Half or high risk, 1 out of 2, July 9, 2026

A bit of a classic now and representative of the Red Storm in Ukraine. The picture is from Bucha or Irpin right at the beginning of the special operation when they still believed they would march into Kiev, so they had booked tables at all the restaurants and brought their parade uniforms – that’s how it can go.

Monday was a dark day for Ukraine; they have run out of Patriot interceptors and did not shoot down a single Iskander, 23 hit their targets. They still do not have self-produced interceptors against ballistic conventional missiles and still rely on Patriot, NASAMS, IrisT, and SamPT.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cewqqnd7zdwo

Ukraine is now asking Europe to tap into emergency stockpiles since license-produced PAC3 Patriots in Europe will be delivered only in 2027. Apparently, Ukraine will be allowed to license-produce their own after Trump and Zelensky met in Ankara, but that has a long lead time and, above all, you can accelerate and brake as much as you want, so there will be none in the tubes for the next year.

The week before, UA shot down 98% of all incoming drone threats in a large Russian operation and we reported enthusiastically about it – the drone defense is like a wall and totalitarian. Moreover, it is now completely Made in Ukraine and nationwide.

So why does Ukraine have completely run out of interceptors 4.5 years into the war?

They have still not succeeded in producing their own and have not received any licenses, that’s the short answer; they have tried for several years.

The fact that the US has shot away 1700 in the Iran war is one reason, of course, but we already know that Trump is hard-driving the US line that Putin must not lose the war significantly more than his predecessor did.

When it was no longer possible to hold back the elite air force, Trump holds back PATRIOT, and probably NASAMS too, because it gives Putin an opening to use a weapon system he otherwise does not succeed with – the Krasnov suspicion goes from smoldering to a small flame.

We know for sure that Europe still does not have anti-drone capability – for me, that is indisputable. It is underway but we do not have it yet, which also means that our major weapons platforms are very vulnerable.

RU can operate around 10k FPV drones per day that have some 30km-50km fire control zone, and about 500 Gerans every two days roughly, which reach hundreds of kilometers over the border. They are relatively slow but Europe has had poor control over them anyway, not to mention the very limited ability to combat them when the will to shoot them down finally appeared.

RU can fire 100 missiles in one operation but naturally has supply limitations, a few minutes flight time until impact in the Baltics depending on where the launch ramps are when they temporarily leave Belarus to fire and then immediately drive back onto “neutral ground”.

So how many missiles does Russia have?

(all figures below are from open sources so there are surely errors somewhere which you will triumphantly point out).

Ukraine occasionally combats Grau arsenals and key manufacturing, and the same applies to RU; if a missile is 95% ready, it won’t fly – it is hard to know how the stockpiles of flight-ready missiles look.

What we know is that China has built up Russia’s production lines since 2023. The last time I checked, RU had about 2000 missiles in storage-

New production of Iskander is +800 Iskanders/year

Zircon, which is a bit harder to shoot down despite its anti-ship classification, they produce 120/year.

The rest of the missile park is about 1500-2000/year in production rate roughly.

If the Iran war was a sham operation to drain US stockpiles, the conspiracy theorists can discuss that for the next centuries, but the fact is that +1700 Patriots are consumed and the US has an acute shortage.

Patriot is produced at about 600/year, the Germans have gotten license production but are not yet up and running (right?) as Ukraine would get the first ones. Many are clamoring for them, by the way.

We have to buy NASAMS from Raytheon but Norway, if I understand correctly, has production that has increased sharply – around 2000-2500/year from 2026. Long queue to buy them.

SamPT, which we produce in Europe, is still a few hundred per year.

IrisT has had 5000 more missiles produced, Ukraine uses the system.

How many do we have in storage? Not a lot, I guess, because we are stingy with Ukraine; they get nothing right now. Patriots seem to be critically low, NASAMS we must have since it is a standard missile, and SamPT they don’t produce, so probably a low number?

Then we don’t have many batteries either in Europe, 60 PATRIOT, 36 NASAMS, 10-12 SamPT, and 26 IrisT.

It doesn’t end there; all countries that hoard want them for their close protection, so they are not where they would do the most good, naturally. Spain has both NASAMS and Patriot for its own use, for example, even if they have one or a few systems in the Baltics.

Europe is by definition reactive, which means RU will deliver the first strike – if we change our minds at the last minute, it would be appreciated, and I guess it is being discussed right now.

In the Baltics, my favorite area right now, there are 3-4 heavy LV systems depending on the day of the week or if Trump pulls something overnight. During 2026, they will have received more than that, but I don’t know exactly how many are deployed today.

Ukraine has “dozens” of heavy LV batteries.

There is thus an under-dimensioned ground-based defense in the Baltics against missiles that in area is not directly smaller than the area Ukraine usually has to defend against missiles and drones.

Since we have not yet been at war, it is not unreasonable that we have not yet understood how vulnerable large weapons platforms are to the drone weapon. The Baltics are not very wide, and RU knows very well that the capitals are defended, which makes the area even smaller.

They are more vulnerable today than four years ago, and one needs to understand how to protect them the hard way. Aurora26 clearly showed that we have learned too little from the Ukraine war, and that was recently.

The elite air force is apparently not optimal for shooting down ballistic missiles; Ukraine is a good example of that.

The drone weapon is an acute weakness for us that we have worked away over perhaps two years; it is new, and there is an explanation for why, even though we have been quite slow.

Not having full protection against missiles is indefensible and direct negligence, Cold War weapons that we have built an entire defense industry to protect ourselves against but we do not produce enough – despite missiles raining over Ukraine about once a week.

I did not see this coming, I thought Europe had started producing in large quantities when Trump came to power because it did not take long before it was clear what he was up to, and that was 1.5 years ago.

Unfortunately, we have to add another puzzle piece where Europe is weak when we should have been strong.

The risk is probably that Russia can threaten with the missile weapon whenever they want a ceasefire and frozen fronts sometime in the future.

The answers to all my posts are always that Europe has an enormous retaliatory capability, but whenever you start digging a little, it looks like this – pure negligence in my opinion by those whose job it is to protect us.

Rheinmetall says that Merkel was the devil herself and tried to disarm, but now it is 2026 and there has been full-scale war since 2022. Interesting in this context is that here on Johan No.1 we have posted a couple of statements from Merkel in recent years that have been pro-Russian in nature.

We have two clouds of concern in the sky that shouldn’t even be up for discussion, one is that Trump is once again fighting for a ceasefire in Ukraine. If there is a ceasefire in Ukraine, Putin will move his army and attack us point blank, Europe must understand that self-defense applies here. In Ankara, Ukraine seems to have found its style and they do not seem to be yielding to Trump as far as I can see?

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/05/ukraine-war-briefing-trump-repositions-himself-as-peacemaker-in-long-call-with-putin

The other is that my marker for if there would be conflict in the Baltics just lit up.

