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“Lethality over 50%”: why the kill zone became deadly dangerous – Mirchuk and Zhadan about the front

Volodymyr Mirchuk discusses the role of the 21st Unmanned Systems Regiment "Lava" as a substitute for heavy aviation, focusing on operational depth and the high lethality of the modern kill zone.


Speaker 1

Corps aviation, since things didn't work out for us with real heavy aviation, so we are trying to find alternatives in unmanned systems. On one hand, my fire team, where it is necessary to put things out a bit, on the other hand, where it is necessary to light a fire, we light it. So how would you evaluate the last year from a purely military perspective?

Speaker 2

He is more

Speaker 1

meaning, benefit. There have been no wars with such lethality; now lethality is over 50%. Conventionally, if you are detected and they start striking, hitting, it is likely, very likely, that it will lead to death. They still don't have some technologies, but we already do. Why are so many new technologies appearing? Because we can do not just two iterations a day, but send a third one to the battlefield by evening to test whether it flies in the conditions of the ridge or not. I call these parks, but if you suppress this and this for me, then this panther and this will still work.

Speaker 2

Friends, hello everyone, this is "Radio Hartia," my name is Serhii Zhadany. This is the program "Scenario of the Parade on Magic Square." A program to which we invite experts, specialists, people who are knowledgeable about the conduct of war, knowledgeable about the Armed Forces, who can explain to us what is happening today around the edges of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Our guest today is Volodymyr Mirchuk, commander of the 21st Regiment of Unmanned Systems "Lava" within the "Hartia" Corps. Mr. Volodymyr, good morning.

Speaker 1

Good day

Speaker 2

morning,

Speaker 1

Serhiy. Thank you for the beginning.

Speaker 2

Thank you for coming. We have representatives of the unit here constantly, we love you very much, and we follow with interest how you are forming, how you are, uh, building these up, building muscle. But, you know, I would like to hear your vision as a commander, something more strategic. "Hartiya" is a complex mechanism. There are several brigades, there are several additional regiments. In this mechanism, what is the role of the unit? So, what are you for? Are you a reserve, are you the offensive, what are you?

Speaker 1

Corps aviation, since things didn't work out for us with real heavy aviation, we are trying to find alternatives in unmanned systems. And, actually, our regiment is this conditional aviation, an aviation brigade for the corps. We operate in the operational depth, far enough from the front line, from 40 to 200. Are these "middle strikes" as well? "Middle strikes," yes. Similarly, we also help, if necessary, in the tactical depth with front-strikes. So we are the kind of people who… On one hand, my fire brigade, where it's necessary to put things out a bit; on the other hand, where it's necessary to light a fire, and we light it, so…

Speaker 2

So, I would say, aviation is indeed such a principle of warfare of the 20th century, when aviation is attached to ground units. Now we have it, as such, real, old in the classical sense, but it is somewhat separate. And so, it turns out that drones are returning to this old scheme, where those who fly are added to the units?

Speaker 1

To be honest, not me. That is, our commander has such a vision. Actually, he says, boys, you must be the aviation of our corps. And indeed, when we started reading some doctrinal things, field manuals, but on this topic, and indeed, in some part we can replace aviation with large heavy multicopters. In principle, what are we doing? We just don't have enough. Of course, if we had aviation in the usual sense for us, it would be cool. A huge number of missiles – that would be… But why dream? We have what we have. And, in principle, as for me, the unmanned systems and the joy of this occasion are super effective regarding the costs spent and the effect. They are developing incredibly. Therefore, thanks to our kind of inventiveness, of our country, which we have now, we have come to the point where aviation is no longer so absolutely necessary. That is

Speaker 2

This is about talking about you, about unmanned systems, as various types of aviation, right? We've already touched upon this word. You are with the corps, meaning you are a separate regiment within the corps. And what about talking about separate brigades? That is, in Kharti, primarily, these are several brigades located on different sections of the front. Does this imply that, well, each brigade obviously has to have its own aviation? Or is it still more impractical, more effective when there is a regiment like yours that responds operationally?

