Medium or high risk, 2 of 2, 10 July 2026

This is how tired Putin was when he was live-playing commander-in-chief from inside a studio in a bunker under Moscow.

This is roughly how I interpret the situation today,

Europe is starting to gain momentum REALLY and in 2-3 years we will be what Russia would interpret as an existential threat to them. Our rhetoric (which should be even more aggressive than today) is uncomfortable for Putin now and his tentacles to prevent what we have now set out to do are in many cases hanging loose, he is starting to lose grip in important countries like us in Sweden for example.

The USA and China don’t like this either, Europe is supposed to be compliant consumers, not at war at all. Even though Trump said we should buy a lot of new weapons, he did not mean at all that we should manufacture them ourselves as we are now doing – that is the wrong path to take.

Ukraine is just a long downhill slope now for Putin where he can either tie himself to the mast and sink with the raft or try to come up with something else to wiggle out of the jam that is entirely self-inflicted.

I will bring this up in a post soon because at the fronts there is nothing but Christmas joy, OPSEC prevails but I still get direct info from Zelensky on WhatsApp, 90th TD is having trouble, in Lyman a scope is forming, at Kamyanske UA is advancing and 2-3 more places have light blue and soothing elevator music.

The USA is preparing the ground for a weak Baltics, they are pulling back all units and promising new ones, which are not there yet. Promising new ones in the “near future” is probably an attempt to lull us back to sleep.

The same with UA patriot license, we calm down but interceptors in the tubes are a year away.

My marker for conflict in the Baltics has triggered – the American heavy battalion in Estonia. This happened completely without fanfare or announcements and they left about two months before they were supposed to rotate out anyway according to Google AI. For me, this is a burglar alarm sounding without yet seeing the signs of the break-in.

Putin has several choices to make and whether he has decided yet I do not know. Poland’s outburst a while ago was “we know what plans you have, don’t try”.

Now Putin must make a couple more moves before it becomes open conflict, if it does – the Baltic fleet cannot lie at the quay for example.

We will then also see some movement of operators on the Russian side of the border which is what the Baltics will see and warn about but in terms of “few”. Sabotage is also increasing along with drone overflights.

And lastly – Ukraine will warn about units preparing to move at the northern border, but they can never be sure exactly where they will go. Probably a march order is spread for Belarus or the southern front and then the day before they get the coordinates to some staging area over by the Baltics.

So far everything is at such a low level that our politicians can say “we wait and see” when they answer the phone from the cabin in the archipelago during the summer.

Putin will until the last moment say that everyone is moving to Belarus or will “roll over Kramatorsk in a huge red wave”.

False flag – probably not needed, we are probably past that already. Maybe all the chatter about Ukrainian drones flying through the Baltics towards St Petersburg was a false flag but we didn’t understand it?

Trump’s task is evidently to pull away everything he can from the Baltics, Poland and Germany. Really only fighter jets and air defense left as far as I understand of what Putin absolutely does not want to see in the area?

The only countries still seriously buttering up Trump are the Baltics and they are losing all protection. The countries he is most upset with, for example Spain – there he lets all units remain.

He has not managed to get the Canadian-led brigade but there is some suspicion that Spain’s heavy battalion might disappear, I have checked but find nothing. Trump is at least arguing as much with Spain as with Canada right now.

Then he must try to convince Europe that a ceasefire in Ukraine is necessary so the pressure on Russia eases, even if it is only temporary for a month or two. Maybe even a timed ceasefire to start with?

His last task before he can rest is what finance in the USA is always eager for anyway – exploit the upcoming 2008-style financial crisis to hit Europe as hard as possible economically. It is really enough to just stop exporting LNG to us and we will crash.

A combo where China holds back what we need for our industrial production would otherwise make us crash if LNG alone is not enough.

This is what I believe we have ahead of us regarding Trump.

Even if Putin is starting to look over the abyss, that dog still has some bites left I am quite sure, it could be an expensive lesson to believe that Putin’s balloon has already deflated.