ā€œUntil recently, the U.S. contingent in Estonia numbered between 500 and 700 troops, stationed at Tapa, in southern Estonia, and at other military sites across the country. That number has now fallen to fewer than 100 personnel. Officials have not disclosed any information about future troop movements or the deployment of additional U.S. forces to Europeā€.

The heavy American battalion in SE Estonia in VƵru has rotated out and they are vague about the one that would rotate in. There were 600-700 (that battalion), and now there are 100 Americans left in the country.

The USA has withdrawn all offensive units from the Baltics, Poland, and Germany now. They have accelerated the movements, recently transferred heavy equipment which was then immediately sent back, and General Donahue, the highest US commander for Europe, was just fired. His successor ā€œwill come eventuallyā€ so there is indeed a decision vacuum right now in the American camp.

Staff functions have been cut at short notice and the USA provided much of that capability – you have all read previous posts so no need to repeat.

If I were Europe, I would immediately send in brigades to dig in along the eastern border of the Baltics and mine it as best they can in time.

Trump had a ā€œ90-minute fun call with Putinā€ the other day.

Then two Russian government planes land in the USA right during the NATO meeting in Ankara.

Time is starting to run out, moving units that dig in takes time and it must be done now. Of course, it’s unfortunate that no one listens but now it’s starting to burn.

Note in Ankara that Trump is furious at Spain for all sorts of things but it is from the Baltics that he is pulling all offensive units.

ā€œWe could never have guessed, there was nothing indicating itā€ closely followed by ā€œto retake the area north of the Daugava losses will be measured in tens of thousands because we didn’t get there in time and couldn’t secure bridgeheadsā€ closely followed by ā€œthe EU has decided to strongly condemn Russia’s aggression and does not at all recognize Estonia and half of Latvia as Russianā€.

The curtain falls lightning fast and everything is buried in meetings, well-formulated emails, and endless discussions.

To me this is incomprehensible, since ZAPAD25 we have been writing about this and absolutely nothing happens, don’t all politicians in the EU read Johan No.1?

Add a financial crisis Ć  la 2008 on top of this this autumn and then Russian psyops and finance, which is quick to flee, will pull out of Europe as a payback and everything will only get worse.

Since I follow fine Twitter, I keep up loosely at the fingertips and it seems there are some sellers of US government securities now?

The easiest way to stop that is to make the only real competitor to US government securities, which is the EU’s equivalent, less attractive than their own, so there might be some financial survival from the USA in the overall mix.

We only have difficult decisions to make now – make them instead of dithering. It rarely goes well for cowards and if we can’t make tough decisions now, how on earth do you think it will go when we have seen the drone clouds over the Baltics and all the hundreds of missiles they never managed to shoot down. Our politicians will go into hibernation and throw their phones in the bathtub to avoid making decisions.

At best ā€œyes, we are happy to help but then everyone must do it, but *(insert any country)* does not send exactly as much as us so we are waiting for clarification via Postnord. We need to understand this better before we can send anything and that is the routine we have agreed on in our new management system from McKinsey – you always follow the routines, that’s how it’s been foreverā€.

The Baltics are probably starting to understand where this is heading, that all agreements on fancy shrimp shell paper are practically worth as much as an election promise from any parliamentary party.

https://ua.news/en/world/krayini-skhidnogo-flangu-nato-gotuiutsia-do-samostiinoyi-vidsichi-udaru-rf-politico

If you have read previous posts you have also understood that our agreements and battle plans for the Baltics have clear weaknesses that mean we cannot be both reactive and get the units in time for defense. Now at least the Baltics have understood that they need to defend themselves for two weeks alone before we have worked our way up to them. When the refugee flows go south, the Russians are dug in north of the Daugava and the drone umbrella is fully deployed 50 km south, then two weeks is a wishful dream where acceptance of an infinite timeline will gradually creep in.

After two weeks the Baltics are blocked on WhatsApp and we stop answering all the desperate ā€œwhere are you, are you here soonā€ messages.

Anyway, the next critical time is the turn of July/August and onwards. When the rains come in October it should be over if it gets muddy in the Baltics as it usually does in Ukraine. If Russia has then managed to go on the defensive it is not they who suffer from the rains but we who must carry out a lightning counteroffensive, which then will be another reason to ā€œwait and deeply analyze the situation to be able to make the best decisionā€ – a saving grace for our elected officials.

The beginning of the end in Ukraine and maybe the beginning of the beginning for us 😐

At least that’s what Budanov says and I think there are good reasons to prepare for war because we want peace as Finland did on the ground up to 1939, and as the only country still does today.

You do that best by letting light infantry go on defense in eastern Baltics and then a paid subscription here on Johan No.1 Substack. I saw that a few subscribers have joined and I thank you solemnly with a deep French bow and a white powdered wig.


Don't forget to donate, Ukraine's cause is ours! Support Ukraine!

96 thoughts on “Half or high risk, 1 out of 2, July 9, 2026”

  1. Russian losses in Ukraine 2026-07-10

    • 1310 KWIA
    • 7 Tanks
    • 3 AFVs
    • 59 Artillery systems
    • 4 MLRS
    • 1 Air defense system
    • 1 Aircraft
    • 1843 UAVs
    • 4 UGVs
    • 363 Vehicles & fuel tanks
    • 4 Special equipment

    SLAVA UKRAINI

  2. Good that Duplantis and others stand up and criticize the IOC. Hopefully they will be forced to back down.
    There must almost certainly be large bribes, or alternatively threats, involved for them to make the stupid decision to let Russia back in, considering that their terror bombings of civilian targets are only getting worse and worse.

    “The Swedish pole vault star Armand Duplantis is critical of the International Olympic Committee welcoming Russian athletes back to the games starting in Los Angeles 2028. To SVT Sport he says the timing is strange and that Russia’s attacks on Ukraine continue as usual.

    – Nothing has changed. It’s only getting worse. I don’t understand it, honestly.

    He is not alone in reacting to the IOC’s decision. The Swedish Olympic Committee, SOK, has also criticized the decision to allow Russians to compete again.”
    https://omni.se/duplantis-kritik-mot-iok-tajmingen-ar-konstig/a/9p8Byw

  3. Off-Topic, Russia and Africa

    Russia is trying to maintain its grip in Africa.

    “Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says in a statement that they will continue to provide military support to the juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. This is reported by Le Monde.

    The three countries have strained relations with the Western world and have formed the regional Sahel Alliance (AES).

    ā€We unite in our shared understanding of the need to build a just multipolar world order, and through joint efforts fight against the neocolonialism that is so deeply rooted among our colleagues in the Western world,ā€ Lavrov says in the statement.” https://omni.se/ryssland-utlovar-fortsatt-stod-till-afrikanska-juntor/a/bOQXR3

  4. When this is over, I hope that Europe has unequivocally grown a backbone and tells the USA that NATO is a DEFENSE ALLIANCE and that it is highly inappropriate to complain about other countries’ cooperation when it is the USA itself that is attacking. Thus, the USA can go to hell if it doesn’t like it, and Europe will build its own NATO without the USA.

