It is still tricky to figure out what is going on, and now it seems that Project Owl is also holding back, so one has to rely on Russian sources. When Russian sources scream about negative news, there is more credibility than when they lie about Russian successes. My filter goes through other credible UA OSINT analysts who reference the Russian sources.
That didn’t stop me, it seems, and I posted a bad map in the last post. I was after the Zherebets line, but it showed an advance towards Siversk and Bilohorivka that does not exist; it is considerably further east than UA has reached (I think).
It doesn’t help that RU has started a new influence operation where they deliberately exaggerate UA successes to discredit OSINT analysts who are close to the truth.
Then we apparently have a battery of Indian content farmers on X who cobble together anything with AI and make it sensational for clicks. I have learned to recognize the worst offenders, but serious OSINT analysts are furious with them and argue every day – and contribute to the clicks…
Now they have also figured out how to open accounts with Ukrainian names and write in Ukrainian, which complicates things a bit because they take similar names from established OSINT analysts.
A flash I believe in: UA crossed the Russian border and is advancing, sniffing around Tetkino in Belgorod Oblast. No huge surprise, but it is Russian territory even if it is only in square meters.
Invasion of Russia – again.
The North Koreans from their 11th AC are positioned in the rear up there, so I guess UA is advancing slowly so they don’t crash into them again. UA respects the North Koreans, who apparently are quite formidable.
South Korea, as far as I understand, has a shaky president now, and the dispute with Ukraine over the two captured North Koreans is probably staged. South Korea has also sold enormous amounts of diesel to Russia this summer.
Maybe it’s time for Europe to be cautious with the huge amount of materiel we have bought from South Korea so it doesn’t turn out like with the USA – they take the money and delay deliveries for a few years?
It is also likely that UA crossed Zherebets northeast of Lyman but that RU launched counterattacks to try to stabilize the area.
There have been fights in Terny, Yampolivka, and Novosadove, but also reports that RU has brought forward reserves.
It is probably still a sharp situation for RU in that area, and in my opinion, Zherebets has still been passed in a couple of places.
It is the 67th and 144th MRD defending that line, and they have just run a gauntlet during a Russian retreat, which is an unorganized flight, everyone for themselves.
The 3rd MRD defends in the north, and they are probably the unit that has fared best.
Reserves are 4-5 BARS battalions and some DPR regiment that has taken up defense along the next watercourse, the NS-going Krasna.
Still the 20th and 25th CAA have overall responsibility for the area.
If the more optimistic maps up there are correct, like the one I posted in the last front update, then it is a total front collapse, and we would probably have heard a lot more from a well-run Twitter. Even though David D writes exactly that about the whole war.
So, we do not yet have a full front collapse.
New Chief of Defense Drapatyi has both fired commanders and promoted others; he has been praised quite strongly, but it probably went about the same as when Sirsky took over and the axe fell.
What he has also done is take over a ready corps system from Sirsky and then took what he considered the best corps commanders and upgraded them to military district commanders – suddenly you got experienced troop commanders in all positions who make a difference instead of staff officers who mostly occupy themselves with avoiding danger.
Apparently, he has sent staff officers without combat experience to fighting units, and now only officers with combat experience are allowed to lead corps and MILOs.
He has also delegated responsibility strictly and expanded the freedom of action for corps and MILO commanders, which we saw immediately. They probably all had combat plans that they couldn’t get through with Sirsky, and when that was lifted, they got going quite quickly.
Drapatyi has also developed an overall combat plan that is strategic and covers MILO and corps commanders’ activities.
He probably still has the offensive strategic reserve at his disposal and can then carry out overarching strategic operations together with MILO.
One thing you can probably say already is that the decisions made have been good and that what we see is a tuned team with a lot of will to win. The national team ’94 with Brolin and the other guy, Sandelin?
If the staffs, command, himself, the Armed Forces, and politics just stay out of the way, this could go incredibly well.
The accounts of the fighters I follow on X are becoming very positive; life has been breathed back into the Ukrainian armed forces, and that gets you far.
Have the Russian bastards managed to stabilize Lyman is the question you all anxiously await to be answered.
No, RU doctrine now is that riflemen are consumables, and during their own offensive they choose time, place, pre-fight, and send forward the riflemen. No one is inside their decision circle.
During defense, which many interpret as an easier task, they do not know what will happen, and UA units are mobile, so their indirect fire works worse.
It is also there and then that UA can get inside their decision circle, which they have now done.
The riflemen are still consumable ammunition, and huge amounts are used even during defense.
Then they are reactive, which means they must move units to threatened areas, and then they are completely exposed to drone weapons where they are moving on roads – we have probably seen some of that hidden in the high loss figures in recent weeks.
We have seen the beginning now, and the offensive operations are starting to become front-wide.
According to earlier, UA can pool capabilities at front sections and gain an absolute advantage; they have their own drone weapon, so the defense is isolated in depth, and their anti-drone weapons mean RU cannot fly their poor drones.
Then UA can start fighting mechanized again, which they are doing, and on the other side of the fence stands scattered riflemen without food, water, ammunition, or reinforcements.
Not all army corps have the same luxury treatment as the 3rd AC or Azov, and in some places the situation is still tight, but it is moving forward across the whole area really.
Putin has three tough choices to make –
– defend with what he has in Ukraine until they have withdrawn from Ukraine.
– reinforce Ukraine with the offensive strategic reserve or newly mobilized units.
– defend Ukraine with what he has in Ukraine to buy time while opening a new conflict front against an opponent who cannot wage war in 2026 – a perceived advantage.
He can theoretically also try to attack southward from Belarus, but he has probably been advised against it because even the Russians understand it would be a bloodbath.
In 2022, the plan was for Hungary and Transnistria to attack northwards while Belarus attacked southwards, cutting Ukraine off from Europe – the pals who betrayed did not do so.
Orban then dismissed a few hundred senior officers, so maybe they were the ones who refused orders?
One and two are unattractive, and I am quite sure he will choose three, remains to be seen where.
At the same time, he will increase pressure on us, now the hybrid war he has waged since last summer did not work and Russian DNA dictates that if the current level of violence does not work, you increase the level of violence – they have no other option with that steering wheel that only turns clockwise.
This will continue until Russia collapses inwardly and starts eating itself. It has already begun and the FSB has purged heavily in the military over the past year.
Ukraine is locked, they can only move forward until their land is reclaimed; anything else will throw them into domestic chaos which over time leads to RU eating its way into the country.
If they have the slightest chance, they will try to collapse Russia inwardly so that it becomes total chaos there – the weaker Russia is, the better for them.
The unknown is what Europe will do, but since last summer we have started showing our teeth and I am satisfied with that. We are far from doing enough but at least we don’t have to be ashamed, something like that.
From a safe spectator’s perspective, I see positive signs everywhere but we fumble a bit blindly due to OPSEC and have to rely on OSINT. I apologize again for the poor map, MXT should have stopped me, feel free to bring it up with him.
Don’t forget to rush to a paid subscription now, more faulty maps promised. I am working on the book about Dengamle which will be posted here and open is best until it no longer works.
MXT at johanno1.se has been working extra to migrate all posts from the other blog, he posts translated films and will now dive into AI films based on the bestselling book. Apparently, I have also been reported to the police by three book publishers but that seems to be a completely different beef than the one I have with Mona.
The undersigned was also scammed by DeepL where a full unlimited annual subscription now has a few post limits and they want 500 EUR more as thanks for my annual subscription. Both time and money for both of us, so if you read and value the work we do – swish MXT and subscribe to my Substack.
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