11:09 – MatsExtrude
Thanks for the yellow wall! 👍
Regarding trench clearing, I listened to Mryiareport last week and they had with them a Ukrainian soldier from their training (missed the introduction but he sounded like an American).
He was asked what he might have learned from the Ukrainians and the first example he gave was exactly how they fought the Russians’ trenches, it apparently differed quite a bit from NATO standard. He did not go into details but gave one example and that is when you have taken the trench you do not rush forward but make sure to secure it properly before continuing. The second example was unsurprisingly the use of drones.
22:50 – Johan No.1
The Sumy offensive has started
https://x.com/pstyle0ne1/status/1799903091371946065?s=46&t=Vah3JXV31B9lXwZOK5gF7w

10:00 – Johan No.1
Putin is not stupid and above all he is at war with the West.
I am following with interest where the landing ships will go and that naval visit to Cuba is of interest.
Maybe Putin is trying a modern version of the Cuban Missile Crisis?
If you put on Putin’s very small hat, the tactic so far has been to keep the West out of the conflict, despite a lot of hot air, and to prevent the West from sending weapons.
Now that the West has done so, and even Putin understands that he cannot win in Ukraine, he must reasonably try something new.
Trying to get China actively involved in the war is likely; this half-hidden support is not even active support.
Challenging NATO in the Baltics, Finland, or Gotland is also likely, trying to expose NATO’s bluff.
But he could also try to get the USA to attack a third country like Cuba by basing missiles there?
That could lead to a very difficult internal debate in the USA which might, for example, make Trump popular?
Anyway, if things go badly in Ukraine, further global escalation must follow.
There is a rumor, a loose one, that the USS Eisenhower took a hit from a Houthi missile and is in for repairs.
We have posted that escalation ladder before and what remains. What happens or not only Putin knows but the longer time goes, the more steps will be taken.
The absolute best solution to everything is that Ukraine goes and wins the war, right?
Then it is no longer an open conflict and the West can start de-escalating.
This thing about the world’s best infantry comes up from time to time, my opinion vs. someone who has trained and says the shooting is terrible. Then everyone who says that Europe’s conscripts are better, our training is better, etc.
First of all, no one has seen this type of conventional war between two evenly matched (qualified opponents) states for a very long time; hunting terrorists with air support, an abundance of fragmentation protection, and base rest after a few days is not the same thing. Many SOF or marine veterans have left Ukraine because the intensity has been too high and they have had several tours in Iraq behind them.
Instructors in the West generally have that work experience.
We have since seen that Swedish training has been very accurate so our basic training is absolutely on point.
We can then guess that our units, after work experience, would maintain a high level.
But they are not there today – Ukraine is 2.5 years ahead and then they must be better automatically, right?
And then I wonder how many Swedes today have training in case of war?
It was 75% of conscripts who reported injuries or illness so they would not have to enlist.
If we do a Ukraine, we will send 300,000 to the trenches and stay there for two years without complaining?
Would all of them be better than the poor Ukrainian infantry?
You can’t compare our few hundred best-trained soldiers and claim that we are better than Ukraine.
Ukraine has well over 10,000 in various SOF constellations and tens of thousands in units we call coastal rangers, Norrland rangers, and paratroopers – i.e., the best.
The Home Guard is mechanized and the army at large is mechanized.
To be fair, 30 HV battalion should be matched against the 108th territorial, our light battalion against the 81st Airmobile, our mechanized brigade against the 4th Tank, our SOF against the GUR unit we don’t know about, etc.
Ukraine has had two things – a burning hatred of Russians which has made it relatively easy to get personnel and a population that has been quite resilient.
It takes its man (woman, hen or cat) to lie two years in a wet trench and not sprint away (desert) when 10:1 attacks start.
It is very rare that lines have broken in under 2.5 years and Zalizhny was apparently very strict on that point.
Many Western soldiers have also left because they felt forced and pushed into situations where they were sacrificed and treated badly.
I don’t know how it looks in Sweden today but during WW2 you were executed if you deserted whether you were treated badly or not.
It really boils down to two things – your training and your acceptance to die.