    Several presidents before Trump have demanded that defense spending be increased according to agreement, which is completely right, but only Trump uses blackmail, moreover during a war that threatens all of Europe. It is irresponsible not to stand up for the appropriations, but it is reckless to blackmail during a war.

    We must stand on our own feet! The USA is in decline and will not recover (I have said it before, before 2050 there will be rumblings about the secession of certain states). Germany is in decline and will have a tough time for a long time ahead, so others must step in.

    1. Attack is the best defense. Ships with military equipment have stopped operating the route Iran – Russia across the Caspian Sea, as most of the materiel is either destroyed or needed in Iran’s remaining defense. All countries have the right to attack countries that either themselves violate international law or help other countries that do. Right and moral obligation.

       

      Right and moral.

       

      The claim that the attack on Iran would in any way be questionable from an international law perspective is wrong and such claims are morally questionable.

      1. Of course, I do not agree with you there.

        There are slightly different figures, but approximately 3,500 – 3,700 civilians have been killed during the war, including at least 181 children. Counting Lebanon, it is about 2,000 more.

        Even though, of course, there is an attempt to avoid civilian casualties, that is exactly what war leads to.

        These are therefore people who would not have died otherwise, and it is not exactly as if anyone has been saved in Iran; rather, they have probably gone even harder against their population. 

        Then, of course, many soldiers on both sides of the war are added.

        Then we have the enormous economic costs which ultimately (even if it is only a small part) affect access to food, healthcare, and welfare in many countries. 

        The cost of the war purely militarily is estimated to be between 50-100 billion USD.
        You have roughly the same amount regarding the direct damages caused by the war.

        There are some calculations of the global economic effects of the war.
        These calculations vary from hundreds of billions of USD up to 3.5 trillion USD.
        This affects, among others, countries that are not involved at all and already have a strained economy, and then, as usual, it is the poorest who suffer the most. Sri Lanka is one of the countries that has encountered problems. 

        What do you think the war has achieved in terms of noble human goals that make it worth the costs in human lives, all those injured, all the destruction, and also economically (which ultimately affects people)?

        1. And the missed arms deliveries to Russia (which turned the war to a hard-pressed Russia’s advantage in 2023, we exclude). We ignore the civilians who have been killed in Ukraine by Gerandrƶnare. Yes, then I wonder what blunt spear we are aiming at Russia if we are to calculate — short-term — economic losses and the risk of civilians on the enemy side being affected. War cannot be risk-eliminated, you should know that since you have been covering a war for three to four years. If the allies had been forced to eliminate the risk of civilian casualties when carrying out resistance operations, we would not have had any liberation of Europe. And despite your reasoning, JD Vance is completely right that Ukraine should cease offensive actions inside Russia, admittedly civilians do actually get affected. Despite Ukrainian efforts (as well as American efforts in Iran) to minimize the risk of this. And over two or three days in Iran, the regime killed up to twenty thousand of its own inhabitants. This is confirmed, which I do not believe your information about civilians affected in Iran in connection with the American attack is.

        2. “Rather, they have probably gone even harder against their population”

          Oh really? I think we would have known about any massacres since the last one carried out by the then current and now eliminated leadership.

    2. Sorry, MacDelmac, but when you listen to what Germany’s Chancellor Merz said yesterday at the NATO meeting in Ankara šŸ‡¹šŸ‡·, the one with backbone is not Europe. Nor all the US presidents, but a certain American president:

      Merz: ”Trump often applies pressure through a very forceful approach.

      The last American presidents politely asked us, ”Please, finally do a little more for your own defense,” but across Europe those requests largely fell on deaf ears.

      Now there is an American president who says, rather bluntly, ”Enough is enough.”

      And I cannot blame him. Just look at the numbers: the United States spends around 80 percent of NATO’s defense resources, while Europe accounts for only about 20 percent.

      That is unacceptable. It has always been unacceptable.”

      1. Most at least since Bush the Younger have criticized Europe for not doing more and paying more.
        Trump is totally unreliable and should therefore be kept on a short leash as long as he is running Putin’s errands!

        1. In this case, it is not to Putin’s advantage that Europe is rearming. The fact that the USA has for some time had an increasing confrontation with China, with consequences for how the country must prioritize militarily, is also not to Putin’s advantage, since China — as appears in some posts below and which has been extensively discussed here on johanno1 — is to be considered an ally of Russia. These are the only sensible results of Trump putting his foot down, and these are to our advantage and to Putin’s disadvantage.

          1. He doesn’t care about the USA, he doesn’t care about Europe, he doesn’t care about China or Russia. He only cares about himself and his own legacy. Trump is just Trump first.

            If he were really interested, he would have made a deal with Xi (he’s soooo good at that, so why hasn’t anything been done) and thereby further disarmed Russia. After that, he could have threatened Russia by giving Ukraine everything they point to.

            1. Well, it’s a bit of both. Trump has both visited XI and projected military strength. The Iran war, maybe also Venezuela, was partly about putting not only Russia—but also China—in their place regarding their military influence in the world and their strategic role as a military ally. There was quite a bit of Chinese scrap, as well as Russian, as a result of the attack. Trump’s claims about Greenland are less about a Trump Tower in Nuuk and more about the fact that Chinese as well as Russian ships are actually present around Greenland. If you are to believe the Americans. Just like in Venezuela (oil) and Iran (Silk Road), Greenland has been a target for Chinese economic interests (rare earth metals, oil?). Which conflicts with American interests. So Trump acts against China both militarily and economically. Which benefits American interests, militarily and economically. Regardless of whether it also benefits Trump.

              1. Had it benefited the USA but not Trump, he wouldn’t have done a damn thing, I’m convinced of that. He does nothing unless he benefits himself. That’s how narcissists act.

  5. Off-Topic, the ceasefire in Iran

    Late Wednesday evening, the US carried out attacks against Iran for the second day in a row. According to the US Central Command, Centcom, about 90 targets have been hit.

    According to a source to the news agency Reuters, the US’s new attacks were larger than those carried out during the night to Wednesday. CNN reports that Iranian authorities have stated that a railway bridge in northern Iran has been damaged in the attacks. Al Jazeera writes that one person has died in the city of Iranshahr.

    The Iranian military has responded to the attacks during the night. The Iranian TV station IRIB reports, according to CNN, that Iran has sent drones and missiles against US bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, just like the previous day.

    The conflict between the US and Iran is now escalating more and more. During Wednesday’s NATO summit in Turkey, US President Donald Trump said that he believes the ceasefire that has been in place since mid-June is over.”
    https://omni.se/iran-och-usa-har-utvaxlat-nya-attacker-under-natten/a/K8G6dG

  6. Off-Topic, Trump and his new plan

    “Donald Trump’s journey home from the NATO summit in Ankara has become a talking point for several reasons. Among other things, he flew home in an old blue and white Air Force One plane, not the large luxury gift from Qatar – a new Boeing converted into a presidential plane – which he arrived in Turkey with.