Speaker 1

Well, there is a regiment, it is part of a corps, which has several combined arms brigades; there can be a drone systems regiment, an air defense regiment, or a support regiment. We are that drone systems regiment. Of course, in every brigade, there is the so-called concept of width and depth of responsibility. So each brigade has its own sector, both in width and depth. And the brigade depth is nominally 30 kilometers. Within these 30 kilometers, units such as battalions, which also have their own drone detachments or even companies, operate—nominally 15 kilometers from the conditional line of demarcation. In the brigade, there is a drone systems company or battalion; it operates at a depth of up to 30 kilometers. And we, starting from these 30-40 kilometers, depending on the territory, and deeper—that is already the drone systems regiment. Larger assets, more expensive assets, and perhaps better specialists for some deeper, nominal deep strikes. In this way, we achieve coverage of this general battlefield or, as we call it, the kill zone, by different units that do not overlap in their functions. That is the idea, and we are not unique in this; in more or less every corps, such a regiment as ours exists and performs its tasks. Two main tasks. I'll say it again. Operational depth of 40-200 and tactical—to suppress something, to help someone, to prepare for certain actions.

Speaker 2

You used this word, which the men inside use constantly, kill zone. The commander constantly, the charter commander constantly talks about this. Overall, I understood that this is some kind of vision of the charter, to create and expand it as much as possible. Essentially, so, explain to a person, a person from outside the defense forces, what a kill zone is, how it works, what it is needed for, how to simply do it, what is it?

Speaker 1

A killzone is the distance from a conditional line of demarcation where there is a high risk of injury or death. Accordingly, the closer one gets to this line, from either side, this risk increases. How to explain this? I don't know, 20 kilometers from the LoC. That is where you have to be ready mentally and physically. You'll simply be on alert. Usually, when I drive in, my body is at a maximum concentration of all sensors—audio, eyes, what I see—the brain is working. The organism doesn't normally function with such concentration, but that is how this killzone works, and who realizes it.

Speaker 2

This effectively changes the very concept of the front line. Usually, when we talk about the front line, it's some kind of drawn line, a line of trenches where the infantry is stationed. Between the lines of trenches, within a nominal 500 or 1000 meters. Now it is not like that. And this line we are talking about is actually what is like a purgatory between the trenches and the peaceful rear.

Speaker 1

Essentially, yes. It's just more intensive, say 10-15 kilometers. In the intensive [zone], on the contrary, you can't get through by car; you have to go on foot, firing back, hiding in shelterbelts or forest strips. And there is a less intensive, but no less dangerous one, where we already travel by car, which, in principle, is also dangerous. This is roughly from 10 to 30 kilometers. In

Speaker 2

Is Kharkovo already the suburb of Kharkovo?

Speaker 1

100%. And to come under shelling 25-30 kilometers in the field is quite difficult.

Speaker 2

It is a process, to the extent that both sides can be seen. Both theirs and ours.

Speaker 1

Exactly. Maybe, even in some moments, it was still a bit dangerous with our Middlestrike. They still don't have some technologies, but we already

Speaker 2

is. But why in general speak about changing the configuration of the front line, about the appearance of this so-called expansion, the so-called expansion of the kill zone? Who has more problems here? For us or for the Russians? Existence, existence of units, logistics, supply, movement. Who has it harder now?

Speaker 1

I don't know about this. I think it is known to the parties. This is simply the reality of this new war. I don't know what it will be like, but it is terrible and ruthless. And actually, this so-called transparency of the battlefield, as we call it, the speed of detection, lethality. There has been no such lethality in any wars. Now the lethality is over 50%. Conventionally, if you are detected and they begin to strike, to hit. Likely, very likely, this leads to death, not to injury. I think, for both sides it is equally hard for infantrymen, pilots, unmanned systems who are in this zone. We are practically going step by step. Here the question is who will use resources more effectively, who will make fewer mistakes, make correct decisions faster, see the development strategy. And here we are a little ahead in this. And regarding suffering and pain, it is the same.

Speaker 2

It's hard.

Speaker 1

It must be said that the enemy is simply driving this infantry. He chose such a tactic, a strategy of advancement, regardless of terrible losses. Quantitatively, they suffer more. But that's just their way.

