• gasoline
• diesel
• aviation kerosene/jet fuel
• heating oil
• liquefied petroleum gas and other light oil products
• bitumen and various refinery raw materials
• petrochemical production including ammonia and fertilizers

It is reported that an AVT (simply a primary column) is said to have been hit and if it is destroyed they will have problems with

Read more at Kyiv Independent and see the post here.

Russian losses in Ukraine

Continued high losses for the Russian army even though today’s report is partly somewhat below the current norm.

• 1120 KWIA
• 6 Tanks
• 1 AFV
• 46 Artillery systems
• 2 MLRS
• 2 Air defense systems
• 1508 UAVs
• 11 UGVs
• 330 Vehicles & fuel tanks
• 4 Special equipment
• 3 Cruise missiles

Ukrainian General Staff report

• 244 combat clashes
• 77 air strikes
• 249 KAB/CAB
• 8,673 kamikaze drones
• 2,903 shells (41 from MLRS)

SLAVA UKRAINI

Inlägget Refinery in Russian Bashkortostan has once again been droned by Ukraine – Russian losses dök först upp på Johan No.1.

Russian losses

Russia continues to suffer heavy losses, and today’s report included an especially high number of KIA as well as a significant number of soft-skinned vehicles, although it is not a record. Also notable are 4 air defense systems and 5 special equipment.

• 1600 KIA
• 5 Tanks
• 3 AFVs
• 56 Artillery systems
• 1 MLRS
• 4 Air defense systems
• 1734 UAVs
• 11 UGVs
• 494 Vehicles & fuel tanks
• 5 Special equipment
• 7 Cruise missiles

Summary from the Ukrainian General Staff

• 257 combat clashes
• 70 aviation strikes
• 246 KAB/CAB
• 8,676 kamikaze drones
• 3,296 shells (32 from MLRS)

As I have written before, it seems Russia can no longer increase the number of suicide drones and has reached a plateau. The increase was otherwise very high for a period. At the same time, artillery has decreased and seems to have stabilized at a lower level. Regarding the shells, I do not expect any major changes; however, I guess Russia is trying to increase the number of suicide drones again, and we may see them rise once more.

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Inlägget Ukraine has attacked two oil depots – Russian losses dök först upp på Johan No.1.

Russian losses

• 1320 KWIA
• 4 Tanks
• 6 AFVs
• 53 Artillery systems
• 4 MLRS
• 2034 UAVs
• 15 UGVs
• 428 vehicles & fuel tanks
• 5 Special equipment
• 2 Cruise missiles

Ukrainian General Staff report

• 260 combat clashes
• 88 aviation strikes
• 244 KAB/CAB
• 8,866 kamikaze drones
• 3,062 shelling (44 from MLRS)

SLAVA UKRAINI

Inlägget Ukraine has attacked a major refinery in Syzran – Russian losses dök först upp på Johan No.1.

By the way, now we have read about “Half or high risk” one day and then the follow-up “Medium or high risk,” admittedly supplemented with 1/2 and 2/2, but surely it should have been a triptych followed by “Full or high risk” or maybe “High or high risk”? We’ll see, maybe it will come?

Russian losses

• 1490 kwia
• 8 Tanks
• 10 AFVs
• 74 Artillery systems
• 1 MLRS
• 4 Air defense systems
• 1294 UAVs
• 3 UGVs
• 361 Vehicles & fuel tanks

Summary of activities at the front by the Ukrainian General Staff

It is interesting that the suicide drones are among the lowest in a long time. The average is currently about 8,800, so this is far below that. There is a significant deviation on June 25 when the statistics say 1,060 drones, but I am almost certain that there was some error there, although in April we had a few days with lower numbers. One day does not make a difference, but it would be nice if this is the start of a new trend.

• 261 combat clashes
• 105 aviation strikes
• 291 KAB/CAB
• 7,360 kamikaze drones
• 2,822 shells (106 from MLRS)

The Ukrainian sanctions against Russian oil

Regarding Ukraine’s attacks on oil refineries, most of the writing focuses on the shortage of gasoline and diesel. It is of course precisely the fuels that refineries produce the most of by volume and where the shortage is noticed quite quickly, but I wanted to remind you that so much more is affected when refineries are shut down or cannot produce as much as usual.

Here I will briefly go through how dependent Russia (and all of us, really) is on functioning oil refineries and what shortages this can lead to after the Ukrainian “sanctions.”

Oils and lubricants
Most people probably think mostly of motor oil, but oils and greases are needed for a huge amount more.
All types of bearings need lubrication. Industry needs to lubricate machines for manufacturing to reduce wear and breakdowns.
There are many more examples. Hydraulic oil in hydraulics. Cooling of, for example, transformers, etc. lubrication in compressors, etc.

The shortage will not be immediately visible in many areas; it is always possible to run a bit longer between oil changes (and hope nothing seizes up), but new production will of course be affected faster.