    AP describes it as an unexpected switch. The president has not given a clear explanation as to why he is flying home in a different plane than the one he flew there with. Trump claims he wanted to travel in the older plane “for old times’ sake.”

    Several media outlets write that the plane change raises questions about the new plane’s safety. The administration has spent hundreds of millions of dollars converting Qatar’s gift, but several media reports indicate that it, among other things, lacks a system that warns of incoming missiles.

    – The new Air Force One plane is a state-of-the-art aircraft equipped with advanced security systems to protect the president and his staff, says White House spokesperson Steven Cheung.”
    https://omni.se/trump-anlande-i-nya-planet-men-akte-hem-i-det-gamla/a/wrxRJ4

  7. Off-Topic, water shortage

    Kill two birds with one stone! Just drink Obolon (or any other Ukrainian beer of your choice) and you support both Ukraine and help counteract the water shortage!

    “SMHI expands its warning for risk of water shortage. Now the groundwater reservoirs in Halland, Ɩstergƶtland, Stockholm, and Uppsala counties are also affected.

    This means a total of eleven counties are affected, according to SMHI’s on-duty hydrologist Hugo Rudebeck.

    – The summer rain showers can temporarily increase moisture in the soil and help plants recover. But to refill lakes, watercourses, and groundwater, significantly more rain is required, says Rudebeck.

    Precipitation during both winter and spring has been lower than normal, which is one of the reasons for the low groundwater levels, reports SVT Nyheter Stockholm.

    Households are now urged to conserve water and stay updated on any new recommendations or restrictions from their own municipality.”
    https://omni.se/smhi-utokar-varning-for-vattenbrist-elva-lan-berors/a/ExvJw5

  8. As usual, I completely agree with you Johan, that Europe is unusually slow when it comes to acquiring countermeasures both against drones and ballistic missiles, and to fortify the Baltics.

    However, I think you are exaggerating the threat from Russia towards Europe.

    If Russia were to fully invade one of the Baltic countries, say they had then saved up drones so they could send a couple of thousand per day for a week or two and thereafter 500 per day, as well as launch all the ballistic missiles they can get hold of, say 400 during the first month, it would of course cause enormous devastation. Taking Estonia or Latvia as an example, they would obviously be in a very bad situation and unable to defend themselves if Russia simultaneously launched a larger ground invasion.
    So far, I agree, the Baltics are not ready to face that threat on their own and we have not done much to strengthen their defense.

    It would of course also be quite difficult for NATO or the EU to send in ground troops who would then have to drive out the Russians while facing 10,000 FPV drones per day. I agree that we are not prepared for that type of warfare either.

    It could become, as you suggest, that we will stand by and watch, but I doubt it. Sure, it will probably take a couple of days before we fully react.
    Then our reaction will not only be to send in ground troops.
    It will primarily be air power and long-range weapons, and we will probably target completely different objectives so that Russia realizes it must withdraw.

    But the threat to Europe then?
    We will not dare because we will face all the drones and ballistic missiles!

    That Russia, through its Shahed/Geran drones and ballistic missiles, would pose a greater threat to all of Europe if we choose to defend the Baltics feels very exaggerated.

    Ukraine has had difficulty throughout the war defending itself against ballistic missiles; it went better when they got Patriots but even then they have not managed to stop them all. They initially had problems with Shaheds, but even before they developed interceptor drones, they managed to take down a fairly large proportion. Then came the jet variant, which caused some problems as they were harder to deal with.

    Sure, they pose a threat, but Ukraine has withstood Russia’s terror attacks for 4.5 years without being defeated and looks stronger than ever. It is of course a huge tragedy with many civilian casualties and even more who have been injured for life. But Ukraine has not been defeated.
    One could argue that they have not defeated Russia either.
    One can also point out that they survive because they receive support from Europe.
    That is true, but that is about 50-60 billion euros per year if we exclude loans. That is roughly as much as the EU pays out in agricultural subsidies each year.

    Europe has a completely different economy than Ukraine and can therefore adapt in a completely different way if we were to end up at war, apart from the fact that we already have a vastly larger defense than Ukraine even though we lack their edge when it comes to interceptors and FPV drones and probably also some of their tough resistance will.

    Back to the threat from Russia. If they were to take on all of Europe and we assume that we have no defense at all against their Shahed or ballistic missiles. They would of course cause a lot of devastation but it does not constitute a greater threat if they have to cover all of Europe.
    Shahed causes relatively small damage, the ballistic ones somewhat more, but it is still limited effect, neither of them is any “Wunderwaffe” and certainly not war-winning. Ukraine is proof of that.

    If they target military objectives, it could have some impact, but Europe is large. 500 drones and 20 ballistics per day will not make a difference. We will be able to combat some of them and besides, not all of them function as intended all the way or even manage to reach the targets they were supposed to hit.

    If they instead target Europe’s capitals, they might manage to destroy a couple of buildings per day and city, and that is very likely exactly what they would do in hopes that the population out of pure fear would pressure the governments to lay down arms and let Russia win (or let the Baltics fall). But that has not worked in Ukraine and I am completely sure it will not work against Europe either.

    The above of course assumes that the war in Ukraine is over. Before that, there is unlikely to be any major attack on the Baltics. They do not have the resources for that.

    1. I really hope you are right. Unfortunately, the pessimist in me thinks that Europe will give up immediately; it is worth redrawing borders if we can avoid freezing this winter and sending our children to their deaths.

    1. ** ā—ļøOvernight, the šŸ‡ŗšŸ‡¦Ukrainian Defense Forces struck two šŸ‡·šŸ‡ŗRussian oil depots at once. The facilities hit were Lukoil-Yugnefteprodukt in Mikhailovsk, Stavropol Krai, and Tvernefteprodukt in Tver.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ ** Movie:
      https://bsky.app/profile/militarynewsua.bsky.social/post/3mq72754mns2r

      And another movie:
      https://bsky.app/profile/beefeaterfella.bsky.social/post/3mq726yxwks2a

  9. ** šŸ‡ŗšŸ‡¦ā€¼ļø “Our deep strikes really impress Trump”: First Deputy Chairman of OP Serhiy Kyslytsya in an interview with “RBK-Ukraine”.

    šŸ”· The meetings in 2025 were only an exchange of positions. In 2026, the process with the active participation of the US and NATO generals.

    šŸ”· The military framework is 90% ready: The technical component of monitoring the ceasefire has long been fully agreed upon. But everything rests on the lack of a political solution.

    šŸ”· At a closed G7 meeting, Trump said: “Putin today and Putin a year ago are different things.”

    šŸ”· Constant contact: Zelensky communicates regularly with Trump. But the visit of the top American negotiators Witkoff and Kushner to Kyiv has not yet been scheduled.

    šŸ”· Ukraine will not give up its territories.

