12:01 – Johan No.1
I wish Gregg all the best, he has managed to hit a lot right in his updates and I have not really been able to catch him lying. He tried to be a bit sensational for a while and then came the Gregghangers but those could be lived with?
Compare that with Chuck Pfarrer who rarely gets it right at all or the whole debacle about Bakhmut having to be abandoned.
Then as you write he and a bunch of others are now information transmitters but I don’t know if it really makes any difference?
Today’s Gregg and the Accent man have been very accurate throughout the war and then we have Girkin who has become manic depressive. Do you remember the Lysychansk retreat? We got wind of it early from Girkin and if you are careful with sifting out the truth it has worked so far.
Then we have all the unit maps and OSINT people and when it comes to Defmon’s maps I still don’t understand how he manages to keep track of everything but that group might also be tied to formal UA?
When you have come this far you start to wonder if the only ones outside trawling open information are us 😀
12:05 – Johan No.1
Forgot this, the Germans are starting to spread workshops.
12:12 – Johan No.1
https://twitter.com/noelreports/status/1642641131941896192?s=46&t=talyhxG5jZsLY3vrpAvvJw
12:42 – MatsExtrude
+100
14:04 – Johan No.1
So, before this goes too far –
You can only write the same thing so many times so to move on I will try to carry out a theoretical reasoning about how it would look if the war continues for another year.
It naturally becomes even more speculative since anything can happen but was for me likely.
Putin is dangling by his feet from a gas station before the summer ends, death to Putin ✊
15:07 – Johan No.1
This from an elite Russian ground unit on how hard they have it with UA drone swarms.
https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1642805329690873856?s=20
15:37 – Johan No.1
Here you have a fun angle on territory in Russia that China is interested in –
https://twitter.com/InfoAgeStrategy/status/1642587617526001665?s=20
18:54 – Johan No.1
Then on this ball, to say the least, at 16:06 and tank operation against Russian in a pit (fortification).
Right at the start, a winged grenade misses – any tips on what it is, it comes in from the side?
Is it an ATGM?
One thing to remember, the tank has direct contact with drones and has the situation in real time all the time.
Nice to smash the reinforced fortification they guessed was there, nice to get in line with the fortification system and shoot away the Russian in the pit.
You save shooting and must be quite sure that there are no RPGs close or ATGMs?
Moves all the time to avoid artillery.
Just because we never trained to totally smash Russians in pits doesn’t mean it doesn’t work?
Smart to collapse the fortifications but I wrote that above, then you get to those who didn’t die from direct fire.
19:01 – Johan No.1
If the Russians had guided indirect fire and good intelligence, it would have looked like in Vuhledar, so UA can only move like this because the Russians don’t have countermeasures.
19:49 – Johan No.1
Have you seen this, nothing escapes Darth Putin.
https://twitter.com/DarthPutinKGB/status/1642453503254593538?s=20
That’s what one suspected…
09:07 – Johan No.1
Now maybe it’s overplayed but if you just gave someone 300g of high explosive, you wouldn’t go and sit three meters away?
https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1642950734047059968?s=20
11:43 – Johan No.1
I belong to those who absolutely believe that Russia will turn inward sometime this summer, and the summer is long in Ukraine and it is probably quite well known what theses I promote.
Not a psychologist but I have the distinct feeling that going from Londongrad, billions in Switzerland, luxury yachts and moving billions through EU banks over to not being allowed to leave Russia, having all your wealth confiscated and only being able to buy Chinese – that is a really big blow to the Russian elite.
After all, it is only the group around Putin that has burned itself in this war but when it comes to globally it is clear that group punishment is okay which is brilliant but that means they can also be rolled back.
We can also guess without psychological training that after what we have seen in terms of the war’s failing allies, rigging traps for each other, general sabotage between Belarus – Russia, the Army – Wagner – different generals – other generals and so on between all factions it feels like a fairly dynamic and fast-moving workplace where a single mistake leads to balcony flying and your friend can stab you in the back at any time. And it looks the same in politics and among the elite.
But for today’s exercise Russia manages to avoid collapse during the spring offensive and succeeds with Chinese deliveries and newly mobilized troops to stabilize the situation. The army also does not spontaneously retreat from any decisive front sections.
What happens next, here the pessimists usually go off really strongly and that Russia would somehow win despite having already lost 40% of the conquered territory and using T55s at the fronts.