I think you should read this, found it the day before yesterday and it is completely in line with what I have seen so far. These analyses get about as much impact as my texts, zero and nothing 😀

https://news.inbox.lv/1507c7s-already-in-august-military-analysts-described-a-possible-scenario-for-russia-s-invasion-of-the-baltics

If we now move on to a post-Baltics scenario, Putin will swear on his honor that the Baltics were his last legal special operation and offer us all the oil and LNG we can eat at a big “peace discount”. Trump does the same from the USA, for peace in our time we avoid all trade tariffs (which he pulled out of the hat), we get “bail-outs” (after the financial crisis he created), all American units will come back immediately (which he pulled away) and the LNG/oil tap is turned on again (which he shut off). As a bonus he promises never to invade Greenland.

But if we choose war we get nothing – then tariffs increase, no one will sell LNG to us at all and especially the Germans will get no gas at all as punishment for all the gas they wasted during World War II.

China is probably involved too and dangles something attractive over us.

Somewhere around there we will get a receipt for who we have chosen for our governments. Russia is probably most worried that Sweden and Finland have already found their inner Vikings.

But we avoid all this if we bury our light infantry in eastern Baltics today, then we own the situation and everyone else must try to counter us.

Belarus shall project a threat against Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania to tie down troops. Russia will possibly use Belarus for logistics and run in-out missile systems fired from inside Russia. It seems I have to clarify this every time because far too many still believe that the conflict will flare up from Belarus and then it is not credible. That was already the case in autumn 2025 when I started writing about Operation Baltics.

Belarus has already partially mobilized and closed areas at the borders with Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania; they are trying to project a threat that is no threat.

Most recently, Russia closed all border crossings with the Baltic states indefinitely. Everyone is shouting mobilization, but there can of course be several reasons.

https://ukranews.com/en/news/1160640-russia-closed-railway-checkpoints-on-border-with-finland-estonia-and-latvia-from-today

Putin has a decision to make and it is probably not made yet, but it is not the first time in history that Europe chooses to sit quietly when neighbors are frantically preparing for war.

Zelensky made that mistake in February 2022 after strong pressure from Macron and Merz, and it almost cost him the country.

The only chance for Putin to succeed somewhat is to keep Poland out.

Germany and Poland have both promised to defend Lithuania to the last Lithuanian soldier, the mechanized brigade is half in place, and Poland is training to keep the Suwałki Gap open.

Belarus projects violence as much as they can when Lukashenko does not project friendship so that Zelensky does not overlook him, so the Germans, Poles, and Lithuanians need to have defense along the line Lublin, Bialystok, Vilnius, and possibly up to Daugavpils?

Then they need to defend the Suwałki Gap and against Kaliningrad.

Putin has no intention of setting foot south of the Daugava.

As soon as it blows up, civilians from Estonia and Latvia will drive south, making movement even more difficult.

There, Poland and Germany probably think they have done their part once they have gone on the defensive and are handling refugee flows.

Since not a shot will be fired from Belarus or Kaliningrad, it is up to Poland how they want to act, but they have a president who is commander-in-chief and likes Putin. I am not so sure they will push over Kaliningrad, but we will see.

Putin also stays away from the Gulf of Finland to avoid angering Finland, and since a few hundred thousand Russians are soon training in bases along the Finnish border, Finland feels they have also done their part.

If it blows up, the shipping lanes past Denmark will be full of sinking rusty container ships and the Russian navy will be out, so it will be up to Sweden and Denmark to take one for the team and save Latvia and Estonia from occupation. Some expeditionary force can probably always be sent over to us from the UK. We can probably forget about the USA; I think that acceptance is now beginning to set in. But it is our ships that must run the gauntlet with German and Polish help if they get out of the ports after Russian mining.

Airborne landing – is it likely? I don’t think so when the airspace is packed with the red team.

Exactly how we will get anything over to Estonia and Latvia I leave as an exercise for others, since we choose to be reactive, the Baltic Sea is full of drones, the two Russian submarines, the dozen or so decent surface ships they have, Russian air, and Russian operators on Saaremaa with both anti-ship missiles and air defense besides the drone weapon.

I thought Denmark would send a new battalion to Latvia, but it is only the rotating battalion that will relieve our Swedish battalion – I absolutely do not understand why they do not let our battalion stay in the area.