    šŸ”· Americans like to be successful and be on the side of those who are successful. **

    https://bsky.app/profile/maks23.bsky.social/post/3mq6z5itqb22q

    1. The last point is not unimportant. There it is as if there has been a thick filter to break through in order to influence the current administration. While Ukraine early on showed strength, which reached many Americans, including the then administration.

  10. Apart from shifts within the different sectors regarding the Russian attacks, no changes in the total compared to yesterday. The Ukrainian pressure remains steadily above one hundred, indicating diligent work being carried out by the offensive part of the Ukrainian defense.

     
    N Slobozhansky 2
    S Slobozhansky 2ā†˜ļø
    Kupyansk 2
    Lyman 15šŸ’„
    Slovyansk 28šŸ’„šŸ’„
    Kramatorsk 3
    Kostjantynivka 29šŸ’„šŸ’„ā†—ļø
    Pokrovsk 38šŸ’„šŸ’„ā†˜ļø
    Oleksandrivskij 3
    Huliaipole 30šŸ’„šŸ’„ā†—ļø
    Orikhivsk 2
    Prydniprovskij 0

    Localized 154
    Unlocalized 114
    Total 268
    Ratio unloc/loc 0.7.

  11. It has been a while since Covert Cabal released any video regarding Russian tanks.

    According to their estimates, the supplies are running low but at the same time Russia today has more active tanks (approx. 3,500) than when the war started (approx. 3,000).

    The supplies are thus on their way to being depleted, but the tanks are being sent for repair at a high rate while today they no longer consume as many in the war.

    CC estimates new production at approx. 200-250 per year (must be a fairly uncertain figure).

    At the moment, the number of Russian tanks is actually increasing rather than decreasing.

    They argue that the reason they no longer use tanks to the same extent is simply because they are far too easy to knock out with cheap drones. Russia is still gathering tanks while they try to find countermeasures against the drones.

    If they succeed with that, they suddenly become interesting to use again.

    Now that they consume fewer than they lose, they have apparently even afforded to send some to Mali.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3nuZbBfEWA

  12. Swedish Frida Stoltz was injured in a Russian attack in Ukraine last Friday after she and a group of other volunteers delivered emergency aid, she tells several media outlets.

    When they stopped to refuel in Poltava, the staff at the gas station suddenly started running. Then it was as if the whole world exploded, she says.

    – It’s like two fireballs, of different sizes, flying in front of my face after the window is pushed in. The first thought is that they will explode in my face, she tells Expressen.

    She and her colleague got out of the car but then encountered a man who had suffered shrapnel wounds. They used a shirt as a pressure bandage before the ambulance arrived.

    In total, six people were injured by the drone. Frida sustained abrasions and burns on one arm and has pressure in her head after the incident.

    – Considering what we were exposed to, the injuries are minor. We all had guardian angels, she tells DN.

  13. ā€We could never have guessed, there was nothing to indicate itā€ closely followed by ā€to reclaim the area north of the Daugava, losses will be measured in tens of thousands because we did not get there in time and could secure bridgeheadsā€ closely followed by ā€the EU has decided to strongly condemn Russia’s aggression and does not recognize Estonia and half of Latvia as Russian at allā€.

    This is, in itself, hard to grasp. Even harder to understand is why Russia has not already acted on it.

  14. Off-Topic, China

    I found this a bit unexpected. It doesn’t say who the importers are, but probably Europe.

    “Exports of cars from China increased by 80 percent in June compared to the same month last year, writes TT.

    In the first half of the year, China exported more than 4.4 million cars, an increase of 72 percent compared to the same period in 2025.

    The Chinese domestic market looks darker, with a sales drop of 26 percent. The market in China is characterized by price wars and falling demand in the wake of a persistent real estate crisis that is eroding Chinese household finances. In addition, government subsidies for the purchase of electric cars in China have been withdrawn.”
    https://omni.se/exporten-av-bilar-fran-kina-rusade-med-80-procent/a/bOQ7qq

    1. The largest regions for Chinese car exports today are:
      Asia (including the Middle East) – the largest region. ļæ¼
      Europe – especially the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Germany. ļæ¼
      Latin America – where Mexico and Brazil drive growth. ļæ¼

  15. “It is likely that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin plans to escalate the war in Ukraine in the coming months. This is according to sources close to the Kremlin who have spoken to Reuters.

    One source, who meets Putin regularly, describes a “high probability” of an escalation.

    Putin is said to have rejected a compromise proposal from a group of advisers to freeze the front line. Instead, he is said to want to take full control over the Donbas region.

    US President Donald Trump claimed on Monday that Putin wants to end the war and that a solution is “closer than many realize.”

    According to Ukrainian intelligence, Putin is preparing for escalation rather than peace. An official at Zelenskyy’s presidential office says it may involve new military operations in Ukraine or a possible attack on another European country.”
    https://omni.se/kallor-nara-putin-hog-sannolikhet-for-eskalering/a/0pWoLA

    1. “Two months – then Russia’s president Vladimir Putin will escalate the war in Ukraine if the peace talks do not continue. This says the Czech president Petr Pavel to The Telegraph.

      – Russia will have parliamentary elections in September. President Putin is unlikely to declare mobilization before then, but when the election is over the window will shrink, he says.

      Voters are becoming increasingly negative towards the ongoing war after several Ukrainian attacks. At the same time, the country is struggling with inflation, fuel shortages, and power outages as a consequence. Putin has therefore found it difficult to maintain calm among the Russian population.

      Therefore, Pavel argues, it is important that NATO continues to put pressure on the president to sit down at the negotiating table.”
      https://omni.se/presidenten-tva-manader-sedan-trappar-putin-upp-kriget/a/RjKmv5

      1. Trump is the best in the world at understanding Putin…… according to himself.

        Putin has tricked Trump into the stands, again!

        But his supporters are wearing MAGA glasses and don’t see the farce. It’s damn tragicomedy.

  16. China and Russia have held secret meetings since 2022 where their military-strategic cooperation has deepened significantly. This is revealed in a major investigation by the German Der Spiegel, French Le Monde, and the Russian independent exile newspaper The Insider.

    Leaked documents disclose, among other things, discussions about attacking Elon Musk’s satellite infrastructure Starlink, considering its importance for Ukraine, as well as extensive weapons collaborations.

    The division of responsibilities between China and Russia is clear, according to the investigation. China provides technology that Russia can use in its war of attrition against Ukraine. In exchange, China gains lessons that can be used against Taiwan.

    The cooperation is said to have long been unknown to Western intelligence services.
    https://omni.se/kina-och-ryssland-i-topphemligt-samarbete-smider-planer-mot-vast/a/M7djRr

  17. China and Russia have held secret meetings since 2022 where military-strategic cooperation has deepened significantly. This is shown by a major investigation from the German Der Spiegel, French Le Monde, and the Russian independent exile newspaper The Insider.
    Leaked documents reveal, among other things, discussions about attacking Elon Musk’s satellite infrastructure Starlink, considering its importance for Ukraine, as well as extensive weapons collaborations.
    The division of responsibilities between China and Russia is clear, according to the investigation. China contributes technology that Russia can use in its war of attrition against Ukraine. In return, China gains lessons that can be used against Taiwan.
    The cooperation is said to have long been unknown to Western intelligence services.
    https://omni.se/a/M7djRr

    1. Not good, but it’s probably quite obvious really, they had probably also discussed the appropriate timing for the invasion so that it came after the Olympics in China.