Propane/butane
Liquefied petroleum gas is used in industry, restaurants, and by private individuals but not on a large scale. For thermal power plants, etc., natural gas is used instead. At the same time, it is common to be dependent on LPG in places where there are no other options, and there the shortage will of course become critical.

Naphtha
The petrochemical industry is completely dependent on refineries and their production of mainly naphtha.
Naphtha is, among other things, an important product used as a base for many things, e.g., to produce ethylene, ethene, and aromatics, etc. It is a raw material important for other processes. Examples of products and materials/substances that may become scarce include:
Solvents, plastics, paints, glues, and resins, but also other substances, some specialty fuels, and additives that other industries may depend on.

Butadiene
Used mainly in the manufacture of synthetic rubber, among other things.
Products that will be affected include tires, hoses, gaskets, etc. Tires are of course needed for all vehicles that are already standing still due to fuel shortages, but the shortage of hoses and gaskets will also affect, among others, industry and those who now have to cycle because they cannot fuel their cars.

Bitumen/asphalt
Road construction will of course have problems (although maintenance is probably already minimal), but also, for example, the construction industry since it is used for manufacturing waterproofing layers and roofing felt.

Petroleum coke
Used in certain industries for metallurgy and electrode manufacturing but also used to a small extent for heating and manufacturing certain chemicals.

Sulfur and sulfuric acid
Used partly as substances in other chemical manufacturing but also in fertilizer production, one of Russia’s larger export goods but also something it depends on itself. Sulfuric acid is also used, among other things, to extract metals in the mining industry. Metals are also a fairly large part of Russia’s exports, but they are of course also used internally.

Heat production
Russia does not use heating oil to any great extent for its heating or electricity production; gas and other solutions such as nuclear power are much more common. At the same time, around 3% of heating is done via oil and diesel. It is also quite unevenly distributed; in some areas, dependence is greater than in others. Heating oil is used (just like in Sweden) as a supplement when other capacity is insufficient, and then it becomes critical if it is missing in the middle of a bitterly cold winter. Heating oil is also used to some extent in industry where relatively cheap heating is needed.

Diesel generators are also not used to any noticeable extent overall but are used where there are no other options. In some places, they are completely dependent on diesel availability. For example, at mines and other operations located in inaccessible areas.

These are the most obvious examples of what depends on refineries but of course not a complete overview, but from this, one understands that there can be shortages of just about everything in Russia. This, in turn, will also affect many other industries and will cause shortages of other products. This will, besides shortages within the country, affect Russia’s export revenues. Either directly because they will be able to produce less or indirectly because it leads to increased production costs, which leads to reduced profits.

Most of what I mention above are more refined substances and products that go through several steps before reaching the market. The cost markups are therefore significantly higher for much of this than for gasoline and diesel.

If the shortage is prolonged, they will of course import much of what I mention above, and when it comes to fuels, they have already started doing so (where the effect of knocked-out refineries is almost immediately visible). When they, who otherwise are self-sufficient and also export, fall away and instead have to import, costs will of course rise. Those who sell to Russia know that they are desperate and can control prices (in the same way as when they buy from Russia and can negotiate good discounts). I suspect it is not so simple to suddenly start importing when they have not needed to do so before.

Unfortunately, Russia now has a huge gold reserve; they will probably manage for a long time with it, but it is like peeing on yourself when it’s cold outside—when that money runs out, the crisis will be even more severe. Ukraine’s sanctions on Russian oil have been ongoing for a while now, but have never been at this level, and although it will take time, it is by no means impossible that this is what will decide the war.

Inlägget Russia attacks Kyiv again with ballistic missiles – Today’s report on Russian losses – What do the Ukrainian “sanctions” on the Russian refineries lead to? dök först upp på Johan No.1.

This is how tired Putin was when he was live-playing commander-in-chief from inside a studio in a bunker under Moscow.

This is roughly how I interpret the situation today,

Europe is starting to gain momentum REALLY and in 2-3 years we will be what Russia would interpret as an existential threat to them. Our rhetoric (which should be even more aggressive than today) is uncomfortable for Putin now and his tentacles to prevent what we have now set out to do are in many cases hanging loose, he is starting to lose grip in important countries like us in Sweden for example.

The USA and China don’t like this either, Europe is supposed to be compliant consumers, not at war at all. Even though Trump said we should buy a lot of new weapons, he did not mean at all that we should manufacture them ourselves as we are now doing – that is the wrong path to take.

Ukraine is just a long downhill slope now for Putin where he can either tie himself to the mast and sink with the raft or try to come up with something else to wiggle out of the jam that is entirely self-inflicted.

I will bring this up in a post soon because at the fronts there is nothing but Christmas joy, OPSEC prevails but I still get direct info from Zelensky on WhatsApp, 90th TD is having trouble, in Lyman a scope is forming, at Kamyanske UA is advancing and 2-3 more places have light blue and soothing elevator music.