Speaker 2

If we talk about mid-strikes, usually in our information space there is more talk about long-range strikes, about missiles, about the need to hit deep into the enemy's rear. That is, as far as can be understood, the front itself is primarily held thanks to mid-strikes. Medium-range strikes are being carried out.

Speaker 1

At this depth, you also influence the front-strike. If you do not allow movement in the middle depth, to bring water, food, ammunition to the front line, then the front line stops and that's it. That is, it is very effective to work precisely in the middle-strike. Therefore, maybe a year, probably two or one and a half years ago, there was a discussion that we had focused on points and were fighting in the front bushes. For every infantryman. For every infantryman, instead of looking deeper, where our strikes, fewer in number, directly influence… Well, and now this has, of course, been corrected and indeed more and more we are working there in that mode. I must say, the enemy is adapting. They also counter. Looking for various paths, methods, mobilizing in bad weather, and so on. But this definitely influences the possible. This is one of the factors why the front line is as it is now.

Speaker 2

You named a specific, specific date. That was last year. There is a year when Ukraine actively uses missile strikes, makes a bet. Actually, in your opinion, as an officer, a unit commander, a person who sees the front line, what happened over the past year in terms of this war? How would you evaluate the last year purely militarily? To whose advantage was it more?

Speaker 1

I think that still for us… Here, since the beginning of the war, we have been neutralizing a certain advantage. And this is more of a plus for us than a minus. We clearly do not outnumber the forces, but we neutralize the advantages. This is the neutralizing of the advantage. This is a greater job that we are doing than the enemy. I think that this year, well, the front line is not moving. I can't tell you for sure right now, but perhaps, in some moments, we are biting back…

Speaker 2

Now the third one started to advance…

Speaker 1

Third and before that Khartiya, Kupyansk. Therefore, we are taking back what is ours little by little. Well, maybe… I think this pace is not quite good, but nonetheless. These are huge successes in today's war. With today's transparent battlefield, the saturation of UAV systems and everything else. I think that a year is also within our reach. We will see how the winter will be.

Speaker 2

Well, yes, the winter that everyone [is waiting for]. Everyone is waiting with such apprehension. With fear, but, I think, somehow also with hope. Do you know why I want to ask? Look, you are talking about how this is assessed from the outside. Well, I think a person looking at the map wants to see some breakthroughs, as it was in the summer, in the autumn of 1922, when entire districts were liberated. Now it is not like that. Now the capture of every settlement is accompanied by a media campaign. Both from our side and from the Russian side—the Russians often claim in the news things that actually remain behind us, as was the case with that Klubinsky one. But, in principle, looking at the front line, can you predict a possible breakthrough? Or in this war, is such a concept as a breakthrough, breakthrough, and emerging into operational space, no longer possible, is it something from past wars?

Speaker 1

It feels like we are at a stage where—when it was possible—now, probably both you and I have more certainty that this is very, very unlikely. Even when we talk about what the winter will be like, it concerns the civilian population and our daily lives more than the military. From a military perspective, I am not afraid of winter. I am more concerned about the energy supply. Cities, electricity, heat, energy. This affects us slightly, but not completely. Therefore, I think, regarding operational breakthroughs to break through, as of today I don't know where this could be done.

Speaker 2

I was speaking, rather, about us. You see, it is presented in the highlights. They talk about our troops, some settlement is liberated, some large village, and they write about a breakthrough of the Russian enemy. Our troops are moving forward en masse, and you hear this. It sounds very beautiful. In reality, two square kilometers, which were liberated at a great cost.

Speaker 1

Alright, and they don't liberate neither in the Kupiansk operation, nor now the third. They don't liberate through those kinds of insane losses, as the enemy does. It is just a scrupulous system, great planning. Step by step, step by step, I know a little, and these are completely different losses. In my opinion, it is high skill for commanders to organize such an operation. Is it possible on our side? I don't know, maybe it is, maybe it's not. So for me, the Kulska operation was once a surprise, but it did happen. Regardless of how it ended, it is evaluated differently, that's not for me. Maybe so, maybe I don't know. I hope that there are resources, and if there is such a need, then these resources will be deployed and there will be such.