      However, I think Xi is starting to feel that it’s enough now as well, he wants a whole Russia that he can control, and he surely sees that it’s going downhill. At the same time, he can’t stop helping them because then they would collapse. However, I don’t see Xi pushing for peace negotiations, at least not officially.

  18. Danish minister pressured about Ukraine’s wind power

    That Ukraine is building so much wind power causes amazement in the industry’s powerhouse Denmark. Energy Minister Samira Nawa is now forced to explain how Ukraine can build five times as many turbines.

    In a formal question, Nawa is required to provide information on how a country in “an active war situation” has managed to build five times as much onshore wind power as Denmark in recent years, and how this affects the Danish ambition to be “a green frontrunner.”

    Nawa defends herself by stating that Ukraine is 14 times larger, and that renewable energy already accounted for “about 80 percent of the total Danish electricity supply” in 2024.

    1. šŸ˜‚šŸ˜‚šŸ˜‚

      I’ve never seen that one, it must be specially targeted at you, are you sure that’s not what you usually order?

  19. Answering here MXT, I have gotten the impression that not everyone goes back up when they click on the page again.

    I must say that we are starting to make progress and that many bulging interior walls poorly supported have now been torn down – I believe the therapeutic term for this is the stage of acceptance.

    I assume that you are not sending out baits for the sake of discussion but have struggled for two hours with a sensible answer. 

    So we agree on –

    – Russian drone capability, and now also robot-incapability from us (new to me since yesterday with the interceptors).

    – That the Baltics themselves without our help will have difficulty defending themselves.

    – That NATO (or Europe) will have difficulty retaking terrain in the Baltics.

    Since the discussion has long been about this, the therapist would probably now say that you are making progress but still recommend two visits a week for the time being, after all they want to milk as much as possible for billing.

    Now I will take the day to answer those arguments to the best of my ability. Everything has already been debated to death in my 2000 posts about the Baltics but since it is getting urgent and I have a post for tomorrow, it actually helps to think it through once more.

    I summarize what you say so it becomes a little less text and if I misinterpret it, it is completely unintentional (seriously meant).

    1 – Europe will not stand on the sidelines but take the fight, it may take 2-3 days before we move north but above all air and long-range weapons against targets (in Russia I guess?).

    2 – the threat to Europe, can Russia really threaten all of Europe with Gerans, missiles and FPV drones, the damage will be at most limited and Europe is large.

    3 – Baseline Ukraine, they have managed well for 4.5 years against Russia. Europe is also “much stronger” than Ukraine so we can be expected to do better.

    4 – The Ukraine war must end first, they do not have resources for any further conflict as long as it is ongoing.

    Your arguments above are still mainstream Europe and you support them well, let’s see if I manage to argue well enough here, we go in disorder.

    4 – In my post above there is a statement from Budanov who claims the opposite, before I contact him that someone claims he is lying I also want to point out that in several posts I have gone through that RU today has a CAA and two ACs deployable at the northern front + a whole mosaic of special forces down to their SOF. This information comes from the unit maps we trust and are thus credible sources in line with what all planners can see, we have the same information.

    As evidence cited below, that NK 11th AC is now 30,000 strong and in a waiting position behind the northern front. They will take over surveillance so RU units can be released. Either 1st CAA or 2 ACs in numbers approximately.

    https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/02/europe/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-intl-cmd

    Mainstream today – 

    “Russia has not built up its capability against the Baltic border so it does not exist and everything they have is in Ukraine”.

    Firstly, Russia has now for over 2 years reinforced bridges and rerouted roads to handle heavy traffic throughout the area east of the Baltics, Pskov and down to Smolensk at least. Russia is therefore READY with this in April 2026 and everything goes straight up to the Baltic border.

    Train stations in Pskov and Smolensk have also been rebuilt and modernized and storage and bases have been built along the border with the Baltics just as has been done up towards the border with Finland – everything is turnkey already.

    For almost two years the Baltics have warned that units have been moved around in the Pskov area and then not appeared in Ukraine. Artillery and air defense mostly I think.

    The driving time between the northern front (the city of Kursk) where these AC and CAA are today and up to the Baltic border is 12 hours by road. In summer the roads are in good condition.

    Everything is also relative, when the USA had 2-3 heavy brigades, long-range HIMARS, Patriot and highest command over the entire operation it was a threshold effect. Now it has completely disappeared, the last offensive unit the USA had in the Baltics is gone. Today no other unit from Europe has filled this gaping hole.

    Ukraine clearly shows that the drone weapon makes it possible to fight with fewer ground units than before, and Russia has the same drone weapons as Ukraine only they are outclassed by Ukraine.

    You can also fight mechanized if you have your own drone weapon, if the opponent lacks it they have to dig in infantry instead.

    3 – baseline Ukraine, they have managed and we will manage better.

    During WW2 all of Europe got badly beaten by Germany in a few months. Finland fought the Soviets and basically won. The Soviets then crushed Germany (with some help from us which they still refuse to admit).

    If we apply WW2 to today then Finland and Ukraine are equal in their will to kill Russian bastards and Europe is untested, but we were not exactly washed in glory and reputation last time it happened.

    Yes, you are absolutely right that Europe has formidable defense forces but the only thing that counts is what exists, and will exist, in the area where the fight is fought, and that one can handle this war’s new warfare. France was a mammoth defense force that collapsed over one summer in 1940. I will return to that below.

    Ukraine is an exception and they have done the impossible really but their national spirit is quite unique.

    Everyone now more or less agrees that Ukraine is one of the world’s strongest and most well-functioning defense forces – if we turn the argument around, Russia still manages reasonably against them even if the curve is falling and it is becoming an increasingly steep downhill slope.

    Russia has 4.5 years of practical combat experience and we know for sure that they have built up a strategic offensive reserve which I guess is around 150,000 strong. They have over 400,000 in the FSB, SVR, GRU, Rosgvardia, SOF and other special forces, not least Putin’s 30,000-strong bodyguard.

    This is in addition to 2 AC and 1 CAA at the northern front.

    They are holding back newly produced materiel from Ukraine, we know that, and we also know that they are re-equipping units outside Ukraine.

    If you now agree that the Baltic states will have difficulty defending themselves because they have not built themselves behind minefields and bunkers – how much of Europe’s defense do we need to send for us to perform better than the Baltics, do you have a number there, 10,000 – 100,000 – one million?

    2 – the strategic drone/missile threat against Europe. No, they absolutely cannot threaten Europe per se but they are only interested in the Baltics and there they can combat enough targets. What they can do, however, is a first strike against our high-value targets BUT that would lead to full-scale war. My guess is that the threat exists there but it is only used in absolute emergency.