The USA is preparing the ground for a weak Baltics, they are pulling back all units and promising new ones, which are not there yet. Promising new ones in the “near future” is probably an attempt to lull us back to sleep.

The same with UA patriot license, we calm down but interceptors in the tubes are a year away.

My marker for conflict in the Baltics has triggered – the American heavy battalion in Estonia. This happened completely without fanfare or announcements and they left about two months before they were supposed to rotate out anyway according to Google AI. For me, this is a burglar alarm sounding without yet seeing the signs of the break-in.

Putin has several choices to make and whether he has decided yet I do not know. Poland’s outburst a while ago was “we know what plans you have, don’t try”.

Now Putin must make a couple more moves before it becomes open conflict, if it does – the Baltic fleet cannot lie at the quay for example.

We will then also see some movement of operators on the Russian side of the border which is what the Baltics will see and warn about but in terms of “few”. Sabotage is also increasing along with drone overflights.

And lastly – Ukraine will warn about units preparing to move at the northern border, but they can never be sure exactly where they will go. Probably a march order is spread for Belarus or the southern front and then the day before they get the coordinates to some staging area over by the Baltics.

So far everything is at such a low level that our politicians can say “we wait and see” when they answer the phone from the cabin in the archipelago during the summer.

Putin will until the last moment say that everyone is moving to Belarus or will “roll over Kramatorsk in a huge red wave”.

False flag – probably not needed, we are probably past that already. Maybe all the chatter about Ukrainian drones flying through the Baltics towards St Petersburg was a false flag but we didn’t understand it?

Trump’s task is evidently to pull away everything he can from the Baltics, Poland and Germany. Really only fighter jets and air defense left as far as I understand of what Putin absolutely does not want to see in the area?

The only countries still seriously buttering up Trump are the Baltics and they are losing all protection. The countries he is most upset with, for example Spain – there he lets all units remain.

He has not managed to get the Canadian-led brigade but there is some suspicion that Spain’s heavy battalion might disappear, I have checked but find nothing. Trump is at least arguing as much with Spain as with Canada right now.

Then he must try to convince Europe that a ceasefire in Ukraine is necessary so the pressure on Russia eases, even if it is only temporary for a month or two. Maybe even a timed ceasefire to start with?

His last task before he can rest is what finance in the USA is always eager for anyway – exploit the upcoming 2008-style financial crisis to hit Europe as hard as possible economically. It is really enough to just stop exporting LNG to us and we will crash.

A combo where China holds back what we need for our industrial production would otherwise make us crash if LNG alone is not enough.

This is what I believe we have ahead of us regarding Trump.

Even if Putin is starting to look over the abyss, that dog still has some bites left I am quite sure, it could be an expensive lesson to believe that Putin’s balloon has already deflated.

I think you should read this, found it the day before yesterday and it is completely in line with what I have seen so far. These analyses get about as much impact as my texts, zero and nothing

https://news.inbox.lv/1507c7s-already-in-august-military-analysts-described-a-possible-scenario-for-russia-s-invasion-of-the-baltics

If we now move on to a post-Baltics scenario, Putin will swear on his honor that the Baltics were his last legal special operation and offer us all the oil and LNG we can eat at a big “peace discount”. Trump does the same from the USA, for peace in our time we avoid all trade tariffs (which he pulled out of the hat), we get “bail-outs” (after the financial crisis he created), all American units will come back immediately (which he pulled away) and the LNG/oil tap is turned on again (which he shut off). As a bonus he promises never to invade Greenland.

But if we choose war we get nothing – then tariffs increase, no one will sell LNG to us at all and especially the Germans will get no gas at all as punishment for all the gas they wasted during World War II.

China is probably involved too and dangles something attractive over us.

Somewhere around there we will get a receipt for who we have chosen for our governments. Russia is probably most worried that Sweden and Finland have already found their inner Vikings.

But we avoid all this if we bury our light infantry in eastern Baltics today, then we own the situation and everyone else must try to counter us.

Belarus shall project a threat against Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania to tie down troops. Russia will possibly use Belarus for logistics and run in-out missile systems fired from inside Russia. It seems I have to clarify this every time because far too many still believe that the conflict will flare up from Belarus and then it is not credible. That was already the case in autumn 2025 when I started writing about Operation Baltics.

Belarus has already partially mobilized and closed areas at the borders with Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania; they are trying to project a threat that is no threat.

Most recently, Russia closed all border crossings with the Baltic states indefinitely. Everyone is shouting mobilization, but there can of course be several reasons.

https://ukranews.com/en/news/1160640-russia-closed-railway-checkpoints-on-border-with-finland-estonia-and-latvia-from-today

Putin has a decision to make and it is probably not made yet, but it is not the first time in history that Europe chooses to sit quietly when neighbors are frantically preparing for war.