When D-Day comes, there will probably be a quick look at the digital situation map and it will be considered too high a risk for a workplace accident, and the Work Environment Act also applies to soldiers. Probably Sweden will say we take full responsibility for Gotland, and when Denmark realizes they can get away with something so cheap, they will say Bornholm will become a veritable fortress.

If we by any chance get something ashore, it will probably be in Ventspils or Liepaja, and then it is still south of the Daugava – maybe that will be how we do it.

I remember a big discussion in 2022 when Sweden promised that we would “in the future” earmark two mechanized brigades for the Baltics in case of unrest in the area, and now it is 2026 without anything having happened.

Alternative two is that now, while the window is open, light units are sent in to dig in in eastern Baltics, and if war breaks out, it breaks out. You know what I think we should do by now.

Ukraine managed with violence and sheer luck in 2022; had Belarus rolled toward Lviv from the north and Hungary from the south, it could have ended any way – apparently the signal when Kiev fell was as dumb as Putin is and both kept their fingers on the trigger because they are always the pals who betray.

Russia’s combat planes were flawless, but he chose the wrong opponent. 1,500 infiltrated Kiev, paratroopers over the presidential palace, Hostomel was to become a base, and Kiev was to be encompassed from two sides. The plan with the 76th GAAD had to turn back in the air when Hostomel fell.

FSB stole the bribes that were to be distributed except down south, and the Russians were over the Dnieper already the first day.

Macron and Scholz were fooled into calming Zelensky a few days before the attack started.

That was probably why Orban fired all 100 senior officers later in 2022 or 2023 because they messed up the eternal victory?

As the events went in 2022 when Scholz suggested Ukraine should give up so everything could return to normal, it is easy to see that Europe would have immediately accepted fate-compli.

It is hard to find anything about the NK 11th AC up in Kursk; they were 12,000 – 15,000 strong, but we have been flooded with videos since at least the turn of the year of North Korean workers in suits arriving, so my assumption has, as you know, been that they are significantly building up that corps.

Found this now; since summer 2025, Ukraine has had information that NK will increase to 30,000 – considering all the videos, it seems they have followed the plan.

https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/02/europe/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-intl-cmd

You hear nothing about the North Koreans today but a lot when they fought – it is reasonable to assume they are in standby in the rear.

There you have what is needed to free two Russian army corps from the northern front for missions in the Baltics. NK will handle defense along the northern front. Ukraine, by the way, has quite a lot of respect for them, apparently fierce bastards.

As a bonus – it is inside Russia and North Koreans, so there is some threshold effect for UA to conduct an offensive into Russia, especially if China gets theatrically very angry. Quite smart thinking actually with the North Koreans.

If the Russian balloon collapses in Ukraine and there is a revolution in Russia – great. But until then, we must reasonably take our damn responsibility?

Exactly what our sluggishness depends on is unclear and probably different in different countries, but one thing I think we can say for sure – if Russian units dig in north of the Daugava, few governments in Europe will demand the area be retaken by force other than eagerly suggesting all other countries set a good example.

I don’t see it as a guarantee either that Poland will overrun Kaliningrad in the event of a conflict; they are now trying to fend off the Russian subversive activities in the country that have taken hold of them. They have managed to get into a heated dispute with Ukraine, where they have now decided not to send their decommissioned Mig-29s, blaming wear and tear and other reasons, of course, but that’s how it is.

The Russian Baltic Fleet has probably already been written off by Putin after Ukrainian drone strikes, so whether it is sunk in the harbor or out at sea, he probably won’t lose much sleep over it.

Putin then trades these losses for the old favorite, the gauntlet in the Gulf of Finland, and as a bonus, he might manage to wiggle out of a fatal shot for the Ukraine war – he is extremely cornered, and then anything short of a fatal shot is probably attractive.

Putin also knows very well that countries in Europe can decide at any time to move troops into the Baltics; the window he has where no decisions will be made is now in July – August. When everyone is back from the archipelago vacation at the start of school in August, anything can happen at unit meetings, and there is nothing he can control at all. Then during the autumn and spring, the curve will go down after we do more and Ukraine crushes the crap out of the Russian bastards down in Ukraine. Putin’s window is the coming months.