Speaker 2

It still seems to me that if you look at these four and a half years of war, you can see how conditional this consolidation of territory is. Remember, the Russians were on the outskirts of Kyiv, then they disappeared from there. For instance, they were on our ring road, they are not in Kharkiv. Almost the entire Kharkiv operation was liberated in 1922. There was the Kursk operation, which you mentioned, when we entered, then left. Is that so? Or is it otherwise that the appearance of the flag of Russian Ukraine somewhere determines that it will remain there tomorrow. That is, the very concept of movements along the front line, is it conditional in this war? Or still, behind this

Speaker 1

there is a certain

Speaker 2

Some kind of arbitrary goal? Moving forward just to plant a flag somewhere over there?

Speaker 1

I don't know, from a military point of view, it's probably important to capture some strategic heights, objects, as part of some big plan. From the point of view of just a flag, it's more of a media thing. In Russia, it is very important to place these new flags anywhere, in some villages, or to have incredible successes in Novotokmaivka, what a year. This is important for them. For us, of course, every kilometer of our land is also very important. And especially if this kilometer moves [the front], for example, away from Kharkiv, or reduces the danger to Kharkiv. This is mega important. Maybe Novotokmaivka isn't super important, but somewhere here it's more important. Or from Zaporizhzhia, from Tepnohirsk, where the front is being pushed back, what was previously lost. This is a very high priority for us. Of course, compared to operations in the Kherson or Kharkiv regions, now these cities and villages that we are winning back are completely destroyed and so on. It's absolutely nothing, like the terrain, let's say, or urban terrain. Therefore, all of this is much harsher. Well, overall the war is changing, and we see it moving from those, so-called, more toward total war, where the civilian population, civilian cities are drawn in. And cities are being taken hostage,

Speaker 2

cities are being made the main targets now, when we see what is being done to Kyiv.

Speaker 1

Yes, and this is the biggest change over the year, that we have become more and more. And they are further from despair, the enemy strikes civilian objects more and more to somehow swim. I

Speaker 2

I also wanted to ask about this. Look, we see the situation on the front line, troop movements, the liberation of some territories, just some kind of stabilization of the front. On the other hand, indeed, more news and more events are happening in the rear, both in the Russian one and in ours. First, we started actively hitting oil refineries, and it was a whole operation that continues, as far as I understand. On the other hand, the Russians have simply started terrorizing city centers, well, not primarily Kyiv. That is, I think, not just Kyiv, because everyone is suffering. In fact, is this a new form of war, or is it some stage, in your opinion, and who might have the advantage here? With us, when we destroy their energy facilities, or with them, when they are simply holding our million-plus cities hostage, holding them hostage?

Speaker 1

Yes, it's kind of a… well, not that it's logical, but, well, it's not the first time in wars that civilian objects are drawn in and struck; at the end of wars, this was done by both one side and the other; well, this year, it has simply taken on larger scales, and it will likely scale up even more. Here, simply, well, our population, or the population in general, must be ready. Even if I am in a civilian place, well, having a tourniquet and a bandage, and everyone else the same. Small things like that; I don't know, the government probably should build more shelters, somehow do all this faster. Who will be the winner here, I don't know. We are drawing them in—it's clear why—to influence the society in Russia that was completely detached from the war, they were told that it was a special military operation, and now, this war—this is always a tactic, we are dragging it there. And that, in principle, is normal. Do I feel sorry or not? Well, it is what it is.

Speaker 2

Well, yes, I understand what you are talking about. You know, but if, from your point of view, if it is a missile, essentially, that flies, which is controlled by a unit that flies, then wasn't there this statement by Ukraine about 40 days to force Russia to peace? These 40 days have ended, there are certain results. I don't know if the Ukrainians really [believed] that this war would end in 40 days, but obviously something happened and some conclusions can be drawn. If we exclude the political component, speaking purely from a management perspective, some results—in your opinion, what was the main result of this operation?