Zelensky made that mistake in February 2022 after strong pressure from Macron and Merz, and it almost cost him the country.

The only chance for Putin to succeed somewhat is to keep Poland out.

Germany and Poland have both promised to defend Lithuania to the last Lithuanian soldier, the mechanized brigade is half in place, and Poland is training to keep the Suwałki Gap open.

Belarus projects violence as much as they can when Lukashenko does not project friendship so that Zelensky does not overlook him, so the Germans, Poles, and Lithuanians need to have defense along the line Lublin, Bialystok, Vilnius, and possibly up to Daugavpils?

Then they need to defend the Suwałki Gap and against Kaliningrad.

Putin has no intention of setting foot south of the Daugava.

As soon as it blows up, civilians from Estonia and Latvia will drive south, making movement even more difficult.

There, Poland and Germany probably think they have done their part once they have gone on the defensive and are handling refugee flows.

Since not a shot will be fired from Belarus or Kaliningrad, it is up to Poland how they want to act, but they have a president who is commander-in-chief and likes Putin. I am not so sure they will push over Kaliningrad, but we will see.

Putin also stays away from the Gulf of Finland to avoid angering Finland, and since a few hundred thousand Russians are soon training in bases along the Finnish border, Finland feels they have also done their part.

If it blows up, the shipping lanes past Denmark will be full of sinking rusty container ships and the Russian navy will be out, so it will be up to Sweden and Denmark to take one for the team and save Latvia and Estonia from occupation. Some expeditionary force can probably always be sent over to us from the UK. We can probably forget about the USA; I think that acceptance is now beginning to set in. But it is our ships that must run the gauntlet with German and Polish help if they get out of the ports after Russian mining.

Airborne landing – is it likely? I don’t think so when the airspace is packed with the red team.

Exactly how we will get anything over to Estonia and Latvia I leave as an exercise for others, since we choose to be reactive, the Baltic Sea is full of drones, the two Russian submarines, the dozen or so decent surface ships they have, Russian air, and Russian operators on Saaremaa with both anti-ship missiles and air defense besides the drone weapon.

I thought Denmark would send a new battalion to Latvia, but it is only the rotating battalion that will relieve our Swedish battalion – I absolutely do not understand why they do not let our battalion stay in the area.

When D-Day comes, there will probably be a quick look at the digital situation map and it will be considered too high a risk for a workplace accident, and the Work Environment Act also applies to soldiers. Probably Sweden will say we take full responsibility for Gotland, and when Denmark realizes they can get away with something so cheap, they will say Bornholm will become a veritable fortress.

If we by any chance get something ashore, it will probably be in Ventspils or Liepaja, and then it is still south of the Daugava – maybe that will be how we do it.

I remember a big discussion in 2022 when Sweden promised that we would “in the future” earmark two mechanized brigades for the Baltics in case of unrest in the area, and now it is 2026 without anything having happened.

Alternative two is that now, while the window is open, light units are sent in to dig in in eastern Baltics, and if war breaks out, it breaks out. You know what I think we should do by now.

Ukraine managed with violence and sheer luck in 2022; had Belarus rolled toward Lviv from the north and Hungary from the south, it could have ended any way – apparently the signal when Kiev fell was as dumb as Putin is and both kept their fingers on the trigger because they are always the pals who betray.

Russia’s combat planes were flawless, but he chose the wrong opponent. 1,500 infiltrated Kiev, paratroopers over the presidential palace, Hostomel was to become a base, and Kiev was to be encompassed from two sides. The plan with the 76th GAAD had to turn back in the air when Hostomel fell.

FSB stole the bribes that were to be distributed except down south, and the Russians were over the Dnieper already the first day.

Macron and Scholz were fooled into calming Zelensky a few days before the attack started.

That was probably why Orban fired all 100 senior officers later in 2022 or 2023 because they messed up the eternal victory?

As the events went in 2022 when Scholz suggested Ukraine should give up so everything could return to normal, it is easy to see that Europe would have immediately accepted fate-compli.

It is hard to find anything about the NK 11th AC up in Kursk; they were 12,000 – 15,000 strong, but we have been flooded with videos since at least the turn of the year of North Korean workers in suits arriving, so my assumption has, as you know, been that they are significantly building up that corps.

Found this now; since summer 2025, Ukraine has had information that NK will increase to 30,000 – considering all the videos, it seems they have followed the plan.

https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/02/europe/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-intl-cmd

You hear nothing about the North Koreans today but a lot when they fought – it is reasonable to assume they are in standby in the rear.

There you have what is needed to free two Russian army corps from the northern front for missions in the Baltics. NK will handle defense along the northern front. Ukraine, by the way, has quite a lot of respect for them, apparently fierce bastards.

As a bonus – it is inside Russia and North Koreans, so there is some threshold effect for UA to conduct an offensive into Russia, especially if China gets theatrically very angry. Quite smart thinking actually with the North Koreans.