    You know just like I do that the shadow fleet has Geran drones onboard and is located along all of Europe’s coasts and that RU has agents/saboteurs/operators all over Europe. Our missiles are in large central depots, the air force at a couple of bases in each country and so on. Now we are discussing a first strike here, then of course everything is spread out.

    Russia cannot bomb our capitals to rubble at all and in that way make us give up – absolutely not and very rightly thought by you šŸ‘

    They can, however, project a threat with the purpose of making us hesitate when it comes to making difficult decisions quickly by threatening it.

    1 – Europe will not stand on the sidelines but take the fight, it may take 2-3 days before we move north but above all air and long-range weapons against targets (in Russia I guess?).

    This point is of course the most important of all now that we have come to accept that the Baltics will have difficulty defending themselves on their own.

    I want to claim that within a week from when we get indications that RU is moving at the northern front, they have dug in along the northern shore of the Daugava. I also want to claim that units from Poland (Polish, German and who else) then have not managed to take up positions for bridgeheads north of the Daugava river.

    The reason for this is; distance minimizations, defense against Belarus (which will never join the war), refugee flows southwards from the Baltic states, the drone threat, blown-up road bridges and infiltrated units/”rebels” conducting fire raids. If you have done military service you know what a hell a battalion movement is with all this buzzing around you – it goes at a snail’s pace.

    You know just like I do that all bridges in Germany and Poland have already been pre-registered by RU, we have received information about this for almost two years where 2025 was high intensity. It takes time to get demolition equipment, it has to be placed and then you have to take a detour.

    Europe has a list of retaliation proposals and absolutely, air and missiles, Kaliningrad, the Baltic Sea fleet and each country can also act autonomously if they want. BUT just as Russia cannot bomb our capitals so that we surrender, we cannot do that either AND Ukraine already has sanctions so the Russians are already suffering – it doesn’t get any worse for them, that threshold has already been passed.

    Will we attack preemptively?

    Russia tries to sneak the buildup as far as possible just to avoid that, to make it difficult for us to make decisions.

    It is possible that Finland or Sweden choose this option but we in Sweden have elections in September and the Tidƶ coalition probably wants to win it if they can?

    What we of course should do is fight all road bridges inside Russia already today šŸ˜€

    Consider here that the movement from the northern front takes place before we can be reactive so the only way to stop them is if we are proactive – I of course welcome that but I think that is clear already?

    What does it mean to take the fight for us in Europe?

    Orban blocked everything in the EU as long as he could and now Putin probably still has Slovakia with Fico to gain?

    The USA has just cut the entire command up to Donahue so certainly a vacuum in coordination if one may guess – now it is also summer break.

    I tried to go through this in some posts which countries can be expected to participate and act quickly. Russia is apparently worried about Sweden and Finland above all.

    The further away you are from the conflict zone the less you care is usually a good measure?

    Underestimating politicians’ ability to torpedo themselves is dangerous – Latvia’s government recently resigned after a couple of Ukrainian drones crashed inside their border for example. 

    Bulgaria and Slovakia are pro-Russian, Norway has stood on the sidelines throughout the UA war, Denmark can’t form a government, we have elections in September, Starmer just resigned, in Germany AfD is very strong and in France Macron still worries about Le Pen.

    Meloni in Italy is tricky to understand, Portugal has never cared and in Spain they co-govern with parties Putin controls both on the left and right wings. I think all of Trump’s outbursts against Spain are to make them more docile.

    Poland has a new pro-Russian president who is commander in chief.

    Breaking it up just to make it easier. Decisions involving fighting targets in Russia with guaranteed response and sending troops to a conflict zone where many deaths are at risk are politically very sensitive.

    In 1940, a couple of governments in Europe collapsed before they were invaded by Germany in sheer horror.

    Too many countries in Europe are politically weak right now, and a decision where the outcome is unknown is always unattractive to make, preferably not at all or at least to delay it.

    We have already gone through that our plan for the Baltics was to deploy units when the threat level increased; we are past that point now. To me, it is a sign of weakness and an inability to handle the situation still. The Baltics have already asked us to honor the agreements; now they have accepted that they have to manage on their own for two weeks before help arrives.

    Being reactive only increases the stakes; instead of going into prepared defense before Russia attacks so that the decision becomes theirs to make AND much harder, the decision will be to retake the Baltics by means of crossing watercourses or amphibious combat. In terms of military operations, it does not get much harder than that; digging in the forests in eastern Baltics is easy. That is why I am of the opinion that we will refrain if we do not even manage to decide now to mine the border again.

    Can Putin be persuaded to leave the Baltics?

    I think he has already shown us that it would take a lot for him to voluntarily leave land he has stolen?

    Putin does not dare attack the Baltics?

    Why then has he built infrastructure for it? It surely is not free to build thousands of kilometers of roads, road bridges, railway tracks, train stations, and new bases?

    Why has he asked the USA to leave the Baltics if he has zero plans to do anything nasty? The only thing happening now is that sooner or later we in Europe will fill the vacuum, just not in the next six months. Wouldn’t it be better to have Trump’s units there instead of the Germans, again…

    Moreover, I think we are now at the point where it (maybe) is the least bad option of only bad options he has left – Putin is extremely cornered.

    Is Europe convinced that nothing will happen and that is why we are not doing anything?

    Why would the Dutch and Germans have a new army corps of 60,000 with the destination Baltics where all decisions are already made down to the combat leadership and just to execute when they feel like it at the officers’ mess?

    Why do Finland and the UK threaten preemptive strikes against targets in Russia if they are amassing forces?

    Why are the Baltics starting to talk in terms of managing for two weeks?

    Why did Poland say “we know what you are planning”?

    Why does Budanov say that Russia is ready to attack us?

    Why are the Baltics and Poland buying all the weapons they can get?

    We are heading towards war; the decision is on Putin’s table right now, and what he decides we do not know, but all preparations are ready.

    The point I constantly make is that if we want peace, we prepare for war, which we are not doing.

    It is absolutely part of the basis when Putin is to make his decision, and 20,000 – 30,000 riflemen dug in the forests in eastern Baltics behind broad minefields could very well be what makes him refrain.

    Not a single soldier in eastern Baltics, however, is close to asking to be invaded.

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    1. I joked a little at the beginning but have stripped all that away, tried to answer to the best of my ability and in a good tone šŸ˜€šŸ‘

      1. Saw now that I missed a bit of sarcasm in the beginning 😐

        If you get past that, the rest of the text is very good tone šŸ‘

    2. Ha, you took the bait! šŸ˜‚ 

      Jokes aside, I was serious.

      By the way, it’s completely OK to joke around when you discuss with me! 

      “-That NATO (or Europe) will have a hard time regaining ground in the Baltics.”
      Well, if we were only to send in ground troops, we would probably have big problems before we learned to handle FPV drones (both managing our own and defending against the Russian ones) and Shahed can of course cause some trouble. But we have other means, primarily air power, and if it’s a full invasion, we won’t just try to push the Russians out of the Baltics but strike where it hurts.