Speaker 1

No, it definitely slowed down, there, the logistics, if we there, well, yes, I don't know for sure, if it was meant within these 40 days, it's clear that those were strikes on refineries, on some logistical routes, say, there, to Crimea and so on. Well, all of this has an impact, it's impossible to count it directly as such victories, but overall a certain picture is emerging that, first, on the international stage, Ukraine can, and conditionally, is becoming some kind of subject there, and can put up a proper fight, can develop new technologies, can strike thousands of kilometers away, which was unthinkable at the beginning of the war. That's it. It's just, this is somehow, we showed some kind of capability.

Second, the impact on the troops, on the enemy army. We have been and are striking hundreds of fuel trucks, this definitely affected the front areas, and, in principle, taking into account that there are many leaves now, vegetation is normal, one can move through the shelterbelts, and this infiltration tactic probably has greater effectiveness than it will have in the autumn-winter period. We slowed this down. That's how it goes, when you have a fast, maneuverable target, slow it down, and then hit it. We, conditionally, somehow slowed it down there. What else can be added here? In Waitberis this is indeed an impact on just the civilian population, where you when you can't. Therefore I think that some stages of achieving the overall goal. Probably something went, maybe, not exactly like that, or maybe our hopes were greater than they are. This is also such a story, it's the so-called, how do you call it, friction raibunk, so it also has an effect, you think to yourself, you plan, now we'll wipe everyone out here, the missiles flew, but something went wrong there.

Speaker 2

In other words, you are expressing an interesting and perhaps not always obvious point. By striking the rear, striking the economy, striking certain key nodes, we thereby slow down the advance directly to the front line. Because these are like arteries that reach the front line, and it's not always visible, it can't always be seen visually, but that's how it is

Speaker 1

it works. Yes, it definitely works. We see it, we hear the clamor and everything else, that they sit for three days without ammunition, without gasoline for generators, without drones. This is purely an impact on the front line. That is, it's 100% so.

Speaker 2

You know, you mentioned the world that is watching us, that is looking, that is trying to synthesize. We constantly talk about this here on the radio with our officers, that in this war, Ukraine has one way or another turned into a kind of large laboratory. A large proving ground; of course, not of our own free will, this war was imposed on us, but one way or another we are trying to use this, and the world—however it may sound—has tried many kinds of technologies on us, some logistical things, and technical things. In your opinion, when you communicate with foreigners, do you one way or another perhaps see the experience of the armies of NATO countries? Are they keeping up with these changes that are happening here? Are they reacting to this in some way, or are they currently more just observers?

Speaker 1

I think only one country is reacting to this. And is actually drawing conclusions from it, and actually moving forward with it. That is the United States. If we are talking about Kyiv and NATO, to a lesser extent European countries, I don't know, if Turkey is included in Kyiv and NATO, how they are there, well, they are also probably slower. I think the United States is reacting normally to this. I follow a lot, both startups in the United States, and regarding NRK and drones, they buy some things from us. Some things, I already notice, are more progressive. That is, they looked at us, analyzed, and tried to predict for the next period. And I will tell you frankly, there are some things that I am already taking as an idea, to… In the Americans. Here, yes.

Speaker 2

Please tell me, once again, perhaps a somewhat amateur question. If we take the American operation in Iran, can one see any traces or any lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian war there?

Speaker 1

Actually, it seems to me that the same mistakes have already been repeated there once. That is, no one there [learned] the lessons… Mistakes of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Meaning, the awareness of the lessons as the main lesson. Yes, one could take such a lesson, that failure to take lessons into account leads to ineffectiveness or a negative, or some kind of negative result. Yes,

Speaker 2

But this actually sounds quite terrifying. Because if we consider NATO as an ally, and we see that there is a large-scale armed conflict, and it was found that this is the experience of our war, and we have not yet absorbed the great extent of it.

Speaker 1

They didn't grasp it, I [said] a lot… They will grasp it, but somehow partially, or there is something not quite right… It feels like there is an internal barrier, to make it conscious. Even if here, in Kharkiv, even if there… People we see, where they are. It feels like there is something… But on the other hand, to be honest, these trips somewhere here, there, for two or three days, they don't create this picture. I feel it myself when I am in another region, I see this scale and say, who can detect this. Only by being inside this, if permitted, can one detect these scales. Air raids, UAVs, simultaneous. It's out of this world, I am absolutely sure that these… It's not because they are not quite capable there, it's impossible to detect because it's such a new thing, it's like, I don't know, showing my grandparents a foldable iPhone and something is not there… I understand.