If the Russian balloon collapses in Ukraine and there is a revolution in Russia – great. But until then, we must reasonably take our damn responsibility?

Exactly what our sluggishness depends on is unclear and probably different in different countries, but one thing I think we can say for sure – if Russian units dig in north of the Daugava, few governments in Europe will demand the area be retaken by force other than eagerly suggesting all other countries set a good example.

I don’t see it as a guarantee either that Poland will overrun Kaliningrad in the event of a conflict; they are now trying to fend off the Russian subversive activities in the country that have taken hold of them. They have managed to get into a heated dispute with Ukraine, where they have now decided not to send their decommissioned Mig-29s, blaming wear and tear and other reasons, of course, but that’s how it is.

The Russian Baltic Fleet has probably already been written off by Putin after Ukrainian drone strikes, so whether it is sunk in the harbor or out at sea, he probably won’t lose much sleep over it.

Putin then trades these losses for the old favorite, the gauntlet in the Gulf of Finland, and as a bonus, he might manage to wiggle out of a fatal shot for the Ukraine war – he is extremely cornered, and then anything short of a fatal shot is probably attractive.

Putin also knows very well that countries in Europe can decide at any time to move troops into the Baltics; the window he has where no decisions will be made is now in July – August. When everyone is back from the archipelago vacation at the start of school in August, anything can happen at unit meetings, and there is nothing he can control at all. Then during the autumn and spring, the curve will go down after we do more and Ukraine crushes the crap out of the Russian bastards down in Ukraine. Putin’s window is the coming months.

You can be absolutely sure that there is a decision on Putin’s desk. Whether the decision has been made, who knows – Ukraine would probably have heard something?

If nothing happens, we have to hold on for a year or so and then we will know how close it was and whether our guesses were accurate or not.

What I hope for, of course, is the following – Putin chickens out and wants to wait until after the mobilization, it will be autumn rain and impassable roads, so everything is postponed to 2027, and by then the Ukrainian steamroller will have already come too far.

Maybe the midterm election and the Russian parliamentary election in September play a role?

In 2022, he was forced to wait until after the Olympics in China, and that cost him the war.

But it makes no difference to what we should do, strengthen the Baltics now today. No currently living head of state knows what decision Putin will make, and if we look at Ukraine, he has only increased the level of violence when the level of violence does not produce the desired result. That he would suddenly become Sherman-cautious, we can of course hope for, but history says no.

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Inlägget Medium or high risk, 2 of 2, 10 July 2026 dök först upp på Johan No.1.

A bit of a classic now and representative of the Red Storm in Ukraine. The picture is from Bucha or Irpin right at the beginning of the special operation when they still believed they would march into Kiev, so they had booked tables at all the restaurants and brought their parade uniforms – that’s how it can go.

Monday was a dark day for Ukraine; they have run out of Patriot interceptors and did not shoot down a single Iskander, 23 hit their targets. They still do not have self-produced interceptors against ballistic conventional missiles and still rely on Patriot, NASAMS, IrisT, and SamPT.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cewqqnd7zdwo

Ukraine is now asking Europe to tap into emergency stockpiles since license-produced PAC3 Patriots in Europe will be delivered only in 2027. Apparently, Ukraine will be allowed to license-produce their own after Trump and Zelensky met in Ankara, but that has a long lead time and, above all, you can accelerate and brake as much as you want, so there will be none in the tubes for the next year.

The week before, UA shot down 98% of all incoming drone threats in a large Russian operation and we reported enthusiastically about it – the drone defense is like a wall and totalitarian. Moreover, it is now completely Made in Ukraine and nationwide.

So why does Ukraine have completely run out of interceptors 4.5 years into the war?

They have still not succeeded in producing their own and have not received any licenses, that’s the short answer; they have tried for several years.

The fact that the US has shot away 1700 in the Iran war is one reason, of course, but we already know that Trump is hard-driving the US line that Putin must not lose the war significantly more than his predecessor did.

When it was no longer possible to hold back the elite air force, Trump holds back PATRIOT, and probably NASAMS too, because it gives Putin an opening to use a weapon system he otherwise does not succeed with – the Krasnov suspicion goes from smoldering to a small flame.

We know for sure that Europe still does not have anti-drone capability – for me, that is indisputable. It is underway but we do not have it yet, which also means that our major weapons platforms are very vulnerable.

RU can operate around 10k FPV drones per day that have some 30km-50km fire control zone, and about 500 Gerans every two days roughly, which reach hundreds of kilometers over the border. They are relatively slow but Europe has had poor control over them anyway, not to mention the very limited ability to combat them when the will to shoot them down finally appeared.

RU can fire 100 missiles in one operation but naturally has supply limitations, a few minutes flight time until impact in the Baltics depending on where the launch ramps are when they temporarily leave Belarus to fire and then immediately drive back onto “neutral ground”.

So how many missiles does Russia have?