Ukraine has proven over 2.5 years that their training has managed to face a qualified opponent and many have said that we would never get mechanized combat which we did and now amphibious combat is on its way.
NATO doctrine will be rewritten after this war and it is UA that has managed to stay one step ahead.
Desertion has rarely occurred over 2.5 years and that means they have had the acceptance to die in a country that mobilized across broad social layers and not a small group of volunteers.
During the spring offensive 2023 they became Olympic champions in trench clearing and that was among the harder moments in conscription.
Everything stands and falls with shooting in your trench and they have gone on for 2.5 years without complaining and then they are buried alive by FAB bombs or burned to death with TOS1 if they survived the seventeenth attack by a ten times stronger enemy.
There has been a long discussion about Ukraine not having more mobilizable troops – their conscription resulted in 1.5 million more who can be mobilized and they intend to mobilize 200,000 more within a year.
That is partly the 13 newly established brigades and then replacement personnel for the maneuver brigades. They have also found 200,000 who have served in rear functions who can be moved to maneuver brigades after Sirsky’s review.
That is 400,000 more so they do not lack personnel.
France now has a “coalition of instructors” who will assist with training and that is appreciated, I am quite sure there is a shortage of instructors in Ukraine and there are many Ukrainians in the Foreign Legion, for example.
The next step, and we are apparently not there yet, is that the West takes over the front against Belarus and that would free up 200,000 according to Zelensky.
But some genius in the thread wrote that if all newly established brigades undergo their training up to the front in Belarus, all other units can be moved to the eastern front. Then you have some maneuver brigade as a rapid reaction force behind.
So there is no personnel shortage then either and that is a line many pessimists push hard.
Now more materiel is coming, the USA sent about 300 M113s?
The Italians have sent maybe through a company
https://x.com/jeff21461/status/1799211093673267312?s=46&t=Vah3JXV31B9lXwZOK5gF7w
And the French are sending more VAB vehicles
https://x.com/maks_nafo_fella/status/1799441411844309267?s=46&t=Vah3JXV31B9lXwZOK5gF7w
I suspect that after the spring offensive much of UA’s mechanized equipment was sent to workshops but that ran out early autumn 2023 and now it is summer 2024 – presumably they have had time for the overhaul?
In addition, they have taken for example the 300 BTR60s from Bulgaria and put on new weapon stations and they are probably doing the same with BMP1 and also weapon stations on MTLB?
They manufacture their own wheeled howitzers, 8 per month, and they have their own Ptgb that they produce, was it 400 per year?
France has produced 70 CESARs up to this summer.
It is a co-production with Germany and their LYNX (or was it the other one) where the first ones were produced.
They get hundreds of Polish Rosomaks.
300 more Bradleys
And our 200 PBV302s.
If you add up the recently promised fragmentation protection, it becomes something like a thousand, and that is in the last few months.
Then half of Europe quietly sends, we had 100 T72s from Morocco and up to 200 from Kuwait, their version of the T72.
60 SPAAGs from Jordan have now arrived.
Japan has 875 tanks that have been retired (not sure if they are being sent).
I don’t think Israel will send their old Merkavas anymore but that was about 100.
New production is in full swing across the West now including our CV90 but quite a lot unfortunately goes to national defense in various countries, but France has dedicated 100% of its new production to Ukraine.
Previously, 8,500 armored vehicles had been promised, that is before 2024, but some of them were clearly delivered as late as May 2024 when 10 Leo1s arrived.
I am probably making another mistake now but I assume that the West has done REMO on all their vehicles in storage after 2.5 years and that what is now being sent is in good condition.
In 2023, a lot of what arrived was scrap-ready and Zelensky let us know that equipment for 4 brigades never arrived.
Then there were some losses during the spring offensive 2023 but they have been more than compensated for.
So Ukraine should, when equipment returns from workshops and all new equipment has arrived, have a mechanized capability that far exceeds 2023.
They should also have enough artillery since 70 Cesar and 8 homemade per month are not pocket change.
LV seems to be coming now and we have to assume that small-caliber ammunition, whenPV and personal weapons are also available.