The war does not end this summer is probably the most obvious and we then head towards a second (third) war winter since Russia can then continue to drive the war over time (which I don’t believe and neither does Girkin but for the exercise…).
If we examine the whole discussion about how few weapons the West has and consider whether it really is true, we quickly come to the conclusion that Ukraine has received very little of the West’s available weapons so far in the war.
Now the arms industry is starting to increase production as much as they can throughout the West and countries are placing orders for all types of weapon systems and ammunition. It is a runway but arms industries have already scaled up where there is redundancy (two shifts) and going forward probably every factory that is idle or can be easily converted will be vacuumed up and eventually expanded.
For Russia it looks worse, I am of the opinion that they have emptied the barns now when it comes to critical weapons platforms and their ability for new production is not the best.
Then they must keep some capability in the country Russia as border defense.
But… Russia can probably remedy component shortages with China’s help.
They can let workshops run at full speed and produce more heavy weapons but they are only one part of a functioning unit – maintenance must work, the weapons platform must work, the crew must be competent and the unit must function in platoon, company and battalion.
The simplest example – a tank needs a stabilizer and aiming system for the weapons platform to even be okay, in addition it needs a competent crew, to be part of a functioning unit and to get fuel and ammunition.
Since none of this has worked so far and the army pre-2022 is quite worn out this is a capability that will never come back during this war – I think that is a very reasonable assumption and not a conspiracy theory speculation.
If the EU wanted they could send enough Leopard 2s to equip all of Ukraine’s mechanized and armored brigades with just those.
The Germans will of course vacuum the world for old Leopard 1s for upgrade programs and they will probably launch modification programs for Leo2 as well in the near future?
Already today Eastern Europe’s workshops are running at full speed and I guess they have prepared workshop capacity for Western armor already?
All Soviet armor can then go to territorials who will become the world’s best equipped home guard.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1361760/leopard-tank-inventories-in-europe-and-nato/
There are also enough Western IFVs to top up all the brigades with them too, it becomes a bit of picking and puzzling but a couple of brigades – one weapon system absolutely.
-CV90 you could probably scrape together 500?
-Warrior a few hundred.
-Marder a few hundred but here I think the Germans could get a renovation program going because the number built versus the number in service is large, or they have been scrapping at the highest level for a long time, don’t know but some in the thread usually know how it stands.
-Bradley there are probably +4000 and I understand that also includes the US strategic reserves but you could pick from them.
Right now Bradley, Marder, CV90, Warrior, AMX-10 and others are being test-driven in Ukraine to see which are most suitable.
-Then there are some okay Soviet armor too, Dubai has 400 BMP-3s and Kuwait 300 BMP-3s for example.
-Cyprus had 80 T80s that they might consider donating and Pakistan has hundreds.
-Algeria has 600 T90s and India 1100 T90s.
All that is needed here are various programs from the USA/EU where countries are motivated to release materiel to Ukraine, either for hard cash, exchange for Western armor or through trade agreements.
I have here only included the countries that are pro-West, India is perhaps a bit doubtful.
Ok, we know the Russians will not advance anyway but now they have managed to go into a sufficiently decent defense so that Ukraine did not get a decisive summer 2023 (for the sake of the exercise…).
I stuck to armor but you understand the same applies to artillery, air, air defense and everything else if we go through that too.
Autumn 2023 comes – RU is on defense and UA continues with their SOF and needle sticks with long-range strikes against everything that hurts while building up for the spring offensive 2024. If they see an opening they exploit it as usual.
Since the Russians are not on the offensive the burn-rate for UA is lower.
The whole West is now training the UA army, they also have 1.5 years of active war with a lot of experience to transfer within the units.
The West is not completely stupid and understands that a draw or frozen fronts will lead to something worse than what it is today – there is probably no country in Europe that wants torture centers, raped five-year-olds, rocket rain and castrations?
The number of UA maneuver brigades that can be sorted under command chains and function as cohesive units is today actually around 100.
Until a forest of volunteer battalions and the whole hornet’s nest in SOF arrives.
Does anyone believe it will not end in 2024 if it does not end in 2023?
-Then we have an army whose MBT is Leopard 2 and with Western IFVs.
-The entire territorial has become mechanized with Soviet armor.
-Half a million soldiers in mechanized maneuver brigades that fall under UA command chains and function as cohesive units – quite a formidable spearhead.