(all figures below are from open sources so there are surely errors somewhere which you will triumphantly point out).

Ukraine occasionally combats Grau arsenals and key manufacturing, and the same applies to RU; if a missile is 95% ready, it won’t fly – it is hard to know how the stockpiles of flight-ready missiles look.

What we know is that China has built up Russia’s production lines since 2023. The last time I checked, RU had about 2000 missiles in storage-

New production of Iskander is +800 Iskanders/year

Zircon, which is a bit harder to shoot down despite its anti-ship classification, they produce 120/year.

The rest of the missile park is about 1500-2000/year in production rate roughly.

If the Iran war was a sham operation to drain US stockpiles, the conspiracy theorists can discuss that for the next centuries, but the fact is that +1700 Patriots are consumed and the US has an acute shortage.

Patriot is produced at about 600/year, the Germans have gotten license production but are not yet up and running (right?) as Ukraine would get the first ones. Many are clamoring for them, by the way.

We have to buy NASAMS from Raytheon but Norway, if I understand correctly, has production that has increased sharply – around 2000-2500/year from 2026. Long queue to buy them.

SamPT, which we produce in Europe, is still a few hundred per year.

IrisT has had 5000 more missiles produced, Ukraine uses the system.

How many do we have in storage? Not a lot, I guess, because we are stingy with Ukraine; they get nothing right now. Patriots seem to be critically low, NASAMS we must have since it is a standard missile, and SamPT they don’t produce, so probably a low number?

Then we don’t have many batteries either in Europe, 60 PATRIOT, 36 NASAMS, 10-12 SamPT, and 26 IrisT.

It doesn’t end there; all countries that hoard want them for their close protection, so they are not where they would do the most good, naturally. Spain has both NASAMS and Patriot for its own use, for example, even if they have one or a few systems in the Baltics.

Europe is by definition reactive, which means RU will deliver the first strike – if we change our minds at the last minute, it would be appreciated, and I guess it is being discussed right now.

In the Baltics, my favorite area right now, there are 3-4 heavy LV systems depending on the day of the week or if Trump pulls something overnight. During 2026, they will have received more than that, but I don’t know exactly how many are deployed today.

Ukraine has “dozens” of heavy LV batteries.

There is thus an under-dimensioned ground-based defense in the Baltics against missiles that in area is not directly smaller than the area Ukraine usually has to defend against missiles and drones.

Since we have not yet been at war, it is not unreasonable that we have not yet understood how vulnerable large weapons platforms are to the drone weapon. The Baltics are not very wide, and RU knows very well that the capitals are defended, which makes the area even smaller.

They are more vulnerable today than four years ago, and one needs to understand how to protect them the hard way. Aurora26 clearly showed that we have learned too little from the Ukraine war, and that was recently.

The elite air force is apparently not optimal for shooting down ballistic missiles; Ukraine is a good example of that.

The drone weapon is an acute weakness for us that we have worked away over perhaps two years; it is new, and there is an explanation for why, even though we have been quite slow.

Not having full protection against missiles is indefensible and direct negligence, Cold War weapons that we have built an entire defense industry to protect ourselves against but we do not produce enough – despite missiles raining over Ukraine about once a week.

I did not see this coming, I thought Europe had started producing in large quantities when Trump came to power because it did not take long before it was clear what he was up to, and that was 1.5 years ago.

Unfortunately, we have to add another puzzle piece where Europe is weak when we should have been strong.

The risk is probably that Russia can threaten with the missile weapon whenever they want a ceasefire and frozen fronts sometime in the future.

The answers to all my posts are always that Europe has an enormous retaliatory capability, but whenever you start digging a little, it looks like this – pure negligence in my opinion by those whose job it is to protect us.

Rheinmetall says that Merkel was the devil herself and tried to disarm, but now it is 2026 and there has been full-scale war since 2022. Interesting in this context is that here on Johan No.1 we have posted a couple of statements from Merkel in recent years that have been pro-Russian in nature.

We have two clouds of concern in the sky that shouldn’t even be up for discussion, one is that Trump is once again fighting for a ceasefire in Ukraine. If there is a ceasefire in Ukraine, Putin will move his army and attack us point blank, Europe must understand that self-defense applies here. In Ankara, Ukraine seems to have found its style and they do not seem to be yielding to Trump as far as I can see?

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/05/ukraine-war-briefing-trump-repositions-himself-as-peacemaker-in-long-call-with-putin

The other is that my marker for if there would be conflict in the Baltics just lit up.

“Until recently, the U.S. contingent in Estonia numbered between 500 and 700 troops, stationed at Tapa, in southern Estonia, and at other military sites across the country. That number has now fallen to fewer than 100 personnel. Officials have not disclosed any information about future troop movements or the deployment of additional U.S. forces to Europe”.

The heavy American battalion in SE Estonia in Võru has rotated out and they are vague about the one that would rotate in. There were 600-700 (that battalion), and now there are 100 Americans left in the country.