You can be absolutely sure that there is a decision on Putin’s desk. Whether the decision has been made, who knows – Ukraine would probably have heard something?

If nothing happens, we have to hold on for a year or so and then we will know how close it was and whether our guesses were accurate or not.

What I hope for, of course, is the following – Putin chickens out and wants to wait until after the mobilization, it will be autumn rain and impassable roads, so everything is postponed to 2027, and by then the Ukrainian steamroller will have already come too far.

Maybe the midterm election and the Russian parliamentary election in September play a role?

In 2022, he was forced to wait until after the Olympics in China, and that cost him the war.

But it makes no difference to what we should do, strengthen the Baltics now today. No currently living head of state knows what decision Putin will make, and if we look at Ukraine, he has only increased the level of violence when the level of violence does not produce the desired result. That he would suddenly become Sherman-cautious, we can of course hope for, but history says no.

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75 thoughts on “Medium or high risk, 2 of 2, 10 July 2026”

  1. Russian losses in Ukraine 2026-07-10

    • 1460 KWIA
    • 1 Tank
    • 6 AFVs
    • 52 Artillery systems
    • 1 MLRS
    • 2 Air defense systems
    • 1868 UAVs
    • 8 UGVs
    • 339 Vehicles & fuel tanks

    GLORY TO UKRAINE

  2. 💥🔥✊👍 More oil sanctions!

    ** Major Russian oil refinery, oil infrastructure reportedly struck by Ukrainian drones.
    Located roughly 500 kilometers (310 miles) from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Krasnodar Krai, the refinery is among the largest in southern Russia, producing nearly 6.6 million tons of fuel annually. **

  3. ** Drone attacks on Russia last night, very preliminary information, likely there’s more:

    • A fire at Taganrog port – looks like the port terminal of Kurgannefteprodukt is burning. The company transships petroleum products and loads them onto seagoing vessels.
    • A fire at the Ilsky oil refinery in Krasnodar region of Russia. It’s one of the largest refineries in the south of Russia and can process about 6.6 million tons of oil per year.
    • Azov Optical and Mechanical plant in Rostov region of Russia. It produces optoelectronic, radar, and high-precision systems for military equipment. The local oil depot has also been attacked.

    Moscow and St Petersburg airports shut down due to drone attacks. **

    https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/2075448319610945813

    https://bsky.app/profile/antongerashchenko.bsky.social/post/3mqbfi7t2lk2l

  4. ** 🇺🇦❗️The turning point in the war is still far away: Russia seeks to create a buffer zone in the North (!) of the country and expand the offensive in the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, — Syrskyi

    • Russia has not abandoned plans to occupy the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

    • Russian army loses about 32,000 soldiers killed and wounded per month on average.

    • In 6 months, 697 targets on territory of Russia have been hit by Deep Strike means. Enemy’s economic losses are estimated at $6.1 billion.

    • 7,028 enemy targets were hit during the Middle Strike campaign. **
    https://bsky.app/profile/theukrainianreview.bsky.social/post/3mqblixemvk23

    1. Very good initiative that I was not aware of. Thanks MXS.
      However, I am a frequent user of the Push to leave app and always point out when someone in my circle of acquaintances happens to buy the wrong brand. The colleagues now avoid, at least in my presence, rape cola from Pepsi.

      1. 👍Good! I’m also trying to keep track. I actually haven’t installed the app, but maybe it’s time.

        There are so many brands that you don’t think about that are in turn owned by companies still operating in Russia. It’s important to check who’s behind them.

        It’s a bit disappointing with both Pepsi and Coca Cola; there really isn’t a good alternative.
        Now, Coca Cola probably doesn’t have such a large direct operation in the country anymore, mostly selling essences to keep making money while the Russians make their own cola. At the same time, many videos have been seen (while they were still available on YouTube) where it’s obvious there’s no shortage of real Coca Cola in the stores, so it’s probably being smuggled in in large quantities.

        1. The alternative to Pepsi and Coca-Cola is the Swedish cola with the less Swedish name Cuba Kola, which has existed since the early 1950s and is at least as good as its American cola cousins.
          Sold, among others, at Willys.