In 2023, Ukraine had about 100 maneuver brigades and now there are 13 more in training, most of which are mechanized.
The tank has become a 4 km sniper and is often a battalion resource but fragmentation protection exists in a mosaic of vehicles for infantry in the army. I think they have solved it very nicely.
We saw trench clearing during 2023 from 3rd Azov and how they delivered infantry in fragmentation-protected vehicles which then retreated and the infantry cleared the trench in numerical inferiority and the losses were a platoon of Russians KIA and captured against 1-2-3 Ukrainian soldiers where some fell.
If they have enough vehicles so they can dare to sacrifice them with direct support it would go even better.
This capability should now be widespread in the army and this is how breakthroughs will be achieved, one cleared trench at a time within a geographical area in an attack. Brigade combat task where company size or smaller units get their attack objectives and when one line is cleared the next force comes to clear and all the way until the breakthrough is achieved. Behind stands the next brigade to exploit the breakthrough.
The units will also have support from indirect fire that did not exist in 2023 which will make a difference.
If Ukraine goes for a breakthrough against a brigade they will probably first rain FAB bombs on reinforced trenches and bunkers and then let drones buzz around and enter all openings they find.
When the attack comes, the remaining Russian infantry must get into the trench systems and then 155mm cluster shells or ATACMS are rained down on them.
The task force can today be intercepted many kilometers from the attack targets with drone weapons.
Are the Russians stronger than in 2023?
No, fewer except with the FAB bomb droppers and drone weapons but Ukraine has been able to achieve local “drone supremacy” at the Dnieper through its own EW and EW-resistant drones.
I think by now everyone understands the background to the spring offensive 2023 – Zelensky was forced to sell Ukraine as a winner because the West began to doubt.
There were persistent rumors that the West would force Zelensky to negotiate during the autumn and that he would keep what he had recaptured.
Zelensky was forced by the West to take a risk which they lost.
That the West stopped delivering equipment between spring 2023 and the turn of the year says most of it, doesn’t it?
Now everyone makes the mistake of thinking that the 2023 offensive was representative, Ukraine has learned and has pushed hard to get the capabilities they need while RU is weaker than they were in 2023.
Back then CAS, Ahkp and FAB bomb droppers rampaged almost undisturbed among Ukraine’s mechanized forces because they had no LV and no top-tier air force.
Then UA completely exhausted its LV in the Russian missile rain and after that RU could exploit its air superiority (well, sort of) to carry out offensives during autumn and winter.
Now the rat trap is about to close for air superiority is no more (soon…)
Russian losses skyrocketed in May after the war’s highest losses during autumn and winter and June 2024 looks like it could be a brilliant month – especially LV is taking existential losses right now.
At the same time Ukraine has had a substantial force buildup and now gets the last critical capability in the form of top-tier air force.
All Taurus missiles would be fitting too if Scholz can decide sometime.
Much of what Ukraine is now receiving has started new production, French JDAMS they get 50 new per month and ATACMS are newly produced together with glide bombs. Taurus can definitely be produced and why the West does not buy from the manufacturer who themselves have announced they can produce large quantities quickly I think spells Scholz but no one discusses it. Storm Shadow should also be able to be newly produced?
Putin’s aggressive speech spoke volumes, that he starts crying about peace is also telling. Why the Black Sea fleet left port we are still curious about but it was significant.
At the northern front UA could start attacking into Russia and the limitation is whether they get to or not 😐
Not everything is always as it seems, the link below exemplifies that.
https://x.com/historyinmemes/status/1799124410936316135?s=46&t=Vah3JXV31B9lXwZOK5gF7w
Until 2024 Putin felt he had the West on his side to get his win – that the West gave him an eight-month water break when all equipment was in storage is absolutely catastrophic but it happened.
But in 2024 everything changed when Macron threw the script and Putin has completely lost control now.
In Ukraine, Putin has already escalated everything he is capable of but globally there is much he can do if you remember the list.
2024 is not like 2023, far from it and the situation is much worse for Putin now which will manifest itself going forward.