The USA has withdrawn all offensive units from the Baltics, Poland, and Germany now. They have accelerated the movements, recently transferred heavy equipment which was then immediately sent back, and General Donahue, the highest US commander for Europe, was just fired. His successor “will come eventually” so there is indeed a decision vacuum right now in the American camp.

Staff functions have been cut at short notice and the USA provided much of that capability – you have all read previous posts so no need to repeat.

If I were Europe, I would immediately send in brigades to dig in along the eastern border of the Baltics and mine it as best they can in time.

Trump had a “90-minute fun call with Putin” the other day.

Then two Russian government planes land in the USA right during the NATO meeting in Ankara.

Time is starting to run out, moving units that dig in takes time and it must be done now. Of course, it’s unfortunate that no one listens but now it’s starting to burn.

Note in Ankara that Trump is furious at Spain for all sorts of things but it is from the Baltics that he is pulling all offensive units.

“We could never have guessed, there was nothing indicating it” closely followed by “to retake the area north of the Daugava losses will be measured in tens of thousands because we didn’t get there in time and couldn’t secure bridgeheads” closely followed by “the EU has decided to strongly condemn Russia’s aggression and does not at all recognize Estonia and half of Latvia as Russian”.

The curtain falls lightning fast and everything is buried in meetings, well-formulated emails, and endless discussions.

To me this is incomprehensible, since ZAPAD25 we have been writing about this and absolutely nothing happens, don’t all politicians in the EU read Johan No.1?

Add a financial crisis à la 2008 on top of this this autumn and then Russian psyops and finance, which is quick to flee, will pull out of Europe as a payback and everything will only get worse.

Since I follow fine Twitter, I keep up loosely at the fingertips and it seems there are some sellers of US government securities now?

The easiest way to stop that is to make the only real competitor to US government securities, which is the EU’s equivalent, less attractive than their own, so there might be some financial survival from the USA in the overall mix.

We only have difficult decisions to make now – make them instead of dithering. It rarely goes well for cowards and if we can’t make tough decisions now, how on earth do you think it will go when we have seen the drone clouds over the Baltics and all the hundreds of missiles they never managed to shoot down. Our politicians will go into hibernation and throw their phones in the bathtub to avoid making decisions.

At best “yes, we are happy to help but then everyone must do it, but *(insert any country)* does not send exactly as much as us so we are waiting for clarification via Postnord. We need to understand this better before we can send anything and that is the routine we have agreed on in our new management system from McKinsey – you always follow the routines, that’s how it’s been forever”.

The Baltics are probably starting to understand where this is heading, that all agreements on fancy shrimp shell paper are practically worth as much as an election promise from any parliamentary party.

https://ua.news/en/world/krayini-skhidnogo-flangu-nato-gotuiutsia-do-samostiinoyi-vidsichi-udaru-rf-politico

If you have read previous posts you have also understood that our agreements and battle plans for the Baltics have clear weaknesses that mean we cannot be both reactive and get the units in time for defense. Now at least the Baltics have understood that they need to defend themselves for two weeks alone before we have worked our way up to them. When the refugee flows go south, the Russians are dug in north of the Daugava and the drone umbrella is fully deployed 50 km south, then two weeks is a wishful dream where acceptance of an infinite timeline will gradually creep in.

After two weeks the Baltics are blocked on WhatsApp and we stop answering all the desperate “where are you, are you here soon” messages.

Anyway, the next critical time is the turn of July/August and onwards. When the rains come in October it should be over if it gets muddy in the Baltics as it usually does in Ukraine. If Russia has then managed to go on the defensive it is not they who suffer from the rains but we who must carry out a lightning counteroffensive, which then will be another reason to “wait and deeply analyze the situation to be able to make the best decision” – a saving grace for our elected officials.

The beginning of the end in Ukraine and maybe the beginning of the beginning for us

At least that’s what Budanov says and I think there are good reasons to prepare for war because we want peace as Finland did on the ground up to 1939, and as the only country still does today.

You do that best by letting light infantry go on defense in eastern Baltics and then a paid subscription here on Johan No.1 Substack. I saw that a few subscribers have joined and I thank you solemnly with a deep French bow and a white powdered wig.

Inlägget Half or high risk, 1 out of 2, July 9, 2026 dök först upp på Johan No.1.

Ukrainians also carried out a major attack on Belgorod, reportedly hitting both the airport and a gas pipeline hub, and according to some reports, also a gas depot, a power plant, and a bridge. Read more at Kyiv Independent. Posting links to social media later as comments.

Unfortunately, Kyiv was again attacked during the night, including by ballistic missiles, which led to two injuries and a fire breaking out. Kyiv Independent.

