yes, we talked about a major nuclear treaty, and we will continue to talk about it in a trilateral format. For example, many more times, which also completely corresponds

Speaker 1

the interests of the Russian Federation. A very Russian signature to find a communication channel, so reliable, rock-solid,

Speaker 2

and for a long time

Speaker 1

to play him, absolutely certainly. But I will return to Ukraine; still, Ukraine certainly has, let's say, I wouldn't want to say claims, I wouldn't want to, but certainly, and an offense also doesn't fit, you understand, as the ambassador of the PRC, the plenipotentiary, the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador, his name is Ma Shan Kun, if you don't know the ambassador of the PRC, for example, published an open letter in the Ukrainian media, and in this letter there wasn't a single word about the war, there was about peaceful reconstruction, there was about how China successfully builds roads, bridges, lifts various countries out of poverty, and so on, well, all this Chinese propaganda, standard, which China has been broadcasting to various countries for many years, both on its own and on a global scale, but there was nothing about the war there. We see how in the UN China supports this group of friends of peace, where they also put forward some, well, naive to put it mildly—that's very mild—peace plans, and if not put mildly, then peace plans that would be more pleasing to the Kremlin than to Kyiv, so in these conditions, to be more specific, do we have a chance to build communication channels—I'm not talking about relations, we have relations, formally diplomatic—but how to start understanding one another?

Speaker 2

It is necessary to simultaneously broadcast some main positions, what we are doing, and by the way, they change depending on the situation, something is added, something else fades into the background, this is normal, this is today's fast diplomacy, especially since Ukraine is in a state of war, and our foreign policy must be adaptive one way or another, especially since we don't exist in a vacuum, there are elections in the United States, here different processes are unfolding in Europe, and we have to balance all these factors regarding the implementation of our positions, that is, one thing, here is one line, but there must be a parallel line, a parallel line of seeking communication with China, with an emphasis on what China needs, that is, well, in principle, how they work with major players, this is a major player, one wants to, or doesn't want to, well, that's how we work with the United States of America, seeking what they need.

Speaker 1

We are also dissatisfied with something, right?

Speaker 2

Of course, well, Trump wants a resource deal, please, a resource deal, well, that is exactly it, so that the United States remains within the communication contours of its time, we provided such opportunities accordingly, I don't know whether it was right or wrong, but it was decided to do it that way then, something similar we must do now with China, well because, again I repeat, the factor of the Black Sea and the logistics of the Black Sea without the Russian Federation, this is an important argument in any case for China, because there is Turkey, there is Georgia, there are those deep-water ports through which it plans to fully establish export-import relations with Europe, meaning there are arguments, we have partners on this path, as I have already mentioned Turkey, Armenia, which also strives to detach itself from the Russian Federation, and Georgia as well.

Speaker 1

But we still have Europe as a partner, and Europe is of great interest to China.

Speaker 2

Absolutely, this is a key factor, this is a key element, because if we are here—I am talking about the geography of the Black Sea, about the countries of the South Caucasus, Central Asia—this is more about individual countries that are of interest to China and Europe, then Europe is like a big player, certainly, it is that actor with whom China wants to have the most honest relations.

Speaker 1

But does Europe want to? What I mean is that if we start producing in this

Speaker 2

communication channel… Very briefly, so as not to drag it out, but it is necessary to develop in the direction of China very quickly, as quickly as possible, a single common voice with Europe. Because for Europe, those risks—what is currently happening in communication, let's be honest, with the USA and the RF—is a very dangerous story, and considering that they have no army of their own, that they are not only штею standing in the way of autonomization [of] dependence on weaponry

Speaker 4

from the Russian Federation,

Speaker 2

from the US connection and so on and so forth, they now need a truly reliable partner who, if not to protect them from such a geopolitical storm, then at least can balance certain interests of Europe here and now. Well, in truth, Ukraine can become a very important factor here, for both Europe and China, a kind of balancer of mutual relations.

Speaker 1

Oleksii, thank you very much for the conversation, for the very valuable points and topics. The topic, more precisely. Oleksii Buryachenko, president of the International Institute for Security Studies, was our guest today, for which we thank him very, very much.

Speaker 4

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