-Besides that there is a forest of battalions for defense.
One thing we know the Russians cannot manage is the maintenance of a million or two million men; they have problems with a few hundred thousand. I think we have irrefutable evidence of that.
We have also assumed that the reason Russia has not declared a general mobilization, which they threatened would come with the first Leo2, is partly because they cannot handle the logistics but also because a few million men under arms is a threat to the country Russia – this is speculative but reasonable in my opinion.
So – summer 2024 will reasonably see a mechanized army with a spearhead of half a million against a similar number on the Russian side, which is about as poor as it is today and which must defend from the Belarus border down to the Dnieper in this enormous semicircle.
Ukraine has the advantage that they can concentrate forces wherever they want.
There is a wildcard – that the Russians throw all units from agencies into the war but I don’t think they will do that; that half a million is meant to suppress the citizens and if they go and die in Ukraine the country is completely undefended. Such an opportunity would probably not be missed by at least Ukraine and mostly quite a few others.
It is incredible that the end would be different; the Russians will be fundamentally defeated in summer 2024 even if, against all odds, they manage to hold out this summer, which they will not.
China, I have googled for an hour and below is what I have read, so there is a risk of misinterpretations and incorrect sources.
-They only have around 4500 tanks.
-Their army consists of 13 army corps with 40,000 – 80,000 in each “army” which I interpret as army corps and there are 6 maneuver brigades in each.
-So they have around 13X6 – 78 maneuver brigades and today UA has 100, just for comparison.
-Their “ground force” is around 1 million and counting all branches 2 million.
Take a look at how the country China is located geographically, they can really only threaten countries within their sphere of interest.
Good luck with Taiwan or Japan, it will end like the Spanish Armada. South Korea is somewhat vulnerable in the worst case.
Does China import a lot – yes.
Do they have domestic production – yes.
China feels a bit like the old Soviet Union with two exceptions – the geographical location is terrible and they lack endurance because they have a large population and import a lot.
Harsh sanctions against China would probably do quite a bit of damage.
Can China get all raw materials from Russia?
Yes, that could probably work.
But what would the Chinese think about not being allowed to leave China and only buy Russian – Chinese can be epically difficult, when their version of Freddie Mac blew the mortgage losers in China they stormed the headquarters and kidnapped the CEO.
They also have campaigns where they band together and refuse to pay mortgages, and refuse to leave the residence.
They also have 300 languages in the country and are about as different as we are in Europe.
1.5 billion citizens is not a strength; it is a high risk for the ruling elite. China is also a country that has had revolutions and high turbulence in the last 100 years.
With what I know about Chinese thinking, their army is probably better than the Russian fiasco but they are light years away from Western-level competence – now I’m just guessing.
China will not go all-in in the war at all and they will accept de-escalation even if the war drags into 2024.
However, they will try to top up the Russians with materiel they might need but it will be anti-tank missiles, RPGs, ammunition, and drones. Tanks and advanced aircraft will not be supplied, maybe some artillery?
I also suspect that China does not want to see Russia fall apart, they want Russia as a raw material colony but not as a freewheeling gangster clan with nuclear weapons at their northern border.
The best for China is probably if Russia withdraws from Ukraine as soon as possible before they collapse completely and then the regime remains intact?
The other options are open conflict or a Russia split into gangster clans and both feel worse for China than if Putin withdraws from all of Ukraine today but manages to keep the country together.
For the sake of argument, say China would start a larger conquest war – they will lose the war at sea quite immediately, we probably don’t need to discuss that?
They can conduct offensive operations westward where quantity might be a quality in itself perhaps but then it would have to be north of India which also has a quantity that is a quality in itself.
While they are busy clearing around all the old -stans they have a fairly long border that is a sea border where the USA/west will be able to deliver constant pinpricks.
They have quite a lot of their industry near the coasts and constant pinpricks with missiles against critical infrastructure and manufacturing could cause enormous damage so the Chinese industry, food imports, product processing etc. would collapse immediately.
Then there are whole provinces that could quite easily be turned against the central regime as there is already unrest today, not all are Han Chinese in China.
When I have come this far I can still only see this ending one way and the conclusion is that it is really in both Russia’s and China’s interest that Russia leaves all of Ukraine quite soon before they lose even more.
But that was not part of today’s exercise so I won’t write that 😀