Speaker 2

But, you know, we are continuing with a series of amateur questions. And we just saw how a drone flew in. Some kind of first drone was in Poland. And before that, there was a statement by the Minister of Defense of Poland, who said that if Ukraine continues like this, then we would… Is this political bravado, or are the Poles truly confident that the presence of aviation gives them an advantage?

Speaker 1

Well, actually, in my opinion, this isn't a representation of the scale. I mean, they definitely have superiority, as they say there, in terms of the number of such things. But that's just how it seems to them, or in terms of the number of missiles. I don't know how many missiles are in the European Union, but I think that it's for a few days, for today at most. But here, in one night, a conventional single unit needs to shoot down 80 Shaheds alone. There are conditionally 10 such units. Whether it's 800, or 800, or even more, I don't know how many have been flying into Ukraine based on the latest figures, and so on. Because, by the way, from some period onwards, they stopped showing these numbers to us. There was some kind of scandal about that too. I mean, only then, when, eventually, you understand these tactics. This needs to be studied. And I don't know, I don't think so. It's just because it's impossible to imagine this story. I mean

Speaker 2

bravado…

Speaker 1

I don't think Mr. Sikorsky had quite that much bravado, but he is slightly mistaken.

Speaker 2

So, returning to the bench, you've been working for some time now—could you tell us what you primarily work with currently?

Speaker 1

Yes, I think it's possible. That is, the means to the enemy—by the way, our means are known. Most… So they don't cut it off.

Speaker 2

some special

Speaker 1

physics… I'll try somehow…

Speaker 2

So you work with weapons from a domestic manufacturer, right?

Speaker 1

Where is it more? Well, you know, probably by 95%, if you estimate it that way, then depending, if we don't count components, because components…

Speaker 2

Understood,

Speaker 1

but overall… The manufacturer themselves, what kind of manufacturer. Design, assembly, manufacturing, so to speak, this is Ukrainian weaponry. These are reconnaissance, strike, small and very large. This is all Ukrainian, and it's cool. And, by the way, they are very good. If we are talking, there are some good foreign tools, they are an order of magnitude more expensive for the same capabilities. That is, capabilities may be slightly better due to certain equipment, but the orders of magnitude by which they are more expensive negate this in this…

Speaker 2

This is some wonderful figure, 95%. 95 is almost 100. It is almost completely, not completely.

Speaker 1

I left five, because I couldn't quite remember right away what we are currently using from abroad. My point is that

Speaker 2

Recall when the full-scale invasion began and we received weapons from the West and everyone relied, as far as I remember, mostly on the West, on the allies helping us, and now 4 and a half years have passed. That is, one could say as many as 4 and a half, or one could say only 4 and a half years, and we are effectively providing for ourselves.

Speaker 1

It turns out like this. I felt it once, when we went to the launches of our biggest little planes, our biggest birds with a normal warhead, 100 kilograms, and just a memory surfaced, hypothetically, when everything is humming and now it's pre-launch, it's going, everything has started up, everyone is doing final checks. And just snap, and 4 years, and that's it. And you are a part of this power, when everything there launches simultaneously at the enemy, I don't know, like 1000 assets, huge, just gigantic and large. So it's cool. It's very unobvious, we've just gotten used to it, but it's just incredible, incredible progress.

Speaker 2

Well, that's exactly what I'm talking about, and I'm saying it completely without irony, because we have grown quite skeptical of certain claims that our ballistics will appear now, that our invincible missiles will appear now, that aircraft will now be transferred to us which will break the course of the war, while on the other hand, somehow unnoticed, we are providing ourselves with weapons of our own production, and this indicates what—that our economy is transforming and adapting to this war quite effectively and promptly.