          1. Well, that’s exactly the thing that you have to chase. Now, I’m not a big Cola drinker, so it’s ICA’s those times (you almost get used to it).

  5. N Slobozhansky 16💥↗️,
    S Slobozhansky 18💥↗️,
    Kupyansk 4,
    Lyman 15💥,
    Slovyansk 30💥💥,
    Kramatorsk 6↗️,
    Kostjantynivka 33💥💥,
    Pokrovsk 18💥↘️,
    Oleksandrivskij 4,
    Huliaipole 22💥↘️,
    Orikhivsk 5↗️,
    Prydniprovskij 0,

    Localized 171↗️,
    Unlocalized 112,
    Total 283↗️,
    R. unloc/loc 0.7.

  6. Off-Topic, ICE

    ICE has now shot and killed another person.

    “The 52-year-old father of three, Lorenzo Salgado Araujo, was shot and killed by the U.S. immigration police ICE in Houston, Texas earlier this week. Araujo was undocumented and had lived in the U.S. for 35 years when he was stopped in his car on the way to work. Authorities now confirm that Araujo was not the intended target of the operation, according to the New York Times. ICE agents were looking for two migrants from Guatemala and mistakenly believed that one of them was traveling in a white van that Araujo was driving. The situation escalated quickly and an agent shot Araujo in the stomach. He later died in hospital. According to the immigration police, the shots were preceded by Araujo attempting to ram an ICE vehicle. The fatal shooting has stirred strong emotions in Texas and other parts of the U.S. At a press conference on Wednesday, Araujo’s family demanded an independent investigation. They believe that Araujo likely did not understand that it was ICE who stopped him because the vehicles were unmarked.”

    https://omni.se/a/JO7pR6

      1. Could just as well be any robbers or Proud Boys or some like-minded individuals. But it is probably precisely those who have been hired by ICE.

  7. Johan, we shouldn’t hide the fact that this is not just an attack on the Baltics? It is, in fact — Biden said every mm — an attack on NATO, and FORMALLY on the USA. Add to this: Europe’s unequivocal and massive support for Ukraine — a NON-NATO country. We are talking in the first point about a significant threshold. In the second point about a reality, where Europe’s support for Ukraine has been a decisive contribution to why things are going so badly for Putin, and this without sending a single soldier. Not a single one of Europe’s currently multi-million-strong forces. Which, unlike the Ukrainian army, has enormous air support.

    If it comes to that anyway.

    The combat forces in Europe may be scattered and not in the Baltic region. Perhaps for a reason? They do not want to give Putin a first-strike advantage with the possibility to take out the forces with indirect attacks from air, GPS glide bombs, drones, ballistic missiles, etc. Compare with your own reasoning about the absent Iranian first strike against the US Navy in the Persian Gulf before the Iran attack.

  8. They have thus lost 35%!

    Sure, they have struck almost all major refineries at least once and often several times, so many might expect that it would have had a greater impact. Unfortunately, much can be repaired in a relatively short time.
    If these figures are correct, I at least (who am sometimes a pessimist) think it is beyond expectations. Moreover, Ukraine will continue to improve the numbers. It does not say when the calculations were made.

    “Ukraine’s intensified attacks on Russian oil refineries have hit the country’s fuel production hard. According to two Russian industry sources and Reuters’ own calculations, production now covers only about 65 percent of summer demand.

    According to the sources, production is 40,000-45,000 tons per day below the level required to meet demand during the high season.

    To mitigate the shortage, Russia earlier this week imposed an export ban on diesel in hopes of stabilizing the situation.

    Fuel rationing has also been introduced in about 90 percent of the country’s regions. The crisis has also led to long queues at gas stations across the country.

    In Moscow, the fuel shortage is reported to have increased traffic congestion by 15 to 20 percent. Last week, drivers in the capital with 13 million inhabitants sometimes had to wait up to two hours to refuel.”
    https://omni.se/uppgifter-bara-65-procent-av-branslebehovet-tacks/a/wrx92G
    https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-gasoline-output-covers-65-demand-after-ukrainian-strikes-sources-say-2026-07-10/

    “Russia banned diesel exports this week to stabilize the fuel crisis in the country, AFP reports. According to the news agency, over 90 percent of the country’s regions were affected by fuel shortages or have introduced fuel rationing in June.