      Regarding NATO, if Article 5 is invoked, the individual countries can decide how they want to act without waiting for drawn-out discussions. Of course, not everyone will be at the forefront, but the cowards will probably quickly realize that they at least need to support the rear lines with deliveries, logistics, etc. 

      We have turned this over a few times, but let’s go through it once more.

      Putin doesn’t know how we will react; we have constantly crossed his red lines. The risk is enormous if he chooses to enter the Baltics, and what would he really gain from it?
      Scare us so that we abandon both the Baltics, which are NATO members, AND Ukraine so he can get an easy victory?  That’s hardly going to happen.

      We have supported (even if it could have been more) Ukraine, which isn’t even a member of either the EU or NATO, do you really think the Baltics would get even more support? Or rather, what do you think Putin thinks?

      Show the world that NATO is divided and won’t stand up? Yes, say that some countries chicken out so he can stand there and laugh at it. The whole NATO is not needed, and the only thing he gains is a political victory that neither adds nor takes away. 
       
      The risk is enormous and the gain is minimal.

      Sure, he can point out that look, we are at war with NATO and in that way succeed with a mobilization and have an excuse to squeeze the population even more. 
      At the same time, there is an equally big risk that it goes completely wrong. Ordinary Russians are not exactly thrilled about the current war; even the oligarchs have dared to say that the economy is heading down the drain.
      How would people react if Putin now wants to start another war? Very doubtful that he dares to take that risk.

      If Russia, on the other hand, were to succeed in winning against Ukraine, it would of course be a natural step.

      Regarding troop buildup and amassed materiel, there is an alternative explanation. Europe, as mentioned, has constantly crossed the red lines, and despite the US wavering, we in Europe are still determined to help Ukraine and we dare a little more all the time.

      At the same time, Russia is ramping up its hybrid warfare, and the day may come when we actually have had enough or for some other reason get drawn into the war in earnest.

      Besides Ukraine, which border must a paranoid Putin protect?
      Armor is only used on a small scale, I doubt there is really an excess of soldiers, but there are plenty of conscripts (though apparently they would start using them as firefighters now, because there was a shortage of those). 

      As I have written before, projecting threats is a good way to make us lose focus and think more about ourselves, and I actually believe that is the whole purpose of the “preparations”.

      BUT, what I can imagine is that on a small scale he tries to do like in Ukraine and Donbas, sending in civilians dressed as some kind of liberation army, completely without identification documents, causing havoc and making it hard to know how to act. When it becomes clear what is going on and they are fought, Putin then sends in some soldiers because that liberation army must be saved.

      When they are fought, he can internally in Russia use that as an argument to declare war, mobilize, and get the people to endure even worse conditions. The adventure in the Baltics would then end quite quickly, but instead, troops would be deployed on the Russian side to show that they are prepared to defend themselves, and they can then also boast that they stopped NATO.

      It would be relatively risk-free and then he also wouldn’t have started a war, he would only have tried to save Russians and suddenly he has also saved his own position a bit longer and moreover freed up more resources to continue the war in Ukraine.

      As I said, I don’t agree with you at all that the risk is imminent, but it doesn’t matter, I am fully on board that we should build up a strong defense in the Baltics in advance. It is idiotic not to do so.

      It will make Putin sweat at night and it doesn’t have to cost enormous amounts of money, so we can continue supporting Ukraine until they have won! 

      1. A correction just to your otherwise okay answer – the risk is imminent until the rains in October, after which it will gradually decrease to zero because Putin is slowly losing the war while we in Europe are increasing our efforts.

        A declining curve until sometime next summer when everything is over for Putin, or it is already over but he has to throw in the towel first.

        I can accept your argument that the reason Europe is doing nothing at all is because we consider the risk to be low. I think that, in itself, is outright criminal but a reason that can be understood.

         

  20. A proposal for an analogy:
    Johan says, we lack a fire station and rely on the neighbors’ fire stations. This despite having a lot of flammable industry in our municipality with unreliable infrastructure.
    If we don’t have the budget for a permanent fire station, we should at least temporarily base firefighters and equipment in tactical locations, at least during the fire-prone season.

    MXT and others say that it is not very likely that a fire will start. We have also analyzed the area’s arsonist and assess it unlikely that he has the time/interest or dares to take the risk of getting caught.

    …a proposal offered in all helpfulness to make the whole thing easier to understand

    1. Who is the arsonist in this analogy, is it Dengamle?

      SneakyPeate adds to the analogy – the neighbors’ fire stations have just closed and they sold their fire trucks to another country.

      But yes, the last sentence is what mainstream municipalities around the fire-prone municipality say – the local arsonist will not set anything on fire this summer even though he has done so daily since 2022.

      At the fire-prone industry, the municipality has also placed some gasoline cans and turned off the fire alarm because the arsonist will not do anything this year, they believe he probably hasn’t had matches for two years yet.

       

    2. Nice analogy! 

      But I think it falters a bit.

      I completely agree with Johan when it comes to how we should act, it’s just the risk that I see as very small.

      The best thing would be if all decision-makers believed exactly like Johan (so really I shouldn’t argue against the risk).

      More like this:
      Johan: “The whole city is full of arsonists, we must hurry to build a fire station before they burn everything down!!! If a fire breaks out, not only will our city burn down, the whole country will be destroyed!”

      Me: “Well, the only so-called arsonist is Pelle, 12 years old, who set fire to a mailbox five years ago, but you’re still right that we should get a fire station because we lack one and you never know, Pelle might relapse when he’s had too many beers even though he mostly chases girls these days.”

      1. Pelle is actually 17 years old now and a bigger threat in the analogy, we actually have about thirty murderers or murder suspects in various types of detention who are under 18 in Sweden 🧐

        Well, yes, we basically hold the same line, you were clear about that and the difference is probably the risk šŸ˜€

  21. Boring with all the OPSEC.

    At Lyman, it is lively and the 3rd AC is trying to encompass a larger combined force from RU.

    90TD has existential problems.

    At Kamyanske, UA is pressing hard.

    There are 2-3 places left.

      1. Considering how lively (some irony) the page’s Swish and my Substack subscriptions are, the compensation of 77 SEK + VAT per week is decent.

        However, I would very much like to go down there in all sorts of different roles, but you can guess if I get support for that with four children and being the family breadwinner šŸ˜€

  22. Ukraine Could Begin Producing Patriot PAC-3 Missiles Within Weeks, Polish Minister Says.
    ā€œOur country is one of four NATO members—alongside Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands—that was granted the status in Ankara allowing the transfer of technologies related to the production and maintenance of Patriot missiles,ā€ the minister said.

    https://united24media.com/world/ukraine-could-begin-producing-patriot-pac-3-missiles-within-weeks-polish-minister-says-20626

Leave a Comment

Scroll to Top