Speaker 1

Yes, well, there is a nuance there; we still have the skill to transform certain civilian technologies into military ones, which is a big plus for us. We are somewhat lacking in academic engineering science; it was somewhat lost during this period. Perestroika, then independence—it really was lost. But now, from what I see, we are picking up these crumbs here and there, but a new thing has emerged—something like artificial intelligence—and these learning opportunities; I think we can compensate for it. You know how it is: we didn't have computers, then we got Pentiums, while in America, you know, it was 300, 400, 500—then suddenly, hop, you can level up immediately, skip ahead, meaning we can catch up in these engineering components. We definitely lack this; many engineers have left, and there is now fierce competition for specialists in defense tech, but nevertheless, it's like an incubator. Everyone else is already watching; when we visit institutes, more and more people are interested—some are students, some are moving there from IT. You

Speaker 2

Do you contact higher education institutions?

Speaker 1

Yes, both in Kharkiv and in Kyiv. So you are looking for specialists specifically, right? We are indeed looking for specialists, although we are more like looking, but we want to collaborate, because we believe that we have certain expertise that they don't have, feedback from the battlefield, and in this way, although some [fragment], and we want to have certain joint developments, some vision of our own, and they already… Very

Speaker 2

It's interesting, because as much as I've seen the defense forces, the army, the AFU, the NGU interact with universities, from what I happened to see, it's only with their own profiles, with automotive military.

Speaker 1

academy,

Speaker 2

the university, where young men and women potentially study who will tomorrow join the defense forces. You speak of technological exchange, of technological interaction. To what extent is this, in principle, promising, and to what extent, in principle, can the Ministry of Education get involved in the development of the military and in some kind of transformation of it?

Speaker 1

This is super promising, why? Because, hypothetically, the military has its own—we call them workshops, meaning laboratories—which is, in principle, the same as the research [labs] they might have in every institute, there are research [labs] at the departments. And now, I mean, they have students who want to explore and have the opportunity to somehow complete theoretical [work] or do projects, and we can create or print them together; we simply have a unique opportunity to test them immediately, there is no need to ask anyone for permits anywhere, meaning these iterations with us can be mega-fast. This is a big plus for these laboratories of ours. Why are so many new technologies appearing? Because we can do not just two iterations a day, but a third, and by evening, take it to the battlefield to test whether it flies in EW conditions or not, and so on. Because somewhere, hypothetically, in Dnipro, Kyiv, or Lviv, [to] come with EW, but there are simply the harshest conditions, maximally realistic. And there, where it is not like that, Kerylo Vera said that some battery, says the battery, the stool is flying. And that is actually how it is. You've tested an autonomous mission a hundred times, you go out there and op, suddenly there's some problem, something is off. Because this is real.

Speaker 2

life there. But tell me, it's just so different, it's a private initiative of one unit. Can this be scaled somehow to the state level, so that truly the ministry of the world, I have no particular grievances against the ministry of the world right now, just

Speaker 1

I don't have

Speaker 2

to imagine it this way, if it worked, so that there would be a benefit not only to one or two buildings, but to the entire line

Speaker 1

I don't know, it seems to me, all the initiatives, and the ministry is trying to do something, and we went there for an exchange of experience and this one. But it, you know, this is why we survived, it seems to me, it's the horizontal ties, initiative from below, and the exchange of information, openness and so on. And for some reason, it all works like this. That is, we are talking to you now, my guys went there to the first corps for interaction, for an exchange. Before them, [someone] went to others, literally three days ago. It's super here for us, these horizontal ties. To me

Speaker 2

It seems, this is our great advantage, and our main difference from the Russians. For them, everything works most effectively when there is truly a vertical. For us, everything works most effectively when there is a horizontal. This is probably, well, some negatives can be seen in this, but it seems to me, this is our

Speaker 1

a big plus that should be used. I also think it's a plus because it's a kind of flexibility, flexibility. Over there, if there are, say, several tools, they tell you, yes, you have a zoo here. I have a zoo here, but if you throttle this and that for me, then there's still this panther, and it will still work. And there, if we throttle this, then it will already take longer before this. So in this regard, I like the zoo more. You are like the zoo director, you are the commander

Speaker 2

regiment, you have a large unit. This isn't just a drone unit where a few people get in a car, move, and work. It is a large organism, and you are part of a corps, and the corps is an even larger organism, part of the defense forces. How is all this coordinated with the regulations, with the supplies, in principle, according to this structure, the structure of the army, which, well, to a great extent still relies on certain supplies?