    Several key oil refineries have paused their production in recent days after being hit by Ukrainian drone attacks. In some regions, restrictions have been imposed on how much fuel individual customers can buy; in others, filling reserve cans has been prohibited to prevent hoarding.

    President Vladimir Putin recently admitted that there is a fuel shortage in the country but simultaneously claims that the situation is not ‘critical.’ Kyiv is trying to ‘create a nervous atmosphere in society,’ he further says.

    – We are all aware that it is an impossible mission.”
    https://omni.se/branslebrist-i-90-procent-av-rysslands-regioner/a/7pBB3w

    1. Already when the first attacks came against Russian oil (what is it now, two years ago?) I know I wrote that it could actually become decisive in the war, as it also hits their economy hard. 

      Starting to feel like we are really on the right track now!

  9. Wonderful if this is true and they really succeed!

    You see that they are writing about Irkutsk. I mentioned Angarsk the other day, the last large oil refinery that I doubted Ukraine would manage to reach. Angarsk is located just northwest of Irkutsk.
    If they reach that city, they also reach Angarsk!

    “A Russian military analyst claims Flamingo production is growing fast, with Ukraine holding 90 units by early July vs 64 in June. European engineers are working to extend range from 2,500-3,000 km to 4,000-4,500 km, enough to reach Krasnoyarsk or Irkutsk, the analyst claims.”
    https://bsky.app/profile/wartranslated.bsky.social/post/3mqbst36ytc2m

    Here you see both locations:

    1. They are coming 👏👏👏
      Wonderful that the Russian bastards across the entire great empire get a chance to learn the meaning of FAFO and can choose to believe what they hear on TV versus what they can see with their own eyes.

      1. Yes, you have a good point there. It’s hard to miss the huge clouds of smoke, and then it becomes just as hard to believe them on TV when they say that everything is as it should be.

  10. Europe wants every available missile to go directly to the Ukraine front, not to the US’s Iran campaign, whose connection to Ukraine is only indirect via Iran’s arms deliveries to Russia. Then there was a reaction to how the US struck Iran — unilaterally — rather than to what the attack actually achieved. (Yes, and the fact that it leaked to Russia when Ukraine attacked Kursk is something no one considers — with Iranian agents high up in European security services — yes, then we are supposed to complain about formal invitations). Europe also remains stuck in its old Iran diplomacy around the nuclear deal, despite Tehran having de facto become a co-belligerent against Ukraine by arming Russia.

     

    1. If arms deliveries to Russia are considered an acceptable reason to start a war, I look forward to the USA starting a war against China.

      Good for Ukraine and good for Europe!

      1. When it comes to arms deliveries, who started the war? And don’t sanctions apply to China?

        R2P states that the protection of civilians against war crimes is a shared responsibility. Russia’s warfare against Ukrainian civilians is precisely such crimes. Anything that concretely reduces Russia’s ability to carry them out — including striking the supply chain — serves that responsibility. The fact that the UN’s formal R2P machinery is blocked by a Russian veto does not negate the principle; it only forces its realization outside the UN framework. Which is exactly what is happening.

        If a Western-led reinforcement of Taiwan is genuinely defensive, then it is legitimate regardless of whether China chooses to respond with violence — and if China does respond, the responsibility lies entirely with China. The aggressor owns their choice. One cannot “provoke” someone into a war of aggression; the war of aggression is always the attacker’s decision.

        Taiwan’s defense capability is not a threat to China in any meaningful sense. Defensive weapons — air defense, anti-ship missiles, mines, those things that make an invasion more costly — do not threaten China’s security. They only threaten China’s ability to conquer Taiwan. And depriving someone of the ability to attack is not threatening them; it is deterring them. If China responds to purely defensive reinforcement with military aggression, it reveals that the driving force was never security but rather the ambition to conquer. The provocation then lies not in the action but in the observer’s intent.

        It is the same point that makes “Russia felt threatened by NATO’s expansion” a weak excuse — defensive structures reveal the attacker by denying him, not threatening him.