Today’s report on Russian losses in Ukraine

• 1260 KWIA
• 3 Tanks
• 4 AFVs
• 61 Artillery systems
• 1 MLRS
• 2074 UAVs
• 5 UGVs
• 462 Vehicles & fuel tanks
• 4 Special equipment

Ukrainian General Staff’s report

• 271 combat engagements
• 90 airstrikes
• 272 KAB/CAB
• 1,063 kamikaze drones
• 3,065 shells (42 from MLRS)

SLAVA UKRAINI

Inlägget Ukraine has during the night attacked a refinery and a petrochemical plant – Russia has once again attacked Kyiv with ballistic missiles dök först upp på Johan No.1.

Russian losses

Slightly lower losses than yesterday; what stands out is that 37 X-101 cruise missiles were shot down. Russia also fired 21 ballistic missiles (Iskander) yesterday, and unfortunately all reached their targets.

• 1200 KWIA
• 9 Tanks
• 5 AFVs
• 57 artillery systems
• 5 Air defense systems
• 2129 UAVs
• 15 UGVs
• 399 Vehicles & fuel tanks
• 5 Special equipment
• 37 Cruise missiles

Summary from the Ukrainian General Staff

• 255 combat clashes
• 95 air strikes (871 missiles)
• 267 KAb/CAB
• 9,556 kamikaze drones
• 3,110 shells (26 from MLRS)

SLAVA UKRAINI

Inlägget Ukraine may be allowed to manufacture the Patriot surface-to-air missile – Russian losses dök först upp på Johan No.1.

Ukraine, in turn, attacked the Russian oil refinery in Yaroslavl, which is located 700 km from the Ukrainian border. The refinery has been targeted before. This time it is unclear what damage was caused and there is no information about what was used during the attack. Residents have posted pictures showing smoke said to come from fires that broke out after the attack. Kyiv Independent writes about it.

Russian losses in Ukraine

Today’s report shows that losses overall are now high, clearly above average for several categories. It is not often that Russia loses over 20 armored vehicles nowadays, and 580 soft-skinned vehicles is the second highest during the entire war.

1420 KWIA
7 tanks
16 AFVs
63 Artillery systems
1 MLRS
3 Air defense systems
1979 UAVs
12 UGVs
580 Vehicles & fuel tanks *)
4 Special equipment
3 Cruise missiles

Summary from the Ukrainian General Staff

Despite high losses in the report above and also relatively many clashes, Russia has not increased its use of suicide drones or its artillery. Previously, the increase in suicide drones was worrying, but when they reached around 10,000/day it leveled off and has since fluctuated between 8,000-10,000. At the moment, they seem to have reached their maximum capacity. The bottleneck is probably production, but it could also be the availability of drone pilots.

• 256 combat clashes
• 96 aviation strikes
• 292 KAB/CAB
• 8,825 kamikaze drones
• 2,913 shells (37 from MLRS)

SLAVA UKRAINI

Off topic, I wanted to take the opportunity to congratulate the Norwegian Vikings who rowed home the victory against Brazil yesterday!

I’m not a football fan myself, so for me the match was, as Snow White would say, “dead boring and tedious,” until the 79th minute (if I remember correctly) when it suddenly became “absolutely wonderful.” Suddenly the match came to life and we even got drama all the way to the very last seconds with a Brazilian penalty at the end. Maybe I can learn to appreciate football even outside the World Cup?

I will be cheering for Norway even when they face England. Sure, the Norwegians are starting to get a bit unbearably self-confident now, but they deserve it!

Inlägget 10 dead and 56 injured after extensive Russian attacks – Ukraine attacked the refinery in Yaroslavl again dök först upp på Johan No.1.

When it comes to artillery, one wonders how anything can still be left, we passed 45,000 a few days ago. It has been discussed quite a bit and one almost has to assume that mortars are included in the statistics, as they also belong to the artillery. Moreover, the statistics probably refer to hits on targets and not total destroyed. Much can probably be repaired and put back into combat again. Soft vehicles are over an enormous 116,000, and regarding that category, I believe it is not as easy to repair after an attack. Most end up as burnt-out wrecks.

There are also estimates of the value of destroyed equipment, and on average the war costs Russia about 100 million dollars every day in losses, and the total is up to 161 billion dollars for the entire war. That is only the cost of losses of destroyed hardware.

• 1290 KWIA
• 7 Tanks
• 9 AFVs
• 63 Artillery systems
• 3 MLRS
• 1 Air defense systems
• 1628 UAVs
• 6 UGVs
• 462 Vehicles & fuel tanks

SLAVA UKRAINI

Ukrainian General Staff Report (Summary)

High number of clashes, it will be interesting to see if the ratio is still high!

• 295 combat clashes
• 58 aviation strikes
• 252 KAB/CAB
• 8,799 kamikaze drones
• 2,775 shells (46 from MLRS)

Last Night’s Russian Attacks

Ukraine managed during the night to neutralize 115 (of which 3 missiles out of a total of 129).

Inlägget Russian losses dök först upp på Johan No.1.