Speaker 1

It holds up, well, like, the army is really statutes, some algorithms, everything is thought out before you. And I realized that once you understand the clear algorithms, then in some cases it is simpler. On the other hand, we have a full-scale war, I am not very sure that all these statutes were written for this. Well, obviously not. Most were written for a normal state, where the army must exist because it is a guarantee of the state's existence, and now it is, well, somewhere in between, like everyone else, we try to navigate carefully, somehow get through without violating, taking into account that some things are normal. Actually, when you read the statute, it's not that stupid, there is nothing like that there. We can just interpret it differently, like anything else, you can say one thing with different intonations, and it will be different. There are swear words that simply have different nuances in different contexts. And the statute is the same. Therefore, we read. In some places we rely a lot, of course, on field manuals, but also on some NATO doctrinal things, because it seems to us that they have sometimes gone a bit further. We mix in our knowledge from business as well. In what? In calculating the effect, return on investment, how much was invested, how much was destroyed,

Speaker 2

burned

Speaker 1

and so on. War economy, like business, is what I call it in such cases. Somewhere, sometime in the approaches that exist. I'm not criticizing, I just fight bad moods. And we think ahead with other commanders about some KPIs. Meaning, let's achieve this, this. And these KPIs, the two of us, with him, or three, or four of us, determine that, for example, on average we should perform this many operations, or missions, this much, this much. We set some numbers for ourselves, and we measure ourselves against these numbers. To be able to say at the end of the month, well, we worked super great, you did a great job, or, damn, it's bad here. And we take these things from business. Planning, work sessions, and so on. And now, I think we will also connect artificial intelligence to this. This is a business story, an army one. I even feel that such, conventionally, advanced military units like ours are becoming fewer, and along with that, discipline. And along with that, discipline. Because in business you have a good lever. Money.

Speaker 2

Money.

Speaker 1

And in the army, the money is static. Either you just cover it, or you can't. That is why this army discipline is needed here. Plus in business, unlike the military, there are things not entirely pleasant for the military, such as going to positions, duty shifts, lack of breaks, and so on. This is needed at this moment. That is why we mix them in. That is why we try once a week to return to the military, shooting, medical, uniforms, and so on, so that we don't lose it. To keep it up.

Speaker 2

You know, I want to ask at the end, returning to the beginning of our conversation, when we started with the fact that you were the corps cavalry.

Speaker 1

Aviation. Air cavalry.

Speaker 2

The corps' air cavalry. If unmanned systems are indeed treated as aviation, and if you are treated as an internal aviation unit, how can this aviation develop? Could you move toward longer-range strikes, or is your strategic vision simply the expansion of your capabilities? Which direction will the formation move?

Speaker 1

Lava will be… Exactly, probably not for range. Although we can, as both are very similar. If it flew 200, then it flies 400 and 500. And then there will be the question of fuel in this. It is important for us to increase this level of control over this operational space. What do I want? To simply control there, to understand who is moving where, what he is up to—meaning the enemy—where he is, what he is up to; this is an increase in control, a build-up of this control. You control this first, then you strike. That is where Lava will move towards. Greater intensity of detection, observation, and striking. Then perhaps newer technologies, faster ones, certain things. Now a new war has unfolded for us into a maneuver-fast story. That is where we will also head. And also the use, once again, of artificial intelligence, these new things. Begin

Speaker 2

This is not the first time you have repeated this phrase. I think it's a great topic for the next one.

Speaker 1

This

Speaker 2

Very interesting. We will be watching you. We consider [it], obviously, successful; we follow the lava with great interest and sympathy.

Speaker 1

That's all, thank you for the invitation.

Speaker 2

Friends, with us was Volodymyr Mirchuk, commander of the 21st Unmanned Systems Regiment "Lava" as part of the "Khartia" corps. This was the program "Red Square Parade Scenario". My name is Serhiy Zhadan. Goodbye.


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Originaltitel: «Летальність більше 50%»: чому кілзона стала смертельно небезпечною – Мірчук і Жадан про фронт

Längd: 41:55

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