        Strengthening Taiwan’s defense so that Taiwan can deter and survive is straightforward: if China reacts with violence, it is entirely China’s fault, and if it allows itself to be “provoked” by purely defensive reinforcement, it reveals malignant ambitions rather than security needs. China then owns the war one hundred percent. And if it comes to that, a likely consequence is the same as with the attack on Iran: the country’s ability to supply Russia with war materiel would be put out of action. For Iran, it was weapons; for China, it would be the dual-use — electronics, components — that decisively keep Russian drone and missile production going. That is not the purpose, but it is a predictable side effect: an aggressor drawn into its own conflict finds it harder to simultaneously feed someone else’s.

  11. Good! Otherwise, I have almost considered it more likely with tactical nuclear weapons than to enter the Baltics if Putin becomes really desperate.

    Now only the Baltics remain among the truly desperate measures.

    “China has for the first time strongly condemned Russian threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, says Volodymyr Zelensky according to Kyiv Post. The Ukrainian president says that several European leaders have spoken with Chinese representatives recently, and that China has unequivocally marked against the Russian threats. – It seems to me that this is the first time Beijing responds so clearly and forcefully, says Zelensky. Recently, several prominent Russians have raised the issue of nuclear escalation, including former president and deputy chairman of the security council Dmitry Medvedev, one of the most hawkish politicians in Russia.”

    https://omni.se/a/pBKVLW

  12. It is just a special naval operation waiting for the sea conditions to calm down. Everything is according to plan. Nothing to worry about.

    “Russia has temporarily stopped commercial shipping on the route connecting the Don River with the Sea of Azov, according to two sources within the grain industry to Reuters. This follows Ukraine attacking 13 Russian vessels, including ten tankers, in the Sea of Azov on Friday. According to experts, the halt could affect nearly a quarter of Russia’s grain exports through the Sea of Azov.”

    https://omni.se/a/ExvKzl

  13. MXT,

    What does it tell us that China has come out and commented on Russia and tactical nuclear weapons?

    What other options does he have left now?

    1. Hang himself in the bunker after having gulped down one last can of strong caviar which he washed down with some Russian pink champagne while sobbing he asks his grandmother for forgiveness?

      After realizing that the Baltics are not an option either?

    2. Good that China is putting its foot down.

      They want Russia to stay together but be moderately weak, and preferably with Putin still in power. What or who comes after Putin is hard to predict; after a war defeat, chaos will follow.

      An escalation with nuclear weapons would most likely (hopefully) lead to a strong retaliation from the West, and subsequently the death of Putin and the disintegration of Russia.

      I also don’t think Xi is entirely happy with Russia possibly entering the Baltics, as that would involve Europe more actively in the war.

      However, I now believe that Xi still thinks a Europe at war is bad for business, but it could also be that, like Putin, he has cut himself off from reality and no longer thinks about the country’s best interests but only about empire-building and power.

      Xi wants to keep Putin alive and Russia intact, so they can have Russia as a cheap oil and gas supplier.

    1. 🇵🇱🇺🇦Poland and Ukraine have officially shattered their brief diplomatic deadlock, aggressively reactivating top-level defense negotiations to seal a monumental tactical swap: Warsaw’s remaining MiG-29 fighter jets in exchange for Kyiv’s coveted, combat-proven drone and electronic warfare technology.

      Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz confirmed that after a tense standoff where Poland threatened to mothball and scrap the planes due to a technology-sharing dispute, Ukraine returned to the negotiating table with a lucrative, formalized proposal. Under this revived framework, Kyiv will share its unparalleled, frontline-tested UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) architecture, modern anti-drone algorithms, and electronic warfare breakthroughs. In immediate return, Warsaw will transfer its fully modernized MiG-29 fleet directly to the Ukrainian Air Force. (Beefeater)

    2. 🇵🇱🇺🇦Polish Defense Minister rages over criticism of aid to Ukraine. He defended the Polish government’s decision to provide Ukraine with Patriot missiles. He reminded Nawrocki’s team that military aid to Ukraine is in Poland’s national interests. “I prefer that our Patriots shoot down Russian missiles over Kyiv, not Warsaw. Those who criticize Polish support for Ukraine have lost their minds. It drives me crazy.” (Nstrike)
  14. Ankara, July 2026. The man Europeans feared would abandon Ukraine — beside the president he did not abandon.

    Trump’s blunt press did what ten years of polite diplomacy could not: forced Europe to arm itself, Europeanized support for Ukraine, left NATO stronger than he found it.

    You don’t have to like the style to acknowledge the result.

    1. Let’s hope that the final result lands in what you described in your post “205”.
      Unfortunately, we are not there yet and much can happen along the way. Promises can be broken and alliances betrayed.

    2. I am significantly more pessimistic about Trump, maybe I am completely wrong and there are no plans at all.

      We will probably know before New Year’s actually, given how this is unfolding.

    3. Sure, the result can be good if they follow through. But Trump could have done so much more from the beginning if he had just been on the right side.

      The reason Trump is now starting to pressure Russia and help Ukraine is that he sees Ukraine is about to win; his personality type is such that he goes after the one he considers weaker to more easily come out as the winner. Which side is right or wrong, or is the attacker or victim, is not something he places much importance on.

      Another partial reason is his relationship with the leader. I believe he is beginning to realize that Putin lives in a fictional world, and that Zelensky is actually a strong leader and speaks the truth. Zelensky, as the actor he is, has also learned to speak to Trump in a way that makes him listen, which is important.

  15. That the Social Democrats, the Green Party, the Left Party, and the Centre Party shut down nuclear power just a few years before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 is almost on par with Sweden disarming before the two World Wars.
    Now almost everyone realizes that whoever controls the energy also gains political influence (and advantage). Hallonsaft

    1. The two reactors at Barsebäck were also the newest and thus the most modern, as well as the single most important power sources in what would become the electricity area SE4.

      Persson chose to shut these down to buy political support from the Centre Party and to silence the then since the late 1970s eternal whining from Denmark, stemming from the domestic political discourse in this southern neighboring country.

      If Persson had really wanted to close the “smørrebrød gap” with his Danish colleagues, he would have informed them that it was their own representatives who in the 1960s persuaded their Swedish colleagues to abandon Åhus and Karlshamn as the most likely and suitable locations for these two reactors.
      The Danes’ argument was that such an efficient and reliable power source should be located closer to Denmark and Copenhagen. The cheap, inexhaustible electricity was irresistible, but about 10 years later they did not want to be reminded that they themselves had pushed for the placement within sight of Zealand.

    2. Well, we have just about managed, but Germany is really in a bad position.

      If Russia/USA use the gas as a weapon this winter, it will be dark in Frankfurt 😀

  16. I think you’re counting your victory a bit prematurely, a couple of comments above MXT 😀

    Unless the army mutinies followed closely by a revolution, he still has control over Moscow and St Petersburg for now.

    If the republics start declaring independence, Ukraine’s fronts collapse completely, or the city attacks northwards in a violent blitz offensive, he will have a hard time countering it, but the corridors of power are still secured for now with, in order, a warm cup of tea, brightly colored underwear, and open windows.

    If China felt compelled to make a statement saying that Russia must not use nuclear weapons, then that option is something Putin has been toying with, right? 😀

    Now Ukraine has already said they are considering it, so we know it has been on the table – tactical nuclear weapons.

    Now take off that bright red beanie from Gävle Bowling Club and put on Putin’s crown, he is not ready to give up yet and everything short of nuclear weapons is obviously on the table – now we know that for sure.

    I would have liked to see China ask him to end the war or not to go after Europe as well – that would have been more responsible than that noodle-diddling.

    When it comes to “ending the war,” the elite are really only afraid of one thing, an unregulated power struggle in the Kremlin or a revolution. Then it’s like running around in the mirror maze at Gröna Lund – anything can happen.

    Right now they’re probably looking for an out and then to rotate in the next guy as president they believe in. In the worst case, they might have to sacrifice Putin, but then they expose themselves to underwear-pulling and window-jumping for a few years, and they can’t even drink tea then.

    The joker is probably if someone manages to get the army on their side and they just turn on their heel and head for Moscow – maybe that’s why the North Koreans are at the northern front and not down in Ukraine?

     

     

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